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l)REGULATION, GOVERNANCE AND ADAPTATION
GOVERNANCE TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE DUTCH AND FRENCH LIBERALIZING
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRIES
What new forms of governance emerge in the liberalizing electricity industries? What
is the influence of regulation on the governance transformations? In 1996 and 2003, the
European Council and Parliament issued two directives on the creation of one European
competitive electricity market. These directives prescribe the unbundling of the electricity
networks from the integrated energy firms, and the option for consumers to choose their
own electricity retailer. The European governments have implemented these directives
into their national regulations. This thesis analyses which new governance structures
emerged in the Dutch and French electricity industries as a result of these regulations for
four types of electricity transactions: the network connection, network access, balancing
and switching transactions. The parties in these electricity industries did not adopt a
market, but hybrid forms of governance that remained extensively regulated. The
efficiency of these new governance structures cannot be explained with the attributes of
the transactions, as is proposed by transaction cost economics. This thesis therefore
introduces the concept of adaptation into transaction cost economics. Adaptation is the
adjustment by economic actors from one governance structure to another, and is
characterized by three attributes: the identity of the future contracting party, the laterality
of the adaption, and the type of response in the adaptation process. These attributes
explain the governance transformations and the new governance structures in the two
industries. Regulation continues to play a pervasive role in the liberalized electricity
industries. It influences the attributes of the transactions, the new governance structures
and the adaptation process. 
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1 - Introduction 
 
 
For decades, the European governments have focused their economic policies on the processes 
of liberalizing and privatizing their formerly state-run industries. The industries that have been 
subject to the introduction of competition include telecommunications, railways, postal 
services, electricity and gas. For a long time, these industries have been excluded from the 
workings of the market, as they were state-owned, run by a governmental department or 
extensively regulated, and endowed with regional or national monopolies. The reasons for the 
substantial government involvement in these industries included the provision of goods and 
services that are in the public interest, and the presence of infrastructures that have natural 
monopoly characteristics. These industries, as telecommunications, electricity and gas, are 
referred to as network industries, because they are characterized by the presence of capital-
intensive networks. These networks are natural monopolies: there is only one network in each 
industry, for the simple reason that supplying the service with more than one network increases 
costs. In the past, this natural monopoly characteristic of the networks has led to the state 
ownership and state operation of the industries. The networks have often been vertically 
integrated with the production and the supply of the goods and services as electricity, gas and 
telecommunications (e.g. Newbery, 1999: 134).  
The current policies of the European governments are directed at the privatization of the 
network industries, their restructuring and opening to competition, and at their re-regulation. 
The European governments claimed that these policies would bring an increased level of 
efficiency to the industries, a higher quality of services, and a decrease in consumer prices. The 
introduction of competition into these industries is complicated by the presence of the natural 
monopolistic networks and the vertically integrated structures of the firms that provide the 
electricity, gas, telecom, or rail services. In order to introduce competition, the networks are 
being separated from the potentially competitive segments, i.e. the production and supply of 
these services. The restructuring of the industries thus entails a vertical unbundling of the 
14
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integrated firms. It also includes ending the regional and national monopolies and thus opening 
the industries to new entrants. The incumbents and new entrants have to compete for the 
supply of the services to the customers, who are given a choice of switching between suppliers. 
Joskow described these changes as ‘one of the most dramatic government mandated 
transformations in the last century of vertically integrated industrial hierarchies’ (Joskow, 
1996: 342).  
The process of liberalization is often associated with a deregulation of industries. The 
liberalization of the network industries has, however, been accompanied by a substantial 
increase in rules (Minogue, 2002: 653). In the liberalized industries, the networks remain 
natural monopolies and the tariffs and conditions for accessing and connecting to the networks 
are regulated in order to avoid an abuse of the monopoly by the network firms. The re-
regulation does not only include new rules for the monopolistic networks, but also new 
regulations on the vertical unbundling of the industries and on allowing the consumers a choice 
of supplier. The new regulatory framework gives the regulator a duty to promote competition 
and encourage new entry, in contrast to traditional regulatory frameworks that sought to 
replace competition (Littlechild, 2003: 63). An explanation for the increase in rules is the 
‘Europeanisation of policymaking’ (Majone, 1997). Many of the rules at the national levels are 
implementations of European directives. The European directives for the different network 
industries are aimed at introducing competition and at creating one European competitive 
market for the services provided over the networks. These directives oblige the vertical 
unbundling of the industries, the independence of the network operators, and the opening of the 
industries to new entrants. They also prescribe that consumers be given a choice of supplier. 
The European rules thus influence the governance structures at the level of the firm in the 
liberalized network industries: they oblige a change from vertically integrated hierarchies to 
new forms of governance.  
This focus on rule-making is changing the role of the national governments. National 
governments are retreating from the management and operation of the firms, and are instead 
focusing on regulating the network industries. As others have observed, the European 
15
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governments are changing from interventionist states to regulatory states (e.g. Majone, 1996). 
One of the most obvious structural consequences of the shift to a regulatory state is the rise of a 
new type of regulator; the independent, sector-specific regulatory agency (Majone, 1997). The 
independent regulatory agency is taking over, and is reformulating some of the formerly state 
duties. In addition, in the process from monopolistic to potentially competitive industries, the 
competition authority is assuming its role as a regulator of the network industries. As a result 
of the liberalization of the network industries, both the institutional structures of regulation and 
the institutions of governance at the level of the firm are changing.  
 
Several strands within the literature on liberalizing network industries have addressed these 
various themes of privatization, re-regulation, and restructuring. Firstly, research on 
privatization of network industries has focused on the issue of whether privatization increases 
the efficiency of firms in these industries. Several studies on privatization have reported 
contradictory results. In a review of these studies, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) conclude that 
there are no substantial differences in efficiency between publicly and privately owned firms. 
Others, such as Pollitt (1995), find some evidence for a greater efficiency of private firms in 
the electricity industry. Overall these studies conclude that other factors than privatization 
contribute more to the efficiency of network industries, including the degree of competition 
and the quality of regulation. In a more recent review on the effects of privatization, Ricketts 
(2002: 478-482) finds that private firms are better at generating sales, and increasing 
profitability, productivity and efficiency.  
Secondly, different theories can be distinguished within the economics of regulation. The 
public interest theory views regulation as a means to achieve some public interest objective, 
also in circumstances where the market fails, as in the case of a natural monopoly (e.g. Landis, 
1938). Critics of this perspective argue that there is often no agreement on what is in the public 
interest, and that regulators cannot be trusted on taking only public interests into account 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 20). The special interest theorists argue that regulators distribute 
rents among various interest groups, as firms, consumers, and environmental groups, that 
16
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pursue their self-interests and compete for the regulatory rents. When there is one dominant 
interest group, usually the regulated firms, the regulator is often captured by these firms, which 
are pursuing their self-interests and which are, for instance, bargaining for entry restrictions in 
the industry (Stigler, 1971; Laffont and Tirole, 1991). A large part of the discussion on 
regulation focuses on the methods for determining tariffs (Littlechild, 1988). Some alternatives 
are price-cap regulation, rate-of-return regulation or yardstick regulation. These first two types 
of regulation set a maximum for respectively the tariffs that can be charged to consumers and 
the rate-of-return that can be earned by the regulated firms. In yardstick regulation, the tariffs 
that can be charged to consumers depend on the performance and the costs of other comparable 
firms in the network industries.  
The new institutional economics also addresses the topic of regulation (e.g. Williamson, 1976). 
Within this theoretical framework, regulation is mainly viewed as a governance structure that 
can solve the contracting problem between utility firms, who have an incentive to set 
monopolistic prices, and their customers. The regulator takes on an agency role for the 
customers, and engages thereto in a collective contract with the utility firm (Goldberg, 1976). 
In this collective contract, the conditions and tariffs are set out under which the regulated firm 
can supply its service to consumers, and under which it can recover its reasonable costs of 
providing the service (Joskow, 1991: 68; Williamson, 1986: 121). More recently, several 
studies are focusing on regulatory governance structures that govern the regulatory contract 
between the regulators and the regulated firms, as compared to the regulated contracts between 
utility firms and consumers (e.g. Stern and Holder, 1999). The regulators may have an 
incentive to hold up the utility firms, which have sunk large investments in network or 
production capacity, by demanding very low prices for their utility services. The regulatory 
governance structures are the mechanisms that societies use to constrain regulatory discretion 
(Levy and Spiller, 1994). These studies also focus on the political, legal and administrative 
institutions that influence the regulatory governance structures, and on these institutions’ 
ability to restrain regulatory discretion (Parker, 1999ab; Holburn and Spiller, 2002).  
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Recent literature on regulation refers to the importance of studying the relations between the 
various public authorities, as the ministries, independent regulatory agencies and competition 
authorities, and the allocations of power and responsibilities among these authorities (Glachant 
and Finon, 2000; Ogus, 2002). Knowledge of these regulatory institutions is important for 
understanding their influence on the regulatory outcomes (Estache and Martimort, 1999; Ruhil 
and Teske, 2003). There has, however, been very little research on these institutional structures 
of regulation, or in other words on the internal organization of the regulatory state (Böllhoff, 
2001: 3). 
Thirdly, the restructuring of network industries entails the vertical separation of the integrated 
firms to enable the introduction of competition into the services provided over the networks 
(Newbery, 1999: 3). The European directives and the national regulations have prohibited the 
vertically integrated firms in the European industries, and therefore new structures need to 
emerge for the governance of transactions in these industries to replace the vertical integration. 
The restructuring of network industries thus raises questions on the efficiency of governance 
structures and on the changes in forms of governance in these industries. Transaction cost 
economics (TCE) analyses the comparative efficiency of governance structures. Several studies 
within this theoretical framework of TCE have shown that the regulated vertically integrated 
firms are the most efficient institutional solution in these industries when considering the 
attributes of the transactions, as asset-specificity and uncertainty, and the presence of natural 
monopolies (Williamson, 1996a; Joskow, 1996; Glachant, 2002). It has also been argued that 
market forms of governance will not emerge in the unbundled network industries to replace the 
vertical integration (Crocker, 1996). Most of the TCE studies on forms of governance in 
unbundled industries focus on network industries in the United States. They reported the 
emergence of long-term contracts in the unbundled industries, because of the presence of 
bilateral dependencies and asset-specific investments (e.g. Joskow, 1987). In the liberalized 
network industries, the producers have lost their stable customer base of their regional or 
national monopolies, and therefore they experience an increase in uncertainty associated with 
investing in production capacity. These increased levels of uncertainty in liberalized industries 
18
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can even explain ‘the general desire to reintegrate vertically in these sectors’ (Helm and 
Jenkinson, 1998: 11). Very few empirical studies have focused on the type of governance 
structures that are emerging in European unbundled industries (Yvrande-Billon and Ménard, 
2005), in which the processes of liberalization are more recent and which have been driven by 
the regulatory framework of the European directives. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
transaction cost economics is a static perspective that works out of an equilibrium contracting 
setup (Langlois, 1992). A complementary perspective is needed to analyse the changes in 
governance structures from vertically integrated firms to unbundled and liberalized forms of 
governance.  
 
This thesis focuses on these changes from vertically integrated firms to new forms of 
governance in European unbundled industries that are caused by the European directives and 
national regulations. The aim is to understand what new forms of governance emerge, how and 
why forms of governance adapt from one structure to another, and what the regulatory 
influence is on the transformations of the governance structures (i.e. the governance 
transformations). To answer these questions, a theoretical contribution to transaction cost 
economics is made that allows for an analysis of the adaptation process between governance 
structures. The network industry that is chosen to study these governance transformations is the 
electricity industry. The Dutch and French electricity industries are compared. This thesis thus 
focuses on the two topics of restructuring and re-regulation that have been introduced in this 
first chapter. It does not take the issue of privatization of network industries into account, 
because the European directives do not require a privatization of the electricity firms or an 
ownership separation of the networks. 
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1.1 Theory: transaction cost economics  
The theoretical framework that is used in this thesis is that of transaction cost economics. The 
focus is on the transaction cost economics of Oliver Williamson. Within this transaction cost 
economics, the emphasis lies on explaining the comparative efficiency of governance 
structures, which is determined by the type of transactions that the structures coordinate. The 
core argument of TCE revolves around the hypothesis that transactions – that differ in their 
attributes - are aligned with governance structures – that differ in their cost and competence - in 
a transaction cost economizing way (Williamson, 1996a). The attributes of transactions may 
create several contracting problems between the parties to the transactions. For example, very 
specific transactions may lead to the contractual problem of bilateral dependency between the 
contracting parties, and therefore to high transaction costs. To solve this contractual problem 
and to minimize the transaction costs, ex post contractual safeguards are set up in the form of 
governance structures. The three generic forms of governance are the market, the hybrid and 
the hierarchy. For highly specific transactions, the hierarchy is considered to be a more 
efficient form of governance. For standard transactions, the market reduces transaction costs. 
Transaction cost economics analyses this efficient alignment of ex post governance structures 
with the attributes of transactions. TCE thus focuses on defining the attributes of transactions 
and those of governance structures, and on formulating refutable hypotheses on how 
transactions are efficiently aligned with governance structures.  
Transaction cost economics also refers to the institutions at a higher level (the institutional 
environment) that influence the governance structures at the level of the firm. Williamson 
locates property rights, contract law and reputation in this institutional environment 
(Williamson, 1991). Improvements in this environment may increase the use of a particular 
form of governance. Within TCE, the focus has, however, been on the efficient alignment of 
governance structures to transactions, as opposed to the environmental influence on 
governance.   
Several elements of transaction cost economics are adopted in this thesis, including the 
definitions of a governance structure and a transaction, the characterization of the different 
20
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types of governance structures, and the attributes of transactions. In addition, this thesis 
recognizes that transaction costs exist in exchange relations between economic actors, and 
assumes that these economic actors aim for a minimization of transaction costs. It agrees with 
how governance structures are efficiently aligned with transactions, and adopts the analysis of 
higher-level institutions that influence the forms of governance. 
The main reason for choosing transaction cost economics in this thesis is that this theoretical 
perspective analyses both governance structures and transactions. The focus is on governance 
structures in this thesis, because the main drivers of the liberalization of the European 
electricity industries are the EC electricity directives, and these directives prescribe changes in 
the governance structures. In addition, these directives, that include rules on unbundling, leave 
several electricity transactions (network connection, network access, and balancing 
transactions), that are crucial to the functioning of the electric system, without a safeguard (see 
figure 4.4). In the liberalized industry, consumers and generators still need a connection and an 
access to the electricity network, and electricity supply and demand still need to be balanced. 
Therefore, the focus is also on the transactions in this thesis. 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical contribution: complementing transaction cost economics  
On various points, however, this thesis also diverges from the transaction cost economics of 
Oliver Williamson. It aims for several complements to this theory of TCE to enable an 
understanding of the current changes in liberalizing electricity industries, and in particular the 
regulatory influence on changes in governance structures. As was set out in this introduction, 
the new European and national regulations prohibit the vertically integrated structures of the 
electricity firms, and encourage instead the adoption of market forms of governance; in other 
words, they force a process of governance change on the European electricity firms. For 
transaction cost economics, the analysis of this process of governance transformations and 
regulation poses several problems. Firstly, transaction cost economics is limited in its ability to 
explain governance transformations, and thus the processes of change from one form of 
21
Introduction 
 
11
governance to another. It is largely a comparative static perspective (e.g. Langlois, 1992). TCE 
does refer to adaptation as the ‘central problem of economic organization’ (Williamson, 1999a: 
1101), but adaptation is not analyzed as a mechanism that can explain changes between 
different forms of governance. Within TCE, adaptation is defined as a static feature of 
governance structures; the market is characterized by autonomous adaptation, and the hierarchy 
by cooperative adaptation. Secondly, transaction cost economics ignores the fact that 
regulation sets the rules of the game and thereby influences the governance structures at the 
level of the firm, as can be observed in the case of the European liberalizing electricity 
industries. Transaction cost economics analyses regulation solely as a governance structure that 
is positioned at the same level as markets, hybrids and hierarchies (Williamson, 1999b). It does 
not embed regulation in the institutional environment. This complicates both an understanding 
of the regulatory influence on the comparative efficiency of governance structures, and on the 
governance changes at the level of the firm. Thirdly, the contracting problem on which 
transaction cost economics focuses is less relevant in liberalized electricity industries. TCE 
focuses on the contracting problem between consumers and utility firms, for which regulation 
is considered to be an efficient governance solution (Williamson, 1976). In the liberalizing 
electricity industries, the electricity firms have lost their monopolies for the supply of 
electricity, and are therefore not able to hold up the consumers with monopolistic prices. The 
relevant contracting problems in liberalizing electricity industries are the ones between the 
unbundled segments of the formerly integrated electricity firms. These are considered to be the 
most relevant, because the European and national regulations have required the vertical 
unbundling, and because new forms of governance need to be set up to replace the vertical 
integration and to safeguard the contractual hazards between the unbundled activities.  
This thesis presents a different, but complementary to TCE, perspective on regulation and 
governance transformations that enables an understanding of the regulatory influence on 
changes in governance structures. Transaction cost economics is able to explain the 
comparative efficiency of governance structures with the attributes of transactions. When 
regulations prohibit the efficiently aligned governance structure, transaction cost economics 
22
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only points to the adoption of a governance structure that is a second-best solution. TCE is not 
able to explain the transformation from the efficient governance structure to the second-best 
solution, or what this second-best solution will be. The complementary perspective extends the 
transaction cost economics framework to include a process of adaptation that enables an 
explanation of governance transformations and consequently of the type of new governance 
structures (and thus also the second-best solutions) that emerge. It locates regulation in the 
institutional environment. Regulation influences the structures that govern the contracting 
problems between the unbundled segments of the electricity value chain. This complementary 
perspective is different from the current transaction cost economics’ treatment of concepts as 
regulation, relevant contracting problems and governance change, but it can still be 
incorporated within the larger TCE framework. These complementary elements are 
theoretically consistent with transaction cost economics, so that they can be introduced into the 
current framework of transaction cost economics. The assumptions on bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and the minimization of costs by the economic actors (whether these are 
transaction costs, or the costs of adapting to new forms of governance) are the same. The 
heuristic device is similar: the attributes of adaptation have an efficient alignment with 
governance transformations, as do the attributes of the transaction with the governance 
structures. In this transaction cost economics, that is extended with the analysis of governance 
transformations, a first step is always to study the efficiency of the governance structure with 
the attributes of the transactions, and when there is a misalignment (possibly due to new 
regulations), the process of adaptation is analysed to understand the transformation to a new 
governance structure. 
 
 
1.3 Research questions and conceptual framework 
Figure 1.1 presents the conceptual framework of this thesis. It shows the intermediate steps that 
have to be taken before the general research question can be answered. The general research 
question is formulated as follows:  
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What is the influence of regulation on the transformations between governance structures in 
the liberalizing Dutch and French electricity industries? 
 
Figure 1.1 Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
In the conceptual framework, regulation is opted to have a direct effect on the governance 
structures that existed before the liberalization of the industries; regulation prohibits the 
vertical integration, and thereby creates a need for the emergence of new forms of governance. 
Regulation refers here to the national laws and rules that implement the European directives on 
the creation of one European electricity market. The new governance structures need to 
coordinate the transactions between the various unbundled segments in the electricity value 
chain, and to safeguard against the contractual hazards that arise between the transacting 
parties. Several research questions are formulated for this first step in the conceptual 
framework.   
1.a. What is the effect of regulation on the governance structures that existed before the 
liberalization of the electricity industry?  
1.b. Between which segments of the electricity value chain and for what types of transactions 
does the need for new forms of governance arise as a result of the regulations?  
1.c. What contracting problems – that are in need of new forms of governance - emerge as a 
result of the regulations on unbundling and consumer choice?  
Transactions 
Alignment Adaptation Governance 
structures 
New 
governance 
structures 
 
Regulation 
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The new European and national regulations may also influence the attributes of the transactions 
in the electricity industry. This thesis defines the attributes of the relevant transactions in the 
industry, where relevant refers to those transactions of which the governance is affected by the 
new rules on unbundling and consumer choice. These transactions include the network 
connection, network access, balancing and switching transactions. This thesis also discusses, 
with the transaction cost economics framework, what the governance consequences are of the 
attributes of the transactions.  
2.a. What are the attributes of the relevant transactions in the electricity industry?  
2.b. What is the effect of regulation on the attributes of these electricity transactions?   
2.c. How do these attributes limit and/or enable the emergence of particular governance 
structures? 
 
Based on the findings of the regulatory effects on the governance structures of before the 
liberalization and on the transactions, this thesis analyses the resulting degree of misalignment 
(or alignment) between the emerging governance structures and the attributes of the 
transactions. The conclusions on the presence of a (mis)alignment are based on the TCE 
framework that matches particular attributes of transactions with particular forms of 
governance in a transaction cost economizing manner. Transaction cost economics has argued, 
and has empirically shown, that vertical integration in the electricity industry is an efficient 
form of governance when considering the attributes of the electricity transactions (e.g. Joskow, 
1996). The assumption is therefore made in this thesis that the governance structures of before 
the liberalization were efficiently aligned with the attributes of the transactions. Taking into 
account the regulations on the vertical unbundling of the integrated firms, a misalignment 
between the emerging forms of governance and the transactions is likely to occur.   
3.a. How does transaction cost economics explain the efficiency of various forms of 
governance?  
3.b. For which transactions do the regulatory effects on governance and transactions create a 
misalignment between governance structures and transactions?  
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A misalignment between governance and transactions stimulates a process of adaptation 
towards new forms of governance since economic actors aim for an efficient alignment to 
reduce transaction costs. This thesis takes this process of adaptation into account as a variable 
that explains what new forms of governance will emerge. It also explains the transformation 
from one governance structure to another. Three attributes of adaptation (identity of the future 
contracting party, laterality of the adaptation, and type of adaptation response) will be defined 
that determine the direction of change into either the market or the hybrid form of governance.  
4.a. What new forms of governance are adopted in the liberalized electricity industries for 
each of the four types of electricity transactions?  
4.b. How do the attributes of adaptation explain the transformations from one governance 
structure to another, and thus the emergence of the new governance structures?  
 
Regulation is analysed in this thesis as the ex ante rules of the game that influence the 
governance structures and the transactions, but two other effects of regulation will also be 
taken into account. In the conceptual framework in figure 1.1, the line from regulation to 
adaptation indicates that regulation may also have an influence on the process of adaptation. 
And the bottom line in the figure (from regulation to new governance structures) indicates that 
regulation can also become part of the new governance structures.  
5.a. How does regulation influence the process of adaptation?  
5.b. When does regulation become part of the new governance structures? 
 
 
1.4 Case studies: the Dutch and French electricity industries 
To answer these research questions, a multiple case study is done on the governance 
transformations in the Dutch and French electricity industries. The case study is preferred as a 
research strategy in this thesis, because it allows for an investigation of ‘a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real-life context’ (Yin, 2003: 13). In this case study, the contemporary 
phenomenon refers to the governance transformations in the liberalizing electricity industries. 
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The real-life context includes the electricity laws and regulations that stimulate governance 
changes, and the governance structures that characterized the industries before the 
liberalization.  
This multiple case study predicts similar results across the two cases on how the adaptation 
process to new forms of governance works. The governance transformations in the Dutch and 
French electricity industries have been chosen as the two cases, because of their contrasting 
real-life contexts1. Although the Dutch and French governments transpose the same European 
electricity directives, the Dutch and French electricity legislation and regulations differ. The 
Dutch government has formulated electricity laws and regulations that stipulate more stringent 
requirements on the independence of the networks than are included in the European 
directives, while the French government has been very conservative in transposing the 
European directives into French law. Before the liberalization, the Dutch electricity industry 
internalized the generation and transmission of electricity, but had separate distribution 
companies with regional monopolies. The French electricity industry has been characterized by 
a vertically integrated firm (EDF) that internalized the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity and that had a national monopoly in these three activities. These two 
contrasting real-life contexts have been chosen to enhance the generalizability of the case 
results to the proposed theory on the adaptation process. Yin (2003) states that if ‘under varied 
circumstances you can still arrive at common conclusions from both cases, they will have 
immeasurably expanded the external generalizability of your findings’ (Yin, 2003: 53). The 
results of case studies are not generalized to a larger population, but to theory (analytic 
generalization) (Yin, 2003: 32-33). Possible differences between the new governance 
structures in the two industries can be explained by referring to the differences in the contexts.  
In each of the two electricity industries, the four types of electricity transactions (network 
                                                 
1
 Other countries have not been chosen for several reasons. For example, the United Kingdom has not 
implemented the European directives of 1996 and 2003, but has liberalized its electricity industry before 
these directives were issued. A choice for the United Kingdom would complicate the analysis in this 
thesis, because the directives are the drivers of governance change. After the implementation of the 1996 
directive, Germany relied solely on an ex post regulation by the competition authority. This would also 
have complicated the analysis, because regulation is here seen as the ex ante rules of the game.  
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connection, network access, balancing and switching transactions) are studied. For each of 
these electricity transactions, the case will show what new governance structure has emerged, 
how this new form of governance can be explained (with the attributes of adaptation, and with 
the attributes of the transaction only when there is also an efficient alignment in the new 
situation), and what the governance transformation has been. These four types of transactions 
are the subunits of each case. The type of case study can therefore be described as an 
embedded multiple case study, in which several subunits – the different transactions – are 
embedded in each of the two case studies (Yin, 2003: 39).  
The time period for which the changes are studied in both industries range from the 
implementation of the first EC electricity directive of 1996 into the national laws and 
regulations until the end of 2008. Several data sources are used in the case studies, including 
literature, documents, and interviews. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter two discusses the theoretical framework of transaction cost economics. It starts with 
some definitions of the main elements of TCE, including the transaction, transaction costs, and 
governance structures (section 2.1 and 2.2). The core argument of TCE revolves around the 
discriminating alignment hypothesis in which transactions are matched to governance 
structures in a transaction cost economizing way (section 2.3). The paradigm case of 
transaction cost economics is that of vertical integration. This form of governance is efficiently 
aligned to transactions with a large degree of asset-specificity and uncertainty (section 2.4). 
Transaction cost economics is a theoretical framework that allows for a comparative analysis 
of the efficiency of governance structures, but its approach to adaptation, and specifically to 
changing forms of governance, is limited (section 2.5). One way in which the comparative 
efficiency of governance structures is explained is through the influence of the institutional 
environment on the governance structures (section 2.6). TCE locates property rights, reputation 
and contract laws in the institutional environment to the neglect of regulation. Regulation is 
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analyzed as a governance structure (section 2.7). 
Chapter three presents the particularities of the electricity industry. It introduces the various 
segments of the electricity value chain, including the generation, transmission, distribution and 
retail of electricity. The European electricity industries have for decades been characterized by 
a vertical integration of these segments (section 3.1). From a transaction cost economics 
perspective, the vertical integration in this industry is considered to be an efficient institutional 
solution, when looking at the attributes of the electricity transactions, the presence of 
externalities and the strong interrelationships between the different segments of the electricity 
value chain (section 3.2). The transmission and distribution of electricity are natural 
monopolies. TCE argues for the efficiency of regulation as a form of governance for natural 
monopolies (section 3.3). The European electricity directives of 1996 and 2003 require the 
vertical unbundling of the transmission and distribution system operators, and the possibility 
for consumers to choose their electricity retailer (section 3.4). The few empirical studies within 
TCE on unbundled industries conclude that the most common form of governance that 
emerges is the long-term contract, and not the market form of governance as envisaged by the 
European directives (section 3.5).  
Chapter four presents the conceptual framework of this thesis in detail. It discusses a 
perspective that allows for an analysis of changing governance structures and that is 
complementary to transaction cost economics. Within this framework, regulation is located in 
the institutional environment (sections 4.1 and 4.2) and has an influence on governance 
structures and transactions at the level of the firm (sections 4.3 and 4.4). This regulatory 
influence can create a misalignment between governance structures and transactions (section 
4.5) that stimulates a process of adaptation towards altered forms of governance. The 
adaptation process enables an explanation of governance transformations in the direction of 
either a market or a hybrid form (section 4.6).  
Chapter five discusses the operationalization of the various concepts (section 5.1), the research 
design of the embedded multiple case study (section 5.2), and the data collection methods that 
are used in this thesis (section 5.3).  
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Chapters six and seven present the two cases of the Dutch and French electricity industries, 
respectively. These studies discuss the real-life contexts: the governance structures of before 
the liberalization, the regulations and regulatory institutions in each of the two industries 
(sections 6.1-6.3; 7.1-7.3). These two chapters analyse what new forms of governance have 
emerged in each of the respective industries for the network connection, network access, 
balancing, and switching transactions; how these forms of governance have changed with 
respect to the governance structures of before the liberalization; and what the influence of 
regulation has been on these governance transformations. These studies will indicate when the 
attributes of adaptation are able to explain the transformations to the new governance 
structures, and when there is an efficient alignment in the new situation and the attributes of the 
transactions are able to explain the new governance structures (sections 6.4-6.8; 7.4-7.7).  
Chapter eight makes a comparison between the results of the two cases. It presents the 
observations on how the findings of the two cases and the comparisons match the conceptual 
framework. It concludes on how the multiple case study has contributed to an understanding of 
governance transformations and regulatory influences on changes in governance structures. 
This chapter also presents the policy recommendations, and draws the conclusions for the 
entire thesis. 
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2 - Transaction Cost Economics 
  
 
The theory of transaction cost economics has its origins in the article that is written by Ronald 
Coase in 1937 on ‘The nature of the firm’. In this article, Coase addressed the question: if 
markets are so efficient, why do firms exist? The answer was found by recognizing that there 
are costs involved in running the economic system (i.e. transaction costs), and that economic 
actors aim to minimize these positive transaction costs. The firm and the market are alternative 
structures for coordinating transactions, and they coexist in the economy for transaction cost 
economizing reasons. This analysis of Coase in 1937, and the continuing development of 
transaction cost economics (e.g. Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996a), differ from the neoclassical 
economics’ view on the firm (Williamson, 1985: 15-19). Neoclassical economics traditionally 
views the firm as a production function that exists in a zero transaction cost world. In this 
neoclassical world, efficiency is based on comparisons to the hypothetical ideal of the market. 
In transaction cost economics, the efficiency of the market is determined by comparisons to 
feasible governance alternatives. For some transactions, it is more efficient - meaning it 
economizes on transaction costs – to use the market. For other transactions, it is more efficient 
to internalize the transactions into the firm. 
From the late 1930s to the beginning of the 1970s, ‘The nature of the firm’ (Coase, 1937) was 
largely neglected. In a lecture in 1970, Coase referred to his 1937 article as ‘much cited and 
little used’ (Coase, 1988: 62). After this period, among others Oliver Williamson began the 
operationalization of Coase’s ‘big idea’ (Varian, 2002) by focusing on naming and explicating 
the attributes of transactions and the various forms of transaction costs (e.g. Williamson, 1975, 
1985). A focus on transactions also made sense at the time to overcome the reputation of a 
‘well-deserved bad name’ (Fischer, 1977: 322) of transaction costs; the use of the concept was 
too elastic in that almost anything could be explained by resorting to transaction costs. One of 
the attributes of transactions, on which most of the transaction cost analysis and its empirical 
work has been built, was characterized as the asset-specificity of transactions. Asset-specificity 
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refers to ‘the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative 
users without sacrifice of productive value’ (Williamson, 1996a: 59). 
By the time of the publication of Williamson’s ‘Markets and hierarchies’ (1975), the contours 
of transaction cost economics were clear: the comparative efficiency of governance structures, 
as the market and the hierarchy, needs to be determined by the attributes of the transactions. 
Transaction cost economics started with the analysis of the make-or-buy decision (the decision 
on whether to make a transaction within the firm or to buy it in the market) as it was first 
addressed by Coase in his 1937 article. The early empirical studies focused on this paradigm 
case, which is also referred to as the vertical integration decision (e.g. Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian, 1978). One of the main explanations that was found for vertical integration is the 
transaction attribute of asset-specificity.   
From the late 1970s onwards, Williamson extended the transaction cost analysis beyond the 
market and hierarchy dichotomy to include the hybrid form and characterized the features of 
governance structures (Williamson, 1979; 1991)2. The hybrid form is a governance structure 
that is situated in between the market and the hierarchy in TCE’s comparative institutional 
analysis. The contracting parties to a hybrid form retain their autonomy, but they are dependent 
upon each other due to asset-specific investments into the contractual relation. Several 
attributes of governance structures have been defined, including incentive intensity, 
administrative control and contract law regimes (Williamson, 1991). The market exhibits a 
high incentive intensity, a low administrative control and a use of courts, while the hierarchy is 
characterized by a low incentive intensity, a large administrative apparatus, and the use of fiat. 
The hybrid form displays intermediate values on these attributes. This focus of transaction cost 
economics on the ex post governance of incomplete contracts distinguishes it from the ex ante, 
incentive alignment agency perspectives (Grossman and Hart, 1976). The ex post governance 
of incomplete contracts with market, hybrid or hierarchical forms serves efficiency purposes 
and provides safeguards for contractual hazards. An example of a contractual hazard is 
                                                 
2
 In 1979, Williamson does not yet use the term hybrid form of governance, but refers to bilateral and 
trilateral governance as the structures that are situated in between the market and internal organization.   
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bilateral dependency, which is the result of investments in specific assets by the parties to the 
contractual relation. This contractual hazard consists of the potentially opportunistic behaviour 
by one of the contracting parties that can hold up the other contracting party due to the asset-
specific investments. The governance of these asset-specific transactions with a hybrid form 
that consists of a commitment to a long-term relation or with an integration of these 
transactions into the firm, guards against the hold-up problem and thereby solves the 
contractual hazard and reduces transaction costs. 
Transaction cost economics is often described as a private ordering approach (Williamson, 
1996a). Private ordering refers to efforts of the immediate parties to the transactions to craft 
governance structures that are better attuned to their exchange needs. These private parties do 
not rely on a regulator or legislator to construct governance structures for them. This central 
role for private ordering in transaction cost economics also entails, according to Williamson, 
that ‘court ordering is better regarded as a background factor’ (Williamson, 1996a: 57). 
Williamson has often criticized the legal centralism tradition for overemphasizing the role of 
the law (Williamson, 1996a). Public ordering has, however, a larger role in transaction cost 
economics than is admitted by Williamson. Firstly, public forms of governance have been 
added as structures to the comparative institutional analysis (Williamson, 1999b). Secondly, 
the law of contracts, which Williamson locates in the institutional environment, is analysed as 
having an influence on the comparative efficiency of governance structures (Williamson, 
1991). And thirdly, Williamson often refers to the public policy ramifications of transaction 
cost economics (e.g. Williamson, 1996a: 27).  
This chapter discusses the various components of TCE, as introduced above, and with an 
emphasis on the transaction cost economics of Oliver Williamson. It focuses first on the 
attributes of transactions and transaction costs (section 2.1), the characteristics of governance 
structures, the different types of governance and their corresponding attributes (section 2.2), 
and the alignment of the attributes of transactions with governance structures (section 2.3), 
followed by a discussion in section 2.4 on the paradigm case of vertical integration. Section 2.5 
presents the analysis of dynamics within transaction cost economics, and sections 2.6 and 2.7 
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expand on the role of the institutional environment and regulation in transaction cost 
economics. 
 
 
2.1 Transactions 
Transaction cost economics concurs with John R. Commons, who stated that ‘the ultimate unit 
of activity must contain in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality and order. This unit 
is a transaction.’ (Commons, 1932: 4). The transaction is the basic unit of analysis in 
transaction cost economics.  A transaction occurs ‘when a good or service is transferred across 
a technologically separable interface. One stage of activity terminates and another one begins’ 
(Williamson, 1985: 1). Three main attributes of the transaction have been identified, including 
the uncertainty to which the transaction is subject, the frequency with which the transaction 
recurs, and the asset-specificity of the transaction.  
 
2.1.1 Transaction attributes  
Uncertainty refers to the unanticipated disturbances that affect transactions. Disturbances have 
different origins; transaction cost economics focuses on uncertainty that is attributable to 
opportunism. This type of uncertainty, referred to as behavioral uncertainty, arises as a result of 
‘strategic nondisclosure, disguise or distortion of information’ (Williamson, 1985: 56) by the 
contracting parties.   
Frequency plays a relatively minor role in characterizing transactions in Williamson’s 
transaction cost economics (Rindfleish and Heide, 1997). Three frequency classes are 
identified for transactions: one-time, occasional and recurrent (Williamson, 1985: 72). 
Frequency has been argued to be relevant with respect to reputation effects and governance 
costs. When the frequency of transactions increases from one-time to recurrent, the reputation 
of contracting parties on previous transactions starts to matter. And when transactions are of a 
recurring kind, they allow for an easier recovery of costs for specialized governance structures 
(Williamson, 1985: 60).  
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Asset-specificity plays a central role in transaction cost economics; it is the source of many 
refutable hypotheses, and the focus of the majority of the empirical work (Macher and 
Richman, 2006: 5; David and Han, 2004: 52). Asset-specificity refers to ‘the degree to which 
an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of 
productive value’ (Williamson, 1996a: 59). It ranges from generic, non-specialized assets to 
highly idiosyncratic assets. Generic, non-specialized assets can be easily transferred to other 
transactions and alternative uses without great costs. Investments into idiosyncratic assets are 
made specifically to enable a particular transaction. These assets, which are specific to a 
transaction, are put to alternative uses only at a great loss of economic value. Asset-specificity 
can be traced to investments that are made immediately upon signing a contract, ‘but asset-
specificity also evolves during contract implementation’ (Williamson, 2005b: 7). In ‘The 
economic institutions of capitalism’ (1985), Williamson identifies four types of asset-
specificity: (1) site-specificity, in which successive plants are located in close proximity to one 
another so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses; (2) physical asset-
specificity, where inputs are specialized to the production of a particular component or a 
product; (3) human asset-specificity that arises in a learning-by-doing fashion; and (4) 
dedicated assets, which represent a discrete investment in generalized (as contrasted with 
special purpose) production capacity that would not be made but for the prospect of selling a 
significant amount of product to a specific customer. In ‘The mechanisms of governance’ 
(Williamson, 1996a), (5) brand name capital (an investment in reputation (Williamson, 1988: 
359)) and (6) temporal specificity have been added (Williamson, 1996a: 60, 106) to the types 
of asset-specificity that are mentioned in ‘The economic institutions of capitalism’. Temporal 
specificity is ‘a type of site-specificity in which timely responsiveness by on-site human assets 
is vital’ (Williamson, 1996a: 106). 
 
2.1.2 Transaction costs 
There are costs involved in transacting, in transferring goods and services from one stage of 
activity to another. Transaction costs are often described as ‘the costs of running the economic 
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system’ (Arrow, 1969: 48). They include the costs of bargaining, drafting, negotiating and 
safeguarding an agreement. These are referred to as ex ante transaction costs; they are incurred 
before the intended transaction takes place. In addition, transaction costs include costs of 
planning and monitoring task completion. And finally, there are ex post transaction costs, such 
as costs for enforcing and policing an agreement, and misalignment costs. Transactions can 
become maladapted to the structures that govern them, because of the unanticipated 
disturbances to which transactions are subject. This misalignment3 creates various ex post 
transaction costs, including (1) the maladaptation costs; (2) the haggling costs incurred if 
bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments; (3) the setup and running costs 
associated with the governance structures to which disputes are referred; and (4) the bonding 
costs of effecting secure commitments (Williamson, 1985: 21).  
The empirical research in transaction cost economics almost never measures transaction costs 
directly4, because these costs are often difficult to quantify (Williamson, 1985: 22). Buckley 
and Chapman (1997) claim that these costs are often outside the domain of quantification 
altogether (Buckley and Chapman, 1997: 137). Williamson offered a solution to these 
difficulties by referring to the comparative nature of transaction cost economics: the magnitude 
of transaction costs does not need to be measured in an absolute sense, but can be assessed by 
comparing costs under different modes of governance (Williamson, 1985: 22; Williamson, 
1996a: 5). However, when comparing transaction costs under different modes of governance, 
these costs still need to be quantified in order to allow for a comparison. One central 
assumption of transaction cost economics reduces the need for empirical research to focus on 
the measurement of transaction costs: TCE assumes that economic actors minimize transaction 
costs, and that they aim for such a minimization through the efficient alignment of transactions 
                                                 
3
 The misalignment of transactions and governance structures is discussed in detail in section 2.3. 
4
 There are some exceptions; for example, Wallis and North (1986) calculated that the amount of 
transaction costs in the United States had grown from 25 per cent of GNP in 1870 to 45 per cent of GNP 
in 1970. Transaction costs were measured by ‘adding all the resources used in the transaction industries 
(wholesale and retail trade; and finance, insurance and real estate) and the wages paid to employees in 
transaction-related occupations (e.g. managers, supervisors, clerical workers) in all other industries’ 
(Wallis and North, 1988). 
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with governance structures. TCE formulates hypotheses on this efficient matching of 
transactions with governance structures, and most empirical studies within TCE are therefore 
focused on testing these hypotheses.   
 
 
2.2 Governance structures 
Transaction cost economics assumes the presence of two behavioural attributes in economic 
actors: bounded rationality and opportunism. These two behavioural attributes of economic 
actors lead to the necessity of governing transactions.   
 
2.2.1 Bounded rationality and opportunism 
Bounded rationality refers to ‘human behavior (that) is intendedly rational but only limitedly 
so’ (Simon, 1957: xxiv). It is a condition of limited capacity to receive, store, retrieve and 
process information (Williamson, 1996a: 377). The limited cognitive competence of economic 
agents makes complete contracting impossible. A consequence of the assumption of bounded 
rationality is therefore that all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete. Transaction cost 
economics is said to work out of a semi-strong form analysis of bounded rationality. This type 
of analysis ‘joins bounded rationality with farsighted contracting’ (Williamson, 1996a: 8). The 
intentionality of human agents that Simon referred to in his definition of bounded rationality is 
translated to farsightedness in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1996a: 9). Farsighted 
economic agents have ‘the capacities both to learn and to look ahead, perceive hazards, and 
factor these back into the contractual relation, thereafter to devise responsive institutions’ 
(Williamson, 1996a: 9).  
Opportunism is a form of self-interest seeking that is combined with dishonest behaviour in 
transaction cost economics. It refers to the ‘incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, 
especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse’ 
(Williamson, 1985: 47). It is responsible for real or contrived information asymmetries, and for 
uncertainty in the contractual relation.  Transaction cost economics does not require that every 
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economic actor is opportunistic all of the time, but that some economic actors display 
opportunistic behaviour some of the time. Since it is especially costly to ascertain ex ante the 
level of trustworthiness of a contracting party, opportunism is assumed, and safeguards against 
the hazards of opportunism are set up.  
These two assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism result in the transaction cost 
economics’ focus on the governance of incomplete contracts. The limited cognitive 
competence of human agents leads to incomplete contracting, and farsightedness leads these 
human agents to set up governance structures that guard against the hazards of opportunism 
and economize on bounded rationality.  
 
2.2.2 Governance defined 
Governance structures are the organizational constructions that coordinate the transactions 
between the parties to incomplete contracts5. They enable the implementation and enforcement 
of these contracts, and the settlement of disputes between the contracting parties. They also 
determine how decisions are made on matters that are not specified in the incomplete contracts, 
and thereby they allow for an adaptation to unanticipated disturbances. Where incomplete, 
complex contracts have been defined as the frameworks around which real working relations 
vary (Llewellyn, 1931), governance structures define and constrain how the real working 
relations function. In doing so, they promote the continuity of ongoing contractual relations. 
                                                 
5
 Incomplete contracts are not considered to be governance structures. A clear distinction exists within 
TCE between incomplete contracts and governance. TCE focuses on the analysis of ex post governance 
structures, which are necessary to safeguard against the contractual hazards that are created by incomplete 
contracts and specific investments. The presence of the behavioral assumption of farsightedness within 
TCE leads economic actors to set up governance structures. In addition to the incomplete contracts, 
Williamson also refers to contracts that are simple and discrete. He states that this is ‘the ideal transaction 
in both law and economics: sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance’ (Williamson, 
2000: 603). He refers to this as an ‘ideal market’ (Williamson, 1998a: 38) or as an ‘unassisted market’ 
(Williamson, 2000: 602). Unassisted refers to a lack of governance, and therefore these contracts are also 
not considered to be governance structures. Once contractual hazards appear in his contracting schema, 
governance is needed to solve these hazards. The ideal markets are rare in real economic life, and markets 
come in various forms. In addition to this ideal, unassisted market, Williamson also refers to a market as a 
governance structure that he compares with the hybrid and hierarchical forms. The market is here 
therefore defined as a structure that governs an incomplete contract.     
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In terms of the ‘Commons-triple’, governance is described as ‘the means by which order is 
accomplished in a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities 
to realize mutual gains’ (e.g. Williamson, 1996a; 2005b: 3). Conflicts between contracting 
parties can arise due to the hazards in the contractual relation. A well-known example of a 
contractual hazard is bilateral dependency that is the result of the transaction-attribute of asset-
specificity: when contracting parties invest in transaction-specific assets, they become 
dependent upon each other. Given the behavioural assumption of opportunism, this 
transaction-attribute of asset-specificity creates the hazard of being held up by one of the 
contracting parties. Governance structures mitigate this contractual hazard. An often-used 
definition of a governance structure is therefore ‘the institutional framework within which the 
integrity of a transaction, or related set of transactions, is decided’ (Williamson, 1996a: 11).  
 
2.2.3 Attributes and generic forms of governance 
The three generic forms of governance are the market, the hybrid and the hierarchy. Many 
varieties of governance structures can be observed among these three generic forms, such as 
joint ventures, strategic alliances, producer cooperatives, networks, regulation, functionally 
organized firms (U-form), multi-divisional firms (M-form) and public bureaus. The various 
forms of governance can be characterized along three attributes: incentive intensity, 
administrative control and contract law regime (Williamson, 1991). Firstly, incentive intensity 
is the degree to which changes in efforts expended by an economic actor have an immediate 
effect on his compensation or stream of revenues (Williamson, 1996a: 99; 1985: 132). Markets 
are characterized by high-powered incentives; since contracting parties to a market governance 
structure receive immediate, individual streams of revenue for their efforts, they have a strong 
incentive to reduce costs and adapt efficiently (Williamson, 1996a: 103). The incentive 
intensity in hierarchies is low. Employees get paid a monthly salary that is not immediately 
dependent upon their individual efforts. Hierarchies benefit from these low-powered 
incentives, because they promote cooperation among employees towards a larger goal or a 
greater task.  
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Secondly, administrative control refers to the various mechanisms that support the functioning 
of governance structures, such as dispute settlement machinery, monitoring and information 
disclosure mechanisms, auditing and accounting, career rewards and penalties (e.g. 
Williamson, 2000: 606). This administrative apparatus creates costs that are referred to as 
governance or bureaucratic costs, and that increase when moving from the market to the hybrid 
and to the hierarchical form of governance.  
And finally, three types of contract law regime can be distinguished: classical contract law, 
neoclassical contract law, and forbearance law (Williamson, 1991)6. These three types of 
contract law support the market, the hybrid and the hierarchy respectively. Ménard identified 
several factors that explain the variability among contracts, including the degree of 
completeness, the duration and the enforcement procedures of contracts (Ménard, 2000: 237). 
These factors can be applied to Williamson’s classification of the three contractual regimes.  
The classical contract law regime refers to contracts that describe in great detail the terms and 
conditions under which exchange between contracting parties takes place. Although all 
contracts are unavoidably incomplete due to the bounded rationality of economic actors, 
classical contracts are the most complete contracts. The details of these contracts are largely 
focused on prices and pricing formulas. The transactions between the parties to the classical 
contracts are standardized, and therefore the contracting parties are not dependent upon each 
other and their identities are irrelevant (Williamson, 1996a: 95). The classical contracts are 
very short term. Once the contracts have ended, they are automatically renewed, or the 
economic actors can easily find a new contracting party for supplying the same good or 
service. The enforcement procedures are largely restricted to what is specified in the contract; 
the legal terms supersede informal agreements. When disputes arise, contracts are ended. Third 
parties do not get involved in solving the conflicts. Only the courts are reserved as a forum for 
ultimate appeal (Williamson, 1994: 325).   
Neoclassical contract law is supportive of contracts with a greater degree of flexibility and a 
                                                 
6
 This distinction between the various forms of contract law is based on MacNeil (1978). It bears no 
relation to the distinction between classical and neoclassical economics.  
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longer duration. These contracts are used when the continuity of the contracting relation is 
valued, which is the case when the contracting parties have invested in specific assets to the 
contractual relation. Asset-specific investments create a dependency relation between the 
contracting parties to the neoclassical contract, but these parties do maintain their autonomy. 
Neoclassical contracts allow for adaptations to unexpected disturbances. These adaptations do 
not only include price adjustments as in classical contracts, but also come from special 
adaptive mechanisms, such as information disclosure requirements. Third-party involvement in 
these contracts is common, for example to observe performance, regulate the contracting 
relation, or to settle disputes through arbitration.  
The implicit contract law of the hierarchy is described as forbearance (e.g. Williamson, 1996a). 
These contracts are even more elastic and long-term than the contracts under neoclassical 
contract law. Their capabilities for adapting to disturbances are even greater, because consent 
between autonomous contracting parties under a neoclassical contract takes longer to 
accomplish than a hierarchical decision. Hierarchies are their own court of ultimate appeal; 
disputes between divisions are resolved internally or resorted to the hierarchy for a solution. 
The underlying rationale for forbearance law is twofold: ‘parties to an internal dispute have 
deep knowledge - both about the circumstances surrounding a dispute as well as the efficiency 
properties of alternative solutions – that can be communicated to the court only at great cost, 
and permitting internal disputes to be appealed to the court would undermine the efficacy and 
integrity of hierarchy.’ (Williamson, 1996c: 33). 
  
Table 2.1 Supporting match of governance attributes to governance forms 
 Incentive intensity Administrative control Contract law regime 
Markets High Low Classical 
Hybrids Intermediate Intermediate Neoclassical  
Hierarchies Low High  Forbearance 
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Table 2.1 summarizes the attributes of the generic forms of governance. Markets are 
characterized by high incentive intensity, little administrative apparatus, and dispute settlement 
in courts; and hierarchies feature low incentive intensity, a large degree of administrative 
control, and internal dispute settlement. The hybrid form displays intermediate degrees of 
incentive intensity and administrative apparatus, and is supported by neoclassical contract law. 
These attributes of the various forms of governance bear a supporting relation to one another. 
For example, the large administrative apparatus and internal dispute settlement of the hierarchy 
are internally consistent with a low incentive intensity. In chapter six of ‘The economic 
institutions of capitalism’, Williamson describes how the introduction of high-powered 
incentives into firms leads to several problems. He observes, for example, that assets (e.g. 
equipment) will not be utilized with due care. Managers aiming to maximize immediate net 
receipts save on labor costs by utilizing equipment intensively and deferring maintenance 
expenses to a successor manager (Williamson, 1985: 138).  
 
 
2.3 Discriminating alignment 
The core argument of transaction cost economics is the discriminating alignment hypothesis. 
This is the string that draws the foregoing elements – the attributes of transactions and 
governance - together. It is the main assertion in transaction cost economics from which it 
draws its predictive content7. The discriminating alignment hypothesis claims that 
‘transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which 
differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating - mainly a transaction cost-
economizing – result’ (Williamson, 1996a: 12).  
Transaction cost economics always starts from the market, after which the hybrid form and the 
hierarchy can be tried to which additional bureaucratic costs accrue. The efficiency of the 
market and the other governance structures are not determined by comparisons to some 
                                                 
7
 The majority of the empirical research in transaction cost economics is based on the discriminating 
alignment hypothesis (Macher and Richman, 2006: 5).   
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Unified 
governance Bilateral governance 
hypothetical ideal of the market. Instead, transaction cost economics bases its comparisons of 
the efficiency (i.e. transaction cost economizing) of alternative governance structures on the 
remediableness criterion, which ‘holds that an extant mode of organization for which no 
superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is 
presumed to be efficient’ (Williamson, 2000: 601). Although TCE starts from the market, there 
is an efficiency place for each form of governance in the comparative institutional analysis of 
transaction cost economics that is dependent upon the attributes of the transactions. Figure 2.1 
illustrates how governance structures are aligned with attributes of transactions in an efficient 
manner. 
 
Figure 2.1 Discriminating alignment of transaction attributes to governance forms  
(adapted from Williamson, 1985: 79) 
 
Asset-specificity: 
Non-specific Mixed Idiosyncratic 
Uncertainty: 
 Intermediate High  
Occasional  Frequency: 
Recurrent  
Market 
governance 
 
 
 
The market is best suited for governing standardized, non-specific transactions of a recurring 
and occasional kind. For recurring transactions market parties can consult their own experience 
with other contracting parties. For occasional transactions this is more difficult, but can be 
overcome by an easy access to, for example, rating agencies that compare prices of numerous 
market parties. The use of the hybrid form (bilateral and trilateral governance in figure 2.1) or 
Trilateral governance 
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the hierarchy (unified governance) for standardized transactions will result in larger 
bureaucratic costs without any benefit from such specialized governance structures.  
The use of the hybrid form of governance has an economizing effect when the transactions are 
characterized by an intermediate or high degree of uncertainty and mixed or idiosyncratic 
assets. Asset-specific transactions create the contractual hazard of bilateral dependency 
between the contracting parties to the transactions. Ending such a contractual relation that has 
invested in asset-specific transactions leads to a loss of economic value. The hybrid form is 
therefore an efficient governance solution, because it promotes the continuity of the contractual 
relation and thereby guards against the hazard of opportunistic behaviour by the contracting 
parties. A distinction is made in the figure between trilateral governance, in which the 
autonomous contracting parties are assisted by a third party, and bilateral governance, in which 
the contracting parties set up a governance structure that is specialized to their transactions. 
Only for recurrent transactions can the setup costs of a specialized, bilateral governance 
structure be recovered. 
The hierarchical form of governance is most efficient when the transactions to be governed are 
characterized by idiosyncratic assets and high uncertainty. The hierarchy can, through the use 
of fiat, make fast decisions when there is a great degree of uncertainty.  
When governance structures are aligned with transactions in the manner as just described, there 
are no inefficiencies. For several reasons, however, governance structures can become 
maladapted to the transactions8. Firstly, contracting parties can invest in specific assets during 
contract implementation, and thereby alter the attributes of the transactions, and reduce the 
efficiency of the initially chosen form of governance. Secondly, exogenous changes can alter 
the comparative efficiency of governance structures9. The contracting parties want to minimize 
                                                 
8
 In their review of empirical studies in transaction cost economics, Macher and Richman (2006) 
conclude that there are very few studies on the costs associated with failing to align transactions and 
forms of governance (Macher and Richman, 2006: 53). One exception is Masten et al. (1991) who report 
that a ‘mistaken integration would increase organization costs by approximately 70 percent, while 
subcontracting work currently performed inside the firm would, on average, generate market organization 
costs almost three times those incurred managing that work internally (Masten et al., 1991: 2).    
9
 Section 2.6 on the institutional environment expands on these external influences. 
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their transaction costs and therefore aim for a more efficient alignment of transactions with 
governance. They can choose to adopt a new form of governance, but they can also choose to 
alter the attributes of their transactions. Williamson recognized the possibility of turning the 
matter of discriminating alignment around: ‘suppose instead that we think of governance 
structures as being in search of transactions for which they are well suited’ (Williamson, 2003: 
933). Transaction cost analysis has, however, largely focused on adjusting the governance 
structures to the transactions.  
 
 
2.4 The paradigm case of vertical integration 
The paradigm case out of which transaction cost economics developed is that of vertical 
integration. TCE started its theoretical development and empirical analyses with vertical 
integration for two reasons. Firstly, vertical integration was analysed by Ronald Coase in his 
1937 article on ‘The nature of the firm’, in the form of the make-or-buy decision. This article is 
considered to be the starting point for transaction cost economics, because it argues for a 
comparative assessment of more than one mechanism for coordinating production. Since the 
make-or-buy decision is central to this seminal article, empirical studies of vertical integration 
were an obvious place to start. Secondly, vertical integration, as compared with other candidate 
transactions (such as the employment relation), has the advantage of being simpler, in that a 
variety of complications that arise in transactions between firms and workers (such as 
differences of information, differential access to technical and legal expertise, differential 
capacity to bear risk) are of lesser importance in transactions between firms (Williamson, 
2005a: 12).  
A few of the first empirical studies on vertical integration within transaction cost economics 
are those by Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Masten (1984). These studies concluded that 
investments in specific assets, either in the form of physical assets or human assets, lead to a 
vertical integration. Williamson also argued that another form of asset specificity, site-
specificity, provides a compelling reason for vertical integration (Williamson, 1985: 95). 
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Investments in specific assets create a relation of bilateral dependency between the contracting 
parties. Without sufficient safeguards, in the form of vertical integration, contractual hazards 
and therefore large transaction costs will result. Vertical integration is thus explained by a 
transaction cost economizing argument. An additional argument for preferring vertical 
integration, in this case over long-term contracts, is given by Klein (1988). He claims that 
when transactions are characterized by a substantial degree of uncertainty, vertical integration 
is preferred. The presence of uncertainty complicates the ability to write and use long-term 
contracts, and increases the transaction costs of using these long-term contracts (Klein, 1988: 
212). Klein defines transaction costs as the ‘rent-dissipating costs borne during the negotiation 
and renegotiation contracting process as transactors attempt to create, avoid, and execute the 
hold-ups implied by necessarily imperfect long-term contractual arrangements’ (Klein, 1988: 
211). To reduce the transaction costs that are due to the hold-ups under long-term contracts, 
Klein argues for vertical integration.  
In the previous section (2.3), it was shown that Williamson identified these two attributes of 
transactions – high asset-specificity and high uncertainty- as those that require the hierarchy as 
an efficient form of governance. This is no surprise when it is considered that vertical 
integration is simply the extension of the hierarchy into additional stages of production. As a 
final comment on vertical integration in transaction cost economics, it is noted that differences 
between firms have been argued to be responsible for varying degrees of vertical integration 
(Williamson, 1985: 94-5). Larger firms will be more integrated, because they have greater cost 
advantages due to economies of scale. M-form firms will be more integrated than their U-form 
counterparts, because they have lower bureaucratic costs. Due to the lower costs of the larger 
firm and the multidivisional firm, vertical integration is preferred over the market for a larger 
range of asset-specificity for these firms.   
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2.5 The dynamics of TCE 
Transaction cost economics has been criticized for being a static perspective that works out of 
an equilibrium contracting setup (e.g. Langlois, 1992). Williamson claims that dynamics enters 
into transaction cost economics in various ways. Firstly, he argues that intertemporal process 
transformations are central to TCE (Williamson, 1996a: 11; Williamson, 1999a: 1101). 
Secondly, transaction cost economics takes adaptation to disturbances to be the main problem 
of economic organization (e.g. Williamson, 1996b). And finally, dynamics enters into the 
analysis through the institutional environment. Changes in the environment influence the 
comparative costs of forms of governance and thereby increase or decrease the use of 
particular governance structures (e.g. Williamson, 1991).  
 
2.5.1 Intertemporal process transformations    
One of the contributions of transaction cost economics to the incomplete contract literature is 
its ex post perspective. In addition to the ex ante incentive alignment stage, TCE takes the 
contract implementation and contract renewal intervals into account. It recognizes that 
contracting takes place over time, and according to Williamson ‘inquiries into the 
intertemporal transformations that contracts and organizations undergo’ (Williamson, 1996a: 
13). One of the intertemporal transformations to which Williamson often refers is the 
fundamental transformation. This is the change from large numbers bidding for a contract at 
the outset to small numbers bilateral dependency in the contract implementation and renewal 
stage. The bilateral dependency sets in as a result of asset-specific investments by the winning 
bidder during contract implementation. In the contract execution stage and in the ex post 
competition during the contract renewal stage, the winning bidder has an advantage over the 
non-winners. Due to the asset-specific investments, ‘economic values would be sacrificed if 
the ongoing supply relation were to be terminated’ (Williamson, 1985: 62). Large numbers 
competition can thus not be guaranteed in the ex post stages. Another intertemporal regularity 
to which Williamson refers is the observation that organization has a life of its own. Some 
examples are bureaucratization, tacit knowledge, informal organization and learning 
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(Williamson, 1996a: 11; 2003: 924).  
Williamson views the uncovering of these contractual regularities as part of the transaction cost 
economics’ exercise (Williamson, 1996a). The regularities are not the focus of attention to 
study the processes of change from one form of governance to another. Instead, knowledge of 
the regularities enables parties to a contract, and students of governance, to work out their 
potential hazards and contractual ramifications and fold these back into the ex ante contractual 
agreement (Williamson, 1996c: 20; 2000: 601). Hereby transaction cost economics takes the 
dynamics out of the intertemporal process transformations and returns to a comparative static 
institutional exercise.  
 
2.5.2 Adaptation  
The intertemporal considerations are also said to enter the transaction cost economics setup 
through TCE’s treatment of adaptation as the central problem of economic organization 
(Williamson, 1999a: 1101). Since all complex contracts are incomplete, governance structures 
need to be devised to enable an adaptation to disturbances. Williamson distinguishes between 
two types of adaptation: autonomous adaptation through the market (Hayek, 1945) and 
cooperative adaptation through the hierarchy (Barnard, 1938). Adaptation through the market 
involves economic actors that respond unilaterally to disturbances. These independent 
economic actors do not have an ongoing relationship with contracting parties that they need to 
consult when adapting to disturbances. They respond unilaterally to changes in relative prices, 
and thereby switch continuously to other contracting parties of which the identity is irrelevant. 
The autonomous adaptations are also referred to as spontaneous or invisible hand adaptations, 
because of ‘how little the individual participants need to know to be able to take the right 
action’ (Hayek, 1945: 526-527). Cooperative adaptation refers to the opposite case that 
involves economic actors to an ongoing contract that are bilaterally or multilaterally dependent. 
These contracting parties consult each other when adapting to disturbances, or they refer the 
decision to the hierarchy where through fiat is decided on the type of response. The adaptation 
is intentional, or in Barnard’s words, it is ‘conscious, deliberate, and purposeful’ (Barnard, 
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1938: 4). These two types of adaptation are believed to co-exist in the economy. 
As discussed in section 2.2, governance structures are defined by their three attributes: 
incentive intensity, administrative control and contract law regime. Markets are characterized 
by high incentive intensity, little administrative apparatus, and dispute settlement in courts; the 
hierarchy features low incentive intensity, a large degree of administrative control, and internal 
dispute settlement. Different adaptive strengths and weaknesses accrue to these syndromes of 
internally consistent attributes (Williamson, 2003: 925). The attributes of markets give them an 
advantage in autonomous adaptation respects, and those of hierarchies in cooperative 
adaptation. The hybrid form of governance takes an intermediate position, between the market 
and the hierarchy, on both the attributes of governance and adaptation.  
Adaptation is thus treated as a fourth attribute by which forms of governance can be 
distinguished (Williamson, 1998a: 37). The core argument of TCE, the discriminating 
alignment hypothesis, is also applied to the adaptive capacities of governance structures. 
Cooperative adaptation is better suited for the efficient governance of transactions 
characterized by a large degree of asset-specificity and uncertainty, whereas autonomous 
adaptation is more efficient for transactions with assets that are easily redeployable. The 
hierarchy has adaptive advantages over the market for transactions of a bilaterally or 
multilaterally dependent kind (Williamson, 1991: 279). Within the transaction cost economics 
of Williamson, adaptation is thus not seen as a process of change in which economic actors 
adapt from one governance structure to another, but as a dual feature that distinguishes among 
different forms of governance.  
A third option of how change can be part of the transaction cost economics’ exercise is through 
the institutional environment. While the discussion on the fundamental transformation showed 
the unintended consequences of endogenous changes in the attributes of transactions, the 
institutional environment is a source of exogenous disturbances that can affect the comparative 
use of governance structures.  
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2.6 The institutional environment in TCE 
The new institutional economics has developed into two complementary parts, one that focuses 
on the institutions of governance, and another that is mainly concerned with institutions at a 
higher level, the institutional environment. Although the institutions of governance are at the 
core of transaction cost economics, TCE does take the institutional environment into account. 
The institutional environment is ‘the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules 
that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution. Rules governing elections, 
property rights, and the right of contract are examples’ (Davis and North, 1971: 6). It is also 
simply referred to as ‘the rules of the game’ (North, 1990: 5), to be distinguished from the play 
of the game: the institutions of governance. The rules define the way the game is played. This 
is one of the most salient differences between the institutional environment and the institutions 
of governance; the environment defines, and is a constraint on, the forms of governance 
(Williamson, 1996a: 5)10. The following sections (2.6.1 and 2.6.2) on Williamson’s four-layer 
scheme and parameter changes expand on this environmental influence on the governance 
structures.  
 
2.6.1 Four-layer scheme 
In his familiar four-layer scheme (see figure 2.2), Williamson shows that there exist four levels 
of institutions and of economic analyses: the first level of informal institutions, such as 
customs, norms and traditions, is the domain of economic historians and sociologists; the 
fourth level of the individual is the one at which neoclassical economics works; and the second 
and third level of respectively the institutional environment and the governance structures are 
the focus of the new institutional economics and transaction cost economics. With the solid 
arrow from level two to three, Williamson illustrates that transaction cost economics focuses 
on the environmental influence on governance structures. The dashed arrow from governance 
                                                 
10
 Although Williamson puts the emphasis on the institutional environment as a constraint on the lower-
level forms of governance, on several occasions (e.g. Williamson, 1999a) he illustrates the enabling role 
of the environment. For example, having the courts available for purposes of ultimate appeal is said to 
delimit threat positions, and thereby provides support for private ordering (Williamson, 1996a: 42). 
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to the institutional environment indicates that Williamson recognizes that this opposite 
influence exists, but that he ‘mainly neglects these feedbacks’ (Williamson, 2000: 596). In 
comparison, Douglass North analyses the institutional environment and changes in the rules of 
the game. The emphasis on governance structures, or what North refers to as organizations, is 
‘primarily on their role as agents of institutional change’ (North, 1990: 5). North thus explicitly 
focuses on these feedbacks that Williamson ignores. 
 
Figure 2.2 Williamson’s four-layer scheme (Williamson, 1998a)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.2 Parameter changes  
Within transaction cost economics, level two, the institutional environment, is taken as given. 
It is treated as a set of parameters; changes in the institutional environment (or, if making 
international comparisons, differences between institutional environments (Williamson, 1996a: 
18)) elicit shifts in the comparative costs of governance, and thereby change the comparative 
use of governance structures. Williamson identifies ‘property rights, contract law, reputation 
and uncertainty’ (Williamson, 1991) as parameters, and thereby locates these in the 
institutional environment. Several examples can be given of the effect of parameter changes on 
Embeddedness: informal institutions (1) 
Institutional environment: formal rules of the game (2) 
Governance: play of the game (3) 
Resource allocation and employment (4) 
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the comparative use of governance structures. Firstly, a change in property rights: a weaker 
appropriability and a consequent increased risk of leakage increases the costs of hybrids and 
markets. Transaction cost economics predicts an increase in the use of the hierarchy. Secondly, 
a change in contract law: an improvement of excuse doctrine, increases the use of the hybrid 
form (Williamson, 1991: 287). At some point in a contractual relation, governed by a hybrid 
form, one of the contracting parties may realize that continuing the relation has lower gains 
than a literal enforcement of the contract. Excuse doctrine can be used to relieve the other 
contracting party from strict enforcement of the contract, when this strict enforcement would 
unduly harm this contracting party, when the altered contractual relation is the result of 
unforeseen events, and when the enforcement is driven by opportunism of the departing 
contracting party. A sensible use of the excuse doctrine means that it is not too lax and not too 
strict. When it is too lax, contracting parties will pay less attention to constructing a good 
contract and setting up a well-governed contractual relation. When it is too strict, contracting 
parties are discouraged to use a hybrid form, and prefer internalizing their transactions, because 
of the possible harmful consequences of a literal enforcement of the contract. Thirdly, 
improvements in inter-firm and intra-firm reputation effects will respectively increase the use 
of hybrids and hierarchies. Finally, uncertainty is also located in the institutional environment. 
Two forms of greater uncertainty can be distinguished: disturbances can become more 
numerous or they can become more consequential due to an increase in the variance of the 
disturbances. When the frequency of disturbances increases, the use of the hybrid mode of 
governance is likely to decrease. Adaptations through the hybrid form of governance require 
mutual consent of the contracting parties. Since consent takes time, the market or hierarchical 
form of governance will be preferred in an environment characterized by numerous 
disturbances (Williamson, 1991).  
 
2.6.3 First-order economizing 
As discussed in section 2.3, the core argument of transaction cost economics is the 
discriminating alignment hypothesis, according to which transactions are aligned with 
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governance structures in a transaction cost economizing way. The institutional environment is, 
in fact, a second factor that determines the comparative efficiency of governance structures11 
(Williamson, 1999a: 1090), as the examples on property rights, contract law, reputation and 
uncertainty illustrate. Linking the institutional environment to the institutions of governance in 
this way is an additional source of refutable hypotheses and of predictive content for 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1996c: 17-18). A consequence of including the 
institutional environment into transaction cost economics is thus that an opportunity for an 
additional form of economizing is introduced. Where second-order economizing refers to 
getting the governance structures right, through the efficient alignment of transactions with 
modes of governance, first-order economizing refers to getting the institutional environment 
(or the formal rules of the game) right. This additional form of economizing is relevant, 
because the structure of the institutional environment has large consequences for the economic 
productivity of a country (North, 1990; Levy and Spiller, 1994). Williamson identifies the 
instruments for designing the institutions at the environmental level. These are said to include 
‘the executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of government as well as the 
distribution of powers across different levels of government (federalism)’ (Williamson, 2000: 
598). Williamson does not, however, analyze how to get the formal rules of the game right or 
how to structure the functions and powers of government. This can partly be explained by 
TCE’s focus on governance structures, and Williamson’s claim that ‘cumulative change of a 
gradual kind (of the institutional environment) is difficult to orchestrate’ (Williamson, 1998a: 
27). It is much more complicated to change the institutional environment in order to enhance 
the efficiency of this institution (Williamson, 1996a: 5), as compared with altering governance 
structures. Changes in the rules of the game are believed to occur in the order of decades or 
centuries (e.g. Williamson, 1998a).  
 
 
                                                 
11
 In an empirical study on intellectual property protection and inter-firm alliances, Oxley (1999) finds 
that both the institutional environment and transaction attributes are important drivers of governance 
choice.  
54
Transaction cost economics 
 
44
2.7 TCE perspective on regulation 
Within transaction cost economics, regulation has been conceptualized as a governance 
structure, solving a contracting problem between public utility firms and their customers 
(Goldberg, 1976; Joskow, 1991; e.g. Williamson, 1996a), and between regulated firms and the 
regulator (Joskow, 1991; Levy and Spiller, 1994; Williamson, 1999b). Within the new 
institutional economics, regulation has also been approached as embedded in the institutional 
environment (Glachant, 1998; Glachant and Finon, 2000; Yvrande-Billon and Ménard, 2005). 
 
2.7.1 Regulation as a governance structure 
Williamson focuses on the regulation of natural monopolies. Specifically, he addresses the 
contracting problem between utility firms, which have a regional or national monopoly in 
supplying a utility service, and their customers. The contracting problem consists of the utility 
firms’ incentive to set monopolistic prices. Williamson depicts regulation as a hybrid form of 
governance that can solve this contracting problem. Hybrid modes of governance are supported 
by neoclassical contract law (Williamson, 1991: 271). Parties to such contracts retain 
autonomy, but are mediated by an elastic contracting mechanism. Regulation is regarded as 
such an elastic contracting mechanism, mediating the contract between the utility firms and 
their customers. The regulator takes on an agency role for the customers, and engages thereto 
in a collective contract with the utility firm. In this collective contract, the conditions and 
prices under which the utility firm can supply the utility service to consumers are set out. The 
regulator does not only have a responsibility to protect customers from excessive prices, but 
also to establish rate-making rules that enable the regulated firm to recover its reasonable costs 
of providing the service (Joskow, 1991: 68; Williamson, 1986: 121). This collective contract, 
which is also referred to as an administered contract (Goldberg, 1976), governs the individual 
contract that firms have with their customers.  
Regulation’s (comparatively) efficient place in the transaction cost analysis, together with the 
attributes of the underlying (discriminatingly aligned) transactions, can be found in the 
following contracting schemes (Williamson, 1998a; 1999b) (see figures 2.4 and 2.5).  
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Figure 2.3 Contracting schema (e.g. Williamson, 1998a: 38) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 displays the perceived order between attributes of transactions and modes of 
governance, on the basis of the characteristics of contracts: contractual hazards and contractual 
safeguards. A well-known contractual hazard is bilateral dependency that increases with 
greater degrees of asset-specificity. In this heuristic display, Williamson illustrates how the 
absence of contractual hazards (k=0) combines with the (unassisted) market; how the existence 
of contractual hazards (k>0) and the absence of contractual safeguards (s=0) combines with a 
situation of persisting hazards; how the existence of contractual hazards and the existence of 
safeguards (s>0) can be split-up in situations of hybrid contracting, and in situations of 
internalizing the hazard in organizations. The choice between hybrid contracting and vertical 
integration is made on the basis of aligning transactions characterized by a greater degree of 
asset-specificity and uncertainty with the vertically integrated private firm.   
In figure 2.4, Williamson has extended his heuristic display to include regulation and the public 
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bureau. The public bureau is regarded as the ‘organization form of very last resort: try markets, 
try hybrids, try firms, try regulation, and resort to the public bureau when all else fails 
(comparatively)’ (Williamson, 1998a: 46-47). Regulation combines the private firm with the 
public regulatory agency (Williamson, 1999b: 320). It is located between the private firm and 
the public bureau in the comparative institutional analysis. These three forms of governance 
differ with respect to incentive intensity, administrative control, adaptation, and contract law 
regime, with the private firm having the ‘strongest incentives, the least administrative control, 
the strongest propensity to behave autonomously and the weakest to behave cooperatively, 
works out of a (comparatively) legalistic dispute settlement regime, appoints its own 
executives, and affords the least degree of security of staff employment’ (Williamson, 1999b: 
336) as compared with the public bureau. Regulation takes on an intermediate position on these 
governance characteristics. In addition to these differences in governance attributes, the private 
firm, regulation and the public bureau also differ in terms of the types of transactions that each 
structure can most efficiently govern.   
 
Figure 2.4 Contracting schema extended (Williamson, 1999b: 337) 
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Williamson argues that the hazard of probity can be a distinguishing characteristic of the 
contractual setting. With the hazard of probity, Williamson refers to loyalty and rectitude as 
attributes of transactions, or in other words to sovereign transactions (Williamson, 1998b: 77). 
He argues that transactions involving contractual hazards, safeguards, and the hazard of probity 
will lead to the public bureau. Alternatively, transactions involving contractual hazards (h>0), 
safeguards (s>0), but excluding the hazard of probity, will lead to the private firm or to 
regulation. The discriminating factor between the private firm and regulation is again asset-
specificity, where even greater degrees of asset-specificity are to be organized under 
regulation. ‘Extreme conditions of bilateral dependency and information asymmetry’ require 
governance in the form of regulation that ‘provides safeguards beyond those that can be crafted 
through private ordering’ (Williamson, 1999b: 337).  
Already in 1976, Williamson gave an asset-specificity reason for regulating natural monopoly 
transactions. He replied to Demsetz (1968), Stigler (1968) and Posner (1972), who opted for 
franchise bidding as a solution to the contracting problem of natural monopolies. Franchise 
bidding refers to a competitive process, in which firms bid the lowest price at which they are 
willing to offer the utility service. The firm that is able to provide the service at the lowest 
price is awarded the franchise. Williamson argued that they ignored the substantial asset-
specific investments in plants and equipment that utility firms have to make before being able 
to serve their customers. He states that ‘if the good or service is to be supplied under conditions 
of uncertainty and if nontrivial investments in specific assets are involved, the efficacy of 
franchise bidding is highly problematic’ (Williamson 1996a: 85). For Williamson (1976), 
asset-specificity is the reason for depicting regulation as a more efficient institutional solution 
for natural monopoly as compared to franchise bidding12. 
Joskow (1991), on the other hand, focuses on the hold-up problem that is created by the 
relationship-specific investments. ‘Once a public utility has made sunk investments in 
facilities, it is open to being held up by regulators trying to keep prices as low as possible’ 
(Joskow, 1991: 68). The focus turns to a different contracting problem, between the regulated 
                                                 
12
 See also section three of chapter three for a discussion on regulating natural monopolies.  
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firm and the regulator. Joskow mentions several legal and economic constraints, such as 
constitutional restrictions, which limit the ability of regulatory agencies to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour. Levy and Spiller (1994) focus on this contracting problem, between 
the potentially opportunistic regulatory agency and the public utility firm with sunk asset-
specific investments. They discuss the constraints, which Joskow made reference to, more 
extensively and locate them in the institutional environment. They view regulation as a 
governance structure that can solve the contracting problem between the regulator and the 
public utility firm. The regulatory governance structure is defined as ‘the mechanisms that 
societies use to constrain regulatory discretion and to resolve conflicts that arise in relation to 
these constraints’ (Levy and Spiller, 1994: 205). Whether these mechanisms are capable of 
restraining regulatory discretion is said to depend on characteristics of the institutional 
environment (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Parker, 1999ab; Holburn and Spiller, 2002). An 
independent judiciary, restraints on changing the regulatory system and strong administrative 
capabilities are brought forward as valuable characteristics of the institutional environment for 
restraining arbitrary administrative action.  
Williamson has also addressed the contracting relation between the regulator and the regulated 
firms, focusing on the notion of regulatory capture in which the regulator has become captive 
of the special interests of the industry’s firms or the natural monopolist. (Williamson, 1996d: 
1014). Several factors that contribute to regulatory capture are the close and continuing 
relations between the regulated industries and the regulatory agencies, the common exchange 
of personnel, and the comparative disadvantage of unorganized consumers to influence 
outcomes (Williamson, 1996a: 206). Williamson describes regulatory capture as a contractual 
hazard (Williamson, 1999b: 318), and as a transformation in the regulatory contract; declared 
intentions of the regulatory agencies differ from realizations (Bernstein, 1955). With their 
feasible foresight, economic actors should be able to recognize this contractual hazard and fold 
it back into the ex ante design of the governance structure (Williamson, 1999b: 318).  
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2.7.2 Regulation in the institutional environment  
Regulation is also viewed as embedded in the institutional environment and thus as 
establishing the rules of the game. A few studies focus on the influence of regulation on 
governance structures at the level of the firm in liberalizing network industries (Glachant, 
1998; Glachant and Finon, 2000; Yvrande-Billon and Ménard, 2005). Yvrande-Billon and 
Ménard (2005) state that ‘the regulatory structure is in charge of implementing a reform that 
involves substantial changes in the organization of the public utility’ (Yvrande-Billon and 
Ménard, 2005: 678). They focus on the organizational misalignment that results from 
regulatory policies that do not take the attributes of transactions into account. Glachant (1998) 
researched what new modes of governance are being produced as a result of the introduction of 
competition into the formerly integrated English electricity industry. He concludes that the 
English wholesale electricity transactions are conducted within a hybrid governance structure, 
the English Electricity Pool, in which the price mechanism is combined with a collective 
agreement between wholesale electricity producers and retailers. In addition, the institutional 
environment exerts a powerful influence on this private hybrid institutional arrangement. “By 
exercising its asymmetrical rights, the public authority can obtain certain results that the Pool 
could never achieve in its capacity as a private arrangement between voluntary participants” 
(Glachant, 1998: 70). For example, the regulator has made Pool membership compulsory and 
has the final say on the Pool rules. Glachant and Finon (2000) claim that reforms in the 
electricity industries are institutional in two essential ways. Firstly, the reforms are directed at 
changing most of the industries’ institutional arrangements, such as horizontal and vertical 
integration and ownership structures. Secondly, they locate the influence on these governance 
changes in the institutional environment. ‘The instigators of these reforms are not the industries 
themselves, but the public institutions in the countries concerned: notably governments and 
public local authorities, law-making bodies, and the authorities that regulate networks and 
competition’ (Glachant and Finon, 2000: 313). The ‘allocation of powers of regulation among 
the public authorities’ is viewed as a main criterion for characterizing the institutional 
environment (Glachant and Finon, 2000: 322). 
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This chapter presented various elements of transaction cost economics, including the attributes 
of transactions, and those of governance, the discriminating alignment hypothesis, and the 
paradigm case of vertical integration. It also discussed the perspective of TCE on dynamics, 
regulation and the environmental institutions. The following chapter will apply this theoretical 
framework of transaction cost economics to the specifics of the electricity industry. It will 
characterize the attributes of electricity transactions and the historical structure of vertical 
integration of the European electricity firms. A transaction cost justification for the vertically 
integrated firm and the regulation of natural monopolies in the European electricity industries 
will be given.  
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3 – The Electricity Industry 
 
 
The European electricity industries have been characterized by an extensive degree of vertical 
integration for almost a century. Many of the activities, from the generation to the distribution 
of electricity, have largely been internalized within a single firm. These vertically integrated 
firms had a regional or national monopoly in the supply of electricity to consumers, and were 
heavily regulated by their national governments on among others tariffs and security of supply. 
In recent years, these structures of vertically integrated monopolies are changing as a result of 
new European and national regulations on the introduction of competition into the European 
electricity industries. In 1996 and 2003, the European Parliament and Council issued two 
electricity directives on common rules for electricity generation, transmission, distribution and 
retail. These directives aim to create one European competitive electricity market. The national 
governments of the EU member states have implemented, or are in the process of 
implementing, these directives into their national legislation and regulation. The European 
directives and national regulations prescribe the independence of the natural monopolies of 
transmission and distribution from the generation and retail of electricity, and thus the vertical 
separation of the integrated electricity firms. The vertical unbundling of transmission and 
distribution enables the introduction of competition into the potentially competitive segments 
of the electricity value chain, such as the generation and retail of electricity. In addition, the 
directives prescribe that consumers should be able to choose their own electricity retailer, and 
therefore that the electricity industries should be opened up to new entrant electricity firms that 
can compete with the incumbents. By implication, the European electricity directives are 
influencing the governance structures in the liberalizing electricity industries; they are 
prohibiting the vertically integrated hierarchies and are promoting the emergence of market 
forms of governance.  
With these requirements on vertical unbundling and consumer choice, the European directives 
and national regulations run counter to TCE claims on efficiency in the electricity industry. 
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Transaction cost economics claims that both vertical integration and regulation are efficient 
structures for governing the transactions in the electricity industry (Williamson, 1976; Joskow, 
1996). TCE argues for coordination in the form of vertically integrated firms and regulation on 
the basis of the attributes of electricity transactions with a focus on asset-specificity, the strong 
interrelationships between the different segments of the electricity value chain, and the 
presence of externalities and natural monopolies in the electricity industry. Within transaction 
cost economics, various empirical studies have analyzed the forms of governance that are put 
in place in the vertically de-integrated energy industries in the United States. These studies do 
not report the emergence of market forms of governance, but mostly the adoption of long-term 
bilateral contracts (Joskow, 1987; Crocker, 1996).    
 
This chapter presents the particularities of the electricity industry. It starts with a discussion on 
the various segments in the electricity value chain, and the structures of the European 
electricity industries of before the liberalization (section 3.1). This chapter also discusses the 
perspective of transaction cost economics on the electricity industry (sections 3.2 and 3.3), and 
in particular, the attributes of electricity transactions and the efficient governance of these 
transactions through vertical integration and regulation. Section 3.4 introduces the various 
requirements of the EC electricity directives of 1996 and 2003. It will clarify how these new 
rules prohibit the vertically integrated monopolies, and influence the new forms of governance. 
Section 3.5 discusses the various empirical studies within transaction cost economics on the 
governance of unbundled energy industries with long-term contracts. This chapter thus 
introduces the various (potential) influences on the new governance structures, such as the 
electricity transactions and the new electricity regulations.  
 
 
3.1 The structure of the electricity industry 
The electricity industry is defined as the collection of firms that are involved in the different 
activities of the electricity value chain; these activities include the generation, transmission, 
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distribution, system operation and retail of electricity. This section discusses these different 
activities and it outlines a short history of the governance structures in the European electricity 
industries of before the liberalization.  
 
3.1.1 The electricity value chain 
The various activities in the electricity value chain include the generation, transmission, 
distribution, system operation and retail of electricity (see figure 3.1). The generation of 
electricity refers to the production of electric power in plants using for example fossil fuels, 
nuclear fuel or falling water. The transmission and distribution of electricity are the 
transportation of electric power from generating plants to consumers along the electricity 
network. The electricity network consists of high- and low-voltage electricity lines, substations 
and transformers in which the electricity is converted to higher or lower voltages, and circuit 
breakers that protect the electrical circuit from damage caused by overload. Transmission is the 
transportation of electricity along the high-voltage part of the network, whereas distribution 
refers to the transportation along the low-voltage electricity lines. Every generator and every 
consumer needs a connection and an access to the network to be able to deliver and receive 
electricity.  
The operators of the electricity network, also referred to as system operators, provide the 
connections and access to the network. They maintain and develop the network to ensure a safe 
and secure delivery of electricity. In addition, they continuously balance the demand for and 
supply of electricity. The supply of electricity by generators and the demand for it by 
consumers need to be balanced every second of the day, because electricity cannot be stored, or 
at least not in an economically efficient way. This continuous balancing of electricity supply 
and demand is necessary in order to avoid an overload, and a possible blackout, of the electric 
system. The operators of the network monitor the changes in load (the sum of all customers’ 
instantaneous usage) (Hunt, 2002: 20) and call upon power plants to start or stop generating, or 
to deliver reserve capacity to the network. The system operators can combine their activities of 
providing access, maintaining a secure network, and balancing supply and demand, with 
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transmitting or distributing electricity. These operators are then referred to as transmission 
system operators (TSOs) or distribution system operators (DSOs), depending on which part of 
the network that they operate.  
The final activity in the electricity value chain is the retail of electricity to consumers. Retail is 
the business of advertising, making arrangements for supplies of power from generators, 
contract bundling, metering, and billing of electricity for final customers (Joskow, 1998; 
Bergman, 1999).  
 
Figure 3.1 Electricity value chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 A history of vertical integration  
Since the beginning of the mass utilization of electric power in the late 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century, the European electricity industries have been structured in 
different ways, ranging from completely decentralized systems with many small generators and 
separate distributors to vertically integrated structures. In the early days, production plants 
were small and located close to their supply area. Electricity distributors were locally 
organized, often under private ownership, and were usually granted concessions by 
municipalities. They served only a small area, because the use of direct current at low voltage 
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made it impossible to distribute electricity over an area greater than one square mile (Kahn, 
1971: 117). The large power losses of direct current led to the close positioning of generators 
to the distribution lines. A few early technological innovations, such as the steam turbine, the 
transformer, and alternating current (Mez et al., 1997: 3), increased the scale at which 
electricity was generated and transported. With the increase in scale, the transmission system 
operator assumed an increasingly larger role as a coordinating body in the electricity industry. 
The TSO became responsible for the balancing of electricity supply and demand for the entire 
electric system in a country, purchasing fuel for the production of electricity, importing and 
exporting electricity, and planning the construction and location of new generating facilities. 
The European TSOs were often, and in some cases still are, vertically integrated with the 
generation, distribution, and retail of electricity (Newbery, 1999: 199; Hunt, 2002: 2). For 
more than sixty years, Electricité de France (EDF) has internalized the entire vertical electricity 
chain in one firm. Another common form of vertical integration was the internalization of 
generation and transmission on the one hand, and distribution and retail on the other hand. In 
this case, ‘the generation and transmission entity typically serves the distribution entity on a 
long-term exclusive basis’ (Joskow, 1998: 27). In the United Kingdom, the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) and its precursors, controlled generation and transmission, and 
supplied electricity to the distributors under a bulk supply tariff (Newbery and Green, 1996: 
25). In the Dutch electricity industry, distribution was unbundled from generation and 
transmission in the late 1980s. The Dutch distributors paid the generators a uniform tariff for 
the electricity. This variant to the vertical integration of the entire electricity value chain is 
referred to by Hunt (2002) as ‘vertical integration by contract or tariff, a variation, but not an 
exception, to the rule of vertical integration’ (Hunt, 2002: 24). The European electricity 
industries have been characterized by varieties of vertical integration for several decades. It has 
been argued that there are substantial economies associated with vertical integration, and that 
single-firm production by a vertically integrated firm can in fact be a least-cost solution (e.g. 
Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). The following section explains the efficiency of vertical 
integration in the electricity industry.  
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3.2 The efficiency of the vertically integrated structure 
From a transaction cost economics perspective, the vertically integrated, hierarchical forms of 
governance are considered to be the most efficient institutional solution for the transactions 
that need to be governed in the electricity industry (e.g. Joskow, 1996). TCE gives two reasons 
for the efficiency of vertical integration in the electricity industry, namely the attributes of the 
transactions with a focus on asset-specificity, and the presence of externalities in the industry. 
Joskow (1996, 2002) provides another reason for vertical integration in the electricity industry, 
which are the operating and investment interrelationships between the different activities in the 
electricity value chain (see appendix A). 
 
3.2.1 The governance of asset-specificity 
Williamson has stated that ‘the principal factor to which transaction cost economics appeals to 
explain vertical integration is asset-specificity’ (Williamson, 1985: 90). Different types of 
asset-specificity, including site-specificity, dedicated assets, physical asset-specificity and 
temporal specificity, characterize the various transactions in the electricity industry.  
A first type of asset-specificity that characterizes the transactions for connecting to the 
electricity network between the generators and the system operators is site-specificity. 
Williamson defines site-specificity ‘as where successive stations are located in a cheek-by-jowl 
relation so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses’ (Williamson, 1996a: 59). 
Site-specific investments are investments in assets that are placed in close proximity to assets 
of the other contracting parties, and that are very costly to setup and relocate. The network 
connection transactions are characterized by a large degree of site-specificity: the generators 
need a direct connection to the electricity network to enable the transportation of their 
electricity. Once the generators have built their generating plants and connected them to the 
network, it is prohibitively costly for them to relocate and set-up their generating plants at 
another operator’s connection point. The generators are therefore placed in a dependency 
relation with respect to the system operator. The system operator has a dominant position in 
which he can demand unreasonable network access and connection conditions and prices. The 
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governance, in the form of vertical integration, provides a safeguard for the generators against 
the possible opportunistic behaviour of the system operator. Site-specificity has been argued to 
provide ‘a compelling reason to integrate activities into a single firm’ (Glachant, 2002: 302). In 
the electricity industry, the condition of site-specificity is combined with the presence of a 
monopoly for the network. The generators are dependent on the electricity network, the 
essential facility, to an extreme degree: they have no alternative for the delivery of their 
electricity. This monopoly of the system operator provides an extra stimulus for a safeguard in 
the form of vertical integration.  
Two other types of asset-specificity, dedicated assets and physical asset-specificity, provide a 
transaction cost economizing reason for vertically integrating the electricity supply 
transactions between the generators, distributors and retailers. ‘Dedicated assets are discrete 
investments in general purpose plant that are made at the behest of a particular customer’ 
(Williamson, 1996a: 105). When ‘inputs are specialized to the production of a particular 
component or a product’ (Williamson, 1985), the transactions are characterized by physical 
asset-specificity. Electricity generators invest in large, capital-intensive production plants that 
have very few alternative uses. They build these plants with the prospect of being able to sell 
the electricity to distributors and retailers. Once these investments are sunk, the distributors 
and/or retailers can renegotiate terms of the sales contract to their own advantage. The 
generators, therefore, prefer to vertically integrate into distribution and retail to avoid 
becoming locked into a relationship that is not profitable. They prefer to reduce the uncertainty 
and set up sufficient safeguards for the potentially opportunistic behaviour of their contracting 
parties.  
A fourth type of asset-specificity, temporal specificity, characterizes the transactions of 
balancing electricity supply and demand between the system operators and the users of the 
network. Temporal specificity is ‘a type of site specificity in which timely responsiveness by 
on-site human assets is vital’ (Williamson, 1996a: 106). Glachant (2002) described temporal 
specific transactions as transactions in which ‘the adjustment of production to consumption 
requires a just-in-time synchronization’ (Glachant, 2002: 302). The inability to store electricity 
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in an economically efficient way, and therefore the requirement to balance electricity supply 
and demand continuously in real time, makes this type of specificity highly relevant to the 
electricity industry. The transmission system operator balances electricity supply and demand 
every second of the day for the entire electricity network. It provides the ultimate just-in-time 
service to the users of the network: the generators, distributors and retailers. From a TCE 
perspective, ‘temporal specificity may lead to vertical integration if the dependency 
relationships between users and suppliers are very asymmetric’ (Glachant, 2002: 303). The 
TSO has a monopoly in supplying balancing services. Without these balancing services, the 
system cannot function. When too much or too little electricity is flowing through the network, 
breaks in the current and blackouts can occur. The users of the network are thus dependent on 
the TSO for the supply of electricity. They therefore prefer vertical integration to safeguard 
against the possible opportunistic behaviour of the TSO. The TSO could for example demand 
monopolistic prices for his balancing services.  
 
3.2.2 The governance of externalities 
A second argument for the efficiency of vertical integration in the electricity industry is 
provided by the presence of externalities in this industry. ‘Externalities (or spillover effects) 
occur when firms and people impose costs or benefits on others outside the marketplace’ 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2001: 37). Joskow and Schmalensee (1983: 35) point out that the 
externality problems in modern power systems are important, because the components of 
electric systems are closely linked: the electricity network directly connects generators to 
consumers and there is no alternative for either consumer or generator to receive or deliver 
electricity but through this electricity network. In addition, electricity cannot be stored and 
generators have to respond continuously to the changing demand of consumers. Because of this 
direct connection and the impossibility of storing electricity, externalities are important in the 
electricity industry: any change at any position in the network, either in production or 
consumption, can affect all other places in the network. For example, a negative consumption 
externality is a complete break in the current or blackout of the electric system (Glachant and 
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Finon, 2000; Glachant, 2002). If at one point in the network a few consumers overload a line, 
they negatively affect many other consumers by causing a break in the current or a complete 
blackout. A negative externality for generators is the need to supply reserve capacity to the 
transmission system operator in order to balance the system, when no benefits accrue to this 
service that could otherwise have been obtained in the marketplace. The presence of these 
negative externalities, such as congestion and blackouts, has been said to ‘threaten the 
efficiency of decentralized markets’ (Newbery, 1999: 205). The externalities have been argued 
to create at least an economic rationale for cooperative procedures across the sector (Glachant, 
2002), or maintaining central co-ordinating authorities (Glachant, 2003) such as the 
transmission system operator, or central dispatch (Newbery, 1999: 206) by for example this 
TSO, or even the vertical integration of the industry (Williamson, 1985; Joskow, 1996; 
Glachant and Finon, 2000).  
 
 
3.3 Regulating natural monopolies  
Several attributes of electricity transactions such as the various forms of asset-specificity and 
the externalities have been brought forward as reasons for regarding vertical integration as the 
most efficient institutional solution in the electricity industry. Another prominent feature of the 
electricity industry is the presence of a natural monopoly. Transaction cost economics argues 
for the governance of natural monopolies with regulation.  
 
3.3.1 Natural monopolies defined 
The transmission and distribution of electricity along the electricity network are a natural 
monopoly (Hunt, 2002: 37-8; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2001: 170). Early definitions of 
natural monopoly seem to have been formulated with public utilities in mind. Farrer (1902, 
cited in Newbery, 1999: 28), for example, included in his catalogue of natural monopoly the 
following characteristics: (1) economies of scale, (2) capital-intensity, (3) non-storability with 
fluctuating demand (4) locational specificity generating location rents, (5) producing 
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necessities essential for the community, and (6) involving direct connections to customers. 
Narrower definitions of natural monopoly, in which economies of scale are at the center of the 
issue, are accepted today (Berg and Tschirhart, 1988). Economies of scale exist when long run 
average costs decrease as output increases. Kahn stated that ‘the critical and all-embracing 
characteristic of natural monopoly is an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs over the 
entire extent of the market’ (Kahn, 1971: 119). He added that ‘this is only so when the 
economies achievable by a larger output are internal to the individual firm’ (Kahn, 1971: 119). 
The many characterizations of a natural monopoly focus on the presence of economies of scale 
within a single firm that can satisfy the total demand for the product or service. Baumol defines 
‘a natural monopoly as an industry whose cost function is such that no combination of several 
firms can produce an industry output vector as cheaply as it can be provided by a single 
supplier’ (Baumol et al., 1977: 350). Parkin states that ‘a natural monopoly is an industry in 
which one firm can supply the entire market at a lower price than two or more firms can’ 
(Parkin, 2005: 262). The principal source of these economies of scale is the large investments 
that have to be made before customers can be served (Kahn, 1971; Train, 1991). Once the 
investments have been made, every additional product or service supplied reduces the average 
costs. The large, capital-intensive and immobile investments in the electricity transmission and 
distribution network are the source of economies of scale in the electricity industry. Various 
empirical studies have reported evidence of scale economies in electricity transmission and 
distribution (see Kwoka (1997: 39) for a summary of these studies).  
Kahn mentions an additional source of potential economies of scale in the electricity industry 
that is to be found on the demand side (Kahn, 1971: 122). Because electricity demand 
fluctuates and producers cannot know in advance how much will be consumed, the producers 
have to keep enough generating capacity running so as to serve all customers at peak demand. 
The variability in demand gives rise to economies of scale: the greater the number and 
diversity of customers and markets served, the greater is the likelihood that the variations in 
their separate demands will tend to cancel one another out (Kahn, 1971: 122). The costs of 
running generating capacity can be divided among an increasing number of customers, and the 
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costs per served customer will therefore decrease when the size of the market increases.  
 
3.3.2 The governance of natural monopolies 
Williamson’s concern with natural monopolies is focused on characterizing their efficient 
structure of governance. He refers to natural monopolies in line with the definitions as 
mentioned above; as ‘where economies of scale are large in relation to the size of the market’, 
and where ‘goods or services are supplied under decreasing cost conditions’ (Williamson, 
1996a: 84-5). The discussion within transaction cost economics on the governance of natural 
monopolies started in the 1970s with a reply by Williamson (1976) to Demsetz (1968), Stigler 
(1968) and Posner (1972)13. The latter argued that a private unregulated monopoly does not 
necessarily lead to pricing on monopoly terms. They opted for franchise bidding; a mechanism 
in which the franchise is awarded to the firm that has bid to offer the utility service at the 
lowest price. Williamson (1976) responded by claiming that the efficacy of franchise bidding 
as an organizational response to the problems posed by natural monopoly (the pricing on 
monopoly terms) varies with the circumstances. He argued that if the transactions are subject to 
considerable market and technological uncertainty and involve substantial asset-specific 
investments, the market-oriented approach of franchise bidding is highly problematic 
(Williamson, 1985: 41; Williamson, 1996a: 85). The necessity of investing in specific assets 
transforms the large numbers bidding at the outset into a relation of bilateral dependency, 
between the firms and consumers, after the bidding process. The consumers are locked into the 
relation with the incumbent supplier, since the cost of supply from others, from unspecialized 
capital, is presumably great (Williamson, 1985: 62). In addition, the supplier of the service – 
the winning bidder – is committed to the transactions to a significant degree due to his asset-
specific investments, which have much smaller economic value in alternative uses. In the 
contract execution stage and in the ex post competition during the contract renewal stage, the 
winning bidder has an advantage over the non-winners, because ‘economic values would be 
sacrificed if the ongoing supply relation were to be terminated’ (Williamson, 1985: 62), and 
                                                 
13
 See also section 2.7 for a discussion on franchise bidding versus regulation of natural monopolies.  
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competition in these ex post stages can thus not be guaranteed. When the transactions between 
consumers and the monopolist are characterized by a large degree of uncertainty and asset-
specificity, Williamson argues for regulation ‘as the ‘best’ mode of governance in comparison 
to alternative feasible forms’ (Williamson, 1999b: 320). He views regulation as a hybrid form 
of governance, in which the parties to the transactions retain their autonomy, but are mediated 
by a regulatory agency (Williamson, 1996a: 96). Goldberg also argued for regulation of natural 
monopolies in order to protect consumers right to be served, but also to protect producers right 
to serve. The latter’s willingness to invest in long-lived, specialized capital equipment depends 
on their expectations concerning the future availability of the market (Goldberg, 1976: 432). 
With respect to the electricity industry, Williamson states that the investments are long-lived 
and immobile (Williamson, 1985: 328), and he therefore questions the deregulation efforts in 
the electricity industries (Williamson, 1985: 328; Williamson, 2002: 187).  
 
Transaction cost economics has thus argued for a combination of two forms of governance in 
the electricity industry: regulation and the vertically integrated hierarchy. The European and 
national authorities have apparently not taken the TCE arguments into account when 
formulating their recent energy policies. What Joskow referred to as the ‘neoclassical public 
policy prescription’ (Joskow, 1996: 345) has been implemented in many European countries. 
The European directives and national implementations require the vertical separation of the 
integrated firms and the opening of the industries to competition. These EC electricity 
directives of 1996 and 2003 will be presented in detail in the following section. The 
consequences of these new rules for the governance structures in the liberalized electricity 
industries will be discussed. 
 
 
3.4 Regulating the liberalizing electricity industries   
In the last few decades, the European Commission and national governments have focused 
their energy policies almost exclusively on the introduction of competition into the European 
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electricity industries. To attain the goal of creating one European competitive electricity 
market, the European Parliament and Council issued two electricity directives, in 1996 and 
2003, on common rules for electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply. These 
directives require the vertical unbundling of transmission and distribution from the integrated 
electricity firms, to enable the introduction of competition into electricity generation and retail. 
They set very detailed guidelines for the independence of the transmission and distribution 
system operators, and the opening of the retail segment to competition. The directives 
furthermore stipulate several rules on how access to the electricity network should be provided 
by the system operators, and on the functioning and responsibilities of the public authorities. 
The directives also allow for some exceptions to these guidelines on the basis of public service 
obligations. The specifics of these directives are described below, to show how they constrain 
and promote the emergence of particular forms of governance in the liberalizing electricity 
industries.   
 
3.4.1 Generation capacity 
The 1996 directive allows member states to use two procedures for the construction of new 
generation capacity: a tendering procedure and an authorization procedure. When a tendering 
procedure is used, a competent authority within each member state has to make estimates for 
the required new and replacement generation capacity. In most European countries, the 
transmission system operator is appointed as the competent authority to make these estimates. 
Some national governments have these estimates approved by either an independent regulatory 
agency or a ministry. Details of the tendering procedure have to be published and tender 
specifications have to be made available to any interested electricity company. These 
specifications have to include among others criteria for the selection of tenderers and the award 
of the contract. An authority has to be appointed that organizes, monitors and controls the 
tendering procedure. 
When member states opt for an authorization procedure, they have to publish detailed 
information on the requirements for the grant of an authorization to electricity companies to 
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build new generation capacity. The 2003 directive restricts the use of the tendering procedure. 
Member states can opt for this procedure only for reasons of security of supply, environmental 
protection and the promotion of infant new technologies, when the authorization procedure 
cannot sufficiently achieve these objectives. The aim of the 2003 directive is thus to leave the 
majority of the investment decisions to the market. Under an authorization procedure, 
electricity companies decide where and with what technology to invest, as compared to the 
tendering procedure in which the transmission system operators and the public authorities 
make these decisions.  
 
3.4.2 Transmission system operation 
The 1996 directive requires the appointment of a transmission system operator that is 
responsible for the operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system. In 
addition, the TSO is responsible for the dispatching of generating installations (to call upon 
generators to produce electricity and to send the electricity along the network), whereby 
priority may be given to generators that use renewable energy sources, waste, and combined 
heat and power (chp). For reasons of security of supply, priority may be given to generating 
installations that use indigenous primary energy fuel sources with a maximum of 15 per cent 
per year of all the primary energy that is necessary to produce the total consumption of 
electricity in the member state.  
 
3.4.2.1 Independence of the TSO 
Under the 1996 directive, the TSO has to be independent from the generation, distribution and 
retail activities of the vertically integrated parent company, at least in terms of its management. 
The 2003 directive is more explicit on the independence of the TSO: the TSO has to make its 
own decisions with respect to the assets for the operation, maintenance and development of the 
network, and the personnel of the TSO cannot participate in generation, distribution or retail 
activities of the parent company. In addition, the 2003 directive extends the requirement of 
independence to a separation of the TSO at least in terms of its legal form. In the Dutch and 
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French electricity industries, this requirement on an independent legal form for the TSO has 
been implemented in different ways. The Dutch TSO (TenneT) is a completely independent 
company, which has removed all of its organizational links (including its ownership) with its 
former parent company (consisting of several Dutch electricity generators). The French TSO 
(RTE) is organized as a legally independent subsidiary that is located under the holding of its 
parent company, Electricité de France. This requirement on the legal independence of the TSO 
has large consequences for the relations between the TSO and the electricity generators and 
retailers and the distribution system operators. New contracts and governance structures have 
to be formulated and implemented between these network users and the TSO for a connection 
and an access to and conduct on the transmission system. The 2003 directive does not require a 
separation of the ownership of the TSO from that of the parent company. The owner can 
approve the financial plans of the TSO and set limits on the level of its indebtedness. The 
French transmission system operator (RTE) is managed independently from Electricité de 
France and is a separate legal subsidiary, but RTE has the same owner as Electricité de France, 
which is the French state.  
 
3.4.2.2 Balancing by the TSO 
The 2003 directive includes rules for the balancing of electricity supply and demand. Before 
the vertical unbundling of the European electricity industries, demand and supply for electricity 
were only balanced for the entire (national) electric systems. The vertically integrated national 
monopolies matched their generation of electricity to the demand by consumers. An example is 
the French electricity industry in which EDF balanced the total generation to the total 
consumption of electricity. In electricity industries where generation was integrated with 
transmission on the one hand and distribution with retail on the other hand, as was partly the 
case in the Dutch electricity industry, the TSO acted as a pooling system. The TSO pooled all 
the electricity of the generators, and sold it for a uniform tariff to the distributors. It monitored 
the amount of electricity taken out of the network by consumers, ordered generators to produce 
reserve capacity in indicated plants, and thereby balanced the entire electric system.  
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A consequence of the vertical separation of the TSOs from the integrated structures is that in 
addition to the system-wide balances, the electricity firms (both the incumbents and the new 
entrants) have to balance their individual positions. They have to match their production of 
electricity to the demand of their customers. These individual, firm-specific balances do not 
only have the goal of ensuring a safe and secure electric system, but also of reducing the 
balancing costs of each individual electricity firm. Electricity firms have several options to 
balance their daily individual positions of electricity supply and demand. They can increase or 
decrease their production, buy or sell electricity on the spot market, and contract balancing 
services from the TSO. Several options are thus available for governing these individual 
balancing transactions.  
In the unbundled electricity industries, the total supply and demand for electricity still need to 
be balanced for the entire systems. Since the TSOs are independent from the vertically 
integrated firms in the new situation, a new form of coordination had to be devised for enabling 
the system-wide balances. This new form of coordination includes among others the program 
responsibility. This is the responsibility of electricity firms to send energy programs (e-
programs) to the TSO on a daily basis. These e-programs contain the amount of electricity that 
firms expect to put on and be taken out of the network on the next day. The TSO adds all these 
e-programs and makes sure that these projections are balanced for the entire system. The 
expectations on electricity generation and consumption often differ from reality. The TSO is 
responsible for balancing electricity supply and demand for the entire system. It also bills the 
electricity firms for the amount of imbalance (the difference between their e-programs and the 
actual production and consumption of electricity) that they create on the network. The 2003 
directive states that the TSO cannot favour any electricity firms when providing balancing 
services. The rules for charging the users should be non-discriminatory and cost-reflective. 
The electricity firms also provide balancing services to the TSO by increasing or decreasing 
the amount of electricity that they supply to the network. New forms of governance are 
emerging for the coordination of these balancing services by the electricity firms. A bidding 
mechanism can be set up, in which the electricity firms bid to deliver a certain amount of 
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reserve capacity to the TSO. Another option is bilateral contracts, in which a minimum amount 
of electricity is specified that the electricity firms will reserve for delivery to the TSO as 
balancing power. The 2003 directive requires that the TSO buys the energy from electricity 
firms to balance the system in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. It also states that ‘as 
soon as the electricity market is sufficiently liquid, non-discriminatory and cost-reflective 
balancing should be achieved through the setting up of a transparent market-based mechanism 
for the supply and purchase of electricity needed in the framework of balancing requirements’ 
(EC, 2003).   
 
3.4.3 Distribution system operation  
The first directive states that a distribution system operator shall be appointed to which many 
of the same guidelines apply as to the transmission system operator. The distribution system 
operator shall not discriminate between network users. When dispatching, it can give priority 
to electricity firms that generate combined heat and power or that generate electricity with 
renewables or waste. The 2003 directive sets the same balancing mechanism guidelines for the 
distribution system operator as those that apply to the transmission system operator. The 
distribution system operator has to be independent in terms of its legal form, organization and 
decision-making from the other activities of the related electricity firm.  
 
3.4.4 Accounting unbundling 
Electricity firms have to unbundle their accounts, which means that they have to keep separate 
accounts for their generation, transmission and distribution activities. The directives state that a 
competent authority has to be appointed that has a right of access to these accounts. In most 
countries, the independent regulatory agencies are responsible for monitoring the accounting 
unbundling of electricity firms. This unbundling of accounts is required in order ‘to avoid 
cross-subsidies, discrimination and distortion of competition’ (EC, 1996). Vertically integrated 
firms could use income of the transmission and distribution activities for expenditures in the 
potentially competitive segments as generation and retail. These cross-subsidies enable them to 
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offer lower prices to consumers or better returns to investors. New entrants, which do not own 
transmission or distribution systems, are set at a competitive disadvantage. The 2003 directive 
added that electricity firms have to separate their accounts of the retail services to eligible 
customers (consumers that can choose their electricity retailer) from those to the non-eligible 
customers (consumers that are still restricted to supply from their regional or national 
monopolist). While the eligible customers pay a price for their electricity that is set by their 
electricity firm, non-eligible customers pay a regulated tariff. Electricity firms can have an 
incentive to use the income from the non-eligible customer segment to offer lower prices to 
their eligible customers, and thereby distort competition.  
 
3.4.5 Network access 
The independence of the transmission and distribution system operators from the generators 
and retailers necessitates the development of new forms of governance for network access to 
replace the vertical integration. The generators and retailers still need access to the network to 
be able to deliver and receive electricity. The 1996 directive states that the system operators 
have to provide a non-discriminatory access to the network for every network user: the 
electricity generators, retailers and large industrial consumers. The two directives give several 
options for governing these network access transactions.  
Under the 1996 directive, member states could opt for a system of negotiated access to the 
network, a single buyer procedure, or a system of regulated access to the network. In a system 
of negotiated access to the network, the system operator and the network user negotiate the 
price and conditions of the contract for access to the network. In the case of the single buyer 
procedure, a single buyer is appointed for the territory that is covered by the system operator. 
The single buyer purchases all the electricity from competing generators and supplies all the 
consumers within its territory. The problem with this single buyer model is that no competition 
can develop in the retail part of the industry. There is only one electricity firm, the single 
buyer, which sells all the electricity to the consumers. In a system of regulated access to the 
network, the network users pay a regulated tariff to the system operator for access to the 
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network. Most European countries chose to implement the regulated network access system. 
One of the exceptions was Germany, which initially chose for a system of negotiated access to 
the network. The 2003 directive only allows for the system of regulated access to the network. 
This directive adds that the tariffs, or at least the methodologies used to calculate them, need to 
be fixed or approved by a public authority prior to their entry into force. 
 
3.4.6 Opening retail to potential competition 
The first directive sets several thresholds and a timetable for giving consumers a choice of 
electricity retailer, and thereby for ending the monopolies in the retail segments of the 
European electricity industries. These thresholds are based on the levels of electricity 
consumption, ranging from consumers that buy more than 40 GWh of electricity per year to 
those that buy more than 20 GWh and 9 GWh per year. These thresholds determine the shares 
of the national industries that have to be opened up to potential competition. If consumers that 
use more than 40 GWh of electricity per year cover 33 per cent of the total demand in the 
European electricity industries, then 33 per cent of each national industry needs to be opened. 
This means that 33 per cent of the consumers must be able to switch from their incumbent to 
another electricity retailer. The first threshold is thus 40 GWh, and after three and six years of 
the entry into force of the directive, the thresholds are reduced to 20 GWh and 9 GWh, 
respectively. The 2003 directive added that by July 2004 all non-household consumers should 
be free to choose their electricity retailer, and by July 2007 all consumers should be able to 
choose their retailer. 
 
3.4.7 Regulatory authorities  
The 1996 directive states that a competent authority within each member state needs to be 
appointed that is responsible for settling disputes related to among others network access 
contracts and refusals of network access. This authority has to be independent from the parties 
involved in the dispute. The 2003 directive refers not only to a competent authority, but 
specifically to the designation of one or more regulatory authorities. These authorities have to 
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be independent from the interests of the electricity industry. The 2003 directive specifies and 
extends the responsibilities and powers of the authorities. The regulatory authorities are 
responsible for ‘ensuring non-discrimination, effective competition and efficient functioning of 
the market’ (EC, 2003). They have to monitor the accounting unbundling, the conditions and 
tariffs for connecting new generators of electricity to the network, and the extent to which 
transmission and distribution system operators fulfil their tasks. The regulatory authorities have 
to publish an annual report on the outcome of their monitoring activities. In addition, they are 
responsible for fixing or approving the tariffs or at least the methodologies used to establish the 
conditions for the connection and access to the network and the provision of balancing 
services. This responsibility signifies an important change in the 2003 directive as compared to 
the first directive. Member states are not allowed anymore to make use of an authority that 
only operates ex post. Some member states (e.g. Germany) used to rely solely on their 
competition authorities to ensure the functioning of their electricity markets. This directive thus 
requires the appointment of a regulatory authority that approves or sets the tariffs or the 
methodologies for these tariffs ex ante. 
 
3.4.8 Public service obligations 
The directives specify that member states can oblige their electricity firms to take public 
service obligations into account. Public service obligations include such concerns as security of 
supply, quality and price of electricity, and environmental protection. These guidelines on 
public service obligations can allow member states to take exception with other guidelines in 
the directives. Member states may decide not to apply the provisions on the authorization and 
tendering procedures and network access rules if these obstruct the performance of the public 
service obligations. The development of trade within the European Union should thereby not 
be obstructed. The 2003 directive adds to these public service obligations a concern for 
consumer protection. All household consumers, and where appropriate small enterprises, 
should enjoy universal service, which is the right to be supplied with electricity of a specified 
quality for comparable and transparent prices. Safeguards should be offered to vulnerable 
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consumers to help them avoid disconnection. Member states shall ensure that the eligible 
customer is in fact able to switch to another supplier. 
 
Several of the requirements of these two European directives, including the requirements on 
the vertical unbundling of the transmission and distribution system operators, and on giving 
consumers a choice of electricity retailer, have a substantial influence on the governance 
transformations in the electricity industries. These requirements prohibit the vertically 
integrated structures, and necessitate the emergence of altered forms of governance in the 
vertical chain of transactions. A few of the guidelines in the directives are specifically aimed at 
promoting the adoption of market forms of governance to replace the vertical integration. 
These include among others the designation of regulatory authorities with a responsibility for 
an efficient functioning of the market, the requirements for the transmission and distribution 
system operators to supply and purchase electricity needed for balancing with a market-based 
mechanism, and the use of the tendering procedure for new generation capacity. The following 
section presents the results of the few empirical studies within transaction cost economics on 
the governance of transactions in unbundled energy industries. These studies did not report the 
emergence of market forms of governance, but instead the adoption of hybrid structures in the 
form of long-term bilateral contracts between the vertically unbundled segments of the 
electricity value chain.     
 
 
3.5 Governance in an unbundled electricity industry 
Transaction cost economics argues that the altered forms of governance in a disintegrated 
industry are unlikely to be anonymous spot markets (e.g. Crocker, 1996; Joskow and 
Schmalensee, 1983). Instead, TCE predicts and empirical studies (Joskow, 1987; Crocker and 
Masten, 1988) have shown that long-term contracts are the preferred institutional response. 
Long-term contracts are favoured because the transactions between the transmission system 
operators, generators, distributors and retailers are characterized by extensive relationship-
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specific investments. The empirical studies on the characteristics of governance structures in 
unbundled energy industries will be discussed in this section for the various relations in the 
electricity value chain. These empirical studies have mainly focused on the unbundled energy 
industries in the United States.   
 
3.5.1 Generators – transmission system operators 
Between the generators of electricity and the transmission system operators, Crocker (1996) 
observed the presence of substantial relationship-specific investments that are associated with 
the siting of generation facilities and the construction of transmission lines. These relationship-
specific investments lead to an exchange environment in the wholesale power market that is 
characterized by small numbers bargaining and a high probability of opportunistic behaviour 
(Crocker, 1996: 90-91). The preferred institutional response for both the transmission system 
operators and the generators is therefore the long-term contract, as compared to market 
relations, in the vertically disintegrated electricity industries. See also appendix A for a 
discussion on the operating and investment complementarities between the transmission 
system operator and the electricity generators.  
 
3.5.2 Generators – distributors/retailers 
The contracts between independent generators and utilities in the electricity industry in the 
United States have been studied, and have been found to be characterized by extended 
durations (Cameron, 1992). The main reason given for the increase in the duration of these 
long-term contracts is asset-specificity. Cameron (1992) reported that the contracts between the 
independent generators and utilities were on average 2.3 decades long. Joskow (1987) found 
the same relation between asset-specificity and contract length: the more important the 
relationship-specific investments are, the longer are the commitments that buyers and sellers 
make to the terms of future trade (Joskow, 1987: 168). He studied 277 coal contracts between 
coal suppliers and electric utilities in the United States. The presence of site-specificity 
between mines and electric utilities led to an increase in contract duration of twelve to sixteen 
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years. The presence of dedicated assets led to an increase in the duration of thirteen years 
(Joskow, 1987: 175-178). In the natural gas industry, Crocker and Masten (1988) also observed 
the presence of long-term contracts as a result of extensive relationship-specific investments in 
this industry. The long-term nature of the contracts was found to be accompanied by a large 
degree of flexibility in the terms of the contracts. The longer the contractual agreements are the 
more likely is the chance of some future external change influencing the terms of the 
agreement. Crocker and Masten (1988) concluded that because of these extended durations, the 
long-term contracts include pricing and quantity provisions that allow for future adjustments to 
the agreed upon price and quantity level. Joskow (1988) also reported that the majority of the 
contracts between coal mines and electric utilities included provisions to adapt the price of coal 
to the production costs of the mine.  
Helm and Jenkinson (1998) explain the presence of long-term contracts between generators 
and retailers in the electricity industries, and even the desire of the contracting parties to re-
integrate vertically, by an additional attribute of transactions, that of uncertainty. They claim 
that the vertical disintegration of the electricity industry will lead to the replacement of 
integration with long-term contracts. The introduction of competition into the retail segment 
will have a large impact on the vertical relations. A monopoly in the retail segment allowed for 
the downward allocation of risks of investing in generating capacity to the consumers. When 
the monopoly for the electricity consumers disappears, uncertainty increases substantially. 
Generators are uncertain whether they can earn a sufficient rate of return on their investments 
in new generating capacity. Helm and Jenkinson state that this increase in uncertainty helps to 
explain the general desire to reintegrate vertically in this industry (Helm and Jenkinson, 1998: 
11). 
 
3.5.3 Transmission system operators – network users  
The distributors and retailers prefer long-term contracts in their relation with the transmission 
system operator, because the latter has a monopoly over the transmission network and 
therefore has the potential for displaying opportunistic behaviour and abusing its monopolistic 
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position (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). If, for example, the distributors or retailers were to 
purchase some electric power from the TSO to meet peak demand or balancing requirements 
on a spot market basis, the TSO may have ‘strong incentives to curtail supplies and create 
shortages’ (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983: 144) and thereby increase the price of electricity. 
These long-term contracts would have to specify the price at which the TSO will supply the 
electricity.  
Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) also argued that the long-term contracts between the TSO and 
the users of the network are characterized by a coordinating role for the transmission system 
operator. The TSO has the objective of finding a way to make the decentralized decisions of 
distributors and generators consistent with the overall economics of the system. There are, for 
example, important economies associated with the combined operation and investment of 
transmission and generation capacity. Since the TSO cannot own electricity distribution or 
generation firms, the integrating function has to be performed through contracts with the 
distributors and generators. The TSO will require information from the distributors, including 
among others information on the distributors’ contractual arrangements with the generators. 
This information should enable the TSO to decide whether the contracts will allow for an 
efficient mix of plant, plant locations and total capacity of electricity for the entire system 
(Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983: 139-142). Not only do long-term contracts replace the 
vertical integration, the TSO thus also takes on a coordinating role in the governance of several 
of these contracts. 
 
These various empirical studies have shown that long-term contracts have emerged in the 
unbundled energy industries. For reasons of asset-specificity and uncertainty, the market is not 
an efficient institutional solution for the vertical relations between the various unbundled 
segments of the energy industries. A coordinating role for the transmission system operators is 
reserved for several of the long-term contracts. The increased uncertainty in liberalized 
industries provides a reason for the vertical re-integration of electricity generators and retailers.   
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3.6 Conclusion 
The search for new forms of governance by the European electricity firms in the unbundled, 
liberalized industries is constrained, both by the attributes of the electricity transactions and the 
institutional environment in the form of the European directives and national regulations. The 
presence of extensive asset-specific investments, externalities, natural monopolies and close 
interrelationships between the various segments of the electricity value chain constrain the 
emergence of market forms of governance. These transaction attributes lead to relations 
between the parties to the electricity transactions that are characterized by a great degree of 
bilateral and multilateral dependence. The transacting parties require some form of coordinated 
cooperation to ensure the efficient performance of the electric system. The European directives 
and national regulations on the unbundling of the vertical hierarchy, the independence of the 
system operators and the opening of the retail segment are, on the contrary, stimulating the 
emergence of market forms of governance. This chapter has discussed these characteristics of 
the electricity industries, the electricity transactions’ attributes and the regulations, to analyse 
the drivers of governance transformations and determinants of the new forms of governance in 
the electricity industry. These two factors, regulation and transactions, are inputs to the 
conceptual framework that provides the explanation of this study on how governance structures 
change, and what new forms of governance emerge. This conceptual framework is presented in 
the following chapter.  
88
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4 – Complementing Transaction Cost Economics 
 
 
The European Council and Parliament and the national regulators have formulated various 
rules to enable the liberalization of the European electricity industries. These rules prescribe 
the vertical unbundling of the integrated electricity firms and promote the development of 
competitive electricity markets14. The vertical unbundling refers to the separation of the 
transmission and distribution of electricity from the generation and retail of electricity. It 
entails the creation of independent companies for the operation of the transmission and 
distribution networks. These networks have natural monopoly characteristics and are therefore 
excluded from the introduction of competition. The vertical separation of these networks from 
the integrated electricity firms is prescribed to facilitate the introduction of competition in the 
generation and retail of electricity15.  
The new rules also prescribe that electricity consumers should be allowed to choose their 
electricity retailer. These rules thereby end the regional and national monopolies for the supply 
of electricity and allow new electricity firms to enter the electricity industries. The incumbent 
and new entrant electricity retailers are expected to compete for the supply of electricity to 
consumers, and to set competitive prices. The regulated tariffs for the supply of electricity are 
abandoned when consumers are able to choose their electricity retailer.  
By implication, these new regulations influence the governance structures at the level of the 
firm in the European electricity industries; they stimulate a process of governance change away 
from the vertically integrated hierarchies. New forms of governance need to emerge to 
coordinate the transactions between the unbundled system operators, and the generators and 
                                                 
14
 See section four of chapter three for a more detailed discussion on the European electricity directives.  
15
 Competition could also be introduced into the electricity industries without the vertical unbundling, and 
the vertically integrated energy firms would compete for the supply of electricity to consumers. The 
European Commission advocates vertical unbundling, because a continued integration of the electricity 
networks into the incumbent energy firms could give these firms a competitive advantage over the new 
entrants. The incumbent firms would be able to cross-subsidize their electricity generation and retail with 
earnings from the distribution and transmission of electricity, and they could favor their own subsidiaries 
over the new entrants for a connection and an access to the network (EC, 2003). 
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retailers of electricity. These new forms of governance need to replace the vertical integration 
and to provide safeguards for the contractual hazards between the unbundled activities. The 
main contractual hazard between the system operators and the generators and retailers of 
electricity is bilateral dependency. This dependency is due to the extensive asset-specific 
investments that characterize the transactions between the operators, generators and retailers16. 
The European Commission and national regulators aim for changes to market forms of 
governance.  
These two topics, regulation and governance structures, are addressed by transaction cost 
economics17. Transaction cost economics analyses regulation as a hybrid form of governance 
that solves a contracting problem between utility firms and consumers, and between utility 
firms and the regulator (Williamson 1996a: 96). This first contracting problem arises when the 
utility firm has a monopoly for the supply of its service, and has an incentive to hold up the 
consumers with unreasonably high prices. The regulator takes on an agency role for the 
consumers and signs a collective contract with the utility firms. This collective contract 
includes a maximum tariff for the utility service (e.g. Goldberg, 1976; Williamson, 1976). The 
second contracting problem consists of the regulator’s incentive to hold up the utility firms 
with very low tariffs once the utility firms have sunk large, capital-intensive investments in the 
networks and in generating capacity (e.g. Joskow, 1991). In this case, a regulatory governance 
structure has to restrict the discretionary behavior of the regulator. Transaction cost economics 
has thus focused its analysis on the regulation of utility firms that have a monopoly for 
providing utility services and that provide these services at a regulated tariff. In the liberalizing 
electricity industries, this analysis is relevant only for the regulation of the transmission and 
distribution networks. The networks remain natural monopolies, and the system operators 
provide the transportation services at a regulated tariff.  
Transaction cost economics has largely ignored the regulation of introducing competition into 
                                                 
16
 Section 3.2 introduced the various forms of asset-specificity that characterize the transactions in the 
electricity industry. 
17
 Section 2.7 gives a detailed discussion on the perspective of TCE on regulation as a governance 
structure.  
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the electricity industries and of maintaining competition between the various electricity 
generators and retailers18. Analyzing the regulation of the current governance changes in the 
liberalizing electricity industries with transaction cost economics poses several problems. 
Firstly, transaction cost economics ignores the fact that regulation sets the rules of the game 
and thereby influences the governance structures at the level of the firm, as can be observed in 
the case of the European liberalizing electricity industries. Transaction cost economics analyses 
regulation solely as a governance structure that is positioned at the same level as markets, 
hybrids and hierarchies. It does not embed regulation in the institutional environment19. This 
complicates an understanding of the regulatory influence on governance changes at the level of 
the firm. Secondly, the contracting problems on which transaction cost economics focuses 
(between the utility firms and the consumers, and between the utility firms and the regulator), 
for which regulation is claimed to be an efficient governance solution, are less relevant in 
liberalized electricity industries. In these industries, the electricity firms have lost their 
monopolies for the supply of electricity, and are therefore not able to hold up the consumers 
with monopolistic prices20. In liberalized electricity industries, the regulator cannot hold up the 
electricity generators or retailers with regulated tariffs, because these firms set their own prices. 
The relevant contracting problems in liberalizing electricity industries are the ones between the 
unbundled segments of the formerly integrated electricity firms. These contracting problems 
are relevant because the rules to liberalize the industries, and specifically the rules on vertical 
unbundling and consumer choice, create a need for new safeguards for these contracting 
problems. Thirdly, transaction cost economics is limited in its ability to explain changes from 
one form of governance to another21. Transaction cost economics is largely a comparative 
static perspective (e.g. Langlois, 1992). Williamson does refer to adaptation as the ‘central 
                                                 
18
 Transaction cost economics has focused on competition for the market. The firm that wins the bidding 
competition earns the right to the monopoly franchise and is subject to regulation (Williamson, 1976). 
19
 See section 2.7 for a discussion on the distinction between the perspective of TCE on regulation as a 
governance structure, and the viewpoint in which regulation is located in the institutional environment.  
20
 This contracting problem only remains relevant for the transmission and distribution of electricity. 
These two activities retain their monopoly and are therefore still subject to regulated tariffs.   
21
 Section 2.5 provides a discussion on the concept of adaptation within transaction cost economics, and 
why this concept is limited in its ability to explain changes between governance structures.  
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problem of economic organization’ (Williamson, 1999a: 1101), but adaptation is not analyzed 
as a process that can explain changes between different forms of governance. Within 
transaction cost economics, adaptation is defined as a static feature of governance structures: 
the market is characterized by autonomous adaptation, and the hierarchy by cooperative 
adaptation. To understand the changes from vertically integrated electricity firms to hybrid and 
market forms of governance, the concept of adaptation has to be extended to enable an 
explanation of changes between forms of governance.  
This chapter presents a complementary perspective on regulation and governance 
transformations that enables an understanding of the regulatory influence on governance 
changes. It is different from the current transaction cost economics’ treatment of concepts as 
regulation, relevant contracting problems and adaptation, but it is a perspective that can still be 
incorporated within the larger TCE framework: it is thus complementing transaction cost 
economics. It locates regulation in the institutional environment, focuses on the contracting 
problems between unbundled activities, and analyses adaptation as a process of change 
between governance structures.  
 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework 
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The various sections of this chapter discuss these complementary elements, and thereby follow 
the conceptual framework of this thesis that is illustrated here in figure 4.1. In the first two 
sections (section 4.1 and section 4.2), regulation is defined and located in the institutional 
environment. It is shown how regulation as the rules of the game differs from regulation as a 
governance structure. In addition, the regulatory institutional organizations (consisting of the 
public authorities that formulate, execute and enforce the regulations) are characterized. 
Section 4.3 discusses the various effects that regulation has on the governance structures at the 
level of the firm: firstly, it describes that regulation prohibits the vertically integrated 
monopolies; secondly, it discusses which electricity transactions are in need of new forms of 
governance as a result of the regulations on unbundling and consumer choice; thirdly, it 
characterizes the attributes of these electricity transactions and the contracting problems to 
which these attributes lead; fourthly, it discusses how these contracting problems in liberalizing 
electricity industries differ from Williamson’s contracting problems; and finally it illustrates 
how regulation becomes part of the new governance structures (see the bottom line from 
regulation to new governance structures in figure 4.1). Section 4.4 looks at the effects of 
regulation on the attributes of the electricity transactions, including the asset-specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency of the transactions. Based on the discussion of the regulatory effects 
on governance and transactions, section 4.5 introduces the concept of misalignment (and 
alignment) between governance structures and the attributes of transactions. A misalignment 
may stimulate a process of adaptation towards altered forms of governance. Section 4.6 
extends the transaction cost economics framework to include a process of adaptation that 
enables an explanation of governance transformations and consequently of the type of new 
governance structures that emerge. Regulation has a direct influence on this process of 
adaptation (see the line from regulation to adaptation in figure 4.1). Chapters six and seven 
apply this conceptual framework to empirical data of the Dutch and French electricity 
industries, respectively.  
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4.1 Taking regulation to a higher plane 
Regulation has been defined in various ways, ranging from very broad definitions (‘an 
alternative mode of public control’ (Majone, 1996) or ‘a form of public policy’ (Wilks, 1996)) 
to more detailed ones, and to those that are specifically tailored to the regulation of liberalizing 
electricity industries. A more detailed, and often used22, definition of regulation is provided by 
Selznick (1985). He defines regulation as ‘sustained and focused control exercised by a public 
agency, on the basis of a legislative mandate, over activities that are generally regarded as 
desirable to society’ (Selznick, 1985: 363-4).  
This definition of regulation will here be used, but it will be adjusted to take account of a 
particularity of regulating liberalizing electricity (and other network) industries. In these 
industries, regulation’s main goal is constituting markets and promoting competition. Henry et 
al. (2001) for example define regulation of network industries as ‘involving all aspects of 
intervention on the part of the public authorities, aimed at establishing competition in a sector 
where it did not previously exist or existed only to a very limited extent, and reconciling the 
fair exercise of such competition with the duties in the public interest that are incumbent upon 
network utilities’ (Henry et al., 2001: 14). Littlechild (2003) also stated that ‘the modern 
regulatory framework gives the utility regulator a duty to promote competition and encourage 
new entry, in contrast to traditional regulatory frameworks that sought to replace competition’ 
(Littlechild, 2003: 63). The inclusion of this characteristic of regulation (i.e. market-creation) 
results in a definition of regulation that recognizes that regulation does not only have the 
purpose of restricting behaviour and preventing the occurrence of certain undesirable activities, 
but that ‘the influence of regulation may also be enabling or facilitative’ (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999: 2).  
In addition, the definition of regulation will also have to include a specification of what these 
public authorities do on the basis of their legislative mandate: the public authorities exercise 
control by formulating, executing and enforcing laws, rules, codes of conduct and contracts. 
This adjustment of the definition is necessary to enable a clear distinction (in the following 
                                                 
22
 Studies on regulation often refer to this definition (see e.g. Majone, 1996: 9; Minogue, 2002: 651). 
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subsection, 4.1.1) between regulation as a governance structure and regulation as the rules of 
the game. The following definition of regulation will be used in this thesis:     
 
The regulation of liberalizing electricity industries is defined as the formulation, execution and 
enforcement of laws, rules, codes of conduct and contracts, by public authorities, on the basis 
of a legislative mandate, aimed at constituting markets and promoting competition, and 
protecting the public interest. 
 
4.1.1 Regulation as a governance structure versus regulation as the rules of the game 
Transaction cost economics analyses regulation solely as a governance structure that is 
positioned at the same level as hierarchies, hybrids and markets. Although transaction cost 
economics does take the institutional environment into account as an influence on governance 
structures, it does not locate regulation at this higher level of institutions. Within transaction 
cost economics, the institutions at the environmental level include uncertainty, property rights, 
contract law regimes, and reputation (Williamson, 1996a: 112-117), but not regulation23. In 
this thesis, regulation is also located in the institutional environment. To enable a distinction 
between regulation as a governance structure and regulation as the rules of the game, the two 
definitions of a governance structure and of the institutional environment will here be applied 
to regulation.  
Governance structures have, in chapter two, been defined as the organizational constructions 
that coordinate the transactions between two or more parties to incomplete contracts. 
Governance structures allow for an ex post implementation and enforcement of the ex ante 
formulated incomplete contracts. The two distinguishing features of governance structures as 
compared to the institutional environment are (1) the fact that they only operate ex post to fill 
in the gaps as left by incomplete contracts, and (2) that they govern contracts that are restricted 
in their application to the specific parties that have signed these contracts. This latter feature 
                                                 
23
 Section 2.6 gives a discussion on how the institutional environment is defined within transaction cost 
economics. 
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can be referred to as a distinction between inter-individual governance structures and collective 
institutions at the environmental level (Brousseau and Fares, 2000). The institutional 
environment is defined as the collective24 ‘rules of the game that exist ex ante (before a 
governance structure is built)’25 (North, 1990; Brousseau and Fares, 2000), and that are 
formulated, executed and enforced by public authorities26.  
When regulation is restricted in its definition to that of governance structures, as is the case in 
transaction cost economics, a large part of the regulations in the liberalizing electricity 
industries is ignored. The European electricity directives, national laws, and many of the 
regulatory decisions, codes of conduct, and contracts are collective and formulated ex ante. 
These regulations therefore have to be defined as the rules of the game, and located in the 
institutional environment. They have to be taken into account when studying the regulation of 
governance structures and governance transformation in the liberalizing electricity industries. 
Others have also argued that there exists a clear distinction between governance structures at 
the level of the firm and the public authorities that set the rules of the game. Scott (1995) 
remarked that ‘all organizations are correctly viewed as governance structures, but the state is 
set apart’ (Scott, 1995: 93). The government and its regulatory agencies are set apart, because 
they can ‘exercise authority over other organizations’ (Lindblom, 1977: 21). Lindberg et al. 
(1991) state that ‘the important point is that the state assumes a privileged conceptual position, 
because it is capable of influencing governance in many complex ways, most of which are not 
                                                 
24
 Ménard (1995) summarizes the collective nature of institutions as follows: ‘Institutions transcend 
individuals and organizations such as firms. They involve the implementation of an abstract set of rules 
which are impersonal, in that they must apply to all members of specified categories and preclude 
individual choices, and non-arbitrary, in that they are perceived to be the same for all members of a 
certain category.’ (Ménard, 1995). 
25
 Aoki (2000) refers to Douglass North’ perspective on institutions as existing ex ante: ‘North (1990) 
argues…that institutions should be identified with the rules of the game as distinct from the players of the 
game. By definition, the formal rules of the economic game…have been determined prior to the playing 
of the game.’ (Aoki, 2000: 12).  
26
 Brousseau and Fares (2000) also include the public authorities in their definition of the institutions: 
‘Institutions are made up, on the one hand, of rules that prescribe behaviors to agents in particular 
circumstances, and on the other hand, of decision-making mechanisms that are responsible for managing 
these rules (courts, parliament, a civil service in charge of implementing the law)’ (Brousseau and Fares, 
2000: 415). 
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available to organizations in civil society’ (Lindberg et al., 1991: 31). And specifically for 
liberalizing network industries, Majone (1996) stated that the main function of the regulator is 
to ensure that economic actors play by the agreed rules of the game (Majone, 1996: 54). 
Similarly, Henry et al. (2001) referred to the role of the state as a designer and monitor of the 
rules of the competitive game (Henry et al., 2001: 14). In order to distinguish regulation as the 
rules of the game from regulation as a governance structure, the following two definitions 
apply here: 
 
Regulation is located in the institutional environment, either when regulation refers to the 
rules (in the form of European directives, national legislation, regulatory decisions, codes and 
contracts) that are set ex ante (before the governance structures are set up that are affected by 
these rules) and that are collective (they are not restricted in their application to one specific 
economic actor or one specific contractual relation), or when it refers to the public authorities 
that formulate, execute and enforce these collective ex ante rules.  
 
Regulation becomes part of a governance structure when the public authorities get involved in 
the execution and/or enforcement of a specific contract between transacting parties, or in 
settling the disputes that arise between the parties to the contract. 
 
 
4.2 Regulatory institutional organizations  
These two definitions of regulation, in which regulation is either located in the institutional 
environment or is part of a governance structure, refer to the public authorities that formulate, 
execute and enforce the regulations. Over time, the public authorities that regulated the 
electricity industries, and the role of these public authorities, have changed. Before the 
liberalization of the European electricity industries, most utilities with national monopolies 
were owned and operated by the central governments, as was the case in France and Italy. In 
several other European countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, the regional or 
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local governments owned and operated the utilities and were subject to regulation by the 
central government, usually by the ministries of economic affairs and finances. The 
introduction of competition into the European electricity industries is altering the role of the 
national governments in these industries. This role is changing from being a provider of utility 
services to one of developing and implementing a regulatory framework for the stimulation of 
competition among energy companies that provide the utility services to consumers. As others 
have observed (e.g. Majone, 1996), the interventionist state in Europe is gradually evolving 
into a regulatory state. There is thus a switch from a state that does to a state that tells how 
things are to be done. One of the most obvious structural consequences of the shift to a 
regulatory state is the creation of a new type of regulator: the independent sector-specific 
regulatory agency (Majone, 1997). The independent regulatory agency is taking over, and is 
reformulating, some of the formerly state duties. In addition, in the process from monopolistic 
to potentially competitive industries, the competition authority is assuming its role as a 
regulator of the electricity industries.  
A new institutional organization for the regulation of the electricity industries is thus emerging 
in which the central governments, and in particular the ministries of economic affairs, have to 
share their responsibilities for regulating the electricity industries with independent sector-
specific regulatory agencies and competition authorities. This section defines such a regulatory 
institutional organization by (1) the various public authorities that are involved in regulating 
the liberalizing electricity industries (ministries, independent sector-specific agencies, 
competition authorities); (2) the allocation of regulatory responsibilities among these 
authorities; and (3) the coordination mechanisms that structure the authorities’ mutual relations 
(Niesten, 2006). This regulatory institutional organization is located in between the 
institutional environment and the governance structures (see figure 4.2), because the public 
authorities both formulate, execute, and enforce the collective ex ante rules, and execute and 
enforce the specific contracts between transacting parties. 
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Figure 4.2 Regulatory institutional organization 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Public authorities and the allocation of regulatory responsibilities and powers 
The three main public authorities involved in regulating the liberalizing electricity industries 
are the ministry of economic affairs, the independent sector-specific regulatory agency and the 
competition authority. The ministry is responsible for formulating sector-specific and 
competition legislation. The independent sector-specific regulatory agency and the competition 
authority implement the sector-specific and competition laws, respectively.  
Despite these generalities, countries have attributed regulatory responsibilities and powers to 
each of these authorities in different ways. Important regulatory responsibilities and powers in 
liberalizing electricity industries include responsibilities for formulating, executing, and/or 
enforcing rules on network connection, network access, unbundling of accounts, independence 
of the transmission and distribution system operators, balancing of electricity supply and 
demand, electricity supply, consumer choice, and the transfer of information on switching 
consumers. The responsibilities for these rules are studied in this thesis, firstly because they 
make up the largest part of the requirements in the European electricity directives, and 
secondly because it will become evident that these are the rules that influence the governance 
transformations (see section 4.3).  
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4.2.2 Coordination mechanisms between the competition authority and the sector-specific 
agency 
Coordination mechanisms between the various public authorities exist in order to coordinate 
the formulation, execution and enforcement of the regulations27. These mechanisms include 
various means of control and/or influence of one public authority over another. The 
coordination mechanisms between the competition authority and the sector-specific regulatory 
agency are necessary for at least two reasons. Firstly, the two authorities have to be able to 
cope with an overlap of regulatory responsibilities. An example of such an overlap concerns 
the responsibility for network access rules. When the sector-specific regulatory agency has the 
responsibility for network access rules and tariffs to allow each new entrant a non-
discriminatory access to the natural monopoly of transmission and distribution, it in fact has a 
responsibility to avoid an abuse of dominant position by the incumbent (the owner of the 
network). Avoiding abuses of dominant position is generally the responsibility of the 
competition authority. Secondly, it has to be avoided that the sector-specific regulatory agency 
can interpret terms under the sector-specific legislation in a way that is inconsistent with 
competition legislation. Countries have found different institutional solutions to cope with the 
overlap of responsibilities and inconsistencies in the interpretation of terms. They have set up 
different mechanisms to coordinate the relation between the competition authority and the 
sector-specific regulatory agency. At least four coordination mechanisms can be distinguished. 
Within the sector-specific agency’s area of responsibility, the agency can ask the competition 
authority for advice. The competition authority may also coordinate the decisions of the sector-
                                                 
27
 To identify the coordination mechanisms, various data sources have been used, including reports of the 
OECD (1999) and of the International Energy Agency (2001) on regulatory institutions in liberalized 
electricity markets. This IEA report summarizes the authorities that are involved in regulating the various 
European electricity industries. On the basis of this report, several EU countries, including Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland, were selected to study their 
regulatory institutional organizations more in depth. From this analysis, the various coordination 
mechanisms were identified. The websites of the public authorities were used as a data source: 
www.bmwi.de, www.bundeskartellamt.de, www.cre.fr, www.industrie.gouv.fr/energie/, 
www.finances.gouv.fr/DGCCRF/, www.dte.nl, www.nmanet.nl, www.ez.nl, www.ofgem.gov.uk, 
www.stem.se, www.energiamarkkinavirasto.fi. 
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specific regulatory agency. This means that the competition authority is involved in the 
regulatory decisions of the sector-specific regulatory agency and that it consults with the 
agency on its regulatory decisions, but no formal approval of the competition authority is 
necessary for the decisions of the sector-specific regulatory agency. Co-ordination does not 
rule out conflicting decisions between the sector-specific agency and the competition authority 
(OECD, 1999: 196, 208). If advice or coordination are not sufficient, the sector-specific agency 
can be required to ask for the approval of the competition authority. These three coordination 
mechanisms indicate that an increasing influence of the competition authority over the 
decisions by the sector-specific agency can be observed, and thus an increasing precedence is 
given to competition legislation. In the fourth coordination mechanism, no further influence is 
attributed to the competition authority over the sector-specific agency. It is the sector-specific 
agency itself that gives precedence to competition legislation over the sector-specific acts. The 
sector-specific regulatory agency has concurrent powers under competition legislation.  
 
4.2.3 Coordination mechanisms between the ministry and the sector-specific agency 
Multiple reasons have been brought forward to justify the independence of the sector-specific 
regulatory agencies. It has been claimed that they are better able at hiring more experienced 
and capable personnel (Cushman, 1941), because they are not restricted to civil servants’ 
salaries. Independent agencies have been attributed a longer-term focus (Landis, 1938); a 
change in government should not influence the agencies’ objectives. A complete independence 
of these agencies is not desired by the central government either. The central government 
should be able to hold these independent agencies accountable for their actions, because they 
provide goods and services that are in the public interest. Majone (1997) remarks in this 
respect that ‘indirect government involves not only a structure of responsibilities, but also new 
forms of control and accountability’ (Majone, 1997: 147). Various mechanisms have been set 
up through which the ministry can exert an influence on the independent sector-specific 
regulatory agencies. Firstly, the ministry can exert a direct influence on the independent 
regulatory agency through financing its budget. The budget of the regulatory agency can also 
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be financed by license fees that are paid by the industry. Secondly, the ministry can appoint the 
director of the regulatory agency or the different members in case of a commission. To 
increase the independence of the agency and reduce the direct control of the ministry over the 
agency, different branches of government can appoint the members of a commission. Thirdly, 
the security of tenure of the members of a commission or the head of the regulatory body is 
usually protected. They cannot be removed from office for arbitrary or political reasons. The 
ministry may be allowed to intervene in cases of incompetence or misbehavior or other 
restrictively defined cases. Finally, the ministry can have the power to give individual 
instructions to the regulatory agency. This allows the ministry to exert a large influence on the 
sector-specific regulatory agency. In most European electricity industries, the ministry is only 
allowed to control the agency through its decisions on energy policy that are formulated in 
electricity laws and ministerial regulations. The independent regulatory agencies implement 
these laws and ministerial regulations into more specific rules for the industry.  
 
4.2.4 Relevance of defining a regulatory institutional organization 
Various authors have recognized the importance of specifying who the rule-makers are, and the 
allocation of different regulatory tasks and powers among the different authorities (Lodge, 
2002; Minogue, 2002: 650; Ogus, 2002: 638)28. Glachant and Finon (2000) argued for 
characterizing the European differences in the allocation of powers of regulation among the 
public authorities in order to determine the feasibility of converging national electricity reforms 
to one European model. In this thesis, a regulatory institutional organization is characterized in 
order to understand which public authorities formulate, execute and enforce the different 
regulations within a particular national electricity industry. This enables an understanding of 
when the authorities set the rules of the game and thereby influence the governance structures, 
and when the authorities are part of the governance structures. In addition, a regulatory 
                                                 
28
 Ogus (2002) claimed that an appropriate allocation of power among public authorities is important for 
the legitimacy of the regulatory institutional structure, and the protection of public interest regulatory 
objectives as transparency and accountability. Minogue (2002) pointed to an enhanced understanding of 
the strengths and weaknesses of regulatory practice.   
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institutional organization is characterized in order to highlight the differences in the regulatory 
institutional organizations across the European electricity industries. These differences can 
explain the differences in regulations across these industries, and consequently the differences 
in the governance structures at the level of the firm (see figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3 Influence of the regulatory institutional organization 
 
 
Although each European electricity industry is subject to the same electricity directives that are 
issued by the European Council and Parliament, the transposition of these directives into 
national legislation and regulation by the public authorities differs among the European 
countries, resulting in diverse regulatory frameworks across the European electricity industries. 
These transpositions of the EU directives into national regulations differ across the European 
electricity industries, because each country allocates the regulatory responsibilities and powers 
to each of the public authorities in a different way, and because these public authorities (the 
ministries, independent sector-specific agencies, and competition authorities) take different 
regulatory decisions based on their diverse objectives. While the objective of the competition 
authority is ‘to maintain and encourage the process of competition in order to promote an 
efficient use of resources while protecting the freedom of economic action of various market 
participants’ (OECD, 2003: 2), the ministry takes considerations of industrial policy and social 
policy into account, which ‘more often than not, can inject market distortions which impede the 
competitive process’ (OECD, 2003: 3). The sector-specific regulatory agency is given the task 
of introducing competition into the electricity industries. The difference between the objectives 
of the sector-specific regulatory agency and the competition authority can be summarized as 
promoting versus protecting competition, respectively. This has also been described as the 
difference between an ex ante versus ex post perspective to competition; ‘Sector-specific 
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regulators generally apply an ex ante prescriptive approach while competition offices, except in 
the area of merger review, apply an ex post enforcement approach’ (OECD, 1999: 9). 
Lodge (2002) identified the allocation of regulatory authority and the objectives of the 
regulatory authorities as crucial factors for defining regulatory reforms (Lodge, 2002: 5). A 
regulatory institutional organization that is characterized by a large regulatory responsibility 
for the ministry will thus lead to different regulatory decisions as compared to an organization 
with a greater role for the competition authority and the independent sector-specific regulatory 
agency. Each European country allocates the regulatory responsibilities and powers in the 
electricity industry to each of the three authorities in different ways. These differences in 
regulatory institutional organizations result in different regulations across the European 
electricity industries. The differences between these national regulations serve as an 
explanation for the differences between the new governance structures that are emerging in 
each of the European electricity industries (see figure 4.3 for the influence of the regulatory 
institutional organization).  
 
 
4.3 Regulatory influence on governance structures 
The European directives and national regulations on the introduction of competition in the 
European electricity industries influence the governance structures at the level of the firm in 
these industries in several ways. Firstly, the rules on unbundling the system operators from 
electricity generation and retail, and the rules on giving consumers a choice of electricity 
retailer, prohibit the vertically integrated monopolies that characterized the European 
electricity industries for decades (section 4.3.1). Secondly, by prohibiting the existing 
governance structures, these rules also create a need for new forms of governance, and thereby 
stimulate a process of governance change. The rules on unbundling and consumer choice create 
a need for new governance structures for several electricity transactions: the network 
connection transactions, the network access transactions, the balancing transactions, and the 
switching transactions. The attributes of these electricity transactions create various contracting 
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problems. The new forms of governance need to emerge to replace the vertical integration, and 
to provide safeguards for these contracting problems (section 4.3.2). These contracting 
problems, which are relevant in liberalizing and vertically disintegrating industries, differ from 
transaction cost economics’ analysis of contracting problems in network industries, and more 
specifically from Williamson’s contracting problems between integrated utility firms and 
consumers (section 4.3.3). Thirdly, the new rules for the liberalizing electricity industries (e.g. 
rules on network connection, network access, balancing, and switching) influence the 
characteristics of the new governance structures, and regulation also becomes part of these new 
forms of governance (section 4.3.4).  
 
4.3.1 Regulation prohibits the vertically integrated monopolies 
The European electricity directives and the national regulations for the electricity industries 
prescribe the unbundling of the distribution and transmission system operators from the 
generation and retail of electricity, and the possibility for consumers to choose their electricity 
retailer. These European rules influence the governance structures at the level of the firm in the 
European electricity industries; they prohibit the vertically integrated hierarchies and the 
regional and national monopolies. The unbundling of the distribution and transmission system 
operators from the generation and retail of electricity entails the creation of legally independent 
companies for the (formerly integrated) system operators29. Figure 4.4 illustrates how the 
governance structures in the electricity industries are affected by these rules on vertical 
unbundling: the four activities in the electricity value chain, the generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail, have to be separated where they were previously internalized within one 
firm. The European directives prescribe the independence of the distribution and transmission 
system operators to facilitate the introduction of competition in the generation and retail of 
                                                 
29
 The 2003 directive prescribes the legal unbundling of the system operators. Other forms of unbundling 
were obliged by the 1996 directive, such as accounting, financial and management unbundling. These 
preceded the implementation of the legal unbundling by the energy firms. Some European governments, 
such as the Dutch government, prescribe the implementation of ownership unbundling (the owners of the 
system operators have to be unbundled from the owners of the electricity generators and retailers). Rules 
on ownership unbundling are not yet included in the European directives.    
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electricity. An additional requirement for competition to emerge is giving consumers a choice 
of electricity retailer30. The European directives specify the details on how and when the 
consumers must be given a choice31. When consumers are able to choose their electricity 
retailer, new electricity firms are expected to enter the European electricity industries and to 
compete with the incumbents for the supply of electricity to consumers (see the new entrants in 
figure 4.4). These European rules on consumer choice thereby lead to the end of the regional 
and national monopolies in which consumers were restricted to supply from one electricity 
firm at regulated tariffs.  
 
Figure 4.4 Unbundling of the hierarchy and a need for new governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Competition is also introduced into the generation of electricity. This is not explicitly taken into 
account here with respect to the rules on consumer choice. Most consumers only choose an electricity 
retailer, and this retailer then contracts with electricity generators for the supply of electricity to the 
consumers. Only very large industrial consumers contract directly with electricity generators.   
31
 See section four of chapter three. 
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4.3.2 Regulation necessitates new governance for the electricity transactions 
By prohibiting the vertically integrated monopolies, the rules on vertical unbundling and 
consumer choice create a need for new governance structures for several electricity 
transactions. These electricity transactions include the network connection transactions, 
network access transactions, electricity supply and demand balancing transactions, and 
switching transactions. Figure 4.4 indicates the linkages (A-D) between the various segments 
in the electricity value chain in which these electricity transactions are in need of new forms of 
governance.  
Within the transaction cost economics framework, these four types of transactions can be 
characterized along three attributes: asset-specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and frequency32. 
Two of these attributes, asset-specificity and behavioral uncertainty, determine whether a 
contracting problem is present between the transacting parties. Frequency plays a negligible 
role in this respect. This third attribute of transactions is relevant when making a choice 
between bilateral and trilateral governance. When the transactions occur only occasionally, 
trilateral governance reduces transaction costs. When the frequency of the transactions 
increases, the efficiency of bilateral governance increases.  
The focus is here on the contracting problem of bilateral dependency33. When transactions are 
characterized by specific assets and by behavioral uncertainty, this leads to the contracting 
problem of bilateral dependency between the contracting parties. A contracting party that has 
sunk investments in specific assets is dependent upon the other contracting party for buying the 
goods or services that are produced with these specific assets. This dependent contracting party 
is subject to a potential holdup by its opportunistic contracting party that purchases the goods 
or services. The new forms of governance have to provide a solution for this contacting 
problem, and they have to replace the vertical integration (Jolink and Niesten, 2008).  
This section introduces the four types of electricity transactions, and it discusses the attributes 
                                                 
32
 See section one of chapter two for a discussion on the three attributes of transactions.  
33
 TCE is mainly concerned with the analysis of this type of contracting problem, the bilateral 
dependency. It does identify other types of contractual hazards, including hazards that accrue to weak 
property rights, measurement hazards, intertemporal hazards such as disequilibrium contracting, and 
hazards that accrue to weaknesses in the institutional environment (Williamson, 1996a: 14). 
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of these transactions and the contracting problem of bilateral dependency between the parties 
to these transactions34. The four electricity transactions are the focus of this thesis, because the 
new regulations on the liberalization of the European electricity industries affect the 
governance of these transactions. 
 
4.3.2.1 Network connection transactions 
The network connection transactions involve connecting the generating plants and the 
equipment of electricity consumers to the distribution and transmission network, and of 
connecting the distribution network to the transmission network. These transactions are located 
in the linkages A, B, and C in figure 4.4. They are characterized by a particular type of asset-
specificity, the so-called site-specificity, and by behavioral uncertainty. Site-specificity 
characterizes a transaction when a contracting party invests in assets that are located close to 
the plants and equipment of the other contracting party to reduce costs. The generators and 
consumers of electricity (the network users) are located close to the transmission and 
distribution network to reduce their connection costs. Once the network users have built their 
plants and equipment, and have connected it to the network, they are placed in a dependency 
relation with respect to the system operator. The network users have sunk their site-specific 
investments that have far less economic value in other uses. It would be prohibitively costly for 
them to relocate and set up their plants and equipment at another connection point. This creates 
a contracting problem in which the system operator has a dominant position and can hold-up 
the network users by demanding unreasonable network connection prices. This possibility for 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the distribution and transmission system operators 
characterizes another attribute of the network connection transactions, namely the behavioral 
uncertainty. The two attributes, asset-specificity and behavioral uncertainty, together lead to 
the presence of the contracting problem in which the generators and retailers are dependent on 
                                                 
34
 The preliminary characterization of the transactions in this chapter only serves the purpose of 
illustrating how the attributes of the transactions lead to the contracting problem of bilateral dependency. 
In the case studies, in chapters six and seven, the transactions will be characterized more specifically, and 
for each case. Chapter five provides the operationalization of the attributes of the transactions and the 
governance structures.  
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the system operators. Site-specificity has been argued to provide ‘a compelling reason to 
integrate activities into a single firm’ (Glachant, 2002: 302). The vertically integrated firm 
provided a safeguard for the generators and retailers against the opportunistic behavior of the 
system operators. In the electricity industry, the condition of asset-specificity is combined with 
the presence of a monopoly for the network. The network users are dependent on the electricity 
network to an extreme degree; they have no alternative for the delivery of their electricity. This 
monopoly of the system operator provided an extra stimulus for governance through internal 
organization. In the current situation, in which the vertically integrated firms are prohibited, the 
contracting parties to these network connection transactions, including the new entrants, need 
to find other forms of governance to solve this contracting problem. 
 
4.3.2.2 Network access transactions 
The network access transactions involve the exchange of information between the system 
operators and the generators and retailers of electricity on the amount of electricity that these 
network users expect to take out and put on the network on the next day for each network 
connection (the so-called transportation programs). The system operators need this information 
to resolve any transportation restrictions, which may occur when too much electricity is 
transported along a particular part of the network. The network access transactions also involve 
the supply of reserve power from the electricity generators to the network to resolve 
transportation restrictions in real time. These transactions are located in the linkages A, B, and 
C in figure 4.4. They are characterized by temporal specificity. This type of asset-specificity 
characterizes a transaction when investments in assets are made that enable a transaction to 
take place within a short period of time. The network users have made investments to enable a 
continuous exchange of information with the system operators, and to increase or decrease 
their production and consumption within a very short period of time. The transmission system 
operator is dependent upon the electricity generators for an increase or decrease in production 
to resolve the transportation restrictions. When the generators can earn a higher income on 
their electricity on, for example, the electricity spot market, they may have an incentive to 
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disguise information on their available capacity from the transmission system operator. These 
network access transactions are thus also characterized by asset-specificity and behavioral 
uncertainty, leading to a bilateral dependency among the contracting parties for which new 
forms of governance need to provide a safeguard.  
 
4.3.2.3 Balancing transactions 
In these same linkages in the electricity value chain (A, B and C in figure 4.4), the generators, 
retailers, the distribution system operators and the transmission system operator transact to 
keep the balance of electricity supply and demand. These balancing transactions include an 
exchange of information between the generators, retailers, and the system operators on the 
amount of electricity that the generators and retailers expect to put on and take out of the 
network on the next day (the energy programs). The transmission system operator has to 
balance electricity supply and demand for the entire electricity system in real time. The 
balancing transactions also include the supply of balancing power from the generators to the 
transmission system operator. These transactions are characterized by temporal specificity: the 
network users need to inform the system operators continuously about their energy programs, 
and the generators need to respond within a few minutes to a call of the system operator for an 
increase or decrease in production. The generators may have an incentive to disguise 
information on their reserve capacity for these balancing transactions to earn a higher income 
elsewhere. The balancing transactions are thus also characterized by a behavioral uncertainty, 
which combined with the temporal specificity, leads to the contractual hazard of bilateral 
dependency between the parties to the transactions. Before the unbundling of the electricity 
industries, supply and demand were balanced internally; the transmission system operator 
ordered the vertically integrated generators to produce more or less electricity to keep the total 
supply and demand for electricity in balance. In the unbundled situation, new governance 
structures need to coordinate the exchange of information between the system operators, 
generators and retailers of electricity on their expected electricity production and consumption 
on the next day; and the supply of balancing power to the transmission system operator.  
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4.3.2.4 Switching transactions 
The European directives and national rules prescribe that the European electricity consumers 
should be able to choose their electricity retailer, and that they should thus be able to switch 
from their incumbent to another energy firm. When consumers switch to another retailer, 
metering data and consumer-specific information as names, addresses, and electricity use have 
to be transferred to the new retailer. This information can come from different sources, 
including the consumers’ previous retailer, the distribution system operators, and possibly the 
metering companies. The switching transactions thus involve the transfer of information on the 
switching consumers between these various contracting parties. They are located in linkages C 
and D in figure 4.4.  
The switching transactions are characterized by behavioral uncertainty; the (incumbent) 
retailers and the distribution system operators have an incentive to obstruct transferring 
customer information to the new retailers, or at least they have no incentive to aid in the 
process of transferring the information to competitor firms. Although the distribution system 
operators are structured as separate legal entities (thereby complying with the new EU rules on 
vertical unbundling), they are often still operating under the same holding and owner as the 
incumbent retailers. These integrated distribution system operators therefore have an incentive 
to discriminate between the different retailers in their supply of information on consumers’ 
electricity use and meter readings. They have an incentive to obstruct or delay the information 
transfer to the new electricity retailers. Since the distribution system operators often have a 
quasi-monopoly on the information of metering readings, the new retailers are dependent on 
the distribution system operators for this information. The incumbent retailers have an 
information advantage with respect to the switching transactions over the new retailers. 
Because of their organizational link to the distribution system operators, they have an easier 
access to the consumer information than do the independent retailers. The potentially 
opportunistic behavior of the distribution system operators and their quasi-monopoly create the 
contracting problem of a dependence of the new retailers on the system operators. 
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Before the liberalization, these switching transactions occurred only when consumers relocated 
to a different address that was either served by the same or a different distribution system 
operator with a monopoly for the region. After the introduction of competition into the 
industries, other contracting parties became involved in these transactions, such as the new 
entrant retailers and the independent metering companies. New forms of governance need to be 
set up that can provide a safeguard for the potentially opportunistic behavior of the incumbent 
retailers and distribution system operators. 
 
4.3.3 Regulation alters the location of the relevant contracting problems 
The attributes of the electricity transactions, such as the behavioral uncertainty and the asset-
specificities, create the contracting problems of bilateral dependencies between the parties to 
each of the transactions. These contracting problems are the relevant ones to study in 
liberalizing electricity industries, because as a result of the EU rules on the liberalization these 
contracting problems are in need of new governance structures.  
Figure 4.5 compares the contracting problems in the liberalized electricity industries (on the 
right hand side) with the contracting problem as addressed by Williamson (on the left hand 
side). The contracting problems between the parties to the network connection, network access, 
balancing, and switching transactions in the liberalized electricity industries, are located in the 
linkages A to D in the figure 4.5. Williamson analyses the contracting problem between the 
(integrated) utility firms and their customers (e.g. Williamson, 1996a). These utility firms have 
a regional or national monopoly in supplying a utility service, and an incentive to hold up 
consumers with monopolistic prices. This contracting problem is less relevant in an industry in 
which the monopoly is restricted to the network, and consumers can choose between 
competing electricity firms. The relevant contracting problems are the ones that appear as a 
result of the rules on the liberalization of the electricity industry, and in particular as a result of 
the rules on vertical unbundling and consumer choice. Although the focus is here on a different 
set of contracting problems as compared to the one addressed by Williamson, the contracting 
problems in the liberalized electricity industries can still be analyzed within the transaction cost 
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economics framework. The previous section has shown that the attributes, as asset-specificity 
and behavioral uncertainty that lead to bilateral dependencies between the contracting parties, 
can be identified for the electricity transactions in the liberalized industries.  
 
Figure 4.5 Change in the positions of contracting problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.4 Regulation becomes part of the new governance structures 
The four types of transactions, and the contracting problems between the transacting parties, in 
the unbundled electricity industries are in need of altered forms of governance. When the 
vertically integrated hierarchy is excluded, these transactions will be governed - within the 
transaction cost economics framework - either by hybrid or market forms of governance. The 
EU directives and the national regulations influence the attributes of these emerging forms of 
governance. For example, the directive of 2003 obliges the use of a system of regulated access 
to the network. In such a system, the public authorities determine the conditions and tariffs for 
access to the network. These conditions are usually stipulated in codes of conduct (e.g. the grid 
code and the tariff code) that specify how the system operators and the network users have to 
behave with respect to the transportation of electricity over the network, and with respect to 
connecting to and using the network. The specific contracts between a system operator and a 
network user for the connection and access to the network are based on these codes of conduct. 
Generation 
TSO 
DSO 
Retail 
Generation 
TSO 
DSO 
A 
B 
D Consumers 
Williamson’s 
contracting problem 
Retail 
C 
New entrants 
114
Complementing transaction cost economics 
 
104
Similar codes of conduct have been formulated by the public authorities for the balancing of 
electricity supply and demand and for the switching between retailers (the system code and the 
information code respectively). These codes influence how governance for the four types of 
electricity transactions will be structured.  
In addition to this regulatory influence on the governance structures, regulation can also 
become part of the new forms of governance. The definitions of regulation as the rules of the 
game and regulation as a governance structure, which were introduced in section 4.1, are 
applied here in making the distinction. When the public authorities execute and/or enforce the 
implementation of the specific contracts between the users and operators of the network and 
when they settle disputes between the users and operators of the network, regulation becomes 
part of the new governance structures. For example, the Dutch regulator for the electricity 
industry has interfered in the contracts between energy firms and system operators. The Dutch 
regulator has demanded a change in connection tariffs and in transportation tariffs for specific 
contracts, after a complaint by one of the contracting parties35. It has also enforced a contract 
between an energy firm and a system operator on the payment for system services by the 
energy firm to the operator36. In the illustration of the conceptual framework in figure 4.1, this 
is shown by the direct, bottom line from regulation to new governance structures.  
Figure 4.6 compares the current location of regulation as a governance structure in unbundled 
industries (right hand side) with the analyses of regulation as a governance structure by 
Williamson, and by Levy and Spiller (left hand side). Williamson views regulation as a 
structure that governs the contracting problem between consumers and utility firms, who have 
an incentive to set monopolistic prices (Williamson, 1976). Levy and Spiller (1994) address 
the contracting problem between the regulated firm and the regulator, who has an incentive to 
                                                 
35
 Besluit van de NMa op het bezwaar van Eneco Netbeheer B.V. tegen het besluit van de NMa van 21 
maart 2007 inzake de aanvraag van Europees Massagoed-Overslagbedrijf B.V. tot beslechting van een 
geschil tussen EMO en Eneco Netbeheer B.V. Besluitnummer: 102392/49.  
Bindende aanwijzing voor Essent Netwerk Brabant B.V., press release December 11, 2002.  
36
 Besluit op de aanvragen van Elsta B.V. & Co en Delta Netwerkbedrijf B.V. om een bindende 
aanwijzing te geven. Besluitnummer: 101855-11. 
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keep prices as low as possible37. Schwartz (2002) has summarized various discussions on 
regulation. This summary is useful to highlight the differences between these three 
perspectives on regulation. He stated that ‘a regulation discussion may ask what terms a 
regulated firm can include in its contracts with customers’ or ‘what terms the state should 
supply to firms to use in transaction with each other’ and ‘in recent years, scholars have begun 
to add to the question how the state should regulate contracts between business firms’ 
(Schwartz, 2002: 116). The first discussion on regulating the contractual relation between 
consumers and firms represents the perspective as adopted by Williamson. The second refers to 
the discussion on regulatory structures that govern the relation between the regulator and the 
regulated firms, as focused on by among others Levy and Spiller (1994). The current 
discussion revolves around the latter type of regulation, meaning regulation of contracts 
between two or more business firms. 
 
Figure 4.6 Change in location of regulation as a governance structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 See section seven of chapter two for a discussion on the various perspectives on regulation as a 
governance structure.  
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This section has proposed the various ways in which regulation influences the governance 
structures in the European electricity industries. The European directives and national 
regulations for the electricity industries prohibit the vertically integrated monopolies, and they 
thereby create a need for new forms of governance. These new forms of governance need to 
replace the vertical integration, and to provide safeguards for the contracting problems between 
the parties to the various electricity transactions. The European rules also influence the 
characteristics of the new forms of governance, and they also become part of these new 
governance structures. 
 
 
4.4 The relatively inert nature of electricity transactions 
The European rules on the introduction of competition in the European electricity industries 
have a profound effect on the governance structures in these industries and on the 
transformations to altered forms of governance. The European directives aim for the adoption 
of market forms of governance to replace the vertical integration. The European Commission 
describes one of the key objectives of the EU as follows: ‘To create a genuine internal market 
for energy is one of the European Union's priority objectives’ 38. Article 3 of the 1996 directive 
states that ‘Member States shall ensure that…electricity undertakings are operated in 
accordance with the principles of this Directive, with a view to achieving a competitive market 
in electricity’. The question remains whether these markets will in fact emerge. Within the 
transaction cost economics framework, this depends on the attributes of the transactions, and 
not necessarily on the implementation of a new regulatory framework. For a market to be an 
efficient governance structure, the transactions will have to be characterized by non-specific 
assets. The transactions in the electricity industry have traditionally been characterized by a 
great degree of asset-specificity and by behavioral uncertainty. The new regulations are not 
likely to alter these attributes of the transactions in the electricity industry for several reasons. 
Firstly, there is still only one network to which the users need a connection and an access, and 
                                                 
38
 europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s14002.htm (last accessed December 6, 2008).  
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the system operators retain their monopoly for the network. Secondly, electricity can still not 
be stored in the unbundled industry, or at least not in an economically efficient way. For these 
reasons, the network connection transactions will continue to be characterized by behavioral 
uncertainty, as the system operators may still have an incentive to hold up the network users 
with high connection tariffs. And the network access transactions and the balancing 
transactions will still be characterized by temporal specificity. The network users have to 
continuously send their projections on their electricity consumption and production to the 
system operators, so that the latter can ensure that there are no restrictions on the transportation 
of electricity and that supply and demand of electricity are balanced. The generators have to be 
able to supply electricity to the transmission system operator within very short periods of time. 
Glachant and Finon (2000) argued that ‘the present introduction of competitive forms into the 
electricity industry has not overcome any of the transactional difficulties particular to that 
industry: those of site or temporal specificities, those of natural monopolies, those of 
externalities and measurement’ (Glachant and Finon, 2000: 317).  
The new regulations are thus not likely to alter the attributes of the electricity transactions in 
the direction into which markets are an efficient institutional solution for the network 
connection, the network access, and the balancing transactions. Changes of the transactions 
into that direction can possibly be found in technological innovations. For example, 
innovations that enable electricity to be stored efficiently reduce the degree of temporal 
specificity of the balancing transactions. But chapters six and seven will have to illustrate 
whether regulation has altered the attributes of the transactions in the Dutch and French 
electricity industries. 
 
 
4.5 A regulated misalignment between governance and transactions  
The electricity industry is characterized by transactions with a great degree of asset-specificity 
and behavioral uncertainty. Transaction cost economics has argued and empirically shown that 
vertical integration is an efficient institutional solution for these transactions in the electricity 
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industry. It is therefore assumed on the basis of transaction cost economics that the governance 
structures, and in particular the vertically integrated hierarchies, and the electricity transactions 
were aligned before the liberalization of the electricity industries. This core argument of 
transaction cost economics is referred to as the discriminating alignment hypothesis39. It claims 
that ‘transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which 
differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating - mainly a transaction cost-
economizing – result’ (Williamson, 1996c: 12). The European regulations on the unbundling of 
the system operators from the integrated electricity firms are altering this efficient alignment. 
The vertical integration is being prohibited in the electricity industries, and the European 
regulators are stimulating the emergence of market forms of governance. The regulators may 
have assumed that the transactions would adapt to the governance structures, and thus that the 
discriminating alignment would also work the other way around40. In this case, the attributes of 
the transactions would have to change in the direction of lower asset-specificity to fit the 
market forms of governance. As the previous section has illustrated, the attributes of the 
electricity transactions are not likely to change in this direction. The new European regulations 
are thus ending the situation of alignment between the electricity transactions and governance 
structures, and thereby create a situation of misalignment. A misalignment creates large 
transaction costs41 and therefore an incentive for contracting parties to adapt to more efficiently 
aligned situations. The following section discusses the process of adaptation of the governance 
structures to new forms.  
 
 
                                                 
39
 See section three of chapter two for a discussion on the discriminating alignment hypothesis.  
40
 Williamson allows for the option of turning the matter of discriminating alignment around, in which the 
transactions adjust to the governance structures (Williamson, 2003). 
41
 In their review of empirical studies in transaction cost economics, Macher and Richman (2006) 
conclude that there are several studies on the costs associated with failing to align transactions and forms 
of governance (Macher and Richman, 2006: 53). They state that the ‘relatively few studies that explore 
the performance implications of organizational choice, notably Silverman et al. (1997), Nickerson and 
Silverman (2003) and Masten et al. (1991), find that the effects of misalignment can be substantial, 
entailing lower profitability and higher failure rates (Macher and Richman, 2006: 54).     
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4.6 Adapting to new forms of governance 
Williamson has argued that adaptation is the central problem of economic organization 
(Williamson, 1994: 323). Within his transaction cost economics, two types of adaptation are 
distinguished: autonomous or Hayekian adaptation and cooperative or Barnardian adaptation42. 
In autonomous adaptation, economic actors adapt unilaterally to changes in relative prices, and 
thereby switch continuously to other contracting parties of which the identity is irrelevant. In 
cooperative adaptation, the bilaterally or multilaterally dependent parties to ongoing contracts 
consult each other when adapting to disturbances, or they refer the decision to the hierarchy 
where through fiat is decided on the type of response. Williamson defines these two types of 
adaptation as attributes of governance structures; the market is characterized by autonomous 
adaptation, and the hierarchy by cooperative adaptation (Williamson, 1991: 279). Adaptation 
thus takes place within a particular form of governance. Williamson does not analyze the 
adaptation between forms of governance, or in other words, the adaptation from one 
governance structure to another. His transaction cost economics has often been described as ‘a 
comparative static perspective’ (Groenewegen and Vromen, 1997: 33), which is ‘incapable, by 
itself, of explaining the dynamics of institutional change’ (Dietrich, 1994: 5). Langlois has also 
criticized transaction cost economics for being a static perspective. He introduced the concept 
of dynamic transaction costs - the costs of persuading, negotiating, coordinating and teaching 
outside suppliers (Langlois, 1992: 113) - to allow for a longer time frame in the study of 
governance structures and thereby to enable a better explanation of why the market or the 
hierarchy is used. With this perspective, Langlois aims to integrate capabilities theory and 
transaction cost economics. The dynamic transaction costs have also been referred to as the 
costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them (Langlois, 1992: 99). 
Analyzing the process of adaptation between forms of governance is necessary to understand 
the transformations of governance structures and the emergence of particular forms of 
governance, in particular when the latter cannot be explained by the attributes of the 
                                                 
42
 Section five of chapter two discusses the concept of adaptation within transaction cost economics in 
more detail. 
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transactions. Such an analysis of the adaptation process will be proposed in this section. Since 
most of the terminology within transaction cost economics has not been tailored to the 
description and explanation of adaptations from one governance structure to another, this 
implies that part of the problem of explaining governance transformations is of a conceptual 
nature. However, several concepts that are already present within transaction cost economics 
will be used in this complementary perspective. The definitions of these concepts will be 
extended to enable their application to the analysis of governance transformations. In this 
sense, this is an exercise in how transaction cost economics can be extended to address the 
analysis of changes in governance structures. Such an approach is preferred to ensure that the 
complementary elements are theoretically and conceptually consistent with the current 
transaction cost economics. This is also the reason why no other theoretical perspectives, such 
as the capabilities approach, are introduced to address the analysis of governance change. 
 
4.6.1. Governance transformations 
A governance transformation is a change from one governance structure to another (see figure 
4.7). The three generic forms of governance have been defined as the hierarchy, the hybrid and 
the market (e.g. Williamson, 1996a). Using this categorization, three types of governance 
transformations are distinguished: a change towards the hierarchy, a change towards the 
hybrid, and a change towards the market. A change towards the hierarchy is excluded from the 
analysis, because the vertically integrated hierarchy has been prohibited by EU regulation for a 
large number of electricity transactions. Governance transformations thus include the changes 
from the hierarchy to the hybrid, from the hybrid to the market, and from the market to the 
hybrid. The attributes of these types of governance transformations will be defined using the 
characteristics of governance structures. Within Williamson's transaction cost economics, 
governance structures have been characterized by incentive intensity, administrative control 
and contract law regime. A governance transformation towards the market is characterized by 
an increase in incentive intensity, a decrease in administrative control, and an increase in the 
use of courts. A governance transformation from the market to the hybrid is characterized by a 
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decrease in incentive intensity, an increase in administrative control, and an increase in the use 
of arbitrage to solve disputes; and a governance transformation from the hierarchy to the 
hybrid is characterized by changes in the opposite direction. 
The question that needs to be answered is: how can a governance transformation be explained, 
or in other words, when does a transformation to the market occur and when does a 
transformation to the hybrid occur? In transaction cost economics, the unit of analysis is the 
transaction. The attributes of the transactions explain the efficiency of the various forms of 
governance. When explaining the efficiency of the governance transformations, adaptation is 
taken to be the unit of analysis (see figure 4.7). The attributes of adaptation explain the 
efficiency of the various governance transformations. It is assumed that the economic actors to 
the adaptation process economize on adaptation costs, just as the economic actors to a 
transaction economize on transaction costs. This similar heuristic device and the similar 
assumptions on economic actors contribute to the integration of this complementary 
perspective on governance transformations into TCE. 
 
Figure 4.7 Transformation between governance structures  
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4.6.2 Adaptation 
An adaptation is an adjustment of a governance structure to an exogenous or endogenous 
disturbance. An example of an exogenous disturbance is the EU regulation that prescribes a 
governance change away from the hierarchy. An example of an endogenous disturbance is an 
investment in specific assets by the parties to a contractual relation that alters the governance 
needs of these contracting parties. The exogenous and endogenous disturbances result in a 
misalignment of the governance structure to the attributes of the transaction, and thereby 
increase the transaction costs. An adaptation to another form of governance is assumed to 
move into the direction where it economizes on these costs of misalignment. In the process of 
adaptation, economic actors search for another governance structure to coordinate the 
transaction, they search for a contracting party, and they negotiate the specifics of the contract 
and the governance structure with the contracting party. 
Several attributes of adaptation are distinguished: the identity of the contracting party43, the 
laterality of the adaptation, and the type of response44. Firstly, the identity of the contracting 
party refers to the extent to which the identity of the (potential) contracting party is relevant to 
the economic actor that is searching for a contracting party and a new form of governance. The 
extent to which an identity is relevant is defined only for the relation between the parties to the 
(potential) transaction, and for that particular transaction only. It is thus not an absolute quality, 
but it is relative to the transaction and to the economic actors involved. This quality (that what 
determines the relevance of an identity) can refer to an almost infinite number of things, such 
as the location of the (potential) contracting party, the reputation of the (potential) contracting 
party, the name of the brand of the product or service, the quality of the product or service, the 
combination of products or services that is provided by the (potential) contracting party, and all 
those other qualities that are valued by the economic actor that is searching for a contracting 
party and a new governance structure. When the identity of the contracting party is relevant, 
                                                 
43
 Ben Porath (1980) has referred to the identity of contracting parties as a determinant of institutional 
modes, in addition to the impersonal dimensions such as asset-specificity.  
44
 The choice of these attributes is based on the definitions of autonomous versus cooperative adaptation 
of Hayek and Barnard as introduced in the beginning of this section 4.6.  
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the economic actor is restricted in its search for a contracting party. In the extreme case, there 
is only one contracting party with which the economic actor is able to transact. This happens 
when the economic actor needs to transact with a contracting party that has a particular quality 
that no other economic actor has. When the identity of the contracting party is irrelevant, the 
economic actor can choose among numerous alternative contracting parties, and the search is 
therefore less complicated. Secondly, the laterality of the adaptation refers to how the 
economic actor adapts to the disturbance and adjusts towards a new form of governance. The 
economic actor can adjust unilaterally, meaning that it responds on its own, without consulting 
with another economic actor. A bilateral or multilateral response, on the other hand, refers to 
economic actors that are cooperating in their response to the disturbance and their adaptation to 
a new form of governance. Thirdly, a diverse set of responses exists on the basis of which 
economic actors react to a disturbance. An adaptation on the basis of the price of a good or 
service is a common response across industries. Specific responses for the electricity industry 
are those to the system requirements; economic actors need access to the electricity network to 
be able to supply or receive electricity, and they need to balance electricity supply and demand 
in order to avoid blackouts. Economic actors thus need to take other factors than just the price 
of a good or service into account, such as the safety of the system and their dependence on a 
network, when adjusting to a new form of governance. Figure 4.8 displays the consequences of 
these attributes of adaptation for the governance transformations. 
 
Figure 4.8 Attributes of adaptation and governance transformations 
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When the identity of the contracting party is relevant, it is more costly for the economic actor 
to search for a contracting party, as compared to the situation where the identity is irrelevant 
and numerous potential transacting parties are available. A transformation to an ongoing 
relation in a hybrid form is preferred when the identity is relevant. A hybrid governance 
structure is preferred, because of the limited availability of suitable contracting parties, and the 
longer-term nature of the hybrid form reduces the need of searching for a new contracting 
party. In addition, a hybrid form of governance enables the contracting parties to recover the 
current search costs and to reduce the future search costs, also as a result of the longer-term 
contractual relation of the hybrid form. When only one or a few potential contracting parties 
are available for the desired transaction, the bargaining and negotiation costs for the 
contractual relation are likely to be much higher than when there are numerous potential 
contracting parties. The contracting party with the preferred identity has an incentive to take 
advantage of his preferential qualities in the contract negotiations, and it thereby increases the 
bargaining and negotiation costs. A transformation to the hybrid form is also preferred to 
recover these costs. When the identity is irrelevant, the search costs are low, and the economic 
actor has the option to easily switch to other contracting parties. The economic actor does not 
have an incentive to engage in a long-term contractual relation, and to increase the 
administrative control and costs of the governance structure. A transformation to the market is 
preferred.  
Starting from the governance structure that is influenced by a disturbance, the contracting 
parties to the governance structure can react unilaterally to the disturbance; they can react 
bilaterally or multilaterally with the same contracting parties as those to the governance 
structure of before the disturbance; or they can react bilaterally or multilaterally with economic 
actors that were not parties to this governance structure. When an economic actor prefers to 
adapt to a new form of governance on its own, it will most likely adapt to a market form of 
governance in which cooperation with others is also reduced to a minimum. Economic actors 
may prefer to adapt bilaterally or multilaterally, in order to share and thus reduce the costs of 
searching for a new form of governance. These economic actors will consequently set up a 
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hybrid form of governance with the economic actors involved in the adaptation process. 
When an economic actor selects a contracting party on the basis of the price (of the good or 
service), it prefers a short-term contract. A short-term contract allows the economic actor to 
easily switch to another contracting party in order to react to changes in prices. These 
responses to prices and the short-term contracts are accompanied by an increase in the 
incentive intensity of the economic actor. A transformation to the market form of governance is 
thus observed. When an economic actor takes other factors, such as the safety of the system or 
the dependence on a network, into account, it prefers a transformation to a hybrid form of 
governance. Certain characteristics of an industry (e.g. the presence of a network) will not 
change quickly, and will thus allow for longer-term structures to govern the transactions that 
need to take these characteristics into account. In addition, many actors in the industry are 
affected by the same characteristics of the industry, and may thus prefer to cooperate to reduce 
the costs of searching for the most efficient form of governance.  
In short, when the identity of the (potential) contracting party is relevant, the economic actors 
cooperate in their adjustment to disturbances, and take other considerations than just the price 
of a good or service into account; a transformation to a hybrid form of governance will occur. 
When the identity of the contracting party is irrelevant, and the economic actors adapt 
unilaterally to the prices of goods and services; a transformation to a market form of 
governance will occur.  
With the electricity directives of 1996 and 2003 on common rules for the European electricity 
industries, the EC aims to stimulate the emergence of market forms of governance in these 
industries. The EC should not restrict its directives and regulations to structural measures, such 
as the unbundling of the vertically integrated firms and the creation of independent system 
operators. Considering these attributes of adaptation, the EC should also aim to alter the 
behavior of the economic actors in the direction of unilateral responses to changes in prices, in 
order to stimulate the emergence of markets.  
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4.6.3 Adaptation costs and the transaction cost differential   
When adapting from one form of governance to another, various costs are incurred. These 
costs include search costs, and the costs of bargaining, drafting, negotiating and safeguarding 
an agreement. Search costs have been defined as ‘the costs of locating information about 
opportunities for exchange’ (North and Thomas, 1973: 93), and as ‘the costs of gathering 
information to identify and evaluate potential trading partners’ (Dyer, 1997). These costs thus 
involve the costs of searching for information on the different ways in which the transactions 
can be governed, and information on the various potential contracting parties. When economic 
actors have decided on the type of governance structure and on the contracting party, they need 
to negotiate the specifics of the contract and governance structure with the contracting party. 
These costs include costs of bargaining, drafting, negotiating and safeguarding the agreement. 
Williamson (1985) refers to the latter costs as ex ante transaction costs, but he does not take the 
search costs into account. 
Since these various costs are incurred in the adaptation process from one governance structure 
to another, and thus before the intended transactions take place, they are here referred to as 
adaptation costs. By taking these search, bargaining, drafting, negotiating and safeguarding 
costs as a category of costs related to adaptation between governance structures, they are to be 
distinguished from the transaction costs, such as monitoring costs, enforcement costs or 
policing costs. The latter costs are typically costs which will emerge once transactions have 
materialized and have been aligned with a governance structure. As such, the conceptual stance 
is taken in which transaction costs are considered in cases of executed transactions, as opposed 
to those costs, the adaptation costs, which are involved in the process prior to the executed 
transactions.   
These adaptation costs influence whether adaptation from one governance structure to another 
is, or is not, a feasible option for the economic actor involved. An economic actor will want to 
adapt to another form of governance when its current form of governance is misaligned with 
the transactions. Misalignment implies that the transaction costs are not optimized to the 
prevailing governance structure. The difference between the actual transaction costs and the 
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optimal transaction costs may be called the transaction cost differential45. When the actual 
transaction costs are higher than the optimal transaction costs, a misalignment is observed. 
This transaction cost differential could therefore also be referred to as the misalignment costs. 
In order to overcome this suboptimal situation an adaptation process is feasible, yet at least two 
venues emerge: the economic actors may adjust the attributes of their transactions, or they may 
adapt to a (new) form of governance and re-align the transactions with this new form of 
governance. In the first case, economic actors will reassess the attributes of their transactions, 
and adjust in order to reduce the transaction cost differential. This adjustment of the 
transactions is closely related to Williamson's transaction cost economics, although in this case 
his discriminating alignment hypothesis is turned around; not the governance structures are 
aligned to the transactions, but the transactions are matched to the governance structures 
(Williamson, 2003)46. Since most of the electricity transactions are relatively inert, and 
therefore unlikely to adjust to the governance structures, the focus will be on the second case. 
In this second case, economic actors will reassess the governance structures and will opt for an 
adaptation of the form of governance as long as the adaptation costs are smaller than the 
transaction cost differential. Through this adaptation process a new governance structure may 
be attained and a new alignment may take place. Alternatively, if the adaptation costs are 
higher than the transaction cost differential, an adaptation of the governance structures is 
obstructed and the economic actor may remain locked into a situation of misalignment, when 
no further adjustments are envisaged. Economic actors are assumed to economize on the 
adaptation costs when adapting their forms of governance. When the search, bargaining, 
negotiation and safeguarding costs are relatively high, a transformation to a hybrid governance 
structure will be more efficient. As the previous section has shown, a hybrid form of 
governance allows for a longer period to recover these adaptation costs, and the possibility of 
                                                 
45
 This term has also been used by Masten et al. (1991), to refer to the positive difference between market 
and internal organization costs when governing transactions that are characterized by asset-specificity and 
uncertainty.  
46
 Although Williamson allows for the option of turning the matter of discriminating alignment around 
(Williamson, 2003), his analysis has only focused on matching the governance structures to the attributes 
of the transactions.  
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sharing these costs with the contracting parties. A transformation to a market form of 
governance will be more efficient when the search, bargaining, negotiation and safeguarding 
costs are low.   
 
4.6.4 The effects of regulation on adaptation 
The processes of adaptation are ongoing, and a starting point is therefore hard to determine. 
The case of the regulation of the liberalizing European electricity industries is an interesting 
exception, as there is a deliberate incision of this ongoing process where one form of 
governance, the hierarchy, is restricted ex ante as an option in favor of, and in anticipation of, 
the market. Furthermore, the EU legislation promotes and voluntarily causes a misalignment 
between existing transactions and future form of governance. Thus, by law, adaptation is 
enforced on the vertically integrated firms, in order to promote more competition.  
The European and national regulations on the liberalization of the electricity industries 
influence the attributes of adaptation between forms of governance and the adaptation costs. 
For several electricity transactions, such as the network connection, the network access and the 
balancing transactions, regulation prescribes that the economic actors should take the system 
requirements into account when adapting to a new form of governance. The national regulators 
for the electricity industries have formulated various codes of conduct that specify how the 
system operators and the network users have to behave with respect to a connection to the 
network, the transportation of electricity and the balancing of electricity supply and demand. 
These codes aim for a non-discriminatory and transparent connection and access to the 
network, and the safety of the system by providing procedures for balancing electricity supply 
and demand. The economic actors use these codes of conduct to formulate their contracts and 
governance structures. These codes also specify various procedures that the system operators 
and network users have to follow when making changes to the codes, and which economic 
actors to involve in these procedures. Regulation therefore also prescribes that for several 
transactions the economic actors have to adapt in a bilateral and multilateral way to a (new) 
form of governance. Regulation can also influence the relevance of the identity of the 
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contracting parties to the new forms of governance. For the balancing transactions, the national 
regulators often prescribe that the energy firms should supply balancing power to the electricity 
network. The energy firms are therefore restricted in their choice of a contracting party to the 
transmission system operator for the supply of a particular amount of power.  
In addition to its influence on the attributes of adaptation, regulation may also affect the 
adaptation costs. For example, without the involvement of regulation, the bargaining, 
negotiation and safeguarding costs of adapting to a new form of governance for the network 
connection transactions would remain high. The transmission system operator has the 
opportunity to increase these costs for the energy firms, since it is the only contracting party to 
which the energy firms can turn for a connection to the network. By determining the 
procedures on how and when a (potential) network user is to be connected to the network, 
regulation reduces the bargaining, negotiation and safeguarding costs between the energy firms 
and the system operator for these transactions. With the codes, the regulators may also reduce 
the search costs of the economic actors for both the search for a governance structure and the 
contracting parties for several electricity transactions. When the regulators reduce the 
adaptation costs for the economic actors, they stimulate the process of adaptation to other 
forms of governance.  
 
4.6.5 Co-adaptation  
Two different forms of adaptation have been identified: adaptation within governance 
structures and adaptation between governance structures. Transaction cost economics has 
analyzed adaptation as an attribute of governance structures, and has thus focused on 
adaptation within governance structures. Williamson has distinguished between two types of 
adaptation: autonomous adaptation and cooperative adaptation (e.g. Williamson, 1996a). The 
market is characterized by autonomous adaptation, and the hierarchy and the hybrid by 
cooperative adaptation. In this chapter, the focus has been on adaptations between forms of 
governance. Williamson’s terminology is applied to these adaptations between forms of 
governance. The adaptation that explains the governance transformation to the market is 
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referred to as an autonomous adaptation, and the adaptation that explains the governance 
transformation to the hybrid as a cooperative adaptation. These two forms of adaptation (within 
forms of governance and between forms of governance) do not exclude each other and may, in 
fact, operate simultaneously in an industry. In this case one may refer to a process of co-
adaptation. Figure 4.9 illustrates the various adaptation processes. The horizontal arrows 
illustrate the adaptations between forms of governance, and the vertical arrows the adaptation 
within forms of governance.  
 
Figure 4.9 Co-adaptation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of the figure 4.9, the EU regulation restrains the full possibilities of adaptation within 
the hierarchy, and adaptation towards the hierarchy. The transactions to which the distribution 
and transmission system operators on the one hand and the generators and retailers of 
electricity on the other hand are contracting parties, cannot be governed by a vertically 
integrated hierarchy in the liberalized electricity industries. These transactions include the 
network connection and network access transactions, the balancing transactions, and the 
switching transactions. The governance structures for these transactions will transform into the 
direction of hybrid or market forms of governance. An autonomous adaptation between forms 
of governance will then be observed. An example of co-adaptation can be given. The Dutch 
regulators for the electricity industry have, in the past, set up a market for trading balancing 
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power. They have thus enforced an autonomous adaptation between forms of governance (from 
the hierarchy to the market) on the Dutch energy firms. The Dutch regulators have caused a 
misalignment between the transactions and the newly enforced market form of governance. 
The contracting parties to this form of governance may be driven, due to the misalignment, to 
adjust within the form of governance. They may adjust the attributes of the transactions to 
more efficiently align with the market form of governance. This example of co-adaptation that 
combines an autonomous adaptation between and within forms of governance, can illustrate 
the role of the adaptation costs and the transaction cost differential in the process of adaptation. 
Since the regulator determines how this market will be structured, which contracting parties 
will be involved, and how the contracting parties will have to behave on this market, it reduces 
the adaptation costs for the energy firms, and thereby stimulates the adaptation. Regulation 
increases the transaction cost differential due to the misalignment of the market with the 
unchanged transactions. The attributes of the transactions were efficiently aligned with a 
hierarchy, and not with a market form of governance; regulation thus increases the actual 
transaction costs above the optimal transaction costs. The energy firms will have a further 
incentive to reduce the transaction cost differential by adapting the attributes of the transactions 
to the market form of governance.   
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed several ways in which regulation influences the governance 
transformations in the European electricity industries. Regulation sets the rules of the game, 
and thereby prohibits the governance structures that characterized the electricity industries for 
decades, and influences which new forms of governance emerge in the industries. By 
prohibiting the vertically integrated monopolies, regulation creates a misalignment for several 
electricity transactions, and stimulates a process of adaptation to other forms of governance. It 
reduces the adaptation costs for the energy firms, and influences the direction of governance 
change through its impact on the attributes of adaptation. Regulation also becomes part of the 
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new forms of governance when it implements and enforces the specific contracts between the 
parties to several electricity transactions.  
This chapter has provided several complementary elements to transaction cost economics that 
allow for an understanding of the emergence of specific forms of governance when the 
attributes of transactions cannot provide an explanation, and in particular these elements allow 
for an understanding of governance transformations. These elements include recognizing that 
regulation also sets the rules of the game and thereby influences governance structures at the 
level of the firm, identifying the relevant contracting problems in liberalizing electricity 
industries, and specifying a process of adaptation between forms of governance. Regulation 
and the adaptation process are taken into account to explain the emergence of particular 
governance structures.  
The following chapter will operationalize the various concepts that have been introduced in 
this chapter, such as regulation, the attributes of transactions and governance, misalignment, 
and the attributes of adaptation and the adaptation process. It will present the research design 
and data collection methods of this thesis. Chapters six and seven will apply the conceptual 
framework that was proposed in this chapter to the Dutch and French electricity industries. 
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5 – Research Design   
 
 
The conceptual framework of this thesis on the regulatory influence on governance 
transformations, that was discussed in the previous chapter and is summarized here in the 
illustration (in figure 5.1), needs to be further operationalized and tested with empirical data. 
The various concepts in the conceptual framework, and the attributes along which these 
different concepts vary, will be defined in this chapter (section 5.1). The research strategy that 
is chosen to study the relationships between the various concepts is the case study (section 5.2). 
A multiple case study on the Dutch and French liberalising electricity industries is presented in 
chapters six and seven respectively. The data collection methods and the data sources that are 
used for each of the concepts for both the Dutch and French cases will be introduced in this 
chapter (section 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.1 Conceptual framework  
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5.1 Operationalization of concepts 
Each concept and its attributes will be defined in this section, following the conceptual 
framework (in figure 5.1) from left to right; from regulation to the new governance structures.   
 
5.1.1 Regulation 
The regulation of liberalizing electricity industries is defined as the formulation, execution and 
enforcement of laws, rules, codes of conduct and contracts, by public authorities, on the basis 
of a legislative mandate, aimed at constituting markets and promoting competition, and 
protecting the public interest. The regulation of liberalizing electricity industries takes place at 
the national level. The national electricity laws are themselves implementations of the 
European electricity directives. The three main public authorities that regulate the liberalising 
electricity industries are the ministries of economic affairs and energy, independent sector-
specific regulatory agencies, and competition authorities. The analysis of regulation is 
restricted to the laws, rules, codes of conduct, and contracts that are formulated, executed and 
enforced by these three authorities, and that affect the four types of electricity transactions that 
are studied in this thesis. 
 
5.1.2 Transactions 
A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred from one stage of activity to 
another. The four types of electricity transactions that are studied in this thesis are the network 
connection, network access, balancing of electricity supply and demand, and switching 
transactions. The network connection transaction involves the connection of the generating 
plants and the equipment of the electricity consumers to the distribution network or the 
transmission network; the connection of the distribution network to the transmission network; 
and the maintenance of the connection. Two network access transactions are distinguished. 
Firstly, the network users and system operators exchange information on the daily 
transportation of electricity over each network connection, in the form of so-called programs, 
which allows the network users an access to the network and enables the system operators to 
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check whether there is enough transportation capacity for the intended electricity flows and to 
predict whether and where transportation problems may occur. Secondly, the network users 
supply reserve power to the system operators so that the latter can resolve the restrictions on 
the transportation of electricity over the network in real time. Two balancing transactions are 
distinguished. Firstly, the network users and the transmission system operator exchange 
information on the amount of electricity that the network users expect to put on and take out of 
the network on the next day, also in the form of programs. Since these projections of the 
network users often differ from their actual generation and consumption of electricity, the 
transmission system operator calls upon the network users to decrease or increase their 
consumption or production of electricity to balance supply and demand in real time. The 
second balancing transaction therefore consists of the supply of balancing power from the 
network users to the transmission system operator. The switching transaction involves the 
transfer of information on the switching consumers, such as their names, addresses, monthly 
electricity use, and meter readings, between the consumers, old retailers, distribution system 
operators, metering companies and the new retailers. 
 
These different types of transactions will be characterized along three attributes: frequency, 
asset-specificity and uncertainty.  
The frequency47 with which a transaction occurs can be one-time, occasional, or recurrent. 
When a transaction occurs only once over the entire contractual period, the frequency of the 
transaction is characterized as one-time. An occasional transaction is one that does not occur 
very often, and only on an irregular basis. A recurrent transaction occurs more often and 
follows a fixed pattern of exchange between the transacting parties. 
Five types of asset-specificity will be considered, including site-specificity, human asset-
                                                 
47
 Williamson identifies three types of frequency (one-time, occasional and recurrent). Several researchers 
consider frequency as a dichotomous phenomena (one-time versus recurring transactions) and control for 
transaction frequency by examining only recurring exchanges (e.g. John and Weitz, 1988; Klein et al., 
1990; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997: 31). 
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specificity, physical asset-specificity, temporal specificity, and dedicated assets48. A 
transaction is characterized by site-specificity when investments in assets to the contractual 
relation have lower costs when they are made close to the plants, facilities or equipment of the 
other contracting party. A transaction is characterized by human asset-specificity when 
investments in human capital are made that can only be used for that particular transaction, and 
when without these investments the transaction cannot take place. A transaction is 
characterized by physical asset-specificity when investments in physical assets are made that 
can only be used for that particular transaction, and when without these investments the 
transaction cannot take place. Temporal specificity is present in a transaction when investments 
are made in assets that allow the transaction to take place within a short time period. Dedicated 
assets characterize a transaction when the investments in assets are only made for the 
transactions with a specific contracting party. These assets are thus not specific to the 
transaction, as is the case in the physical, human and temporal asset-specificity, but to the 
contracting party. The various types of asset-specificity are considered to characterize an 
electricity transaction when investments in such assets (in specific sites, time periods, human 
or physical capital, or dedicated to a contracting party) are made; and when these investments 
are not made, the transaction is considered not to be characterized by the particular type of 
asset-specificity. 
Behavioural uncertainty is defined as uncertainty that may arise within the transaction itself 
due to the opportunistic inclinations of the transacting parties (John and Weitz, 1988), and thus 
as a result of the possibility for the ‘strategic nondisclosure, disguise or distortion of 
information’ by the transacting parties (Williamson, 1985: 56). Very few operationalizations of 
behavioural uncertainty exist in the literature on transaction cost economics (Macher and 
                                                 
48
 Williamson has distinguished between six types of asset-specificity, including site-specificity, human 
and physical asset-specificity, temporal specificity, dedicated assets, and brand name capital (Williamson 
1996a: 105-106). This last one is an investment in reputation and is often present in franchise relations. It 
is less relevant for the governance structures studied in the case studies in chapters six and seven, and is 
therefore excluded from the current analysis. The focus is on the first five types of specificity. Some 
examples of empirical studies that have operationalized these types of asset-specificity are Joskow (1987) 
and Masten et al. (1989). 
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Richman, 2008: 6). One measure of behavioural uncertainty is performance ambiguity, which 
refers to the difficulty of ascertaining the actual performance or adherence to contractual 
agreements by the parties to the transaction. It is difficult to ascertain performance when 
responsibility for performance is shared between the contracting parties, when there are no 
readily observable indicators of what is meant by performance (Anderson, 1985: 239), when 
there is a lack of performance standards, when performance evaluation is subjective (Stump 
and Heide, 1996: 436, 440), or when the activities of the contracting parties are separated by 
relatively longer periods of time (John and Weitz, 1988: 346). Williamson (1981) remarked in 
this last respect that when individual productivity cannot be assessed by measuring output, an 
assessment of input is needed. Inputs may be inferred by, for example, observing the intensity 
with which an individual works. This can be measured only over long observation intervals 
(Williamson, 1981: 564). One problem with this operationalization is that these indicators of 
performance ambiguity often depend on features of the governance structure. The 
administrative apparatus of the governance structure may include objective performance 
standards and ways of monitoring and evaluating the performance of the contracting parties. 
The behavioural uncertainty is then hard to identify independent from the attributes of the 
governance structure, and accordingly the efficient alignment of governance with the attributes 
of the transactions cannot be determined when the transactions are defined by characteristics of 
the governance structure. In this case study, a different operationalization of behavioural 
uncertainty is therefore used. A transaction will be characterized by either the absence of 
behavioural uncertainty or the presence of behavioural uncertainty. No degrees of uncertainty 
are defined. When the parties to a contractual relation, which are assumed to be opportunistic, 
have been able to align their incentives, the transaction is not characterized by behavioural 
uncertainty. Incentives are aligned when the parties to the contractual relation will provide the 
other party with accurate information in order to increase their own income. From a transaction 
cost economics perspective, such transactions will not require any protective governance 
structures. The case studies will illustrate that the parties to the transaction benefit from an 
accurate information exchange to be able to conclude on the absence of behavioural 
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uncertainty. When incentives between the contracting parties have not been aligned, and the 
behavioural attribute of opportunism is assumed to be present, this will lead to a transaction 
that is characterized by behavioural uncertainty; the contracting parties have an incentive to 
distort and disguise information to increase their own income. The case studies will identify 
and describe situations in which a party to a transaction has distorted or disguised information 
to increase its own income at the expense of the other party before the attribute of behavioural 
uncertainty is ascribed to a transaction. There is thus not solely an assumption of behavioural 
uncertainty, as in Williamson (1985: 79)49, but it will be empirically proven that an act of 
opportunistic behaviour has occurred between parties that have not aligned their incentives. 
This operationalization of behavioural uncertainty may include situations in which the 
contracting parties break the rules and/or do not abide by the contractual agreements. 
Performance ambiguity is not able to include these situations as an indicator of behavioural 
uncertainty; what is meant by performance can be very clear, but the contracting parties may 
just decide not to live up to the performance standards.   
 
5.1.3 Attributes of governance structures 
The three generic governance structures are the market, the hybrid and the hierarchy50. Vertical 
integration is the extension of the hierarchy into additional stages of activity51. The governance 
structures will be characterized along three attributes: incentive intensity, administrative 
control, and contract law regime.  
Incentive intensity is the degree to which changes in efforts expended by an economic actor 
have an immediate effect on his compensation or stream of revenues (Williamson, 1996a: 99; 
1985: 132). Markets are characterized by a high incentive intensity; hierarchies by a low 
                                                 
49
 ‘The third dimension, uncertainty, is assumed to be present in sufficient degree to pose an adaptive, 
sequential decision problem’ (Williamson, 1985: 79).  
50
 ‘The most common empirical approach is to conceptualize organizational form as one of the three 
broad discrete types: market, hierarchy, or various hybrid and intermediate modes’ (Macher and 
Richman, 2006: 5).  
51
 Vertical integration can be measured as the percentage of the company’s component needs produced 
under the governance of the firm (Masten et al., 1989: 269). 
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incentive intensity; and hybrids display intermediate values. The incentive intensity is 
considered to be high when the efforts of an economic actor will immediately translate into a 
higher income for this actor. The incentive intensity is low when the efforts of an economic 
actor do not directly affect his income, but will only translate into a higher income after a long 
period of time or the income has to be shared with a group of economic actors that have 
together contributed to the higher income. An intermediate incentive intensity characterizes a 
governance structure when a part of the income to be earned cannot be influenced by the 
economic actor; or when the transaction itself may not directly earn an income, but is a 
prerequisite for earning an income with a consecutive transaction. For example, when tariffs 
are regulated, economic actors in a regional monopoly cannot influence their total revenues, 
but by decreasing costs they can influence their profits. To establish an intermediate value of 
incentive intensity in the case studies, it will be illustrated how the economic actor can directly 
influence his income and how this influence is reduced by a factor that is outside of the 
economic actor’s control.  
Administrative control refers to the various mechanisms that support the functioning of 
governance structures. In hierarchies, this administrative apparatus is the most extensive, and 
includes career rewards and penalties, monitoring, accounting, auditing, and transfer pricing, as 
well as the supports of informal organization (Williamson 1996a: 104; Williamson, 2000: 606). 
Hybrids display intermediate values of administrative control. The administrative control 
mechanisms of hybrids include information disclosure and information verification 
mechanisms, specialized dispute settlement procedures, and penalties for premature 
termination. When regulation is a governance structure, and thus when the public authorities 
execute and/or enforce an agreement between two contracting parties or the public authorities 
settle disputes between these contracting parties, it is characterized as a hybrid form of 
governance (Williamson, 1996a: 96). Administrative control mechanisms that can be used by 
regulators include a binding instruction or a fine that will be given when contracting parties are 
not living up to their contractual agreements. Markets are characterized by very few 
administrative control mechanisms. These may include rating services to compare and evaluate 
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standard products of various suppliers, and the organisation that surrounds a bidding 
mechanism.  
Three types of contract law regime can be distinguished: classical contract law, neoclassical 
contract law, and forbearance law (Williamson, 1991). These three types of contract law 
support respectively the market, the hybrid and the hierarchy. Ménard identified several factors 
that characterize the variability among contracts, including the degree of incompleteness, the 
duration, and the enforcement procedures of contracts (Ménard, 2000: 237). These factors are 
used to characterize the different contract law regimes. The classical contracts of the market 
forms of governance are the least incomplete contracts and they are short term. When 
enforcing these contracts and settling disputes, legal terms are always given priority over 
informal agreements. Courts are used to resolve disputes. Neoclassical contracts of the hybrid 
forms are more open ended and flexible; they have a longer duration; and disputes are resolved 
through third party involvement such as arbitration. Forbearance law of the hierarchies is even 
more elastic and long term. Disputes are resolved internally, possibly through the use of fiat.    
The duration of a contract will be characterized as either long term or short term, with long 
term referring to contracts with a duration of one year and longer52, and short term to contracts 
with a duration of less than one year.   
In transaction cost economics, contracts are always incomplete and thus the ‘complete-contract 
benchmark is unattainable’ (Saussier, 2000: 388). A distinction will therefore by made between 
contracts that are close to a complete contract and contracts that are flexible. Saussier refers to 
‘feasible completeness: one contract is less incomplete than another if it gives a more precise 
definition of the transaction and of the means to carry it out’ (Saussier, 2000: 388). When a 
disturbance affects such a contract that is close to a complete contract and that includes precise 
definitions of the transaction, the contract will not be adjusted, but will be ended, and a new 
contract may be set up to take account of the altered circumstances. A flexible contract allows 
for changes to be made to the prices and conditions that are included in the contract. A 
                                                 
52
 For example, Joskow (1987: 168) has referred to contracts with a duration of one year or longer as 
longer-term contractual relationships.   
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disturbance does not necessarily lead to the end of the contract, but may lead to changes in the 
flexible contract.  
With respect to the enforcement procedures and dispute settlement mechanisms, a distinction 
will be made between reliance on courts, third parties (arbitration), and fiat.    
 
5.1.4 Alignment 
The core argument of TCE is the discriminating alignment hypothesis that claims that 
transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which 
differ in their cost and competence, in a transaction cost economizing way. As was shown in 
figure 2.1, the market more efficiently governs non-specific transactions of an occasional and 
recurrent kind, and the hybrid is better suited for transactions characterized by uncertainty and 
asset-specificity. Governance structures can become misaligned with transactions when the 
attributes of the transactions change while the governance structures remain unaltered, or when 
some exogenous disturbance (e.g. regulation) forces the governance structures to change while 
the attributes of the transactions remain the same. The resulting misalignment between 
transactions and governance structures creates inefficiencies in the form of increasing 
transaction costs. An alignment is observed when the transactions and governance structures 
are matched in the manner as analysed by TCE to be the most efficient. When this is not the 
case, possibly due to an endogenous or exogenous disturbance, a misalignment is observed. It 
is assumed that before the liberalization, the electricity transactions were aligned with their 
governance structures. This assumption is based on the previous empirical studies on the 
efficiency of the vertically integrated structure in the electricity industry (see section 3.2). 
 
5.1.5 Governance transformation and adaptation 
A governance transformation occurs when there is a change in governance structure from 
either the market, the hybrid, or the hierarchy, into one of these modes of governance. The 
governance transformation to the hierarchy is excluded for most electricity transactions by the 
EU regulation on vertical unbundling. A governance transformation to the market is 
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characterized by an increase in incentive intensity, a decrease in administrative control, a 
decrease in the duration of the contracts, a decrease in the degree of incompleteness of the 
contracts, and an increase in the use of courts. A governance transformation from the market to 
the hybrid is characterized by a decrease in incentive intensity, an increase in administrative 
control, an increase in the duration of the contract, an increase in the degree of incompleteness 
of the contract, and an increase in the use of arbitrage. A governance transformation from the 
hierarchy to the hybrid is defined by changes in the opposite direction.    
Three attributes of adaptation between forms of governance are characterized that enable an 
explanation of the direction of the governance transformations, either to the market or to the 
hybrid. These attributes are the identity of the contracting party, the laterality of the adaptation, 
and the type of response. The identity of the contracting party is defined as relevant or 
irrelevant to the economic actor that is searching for a contracting party. When the identity of 
the (potential) contracting party is relevant, there are only one or a few economic actors that 
are able to provide the particular good or service to the searching economic actor. When the 
identity is irrelevant, numerous economic actors exist in the industry that are able to provide 
the good or service. The laterality of the adaptation can be characterized as unilateral, bilateral 
or multilateral. In a unilateral adaptation, the economic actor adapts to a new form of 
governance on its own. In a bilateral or multilateral adaptation, the economic actor that is 
searching for a new form of governance and contracting party adapts in cooperation with other 
economic actors. The type of response can be characterized as either a response to the 
requirements of the industry, such as the safety of the electric system or the dependence on a 
network, or as a response to the price of the good or service. When economic actors, in their 
choice for another contracting party and governance structure, do not only consider the price of 
a good or service, but also take into account their dependence on a network and the need to 
balance supply and demand in real time, their response will be characterized as a response to 
system requirements. In contrast, economic actors may consider only the price of the good or 
service in their choice for another contracting party and governance structure.    
An adaptation within the market has been defined as an autonomous adaptation and an 
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adaptation within the hybrid or the hierarchy has been defined as a cooperative adaptation (e.g. 
Williamson, 1996a). This terminology will be applied to adaptations between governance 
structures53. When an adaptation from the hierarchy to the hybrid or the market occurs, this is 
referred to as an autonomous adaptation. When an adaptation from the market to the hybrid or 
the hierarchy occurs, this is referred to as a cooperative adaptation. 
 
 
5.2 Research strategy: the case study 
The research strategy that is used in this thesis is the case study. A case study is ‘an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2003: 
13). The contemporary phenomenon refers here to the governance transformations in 
liberalizing European electricity industries, and the real-life context includes the electricity 
laws and regulations, and the governance structures from which the economic actors adjust to 
new forms. A case study is preferred over other research strategies when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and when the contextual conditions 
are believed to be highly pertinent to the case (Yin, 2003: 13). As was discussed in chapter 
four, the electricity laws and regulations are believed to influence the governance 
transformations in various ways; they are believed to influence the direction of governance 
change, to stimulate the adaptation process, and to set the attributes of the new forms of 
governance. The electricity laws and regulations are thus intertwined with the governance 
transformations. An understanding of the governance transformations benefits from including 
the laws and regulations in the analysis. In addition, the governance structures that 
characterized the electricity industries before the liberalization influence the governance 
                                                 
53
 The aim of this thesis is to introduce adaptation between governance structures into the framework of 
transaction cost economics. The concepts that are chosen, such as adaptation as the unit of analysis, the 
adaptation costs, the attributes of adaptation that explain the efficiency of governance transformations, are 
aimed to be theoretically consistent with transaction cost economics (see also sections 1.2 and 4.6.1). The 
attributes of adaptation are based on the definitions of autonomous adaptation of Hayek, and cooperative 
adaptation of Barnard (see also section 4.6). The adaptations between governance structures are therefore 
also referred to as autonomous and cooperative adaptation. 
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transformations, as starting points of the process of adaptation. A case study allows for taking 
this real-life context into account.  
 
5.2.1 An embedded multiple case study 
Different types of case studies exist. In this thesis an embedded multiple case study is done. 
The two cases are the governance transformations in the Dutch electricity industry and the 
governance transformations in the French electricity industry. A multiple case study is 
preferred over a single case study, because it increases the external validity of the study, and 
thus the generalizability of the study beyond the two cases, and because it guards against 
observer bias (Leonard-Barton, 1990). An embedded design is preferred over a holistic 
design54 to give focus to the two cases. In an embedded design, a case includes more than one 
unit of analysis, and each of the subunits to the case is studied separately before returning to 
the analysis of the entire case. The advantage of such an embedded design is that it enables to 
focus the case study through the use of these subunits. The embedded units of analysis in this 
case study are the transaction and the adaptation. The choice for this first unit of analysis is 
guided by the use of the theoretical framework of transaction cost economics in this thesis. The 
attributes of the electricity transactions may be able to explain the new forms of governance 
(when these forms are aligned with the attributes of the transactions). As argued in chapter 
four, the attributes of the transactions cannot explain the transformations to new governance 
structures and in particular the transformations to the second-best solutions (e.g. when 
regulation has created a misalignment), and therefore a second unit of analysis is proposed. 
This second unit of analysis is adaptation. The attributes of adaptation may be able to explain 
the governance transformations, and therefore the emergence of the new forms of governance. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates how these two types of subunits – the transaction and the adaptation - are 
embedded in the two cases.  
 
                                                 
54
 A holistic design is used if the case study examines only the global nature of an organization, and is 
advantageous when no logical subunits can be identified (Yin, 2003: 43-45).  
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Figure 5.2 Embedded multiple case study 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In both the Dutch and French case, each of the four electricity transactions is studied 
separately. For each of these subunits, the analysis starts with a characterization of the 
attributes of the transaction, and of the new structure that governs the transaction. The analysis 
of each subunit will then indicate if, and how, transaction cost economics is able to explain the 
efficiency of the new governance structure. The analysis will continue by characterizing the 
adaptation towards the new structure, and how the attributes of adaptation are able to explain 
the new form of governance and the governance transformation. The governance 
transformation can only be characterized by identifying the governance structure of before the 
liberalization, and thus from which the adaptation process started. Finally, the analysis 
elaborates on the various roles of regulation in the governance transformation. This is repeated 
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eight times; each of the two cases discusses the four types of transactions. The time period for 
which the governance transformations are studied range from the implementation of the first 
EC electricity directive of 1996 into the national laws and regulations until the end of 2008. 
 
5.2.2 Pattern matching 
The conceptual framework in figure 5.1 illustrates which concepts are believed to be relevant 
to an understanding of governance transformations, and it proposes what the relations are 
among these various concepts. Whether this conceptual framework is able to explain the 
governance transformations in the Dutch and French electricity industries is determined by 
matching the empirical observations to the patterns as proposed by the framework. For 
example, when a governance structure transformed from a vertically integrated hierarchy to a 
hybrid form of governance, and the adaptation is characterized by a search for a contracting 
party with a relevant identity, cooperation among multiple economic actors, and a response to 
the requirements of the electric system, the empirical pattern matches the expected relations in 
the conceptual framework. This adaptation process would only take place if regulation had an 
influence on the old governance structure, and created a misalignment between the governance 
structure and the attributes of the transaction. Yin (2003) argues that inferences about causality 
can be made with pattern matching. He states that ‘if the initially predicted values have been 
found, and at the same time alternative patterns of predicted values have not been found, strong 
causal inferences can be made’ (Yin, 2003: 116). 
 
5.2.3 A literal and theoretical replication of the case study results 
The expectation for the multiple case study is that the results will be similar across the two 
cases with respect to how the adaptation process to new forms of governance works, and how 
the attributes of adaptation explain the governance transformations. Similar results are also 
expected across the two cases with respect to how the attributes of the transactions explain the 
efficiency of the new forms of governance. The latter is based on transaction cost economics’ 
discriminating alignment of governance structures to transactions. When the attributes of the 
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transaction are characterized by asset-specificity and by behavioural uncertainty, and when the 
contracting parties adapt multilaterally, respond to the system requirements, and the identity of 
the contracting party is relevant, it is thus expected that a hybrid form of governance will 
emerge in both the Dutch and French cases. An expectation of similar results across the various 
cases in a multiple case study is referred to as a literal replication (Yin, 2003). 
In this multiple case study, a literal replication is complicated by the fact that the French and 
Dutch cases differ in terms of their real-life contexts. Firstly, the French and Dutch 
governments and energy firms have implemented the European electricity directives of 1996 
and 2003 in different ways. The French government has been very conservative in transposing 
the European directives into French law, and the French energy firms have been very slow in 
implementing the new regulatory requirements. The Dutch government, on the other hand, has 
formulated electricity laws and regulations that stipulate more stringent requirements on the 
independence of the networks than are included in the European directives. It has also 
demanded a fast implementation of the European directives and national regulations by the 
Dutch energy firms. Secondly, the French and Dutch electricity industries have been 
characterized by different governance structures before the liberalization. The French 
electricity industry was characterized by a more extensive vertical integration as compared to 
the Dutch electricity industry. The governance transformations in the French and Dutch 
electricity industries may differ, because of these different laws and regulations in the two 
industries, and because of the different governance structures from which the changes to new 
forms are taking place. These two concepts - the regulation and the pre-liberalization 
governance structures - are taken into account in the conceptual framework of this thesis (see 
figure 5.1). They are included in the analysis in order to better understand how the adaptation 
process to new forms of governance works, but not for the purpose of highlighting these 
differences. A literal replication is thus combined with a theoretical replication in this thesis. A 
theoretical replication ‘predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons’ (Yin, 2003: 47). 
These two types of replication illustrate that a case study relies extensively on a theoretical 
framework that supports the case and that enables the case researcher to determine when 
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results are contrasting for predictable reasons and under which conditions the results are 
similar. It has been claimed that there is an advantage to choosing two (or more) cases with 
contrasting contexts. Bryman and Bell (2007) state that ‘we can understand social phenomena 
better when they are compared in relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or 
situations’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 66). The governance transformations can thus be better 
understood when the differences in regulation and in the pre-liberalization governance 
structures between the French and the Dutch case are considered. For example, French 
regulations may prohibit the emergence of a market for a particular transaction, while the 
Dutch regulations for this transaction may not include such a restriction. A governance 
transformation to the market is thus excluded for the French energy firms. The French energy 
firms often depart from a hierarchical governance structure, and may therefore first transform 
to a hybrid. These differences in the real-life contexts lead to differences in the governance 
transformations between the two cases. Taking the contextual conditions into account should 
not only result in a better understanding of the particularities of each case and of the 
differences between the two cases, but it should enhance an understanding of the process of 
adaptation as such.  
 
5.2.4 The use of theory and analytic generalization  
A theoretical framework plays a central role in a case study. It is used from the very beginning 
of conducting a case study; the research questions and conceptual framework are based on 
previously developed theory, on a review of the relevant literature, and on an expansion of the 
theory into underdeveloped areas of research. The theoretical framework influences what type 
of data will be gathered. Transaction cost economics has introduced the attributes of 
transactions as the explanatory variables for the efficiency of governance structures. In the two 
cases, information is collected on the attributes of transactions, and thus on the specific 
investments that are made in human and physical capital, in assets to position the plants close 
to the other contracting party, and to allow the transaction to take place within a short period of 
time, on the perceived opportunistic behaviour of the other contracting party, and on the 
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frequency of the transaction. To extend the theory of transaction cost economics, information is 
also gathered, in each of the two cases, on the attributes of adaptation to understand the 
governance transformations.   
In addition to the role of theory in the formulation of research questions and the data collection, 
a theoretical framework serves two other purposes in a case study. Firstly, the case study 
allows for testing the existing theory, and for testing the expansion to this theory, with the 
empirical data of the cases (Yin, 2003). Secondly, the case study method enables the 
development of theory based on new findings in the case studies that differ from the 
expectations on the basis of the earlier proposed expansion to the theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The multiple case study of this thesis serves mainly the first purpose. The two cases on the 
governance transformations in the Dutch and French electricity industries illustrate when 
transaction cost economics is able to explain the efficiency of a new form of governance, and 
when the theoretical extension to transaction cost economics on the adaptation process explains 
the governance transformations.   
The multiple case study is preferred over a single case study for both these purposes of theory 
testing and theory building. With respect to theory testing, Yin (2003) argues that two cases are 
better able at testing theory than a single case is, and more specifically, are better able to 
expand the external generalizability of the case studies’ findings. He states that ‘the contexts of 
the two cases are likely to differ to some extent. If under these varied circumstances you still 
can arrive at common conclusions from both cases, they will have immeasurably expanded the 
external generalizability of your findings’ (Yin, 2003: 53). This points to a specific 
characteristic of the case study as a research strategy. The results of the case studies are not 
generalized to a larger population, as in experiments or surveys, but they are generalized to 
theory. This is referred to as analytic generalization (Yin, 2003: 32-33). With respect to theory 
building and multiple case studies, Bryman and Bell state that ‘by comparing two or more 
cases, the researcher is in a better position to establish the circumstances in which a theory will 
or will not hold, and the comparison may itself suggest concepts that are relevant to an 
emerging theory’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 68). The aim of this multiple case study is to 
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confirm the theoretical framework on the transformation of governance structures with the 
results of the two cases. 
 
 
5.3 Data collection  
The data for the two cases are collected from multiple sources, including documents and 
archival records, literature55, and interviews. This section will present the specific data sources 
that were used for collecting information on the various concepts, including regulation, the 
public authorities, the pre-liberalization governance structures, the attributes of transactions, 
the attributes of adaptation, and the new governance structures.   
 
5.3.1 Regulation  
Various documents and archival records were studied to discuss those regulations that affect 
the governance transformations, the new forms of governance and the attributes of transactions 
in the two cases on the liberalizing Dutch and French electricity industries. These documents 
and records include the national electricity laws and amendments to these laws, ministerial 
regulations, regulatory decisions, and guidelines of the independent regulatory agencies, and 
various codes (the grid code, system code, tariff code, measurement code, and information 
code). The decisions of the sector-specific regulators and the competition authorities on dispute 
resolutions were used. The websites and press releases of the ministries of economic affairs 
and energy, the independent sector-specific regulatory agencies, and the competition 
authorities were used for information on legislation and regulatory decisions, and for 
information on the introduction of new regulations. In addition, letters of the ministry of 
economic affairs to parliament, reports by the ministry of economic affairs on a proposal for 
changes to the electricity law, monitors of the regulatory agencies of the energy market, 
                                                 
55
 Secondary data collection techniques include the use of published data from diverse sources such as 
industry trade publications (Lieberman, 1991), government data (Levy, 1985), newspapers and journals 
(Osborn and Vaughn, 1990), or archival data (Anderson and Coughlan, 1987), or non-published data such 
as contracts between exchange partners (Macher and Richman, 2006: 9).  
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activity reports of the sector-specific regulatory agencies, and minutes of a hearing on the 
regulation of the transmission system operator were studied. Interviews with the ministries of 
economic affairs, independent regulatory agencies and energy companies were conducted. 
 
5.3.2 Public authorities 
The websites and press releases of the ministries of economic affairs and energy, the 
independent sector-specific regulatory agencies and the competition authorities were used for 
information on the regulatory responsibilities and objectives of the public authorities. The 
competition law and amendments to this law, and the annual reports of the competition 
authority were studied to understand the objectives of the competition authority, its 
organizational structure and its relation to the independent sector-specific regulator. Literature 
on independent regulators and on the organizational structure of competition authorities was 
studied for this same purpose. A public service contract between an incumbent energy firm and 
a ministry gave information on the objectives of the ministry. A statute of relation between the 
competition authority and the ministry of economic affairs gave information on the 
coordination mechanisms between these two authorities. Interviews with independent sector-
specific regulators, energy firms, and the ministries of economic affairs were conducted. These 
interviews provided information on the separation of regulatory powers between the public 
authorities, and within the independent sector-specific regulator; the coordination mechanisms 
between the ministry of economic affairs, the competition authorities, and the sector-specific 
regulators; and the differences between the regulatory objectives of these public authorities. 
 
5.3.3 Pre-liberalization governance structures 
To understand how governance before the liberalization of the electricity industries was 
structured, literature on the French and Dutch electricity industries and on the recent reforms in 
these industries was used. The annual reports and websites of energy incumbents were studied. 
In interviews with the energy firms, and with an association of energy producers, retailers and 
traders (Energiened), questions were included on the situation before liberalization, and in 
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particular, on which activities in the electricity value chain were vertically integrated. 
 
5.3.4 Attributes of transactions 
The documents and archival records that were used to determine the attributes of the electricity 
transactions include the electricity laws, ministerial regulations, regulatory decisions of the 
competition authority, regulatory decisions on a binding instruction, dispute resolution, and on 
tariffs by the regulatory agency, the tariff, grid and information codes, rules for the program 
and balancing responsibility and the adjustment orders, activity reports of the sector-specific 
regulator, monitors of the energy market by the regulatory agency, and press releases of the 
regulatory agencies. The websites of the transmission system operator, Energie Data Services 
Nederland (EDSN), the APX Group, and Energiegids are used. Various publications are 
studied, including an EDSN reference model on what information has to be exchanged when 
switching retailer; publications of the transmission system operator on how it executes the 
system and grid codes and its procedures for resolving transportation restrictions; documents of 
the regulatory agency and the transmission system operator on the balance system; annual 
reports of the transmission system operator; letters of the transmission system operator to 
parliament; reports of the Brattle Group; a manual on bidding for reserve power; and reports of 
the Dutch energy centre ECN. Minutes of a hearing on the design of a regulatory decision, and 
a response of an energy firm to the competition authority on a consultation of the energy 
market are also used to establish the attributes of the electricity transactions. And finally, 
literature on the efficiency of the balancing mechanism is studied.  
 
5.3.5 Attributes of adaptation 
The electricity laws, ministerial regulations, regulatory decisions of the sector-specific 
regulator, the grid and system codes, the rules on program and balancing responsibility and 
adjustment orders, the minutes of a hearing on the design of a regulatory decision, the activity 
reports of the sector-specific regulator, and communications of the sector-specific regulator on 
consultations with the parties in the electricity industry were used for determining the attributes 
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of adaptation. The website of the transmission system operator, the website of an association of 
energy firms (Energiened), the annual reports of the transmission system operators and a 
distribution system operator were also used. An interview with the sector-specific regulator 
(Energiekamer) also provided information on the attributes of adaptation.  
 
5.3.6 New governance structures 
The documents and archival records that were used to determine the characteristics of the new 
governance structures include the electricity laws, ministerial regulations, the grid, system and 
tariff codes, rules on program and balancing responsibility and adjustment orders, and 
regulatory decisions on a penal sum, on a binding instruction and on the resolution of disputes 
by the regulator. An advice of the competition authority to the ministry of economic affairs, a 
document of the regulatory agency and the transmission system operator on the balance 
system, a monitor by the regulator on the energy markets, and activity reports of the sector-
specific regulator were also used. The network connection and network access contracts and 
the general conditions to these contracts of the distribution and the transmission system 
operators; and publications by the transmission system operator on how it executes the system 
and grid codes, its procedures for resolving transportation restrictions, and several technical 
guidelines of the transmission system operator were studied. The websites of the transmission 
system operator and of Energie Data Services Nederland (EDSN); annual reports of the 
transmission system operator and publications by EDSN; and literature on an evaluation of 
electricity policies were studied to establish the characteristics of the new forms of governance. 
Interviews with the energy firms provided information on what new forms of governance are 
emerging in the unbundled industries; how these governance structures were influenced by the 
new regulations on an independent network operation; and which governance structures were 
prohibited by these new regulations.   
The following chapters six and seven will present the multiple case study on the governance 
transformations in the Dutch and French electricity industries. These chapters provide the 
detailed references of these different data sources. In chapter eight a cross-case analysis is 
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performed that discusses the similarities and the differences across the two cases and their 
impact on the theoretical extension to transaction cost economics. 
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6 – The Dutch Electricity Industry  
 
 
In this chapter, the conceptual framework will be applied to the Dutch electricity industry. This 
first case of the multiple case study presents the governance transformations in the Dutch 
electricity industry for the four types of electricity transactions. Section 6.1 discusses the 
governance structures that characterized the Dutch electricity industry before the liberalization, 
in order to understand from which governance structures the adaptation to new forms of 
governance takes place. Section 6.2 presents the Dutch regulations that implement the EC 
electricity directives on the introduction of competition and consumer choice, and on the 
vertical unbundling of the system operators. Section 6.3 introduces the three public authorities 
that formulate, implement and enforce these new regulations in the Dutch electricity industry; 
the allocation of regulatory powers and responsibilities among these authorities; and the 
coordination mechanisms that structure the authorities’ mutual relations. These regulations and 
public authorities influence the governance transformations. Sections 6.4 until 6.8 introduce 
the four types of electricity transactions: the network connection transactions, the network 
access transactions, two types of balancing transactions, and the switching transactions, 
respectively. These sections discuss the attributes of these transactions, the attributes of the 
new forms of governance that coordinate the transactions, and the governance transformations. 
They illustrate whether transaction cost economics is able to explain the efficiency of these 
new forms of governance on the basis of the attributes of the transactions. These sections also 
characterize the attributes of adaptation, and analyze how the process of adaptation explains 
the emergence of the new forms of governance and the governance transformations. It becomes 
apparent that the attributes of the transactions are able to explain the efficiency of a new 
governance structure for one transaction only. This illustrates the need for a perspective that is 
complementary to the standard transaction cost analysis, and that takes the process of 
adaptation into account. These sections also discuss the various roles of regulation for each of 
the four types of electricity transactions, and which of the three public authorities takes on 
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these roles. Regulation sets the ex ante rules of the game, and thereby influences the attributes 
of the transactions, and those of the governance structures. Regulation also influences the 
attributes of adaptation, and becomes part of the new forms of governance.  
 
 
6.1 Governance before liberalization  
Before the liberalization of the Dutch electricity industry, the governance of the electricity 
transactions was structured as a centralized pooling system that internalized the transmission 
and generation of electricity. A large part of the electricity distributors were vertically 
integrated with the generation of electricity. At the end of the 1980s, a first attempt was made 
to an operational separation of the distributors from the vertically integrated structures, but the 
generators and distributors of electricity retained the same owners. This section discusses the 
characteristics of the governance structures in the Dutch electricity industry before the 
implementation of the EC electricity directive of 1996 in more detail. 
 
6.1.1 Vertical integration by the local and provincial authorities 
At the end of the 19th century, when electricity was invented, private firms were the first to 
generate and distribute electricity in the Netherlands. Within a few years, the local authorities 
(municipalities) had taken over the generation and distribution of electricity. Until 1912 only 
these local authorities were involved in the supply of electricity to the Dutch consumers 
(Veraart, 2007: 172). As the scale of electricity generation increased and the distance over 
which electricity could be transported grew, various provincial authorities started to take over 
the management and ownership of the electric utilities56. The electric utilities of the different 
provinces remained relatively isolated from each other for close to thirty years, both in terms of 
their generation and their distribution of electricity. In 1949, the SEP (Samenwerkende 
Elektriciteits-Productiebedrijven), an organization of co-operating electricity producers, was 
                                                 
56
 In several cities, such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the local authorities remained the owners of the 
electric utilities (see Köper (2003) for an overview of the shareholders of the Dutch distributors in the 
beginning of the 1990s).  
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established for the construction of a high-voltage electricity network, and to connect the 
various networks of the provinces. The SEP was made responsible for operating the 
transmission network, purchasing fuel on behalf of the producers, coordinating decisions on 
the location of new production plants, importing and exporting electricity, system dispatch, and 
balancing electricity supply and demand (Cross, 1996: 171).  The owners of the SEP were the 
co-operating electricity producers. Since the provincial authorities owned the electric utilities 
that both generated and distributed electricity, these provincial authorities also owned the SEP 
(see figure 6.1). The generation, transmission and distribution of electricity were therefore 
vertically integrated, in terms of their ownership, by the provincial authorities57. This 
governance structure of vertical integration of generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity characterized the Dutch electricity industry until the late 1980s (Arentsen et al., 
1997: 176; Van Damme, 2005: 156). 
 
Figure 6.1 Ownership of generation, transmission and distribution by the provinces 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57
 These vertically integrated electricity generators were the largest distributors in the Dutch electricity 
industry (Arentsen et al., 1997: 176). In addition to these large electric utilities, many smaller and 
separate distributors operated in the industry (Interview Anne Sypkens Smit, Energiened, November 29, 
2005). 
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6.1.2 Operational separation of the electric utilities in the early 1990s 
In 1989, the Dutch government issued a new electricity law. This law was aimed at introducing 
a limited amount of competition in the generation of electricity, and it prescribed the 
operational separation of distribution from generation. The ownership of these two activities 
did not have to be separated and could remain with the provincial authorities. Competition had 
to be introduced into the generation of electricity by giving the distributors the option to buy 
electricity from a different generator than the one with which they were vertically integrated.  
This so-called horizontal shopping of the distributors did not occur for two reasons. It would 
constitute lost sales for the integrated producers (Cross, 1996: 181), and the distributors only 
had a limited choice; there were only four producers that charged a uniform tariff. This 
uniform tariff was set by the SEP. The SEP operated as a pooling system; it bought all the 
electricity from the producers at different prices, depending on the producer's fuel use, and then 
sold the electricity back to the producers for a national basic tariff. The producers sold the 
electricity to the distributors for this national basic tariff plus a regional surcharge (Koster, 
1998: 663). This idea of horizontal shopping in the 1989 law did not lead to competition in 
generation, because of this uniform tariff and the fact that the distributors still shared their 
ownership with the generators.  
An omission in the 1989 law unintentionally led to the dominance of the distributors in the 
electricity industry by the first half of the 1990s (Arentsen et al., 1997: 182). This omission 
follows from a distinction in the law between centrally coordinated generation of electricity by 
the SEP and decentralized generation. The law allowed for the decentralized generation of 
electricity by industrial consumers, but also by the distributors. A subsidy program for the 
generation of electricity with environmentally friendly techniques encouraged the distributors 
to invest in decentralized combined heat and power (chp) plants. When the distributors wanted 
to invest in generation units of over 25 MW, they needed the approval of the SEP. The law did 
not require the approval of the SEP for the construction of chp plants of over 25 MW by other 
producers, such as the industrial consumers. The distributors set up joint ventures with these 
decentralized producers to avoid the approval of the SEP. This omission in the 1989 law led to 
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a great increase in decentralized generation. As a result of favorable prices for electricity 
produced by chp units, ‘the decentralized production capacity doubled between 1990 and 1995 
from 2100 MW to 4200 MW, equal to 23 per cent of total capacity’ (Van Damme, 2005: 158). 
Combined with the centrally coordinated generation of electricity by the SEP, the Dutch 
electricity industry was confronted with a large overcapacity of generation. This situation in 
the Dutch electricity industry, as created by the 1989 law, proved to be untenable. ‘SEP 
announced, in early 1995, that it was making payments totalling Nfl 85 million to several large 
consumers in exchange for their cancellation of plans to complete chp projects’ (Cross, 1996: 
169). A new structure for the Dutch electricity industry and a new regulatory framework was 
needed in order to overcome these inefficiencies.   
 
6.1.3 Past governance of the electricity transactions 
When looking specifically at the four electricity transactions (the network connection, network 
access, balancing, and switching transactions), it can be concluded that these were mainly 
governed by vertically integrated hierarchies and by regulation. Firstly, the connection and 
access of the generators to the transmission network were internalized in the SEP, and the 
consumers were given a connection and an access to the network with a regulated tariff and 
contract. Before the 1989 law, there was a vertical integration of generation, transmission, and 
distribution. In the late 1980s, the electric utilities began separating the generation and 
transmission of electricity from the distribution and the supply of electricity58. The distributors 
had to have a long-term contract with the transmission system operator for a connection to the 
high-voltage grid59. Secondly, the balancing transactions were internalized within the SEP. The 
SEP was responsible for balancing electricity supply and demand for the entire national electric 
                                                 
58
 Before the introduction of competition into the electricity industries, the function of the supply of 
electricity to the consumers (or the electricity retail) was very limited. There was hardly any product 
differentiation in electricity, and electricity did not need to be marketed to the consumer. At that time, the 
electricity consumers were not referred to as customers of the electric utilities, but they were simply 
viewed as connections to the network (Veraart, 2007: 180). The supply function consisted mainly of 
sending bills and collecting monthly payments.    
59
 Interview Hendrik Bosch, Managing Director Delta Netwerkbedrijf B.V., October 28, 2005. 
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system. It monitored the amount of electricity taken out of the network by consumers, ordered 
generators to produce reserve capacity in indicated plants, and thereby balanced electricity 
supply and demand. Thirdly, before the liberalization, the switching transactions occurred only 
when consumers moved to a different address. When consumers moved to a region that was 
served by a different electric utility, the consumers had to contact this utility themselves. When 
a consumer moved to an address that was served by the same electric utility, information on the 
switching was performed internally, and the switching transactions were thus governed by 
vertically integrated hierarchies.       
 
 
6.2 Electricity regulations  
The liberalization of the Dutch electricity industry started with the electricity law of 1998. This 
law transposed the EC electricity directive of 1996 (96/92/EC). It was amended several times, 
by the law of July 2004 and the law of November 2006. The law of July 2004 implemented the 
EC electricity directive of 2003 (2003/54/EC) and increased the supervision of the electricity 
networks. The law of November 2006 obliged an independence of the system operators that 
extends beyond the European requirement of legal unbundling. It prohibits the electricity 
generators, traders and retailers to be part of the same holding as those companies that 
distribute and transmit electricity. The electricity law of 1998 appointed TenneT as the 
transmission system operator for the Dutch high-voltage network, thereby replacing the SEP. 
In December 2000, an additional law for the Dutch electricity industry was issued. This law 
(Overgangswet elektriciteitsproductiesector) arranged for the discontinuation of the SEP and 
the transfer of its shares to the Dutch government. 
In addition to the 1998 electricity law, other regulations for the Dutch electricity sector have 
been formulated. The Ministry of Economic Affairs formulates more detailed rules for the 
electricity industry on the basis of the 1998 law in so-called ministerial regulations. The 
regulatory agency for the Dutch electricity industry, the Energiekamer, explains in policy rules 
and guidelines how it implements the electricity law of 1998 and the ministerial regulations. In 
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cooperation with the system operators and the energy firms, the regulatory agency has 
formulated five codes that provide detailed descriptions of the behavior that is required of the 
various parties in the electricity industry. More specifically, these codes prescribe how the 
system operators and the network users have to behave with respect to network connection and 
the transportation of electricity, system services, tariffs, measurement of electricity, and the 
exchange of information on switching consumers. Firstly, the grid code specifies these 
requirements for a connection to the network, the operation of the network, and the 
transportation of electricity. Secondly, the system code applies to the behavior of the 
transmission system operator on the one hand and the distribution system operators and those 
connected to the network on the other hand with respect to the system services that the 
transmission system operator provides for the safe and efficient transportation of electricity, the 
maintenance of the balance between electricity supply and demand, the solutions to large 
disturbances in the transportation of electricity, and the program responsibility. Thirdly, the 
measurement code contains conditions for the design and management of measurement 
devices, the measurement of electricity transportation and supply, and the exchange of 
measured data. Fourthly, the tariff code describes the methods of calculation of the tariffs for a 
connection to the network, the transportation of electricity, and the system services. Finally, the 
information code specifies how the system operators, electricity retailers, and the parties that 
are responsible for the energy programs and the measurement of electricity have to behave 
with respect to the administrative processes and the exchange of information in the electricity 
industry. This exchange of information mainly concerns information on the switching of 
consumers to a different retailer, and the switching to a different program responsible party. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the regulatory agency can also take specific regulatory 
decisions. These include, for example, decisions on the tariffs for a connection and an access to 
the network for a particular period. These tariffs are determined on the basis of the procedures 
as specified in the codes, ministerial regulations and the electricity law.  
The largest part of the electricity law and most of the other regulations concern rules for the 
monopolistic transmission and distribution networks. Several rules also exist for the potentially 
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competitive activities in the electricity industry, such as the generation and retail of electricity. 
The 1998 electricity law and the various regulations will be discussed here with respect to 
these four activities. The discussion is also limited to the rules that affect the four types of 
electricity transactions and their governance. 
 
6.2.1 Generation and electricity retail 
Before the liberalization, the SEP formulated electricity plans that included information on the 
investments to be made in new generation capacity. These electricity plans needed to be 
approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs. Currently, the construction of new generation 
capacity is not regulated in the Dutch electricity industry. The government does not decide 
where and when new electricity plants will be build. If, however, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs believes that too little new generation capacity is constructed in order to ensure the 
security of supply, he can start a procedure as described in article 7 of the 2003 EC directive. 
This article refers to the possibility of tendering for new generation capacity (see section 3.4.1).  
When energy firms vertically integrate the generation and the retail of electricity, article 86 of 
the 1998 electricity law states that these energy firms have to unbundle their accounts, which 
means that they should keep separate accounts for the generation of electricity and for the retail 
of electricity.  
 
6.2.2 Transmission and distribution  
The 1998 electricity law and several other regulations give detailed descriptions of the 
responsibilities of the transmission and distribution system operators, and stipulate the 
requirements with respect to the vertical separation of these system operators from the 
potentially competitive activities, such as the generation, trade, and retail of electricity.   
 
6.2.2.1 Responsibilities of the transmission and distribution system operators 
According to article 16 of the electricity law of 1998, the distribution and transmission system 
operators are responsible for the operation and maintenance of their networks. They have to 
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construct, repair, renew and expand the networks, and while doing so they have to take account 
of measures directed at energy saving, sustainable electricity, and decentralized generation of 
electricity through which the necessity of investing in new generation capacity is reduced. The 
system operators need to provide connections to their network, and if requested, supply those 
connected with a meter. They are responsible for the transportation of electricity, for keeping 
enough reserve capacity on the network, and for metering the amount of electricity that is 
produced by chp plants and by installations that produce sustainable electricity. When an 
electricity retailer goes bankrupt and is unable to supply electricity to its consumers, the system 
operators are obliged to take certain provisions for these consumers. 
The transmission system operator has to provide system services to the users of the network. 
These services include balancing electricity supply and demand and resolving disruptions in 
the transmission of electricity.  
The law of November 2006 prescribes that the distribution and transmission system operators 
have to be so-called ‘fat’ operators. A fat operator is one that performs most of the activities 
related to the operation of the network itself. The law restricts the activities that the operators 
can contract out to other firms, and it thereby enlarges the number of activities that the 
operators have to perform under their direct management. A guideline of the Dutch regulator 
(Energiekamer) defines the activities that are under the direct management of the system 
operator as those activities for which the operator uses its own employees and resources, over 
which it has full control, and for which it does not need the approval of others (NMa/DTe, 
2008). These activities include the planning for new distribution and transmission capacity; 
designing, constructing and maintaining the network; resolving disturbances on the network; 
dispatching the system; and purchasing energy for balancing and for compensating grid losses 
on the network. Other activities can be contracted out, such as the administrative processes of 
the operators and the metering of electricity use. The operators have to take efficiency 
considerations and the principle of non-discrimination into account when contracting out to 
other firms (NMa/DTe, 2008).  
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6.2.2.2 Independence of the transmission and distribution system operators 
Article 10a of the electricity law of 1998 requires that the distribution system operators have 
the economic ownership of their network. This means that the operators are entitled to the 
value of use of their network; they have all the rights and duties with respect to the network 
and bear the full risk of a change in value of the network. This economic ownership is 
distinguished from the legal ownership of the networks. The legal owner has sold the value of 
use of the network to the economic owner, but can still forbid the economic owner to use the 
network as collateral for a loan, or to sell the economic ownership to someone else (Kanning et 
al., 2004: 8).  
The system operators are allowed to be located within a larger holding structure in which other 
firms are present. Until the law on an independent network operation has been implemented, 
these other firms can also be generators, retailers, and traders of electricity. The system 
operators have to be separated from the generators, retailers and traders of electricity in several 
ways. First of all, the generators, retailers and traders cannot be appointed as operators of a 
network60. Secondly, the members of the management team and the majority of the members 
of the supervisory board of the system operators cannot have any connections with a generator, 
trader, retailer or a shareholder of the system operators. Thirdly, the generators, retailers, 
traders and other firms connected to a system operator through the holding structure, cannot 
interfere with the implementation of the tasks of the system operator that are attributed to it by 
the 1998 law61. Fourthly, the system operator is not allowed to discriminate between those 
firms that are located under its holding structure and those that are not. In other words, it 
cannot confer any advantages on those firms to which it is related62. These advantages include 
providing information on consumers to the related firms, providing goods or services to the 
related firms at a price that is lower than the costs that can be attributed to the goods or 
services, and allowing the related firm to use the name of the system operator63. Fifthly, a 
                                                 
60
 Article 11.1 of the electricity law of 1998. 
61
 Article 16.4 of the electricity law of 1998. 
62
 Article 11b.1 of the electricity law of 1998. 
63
 Article 18 of the electricity law of 1998. 
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system operator has to keep separate accounts for the activities related to the operation of the 
network. Sixthly, a network cannot be used to raise funds, except insofar as these funds are 
used for the operation of the network64.  
The law on an independent network operation requires some changes in the holding structures 
of the electricity firms. It prohibits that the system operators are located under the same 
holding as the generators, retailers and traders of electricity. This type of unbundling of the 
electricity firms thus increases the independence of the network operation beyond what is 
required by the EC electricity directive of 2003. It is often referred to as ownership unbundling, 
but the law does not require that the owners of the electricity firms sell their shares, either in 
the network part or in the commercial parts (the generation, retail, and trade) (Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken, 2007a). This unbundling requirement of the law on an independent 
network operation has entered into force in July 2008, and will have to be implemented for 
existing system operators by January 2011 (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2008).  
The 1998 law restricts the possibilities of the system operators to enter into competition with 
other firms. The operators cannot supply any goods or services when they compete with other 
firms for the supply of these goods or services, unless these involve activities that the operators 
have to perform on the basis of their responsibilities as specified in the 1998 law, and 
specifically in article 16.  
 
6.2.3 Network connection and network access 
The system operators are obliged to provide a connection to their network for those who 
request to be connected. They are not allowed to discriminate between these requests65. When 
the capacity of the connection is larger than 10 MW, other companies than the system 
operators are allowed to build the connection to the network. In this case, the purchaser of the 
connection can invite tenders for the construction of the connection66. 
With respect to access to the network, the system operators are obliged to transport electricity 
                                                 
64
 Article 93b of the electricity law of 1998. 
65
 Article 23 of the electricity law of 1998. 
66
 Article 16c of the electricity law of 1998. 
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along their network for those who request the transportation of electricity, in a non-
discriminatory way67. The electricity law also includes rules for the quality of the 
transportation service, and the registration of the quality by the system operators68. In addition, 
it obliges the system operators to have enough reserve capacity available to resolve any 
transportation problems in their network69.  
The tariffs for which the system operators provide a connection to the network and transport 
electricity along the network are regulated. On the basis of a proposal made by the system 
operators and the representatives of different parties in the electricity industry, the Dutch 
regulator for the electricity industry (Energiekamer) sets these tariffs. The efficiency of the 
system operators is stimulated by including an x-factor in the tariffs. This x-factor is calculated 
on the basis of the average increase in productivity (the increase in output per unit of costs) of 
the operators. Each year, the tariffs are increased with a measure of inflation (CPI) and 
decreased with the x-factor. The transportation tariff for those who receive electricity does not 
depend on the place where the electricity is produced or through which connection the 
electricity is put on the network. It only depends on the voltage level of the network from 
which the electricity is subtracted. Similarly for the producers, the transportation tariff does not 
depend on where the electricity is received, but on the voltage level at which the electricity is 
put on the network.   
 
6.2.4 Balancing of electricity supply and demand 
With respect to the balancing of electricity supply and demand, the 1998 law only states that 
the transmission system operator has the obligation to provide system services. When the 
transmission system operator purchases energy to implement the duties that are attributed to it 
by the 1998 law (which thus includes providing system services), it has to use a transparent 
and non-discriminatory procedure, and one that is in accordance with other energy purchases in 
                                                 
67
 Article 24 of the electricity law of 1998.  
68
 Articles 19a, 21, and 39 of the electricity law of 1998. 
69
 Article 16.1.d of the electricity law of 1998. 
171
The Dutch electricity industry  
 
161
 
the industry70. The tariff that the transmission system operator charges for maintaining the 
balance should reflect the costs, be transparent and non-discriminatory71. The tariff for the 
system services is charged to anyone who has a connection to the network and receives 
electricity72. The system code and the grid code specify the responsibilities of the transmission 
system operator and the network users with respect to the system services. Articles 31 to 37 of 
the electricity law specify how the conditions in the system code and grid code, and changes to 
these codes, should be formulated and by whom. 
 
6.2.5 Retail, customer choice and switching 
Since July 2001, the Dutch consumers are able to switch from their incumbent to another 
electricity retailer. For the first three years, this choice was restricted to the purchase of green 
electricity. Since July 2004, the Dutch consumers can also choose another retailer for grey 
electricity. Electricity retailers need a license to sell electricity to consumers73. To obtain such 
a license, the firms have to demonstrate that they are technically, financially and 
organizationally capable of selling electricity to consumers, and that they will include 
reasonable and transparent terms in their contracts with customers. The prices for the supply of 
electricity to consumers are not regulated, but the electricity firms do have to inform the Dutch 
regulator of the prices that they charge to the consumers. The Dutch regulator can set a 
maximum tariff when it considers the prices to be unreasonable, meaning that the effects of an 
efficient management do not sufficiently lead to lower costs74. When a consumer switches to a 
different electricity retailer, the system operator is obliged to execute the switch in accordance 
with rules as specified in ministerial regulations75. The specifics on how information on the 
switches is to be exchanged between the system operators, parties responsible for the energy 
programs and the metering of electricity, and the electricity retailers are given in the 
                                                 
70
 Article 16 of the electricity law of 1998. 
71
 Article 27.3 of the electricity law of 1998. 
72
 Article 30 of the electricity law of 1998. 
73
 Article 95a of the electricity law of 1998. 
74
 Article 95b of the electricity law of 1998. 
75
 Article 24a of the electricity law of 1998. 
172
The Dutch electricity industry 
 
162  
information code. The information that is exchanged includes information on the electricity use 
of the consumer and meter readings.    
The metering of electricity has always been done by the system operators. Since 2000, Dutch 
consumers are able to choose a metering firm. In 2006, the regulatory agency concluded that 
the prices for metering electricity have risen by 99 per cent (NMa, 2006). Because there have 
not been any substantial cost increases in metering electricity, the regulatory agency concluded 
that ‘this free metering market does not work as expected’ (NMa, 2006). Hardly any new 
metering firms entered the Dutch market (NMa, 2006). In 2007, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs decided to regulate the tariffs for metering electricity, because this market does not 
work properly, and to protect the consumers from paying unreasonable prices (Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken, 2007b). As of January 2008, the tariff for the metering of electricity is set 
by the regulatory agency (NMa, 2007a). This tariff is applicable to those activities of metering 
as defined in the article 30a of the electricity law of 1998, including the use of a meter, 
determining the amount of electricity that is taken out of the network and that is put on the 
network, and sharing the metering data with the system operator and the consumer of metering 
services. This tariff is only applicable to the meters that are managed by the system operators, 
which is more than ninety per cent of all the electricity meters in the Dutch electricity industry 
(NMa, 2007b).  
 
 
6.3 Regulatory institutional organization 
In chapter four, a regulatory institutional organization in liberalizing industries has been 
defined as consisting of the public authorities that regulate these industries, the allocation of 
regulatory responsibilities and powers among the authorities, and the coordination mechanisms 
that structure the authorities’ mutual relations. Such a characterization provides an 
understanding of which authority formulates, implements and enforces the regulations, and 
thus of when the authority sets the rules of the game and when it is part of the new governance 
structure. This characterization can also explain why particular regulations are introduced in 
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the Dutch electricity industry, and why these differ from the regulations in other European 
countries. A larger allocation of regulatory responsibilities to the independent regulatory 
agency leads to different regulations than when the ministry assumes a large responsibility, 
because these two authorities have different regulatory objectives. This section characterizes 
the regulatory institutional organization of the Dutch electricity industry, starting with a 
discussion on the public authorities (6.3.1), the regulatory responsibilities and powers (6.3.2), 
followed by the coordination mechanisms (6.3.3), and finally a discussion on the regulatory 
objectives (6.3.4).  
 
6.3.1 Public authorities 
In the Dutch liberalizing electricity industry, three public authorities regulate the energy firms 
and the system operators: the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the sector-specific regulatory 
agency (Energiekamer), and the competition authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 
NMa). The Energiekamer76 is structured as a chamber within the competition authority.  
Before July 2005, the Energiekamer (as a chamber of the NMa) was a separate governmental 
agency. It was responsible for the implementation of the electricity law and had the power to 
take regulatory decisions for the electricity industry within the boundaries of the electricity law 
and the ministerial regulations. The NMa could give general and individual instructions to the 
Energiekamer with respect to sector-specific cases. In 2005, the NMa and the Energiekamer 
experienced several changes in their organizational structure and position within the 
government. These changes were meant to increase the independence of the two authorities 
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Firstly, the board of directors of the NMa was changed 
from a directorate within the Ministry of Economic Affairs to a so-called Zelfstandig 
Bestuursorgaan (ZBO) (NMa/DTe, 2005). A ZBO is an independent administrative authority, 
                                                 
76
 The Dutch regulatory agency is referred to as the Energiekamer since the 1st of June 2008. Before this 
date the regulatory agency was called the Dienst Toezicht energie (DTe), and sometimes it was referred 
to as the NMa/DTe to indicate that the sector-specific regulatory agency is part of the competition 
authority. Several references in this thesis still mention the DTe or the NMa/DTe, because the documents 
or regulatory decisions were published before June 2008. When this chapter refers to the regulator, it 
refers to both the competition authority and the Energiekamer, as they are part of the same organization.  
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outside of the ministerial hierarchy. Secondly, the competences and powers of the director of 
the Energiekamer for the implementation of the electricity law were transferred to the board of 
directors of the NMa, who now takes all the regulatory decisions for the electricity industry. 
Thirdly, a mandate from the NMa to the deputy director and department managers of the 
Energiekamer authorizes the regulatory agency to implement the electricity law, but the final 
decision-making powers rest with the board of directors of the NMa.  
 
6.3.2 Regulatory responsibilities and powers 
No clear differences exist between the three public authorities with respect to their regulatory 
powers: the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the independent regulators formulate, execute 
and enforce regulations in the Dutch electricity industry. 
 
6.3.2.1 Formulating rules 
In 2004, a new law was passed that changed the 1998 electricity law. This law of 2004 had 
among others as its goal to deliver a better separation of powers between the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and the Energiekamer. The Ministry is responsible for formulating energy 
policy, legislation and regulations. The intention of this law was to restrict the task of the 
Energiekamer to executing the electricity law and the ministerial regulations. However, when 
implementing the electricity law, the Energiekamer formulates rules. It develops regulations 
that specify the more general rules of the electricity law. For example, the Energiekamer 
formulates codes that specify how the system operators and those connected to the network 
have to behave with respect to the transportation of electricity, connection to the network, 
tariffs, system balancing, measurement of electricity transportation, and consumer switching. 
The basic principles of these codes are formulated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
ministerial regulations. In cooperation with the energy firms, the Energiekamer determines the 
particularities in the codes. This power of the Energiekamer to set rules with respect to the 
behavior of the system operators and those connected to the network is in part justified by the 
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lack of expertise at the Ministry of Economic Affairs77. The Dutch energy firms claim to 
experience an increase in the amount of rules that are formulated by the Energiekamer. ‘The 
Dutch cabinet can formally say that there is less legislation and regulation, but in fact there are 
more rules set by the sector-specific regulatory agencies’78. In addition, the NMa has some 
freedom in developing policy. It has the power to determine the priority of complaints and its 
own investigations (Algera, 2002: 121).  
 
6.3.2.2 Executing rules 
The Energiekamer shares its power to execute the electricity law with the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs79. For example, the Minister issues licenses for the supply of electricity. He 
has to approve the assignment of the system operators, the appointment of the supervisory 
board of the TSO, and the annual report and budget of the TSO. Article 78 of the 1998 law 
states that the Minister can demand information from an electricity generator, supplier, trader 
or system operator to enable him to execute the electricity law. In an interview with the 
Energiekamer, it was mentioned that the Minister keeps the responsibility for these decisions, 
because he wants to retain an influence over the activities of, for example, the TSO. The 
Energiekamer is, however, attributed an increasingly larger role with respect to the execution 
and preparation of these decisions. For example, the Energiekamer prepares the decisions on 
requests for assignments of system operators and the licenses for the supply of electricity80.  
 
6.3.2.3 Enforcing rules 
The three public authorities have enforcement powers. When energy firms do not abide by the 
rules, the Minister can withdraw their license81. He can take the necessary actions to ensure 
                                                 
77
 Interview Mr. M. Veersma, Energiekamer, January 5, 2006. 
78
 Interview Mr. F. van den Heuvel, Delta, October 25, 2005. 
79
 In an interview with mr. R. Dantuma of the Ministry of Economic Affairs on October 28, 2005, it was 
mentioned that the Ministry of Economic Affairs still has responsibilities for executing the rules for the 
electricity industry. 
80
 Interview Mr. M. Veersma, Energiekamer, June 23, 2006.  
81
 Interview Mr. R. Dantuma, Ministry of Economic Affairs, October 28, 2005. 
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compliance to the rules at the costs of the energy firms. He can assign another firm to manage 
the network if the current firm is not abiding by the rules82. In addition, he can appoint a person 
from outside the system operator to manage the network. In case of non-compliance with the 
electricity law, the Energiekamer can give an energy firm a binding instruction, in which it 
obliges the firm to abide by the rules. A more severe enforcement method is an obligation to 
abide by the rules combined with a penal sum. In certain cases of non-compliance, the 
Energiekamer can oblige firms to pay a fine. The NMa can settle cases informally, by 
threatening with sanctions, naming and shaming, or come to a solution in consultation with the 
parties to the complaints (Algera, 2002: 121). 
 
6.3.2.4 Dispute resolution 
Disputes between system operators and those connected to the network on how the system 
operators execute their tasks, for example, on how they set the tariffs for network connection or 
how they provide information to third parties83, can be settled by the NMa. Another result of 
the newly acquired ZBO-status of the NMa (see section 6.3.1), is that the dispute resolution 
powers are transferred from the director of the Energiekamer to the board of directors of the 
NMa. The legal department of the NMa, in cooperation with the Energiekamer, prepares the 
decisions. There exists no mandate to the Energiekamer for dispute resolution84. In its 
decisions on these disputes, the NMa explains how the electricity law should be understood 
and interpreted. The electricity law prescribes that those who settle the disputes should not be 
involved in setting the rules for connection to the network, electricity transport and the tariff 
structures85. This is partly settled by allocating the responsibility for dispute resolution to the 
legal department of the NMa, but as De Rijke (2002: 65) observes, it is the board of the NMa 
who takes the final decisions and is thus both a regulator and a dispute resolution mechanism.  
 
                                                 
82
 Interview Mr. R. Dantuma, Ministry of Economic Affairs, October 28, 2005. 
83
 Articles 51.1 and 51.2 of the electricity law of 1998.  
84
 Interview Mr. M. Veersma, Energiekamer, June 23, 2006.  
85
 Article 5, chapter 4 paragraphs 4-6 of the electricity law of 1998.  
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6.3.2.5 A fourth branch of governance 
The Energiekamer and the NMa have thus been allocated three powers that are normally 
exercised by, and explicitly separated into, three branches of government. They formulate, 
execute and enforce the rules. Since the establishment of one of the first independent 
regulatory agencies in the United States, the Interstate Commerce Commission, there has been 
a debate about the democratic accountability of these agencies. McCraw states that 
‘controversy became attached to regulation like a Siamese twin’ (McCraw, 1984: 301-2). 
Majone referred to accusations of ‘constituting a politically irresponsible fourth branch of 
governance’ (Majone, 1996: 17). One of the Dutch energy firms mentioned that ‘there is no 
clear democratic legitimacy for the rules set by the DTe’86. In an interview with the 
Energiekamer, it was recognized that there exists no separation of powers. In October 2005, the 
Energiekamer changed its internal structure. With this new organizational structure, the 
Energiekamer aims to contribute to a separation of powers87. The departments that set the rules 
are separated from the departments that monitor the electricity industry and enforce the rules. 
However, the board of directors of the NMa has the final decision-making powers. 
 
6.3.3 Regulatory coordination mechanisms 
6.3.3.1 NMa – Energiekamer 
In section 4.2.2, the coordination mechanisms between the competition authority and the 
sector-specific regulator have been characterized. These mechanisms are necessary to avoid an 
overlap of regulatory responsibilities between the two authorities, and to ensure that the sector-
specific regulator does not interpret terms under the sector-specific legislation in a way that is 
inconsistent with competition legislation. In the Dutch electricity industry, these potential 
problems have been solved by structuring the sector-specific regulator for the electricity 
industry, the Energiekamer, as a chamber within the Dutch competition authority (NMa). A 
mandate has been given to the Energiekamer by the NMa that authorizes the sector-specific 
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 Interview Mr. F. van den Heuvel, Delta, October 25, 2005. 
87
 Interview Mr. M. Veersma, Energiekamer, January 5, 2006. 
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regulator to implement the electricity law, but the final decision-making powers rest with the 
board of directors of the NMa.  
 
6.3.3.2 Ministry of Economic Affairs – Energiekamer 
Although the independence of the NMa has been increased in 2005, the authority does not have 
a separate legal status. It is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs for its finances, personnel 
and organizational aspects. The budget of the NMa (and thus of the Energiekamer) is part of 
the budget of the Ministry (Algera, 2002: 105)88. As a result, the competition authority is 
subject to a certain degree of influence by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Every year, the 
NMa sends a report to the Ministry with an estimate of the necessary financing for the coming 
year89, but it is the Minister who determines the budget of the NMa90. In addition, the NMa has 
to account for its expenditures. It sends its annual report, in which it justifies on what activities 
it has spent the budget, to the Ministry91. A small part of the budget of the Energiekamer is 
paid by the industry. The energy firms are obliged to have a license for the supply of 
electricity. They pay a fee for this license, of which a part goes to the Energiekamer 92. 
The Minister of Economic Affairs appoints the three members of the board of directors of the 
NMa (Braal-Verhoog, 2002: 31)93. He has to approve the rules that specify the division of 
responsibilities among the members of the board (Braal-Verhoog, 2002: 31; Algera, 2002: 
                                                 
88
 Artikel 2:1 Relatiestatuut EZ-NMa. 
89
 Artikel 5i:1 Wet van 9 december 2004, houdende wijziging van de mededingingswet in verband met 
het omvormen van het bestuursorgaan van de Nederlandse mededingingsautoriteit tot zelfstandig 
bestuursorgaan. 
90
 Interview Mr. R. Dantuma, Ministry of Economic Affairs, October 28, 2005.  
Interview Mr. M. Veersma, Energiekamer, January 5, 2006. 
91
 Artikel 5g Wet van 9 december 2004, houdende wijziging van de mededingingswet in verband met het 
omvormen van het bestuursorgaan van de Nederlandse mededingingsautoriteit tot zelfstandig 
bestuursorgaan. 
92
 Interview Mr. M. Veersma, Energiekamer, January 5, 2006. 
93
 Interview Mr. R. Dantuma, Ministry of Economic Affairs, October 28, 2005; Article 3 Wet van 9 
december 2004, houdende wijziging van de mededingingswet in verband met het omvormen van het 
bestuursorgaan van de Nederlandse mededingingsautoriteit tot zelfstandig bestuursorgaan. 
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104)94. Since the NMa is not a separate legal entity, it cannot hire its own employees. The 
personnel of the NMa is employed by the Ministry. This difference between the board and the 
employees of the NMa is also due to the fact that the status of an independent administrative 
authority (ZBO) is only attributed to the board and not to the entire NMa95. To ensure the 
independence of the employees, the law states that they fall under the authority and are 
accountable to the board of the NMa. The board sets up a mandate that specifies the powers of 
its personnel with respect to the implementation of the electricity law. The rules of this 
mandate require the approval of the Minister96.  
The Minister of Economic Affairs has an influence on the security of tenure of the members of 
the board of directors of the NMa97. If the Minister is of the opinion that the board of directors 
of the NMa neglects to perform its tasks, he has the power to propose the suspension or the 
resignation of the members of the board98. These powers offer the minister the opportunity to 
influence the board of the NMa by the mere threat of using these measures (Algera, 2002: 
104). The transformation of the NMa into an independent administrative authority (ZBO) 
reduced the ministerial responsibility for the electricity legislation (Kummeling, 2002: 1). The 
Minister retains responsibility for energy policy, the functioning of the regulatory agencies in 
general terms, and the organization of the monitoring and enforcement system (Braal-Verhoog, 
2002: 21, 29). This latter responsibility includes the allocation of tasks and competences to the 
regulatory agencies. The Minister lost his ability to give individual instructions to the NMa and 
Energiekamer. He can only give general directions in the form of policy rules to the board of 
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 Artikel 4b Wet van 9 december 2004, houdende wijziging van de mededingingswet in verband met het 
omvormen van het bestuursorgaan van de Nederlandse mededingingsautoriteit tot zelfstandig 
bestuursorgaan. 
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 Interview Mr. M. Veersma, Energiekamer, January 5, 2005.  
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 Artikel 5a Wet van 9 december 2004, houdende wijziging van de mededingingswet in verband met het 
omvormen van het bestuursorgaan van de Nederlandse mededingingsautoriteit tot zelfstandig 
bestuursorgaan. 
97
 Artikel 17 Relatiestatuut EZ-NMa; Artikel 5f:1 Wet van 9 december 2004, houdende wijziging van de 
mededingingswet in verband met het omvormen van het bestuursorgaan van de Nederlandse 
mededingingsautoriteit tot zelfstandig bestuursorgaan. 
98
 Artikel 3.2 Wet van 9 december 2004, houdende wijziging van de mededingingswet in verband met het 
omvormen van het bestuursorgaan van de Nederlandse mededingingsautoriteit tot zelfstandig 
bestuursorgaan. 
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directors of the NMa, and thus indirectly to the Energiekamer. This should stimulate an 
independent judgment, based on economic and legal analysis, in sector-specific cases, and 
reduce the possibility of introducing political issues into the decision-making. The policy rules 
describe among others the way in which the NMa and the Energiekamer have to interpret 
legislation and regulation, or how they have to balance different interests when applying the 
electricity law. These rules are binding for the NMa and the Energiekamer.  
 
6.3.4 Regulatory objectives  
6.3.4.1 Energiekamer 
The mission of the Energiekamer is to ensure the effective functioning of the electricity 
markets99. Article 5.2 of the 1998 electricity law states that the Energiekamer, when executing 
the tasks attributed to it in the law, takes into account the importance of promoting an 
electricity market that is non-discriminatory and transparent, and that is characterized by 
competition and an effective functioning of the market. In addition, the Energiekamer protects 
consumers against potential abuses of power by the energy firms. It guards the consumers’ 
interests in this transition phase to a competitive electricity market. The Energiekamer 
monitors the administrative processes of the energy firms to make sure that consumers receive 
correct and clear bills in time. The Energiekamer does not view its role as restricted to the 
implementation of the law. It is a mission-oriented and proactive regulatory agency100. It sets 
up investigations and advises the Ministry of Economic Affairs on its own initiative.  
 
6.3.4.2 The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
The main objective of the Ministry of Economic Affairs for the electricity industry is the 
protection of the interests of consumers. These public interests have been specified as the 
availability of energy at acceptable prices for all consumers, the protection of consumers 
against a potential abuse of power by the monopolistic system operators, security of supply 
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 www.energiekamer.nl (last accessed December 29, 2008). 
100
 Interview Mr. M. Veersma, Energiekamer, January 5, 2006.  
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through sufficient investments in generation, transmission and distribution capacity, and 
quality and safety of electricity generation and supply (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 
2004). The Ministry aims to achieve these objectives through the introduction of competition 
into the electricity industry. The effective functioning of the market is thus not a goal in itself, 
but a means to protect the interests of consumers. The Ministry ignored the advice of the 
General Energy Board (Algemene Energieraad), a Dutch advisory board for the Ministry, to 
create a national energy champion. The Ministry reasoned that reducing competition through 
the creation of one Dutch energy firm is not in the interests of Dutch consumers.  
 
6.3.4.3 The competition authority 
The main tasks of the Dutch competition authority are to enforce a fair competition in all 
sectors of the Dutch economy, to take action against parties who participate in a cartel, and 
who abuse a dominant position. The NMa states that its objectives extend beyond the 
implementation of the competition law: ‘our main objective is to ensure that competition rules 
continue to play a role in business considerations, and we aim for spontaneous compliance’101. 
 
The previous two sections (6.2 and 6.3) have presented the regulations for the liberalization of 
the Dutch electricity industry and the public authorities that formulate, execute and enforce 
these regulations. These rules of the game and the public authorities influence what altered 
forms of governance emerge in the Dutch electricity industry, and how the transformation to 
these altered forms of governance takes place. The following sections will discuss the 
governance transformations for the network connection transactions (section 6.4), the network 
access transactions (section 6.5), the two types of balancing transactions (sections 6.6 and 6.7) 
and the switching transactions (section 6.8). Each of these sections will first discuss the 
attributes of the transaction and the attributes of the new governance structure. Secondly, these 
sections will analyze whether the attributes of the new form of governance can be explained 
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 www.nmanet.nl/engels/home/About_the_NMa/Objectives/objectives.asp (last accessed August 8, 
2008). 
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with the attributes of the transaction, and thus whether TCE is able to explain the comparative 
efficiency of the new form of governance. Thirdly, these sections will discuss the attributes of 
adaptation, and how the adaptation process is able to explain the emergence of the new form of 
governance, and the governance transformation. Finally, these sections will analyze the role of 
regulation in each of the transactions.  
 
 
6.4 Network connection transactions 
The Dutch electricity network is divided into a low-voltage grid ( 50 kV), a high-voltage grid 
(110 and 150 kV), and an extra high-voltage grid (220 and 380 kV). The Dutch transmission 
system operator, TenneT, operates the high- and extra high-voltage grid from 110 to 380 kV, 
and has a national monopoly for this part of the electricity network. There are eight regional 
distributors in the Netherlands that operate the low-voltage grid. Each of these regional 
distributors has a monopoly for the grid in its particular region. TenneT connects the regional 
distributors, the large generators of electricity, and the large industrial consumers of electricity 
to the high-voltage part of the network. The regional distributors connect the smaller 
generators of electricity, such as those that produce electricity with wind turbines and with 
combined heat and power plants, to their network. The Dutch households and businesses are 
also connected to the low-voltage grid. The network connection transactions thus consist of 
connecting the generating plants and the equipment of electricity consumers to the distribution 
and transmission network, connecting the distribution network to the transmission network, 
and of maintaining these connections.  
 
6.4.1 The attributes of the transaction 
The electricity law of 1998 states that the network connection services that the system 
operators provide to the network users include the following: firstly, making a cut in the 
network where the network user needs to be connected; secondly, installing various facilities 
that will protect the network; and thirdly, making a connection from the network to the 
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equipments of the network user and preserving the connection and the safety measures102. The 
network connection transaction is considered to consist of these services. This subsection will 
characterize the network connection transaction along the three attributes of transactions: the 
frequency, asset-specificity and behavioral uncertainty.  
The frequency of this network connection transaction is occasional103. The system operators 
need to provide a connection for a network user only once, and some network users may over 
time want to change the capacity at which they are connected. To preserve the connection, the 
system operators may have to do some maintenance works, and replace some of the 
components of the connection. They may also have to restore a connection when there has 
been a disturbance in the network. These activities do not occur very often and not on a regular 
basis as disturbances cannot be predicted; TenneT indicates that it does maintenance works 
only three weeks per year, and has to respond to one disturbance in a year104.  
The network connection transaction is characterized by site-specificity. The generators have to 
construct their plants (and the larger consumers their equipment) close to the grid if they want 
to economize on the connection costs. The network user has to pay for each additional meter of 
electricity line that the system operators use to make the connection. These payments for the 
additional meters have to be made every year, because they are included in the annual 
connection tariff105. The network users also pay a one-time fee for the construction of the 
connection, which can be as high as 250,000 euro for a connection to the regional grid106, and 
several million euro for a connection to the transmission grid107. These investments of the 
network users are also characterized by physical asset-specificity; the invested assets in 
electricity lines, transformers, and safety measures among others, can only be used for a 
                                                 
102
 The tariff code (article 2.1.2) describes the connection services that the system operators provide to the 
network users as those activities that are stated in article 28 of the electricity law. 
103
 See section 5.1 for the definitions of the attributes of the transactions. 
104
 www.tennet.org (last accessed December 29, 2008). 
105www.dte.nl/nederlands/elektriciteit/transport/tariefregulering/Vaststelling_transport_aansluit_en_syste
emdienstentarief_elektriciteit_2007.asp (last accessed August 6, 2008). 
106www.dte.nl/nederlands/elektriciteit/transport/tariefregulering/Vaststelling_transport_aansluit_en_syste
emdienstentarief_elektriciteit_2007.asp (last accessed August 6, 2008). 
107
 www.tennet.org (last accessed December 29, 2008). 
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connection of their plants and equipment to the electricity network. In addition, the network 
users dedicate the investments to one contracting party: either to the transmission system 
operator or to one of the regional system operators.  
The network connection transaction is characterized by behavioral uncertainty. For the largest 
part of the (potential) network users, which are those that request a network connection with a 
capacity of less than or equal to 10 MW, the system operators have a monopoly on providing 
the connection. These system operators can act opportunistically and set very high prices and 
unreasonable conditions for a connection to the network. They have the information on what it 
costs to provide a connection to the network, what the necessary conditions are, and how much 
connection capacity is available. The (potential) network users do not have access to this 
information. There is thus an asymmetrical dependence of the (potential) network users on the 
system operators. This is not entirely the case when the potential network users request a 
connection to the network that is larger than 10 MW. These network users can tender for the 
construction of the connection, and the system operator has to compete with other firms. The 
system operator still has a large role when another firm constructs the connection. For 
example, the system operator needs to agree with the construction of the connection by the 
other firm108. The electricity law states that the operator may only refuse its agreement when 
the construction by the other firm will harm the reliability of the network. The system operator 
may be able to distort information on when the reliability of the electric system is harmed, and 
thereby obstruct the network user from choosing another firm to construct the connection. 
Several examples can be given of system operators that have disguised information or have 
portrayed opportunistic behavior with respect to the network connection transactions. Firstly, 
the transmission system operator, TenneT, has refused to provide a connection to its network 
for an electricity generator. TenneT claimed that there was not enough capacity available on 
the network. The electricity law of 1998 states that the transmission system operator is obliged 
to demonstrate this lack of capacity to the party requesting a connection, and to propose 
measures that may resolve the restrictions on the network. The transmission system operator 
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 Article 16c of the electricity law of 1998. 
185
The Dutch electricity industry  
 
175
 
did not provide such proof of absence of capacity, and did not suggest any measures to resolve 
the restriction109. A second example concerns the distribution system operator, NRE, which 
charged monthly network connection tariffs that were higher than the maximum tariffs set by 
the regulator110. Thirdly, the distribution system operator, Essent Netwerk Brabant B.V., has 
charged higher connection tariffs to some network users, depending on the other services that 
the users contracted with the distribution system operator. The law requires that the system 
operators act non-discriminatively with respect to the network connection tariffs. Those 
network users that installed a transformer themselves were charged a higher connection tariff 
than those network users that contracted for the installation of a transformer with Essent 
Netwerk Brabant B.V.. The distribution system operator has made it impossible for other firms 
to compete with the operator for the installation of this part of the network connection111. 
Fourthly, this same distribution system operator has been in conflict with an electricity 
generator on the additional length of electricity lines that was needed for the construction of a 
connection, and that thus had to be paid for by the generator. The distribution system operator 
has calculated a connection tariff on the basis of an additional length of electricity lines that 
was three times as large as the calculation by the network user. The regulator has argued that 
the distribution system operator has not calculated the tariff according to the agreements that 
are made between the regulator and the system operator112.  
 
6.4.2 Misalignment 
The governance structures of the network connection transactions of before the liberalization 
have been assumed to be aligned with the attributes of the transactions. The generators and the 
transmission system operator integrated the network connection transactions, and the 
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 Besluit Geschil Essent vs TenneT, Zaaknummer: 102743-49, 22 november 2007. 
110
 Openbaar Besluit van de Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit als bedoeld in 
artikel 77n van de Elektriciteitswet 1998. Nummer 102676/13 Betreft zaak: 102676 NRE Netwerk B.V.. 
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 Bindende aanwijzing voor Essent Netwerk Brabant B.V., press release 02-19, December 11, 2002.  
112
 Besluit naar aanleiding van de aanvraag van REMU Power Plus B.V. voor het geven van een bindende 
aanwijzing, op grond van artikel 5, zesde lid van de Elektriciteitswet 1998, aan Essent Netwerk Brabant 
B.V. Nummer: 100793/5.  
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transactions with the consumers were governed by a regulated contract and tariff. In the 
liberalized industry, the attributes of the network connection transactions (the asset-specificity 
and the behavioral uncertainty), would still, within transaction cost economics reasoning, be 
efficiently aligned with a vertically integrated form113. The regulations have, however, 
prohibited this governance structure for the network connection transactions. A misalignment 
is thus observed for the governance structure between the generators and the transmission 
system operator, stimulating an adaptation process towards altered forms of governance. In 
addition, the regulated contracts with the consumers will have to change from contracts for the 
integrated service of electricity connection, transportation and supply to unbundled contracts 
for the connection services.  
 
6.4.3 The governance structure 
The governance structure for the network connection transactions will be characterized along 
three attributes: administrative apparatus, incentive intensity and contract law regime.   
The competition authority and the Energiekamer have in the past interfered with the network 
connection contracts between a system operator and a network user. These two regulators have 
three administrative control instruments at their disposal to enforce the network connection 
contracts, and to stimulate the contracting parties to live up to the contractual agreements. They 
can give a contracting party a binding instruction, or an instruction combined with a penal sum, 
or they can oblige a contracting party to pay a fine. In July 2007, the regulators imposed a fine 
on a system operator for including monthly connection tariffs that were too high in its contracts 
with network users114. The regulators also gave a binding instruction to a system operator for 
charging higher connection tariffs to network users that contracted out the connection services 
to another firm115. These instruments thus belong to the administrative apparatus of the 
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 See appendix B for a discussion on network connection problems in disintegrated governance 
structures. 
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 NMa legt NRE Netwerk een boete op. 18-7-2007, Zaaknummer 102676/13. www.dte.nl (last accessed 
August 7, 2008). 
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 Bindende aanwijzing directeur DTe aan Essent Netwerk Brabant, 10-12-2002, www.dte.nl (last 
accessed August 7, 2008). 
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governance structure for the network connection transactions, and regulation is thus part of this 
new governance structure. Regulation has been defined as being part of a governance structure 
when the public authorities get involved in the execution and/or enforcement of a specific 
contract between transacting parties.  
The incentive intensity of the system operators is of an intermediate level. An intermediate 
incentive intensity has been defined in chapter five as characterizing a governance structure 
when a part of the income to be earned cannot be influenced by the economic actor. The 
system operators cannot influence their revenues, because they receive a regulated tariff for 
their connection services. They do, however, have some influence on their profits: by 
increasing their efficiency and thus decreasing their costs, they can earn a higher profit. Their 
increase in efficiency will, however, affect the regulated tariffs in the future. In each new 
regulation period, a new x-factor is determined that is based on the average performance of the 
system operators116. An efficient performance in a previous period will increase the x-factor, 
and thus decrease the tariffs. The efficiency of the system operators will, in the long run, lead 
to a lower income. They are therefore stimulated to continuously outperform the other system 
operators in terms of efficiency.  
The network connection contracts are signed for an indefinite period117 and at least for twelve 
months118, and can therefore be characterized as long term.119 The electricity generators and 
consumers will always need a connection to the network to be able to deliver and receive 
electricity. The regulatory decisions on the connection tariffs are made for three-year periods. 
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 See section 6.2.3 for a discussion on the x-factor. 
117
 Advies van de Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit aan het Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken, inzake de beoordeling van het huidige aansluitbeleid van TenneT. Betreft zaaknr. 
102488_3 / Signalen Grootschalige productieaansluitingen TenneT. 18 december 2007. 
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 For example, the contracts and the general conditions for the connection and transportation of 
electricity of Continuon, a distribution system operator, refer to this contract duration.  
www.continuon.nl/informatieopmaat/mkb/products/algemenevoorwaarden/index.jsp (last accessed 
January 4, 2009). Another Dutch distribution system operator, Delta, refers to the same contract duration 
in its general conditions. www.deltanetwerkbedrijf.nl/web/show/id=94000 (last accessed January 4, 
2009). 
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 In an interview with Hendrik Bosch, Managing Director of Delta Netwerkbedrijf B.V. on October 28, 
2005, it was mentioned that these network connection contracts between the distribution activities of 
Delta and TenneT are long-term. 
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The general conditions to the connection contract of TenneT refer to these tariff decisions. 
They state that a change in these tariffs will apply to the existing connection contracts, and 
therefore no new contracts need to be signed when the regulator formulates new tariffs for the 
connection services. The network connection contracts are therefore flexible. In addition, 
articles 32 to 34 of the electricity law describe how the conditions for connecting users to the 
network can be changed. The grid code120 allows for the possibility that changes are made to 
the connected equipment of the network users, which may necessitate changes to the 
connection. In this case, the network connection contract has to be adjusted, for example, the 
voltage level or the connection capacity may have to be changed. The transmission system 
operator can change the general conditions to its connection contracts121. The board of directors 
of the NMa settles the disputes on the connection to the network that arise between a system 
operator and a network user. On several occasions the competition authority has had to settle 
such disputes. These disputes concerned among others the refusal by the transmission system 
operator to provide a connection to the network122, exceeding the time period within which the 
connection had to be provided123, and the calculation of the connection tariffs124.  
 
In summary, the governance structure of the network connection transactions can be 
characterized as a hybrid form, in which there are two contracting parties – a system operator 
and a network user – that retain their autonomy. The network users are dependent upon the 
system operator to an extreme degree; they have no alternative for a connection to the 
electricity network (except when they need a connection larger than 10 MW). The system 
operators have a monopoly on providing the connection services, and they have an incentive to 
behave opportunistically and to set high prices and unreasonable conditions. The long-term 
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 Articles 2.2.4.13 and 2.2.4.14 of the grid code. 
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 Article 18 of the general conditions, www.tennet.org (last accessed August 9, 2008). 
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 Besluit Geschil Essent vs TenneT, Zaaknummer: 102743-49, 22 november 2007. 
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 Besluit tot geschilbeslechting inzake het niet tijdig realiseren van aansluitingen (aanvrager vs. Eneco 
Netbeheer B.V.), Zaaknummer 102704.  
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 Geschilbeslechting inzake de aansluiting van een windpark door netbeheerder, 14-9-2005, 
zaaknummer: 102073/14. 
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connection contract is governed by regulation. Regulation enforces the contract with binding 
instructions and fines, and settles the disputes between the contracting parties.  
 
Williamson described regulation as a hybrid governance structure that solves the contracting 
problem between public utility firms and consumers, in which the public utility firms provide 
the vertically integrated service of connecting the consumers to the network, and of 
transporting and supplying electricity (Williamson, 1996a: 96). In the liberalized industry, this 
form of governance is still present for the relation between the consumers and the system 
operators, but it is restricted to the network connection (and is not applied to the integrated 
service). In addition, whereas Williamson has mainly focused on the contractual relation with 
consumers, in this case the structure also governs the network connection transactions between 
two firms (the system operators and electricity generators). Transaction cost economics argues 
for the efficiency of vertical integration for these transactions. TCE has not yet been applied to 
the new situation of unbundled services, and of involving other contracting parties than the 
consumers. The adaptation process enables an explanation to this hybrid form of governance.  
 
6.4.4 Adaptation 
The electricity law of 1998 has guided the adaptation process to this hybrid form of 
governance, and in particular to the regulated long-term contractual relations for the network 
connection transactions. It has obliged a multilateral adaptation to the new governance 
structure. The law prescribes how the tariff structures and the conditions for connecting to the 
network should be determined, and which parties in the industry should be involved in this 
adaptation process. The system operators had to consult with the representatives of various 
parties in the electricity industry on the conditions and tariff structures. They had to formulate 
a proposal for these conditions and tariffs, and to send this proposal to the competition 
authority125. The competition authority made the final decision, but in this process to the 
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 In an interview with mr. M. Veersma of the Energiekamer on January 5, 2006, it was mentioned that 
the energy firms and the system operators consult with the DTe, and send proposals to the DTe, on the 
specific rules that are to be included in the codes. 
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decision on the tariffs and conditions, the parties in the electricity industry had a chance to 
again formulate their opinion on the competition authority’s first drafts of the decision. By 
stipulating which parties had to be involved in the process of adaptation to the new form of 
governance, regulation reduced the search costs for the transacting parties involved. The 
economic actors involved in this adaptation process are also the parties to the hybrid form of 
governance. 
The identity of the contracting party is highly relevant for the network users. For a connection 
to the electricity network, there are only a few contracting parties: the system operators that 
have a monopoly for their particular parts of the network. This would give the system operators 
a large bargaining and negotiation advantage, if the public authorities did not coordinate the 
adaptation process. The public authorities oblige the system operators to provide a non-
discriminatory connection to the network for a regulated tariff. These authorities thereby 
reduce the bargaining and negotiation costs in the process of adaptation to a new network 
connection contract and governance structure. Or as Williamson has stated, regulation can 
introduce changes “without the costly haggling that attends such changes when parties to the 
contract enjoy greater autonomy” (Williamson, 1985: 347). The network users prefer a long-
term contractual agreement with the system operator, because of the limited availability of 
contracting parties.   
This network connection transaction exists because the generators and consumers of electricity 
have to consider the electric system, and in particular their dependence on the electricity 
network and the safety and reliability of this network. They need a connection to the network 
to be able to supply and receive electricity. There is hardly any selection of a contracting party 
or a governance structure on the basis of price for the network connection transaction, because 
the tariffs for a connection to the network are regulated. When potential network users that are 
requesting a connection that is larger than 10 MW, tender for the construction of the 
connection, they need the approval of the system operator. The operator has to take the safety 
and reliability of the network into account as obliged by the electricity law and the grid code. 
The dependence of the network users on the electricity network will not change in the near 
191
The Dutch electricity industry  
 
181
 
future, and therefore they prefer a long-term agreement with the system operator. 
This combination of a multilateral adaptation in which the identity of the contracting party is 
relevant, and the requirements of the electric system are important, has led in accordance with 
the expectations, to a transformation to a hybrid form of governance. For the network 
connection transactions between the large electricity generators and the system operators, the 
adaptation process can be described as one of autonomous adaptation, from the vertically 
integrated structure to the hybrid form.  
 
6.4.5 The role of regulation  
Regulation has set the ex ante rules of the game, and has influenced the attributes of the 
transactions, the governance structure, and adaptation. Firstly, the rules have created the site-
specificity by increasing the tariffs for connections that are located farther away from the 
network. Secondly, regulation has reduced the incentive intensity of the system operators by 
rewarding their connection services with a regulated tariff. Thirdly, the electricity law has 
required a multilateral adaptation to the new form of governance, and has reduced the search 
costs for the contracting parties, and the bargaining and negotiation costs for the network users. 
Finally, regulation is also a part of the new form of governance. With their binding instructions 
and fines, the competition authority and the sector-specific regulator enforce the contracts 
between the system operators and the network users. The competition authority has settled 
various disputes between the contracting parties.  
 
 
6.5 Network access transactions 
The distribution and transmission system operators have to provide a non-discriminatory 
access to their network for those that are connected to their network. The network access 
service is the transportation of electricity for network users from one connection point to 
another, which includes compensating for grid losses, maintaining the voltage levels and 
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reactive power supplies, and resolving restrictions on transportation126. The system operators 
provide this network access service to the network users, and these users aid the operators in 
providing the service. For example, several network users supply reserve power to the 
electricity network to enable the system operators to resolve the transportation restrictions.  
The contracting parties to the transactions of the network access service are the transmission 
and distribution system operators, and the generators, retailers and consumers of electricity. 
The large generators of electricity need an access to the transmission network to enable the 
transportation of their electricity, whereas the decentralized generators, which produce smaller 
amounts of electricity, access the distribution network. The electricity consumers need an 
access to either the transmission network or the distribution network, depending on the amount 
of electricity that they consume. The electricity retailers may act on behalf of the electricity 
consumers, and contract with the transmission and distribution system operators for access to 
the network. The network users and the system operators sign a network access contract, which 
is usually combined with the network connection contract that was discussed in the previous 
section127.   
Appendices C and D discuss the governance structures that coordinate the transactions of the 
grid losses, and of the voltage levels and reactive power supplies. The focus in this section will 
be on the transactions for resolving transportation restrictions. These transactions involve an 
exchange of information between the system operators and the network users, in the form of 
so-called transportation programs (or t-programs), which allows the system operators to make 
projections of the possible transportation restrictions on the next day, and a supply of reserve 
power by the network users to the electricity network, which allows the system operators to 
resolve the restrictions in real time.  
A t-program includes information on the amount of electricity that a network user will put on 
the network, or the amount of electricity that it will take out of the network for one network 
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 TenneT includes these three elements in its definition of the transportation services that it provides to 
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connection and for every hour of the next day. The electricity law states that every network 
user has the responsibility for sending these programs128. The electricity retailers take over this 
program responsibility for the small electricity consumers, as is stated in the network 
connection and network access contracts. Every energy firm can contract out the program 
responsibility to another firm. These program responsible parties then send the t-programs to 
the system operators. The distribution system operators add all the t-programs that they have 
received from the program responsible parties for the connections within their network area, 
and send these to TenneT. The system operators, and in particular TenneT, need this 
information to calculate whether transportation problems can be expected.  
A restriction on the transportation of electricity means that the system operators cannot 
transport the electricity from one connection point to another as requested by the energy firms 
and the electricity consumers. Every distribution system operator and the transmission system 
operator are responsible for signalling and solving the restrictions in their own part of the 
electricity network (TenneT, 2002: 6). The distribution system operators can, however, ask 
TenneT to partly or completely solve the restrictions in their distribution network. The system 
operators can solve the transportation restrictions in several ways; by changing the schedules 
for maintenance of the electricity network, by redispatching the production of electricity, and 
by calling on reserve capacity of the electricity generators. The grid code states that every 
network user with a contracted capacity that is larger than 60 MW has the obligation to supply 
reserve capacity to the transmission system operator, in the form of either a decrease or an 
increase of the production of electricity. This reserve capacity is made available to TenneT 
through a bidding mechanism, of which the procedures are determined by the transmission 
system operator. The network users specify in their bids for what price and with which amount 
they can either decrease or increase their production of electricity129. The network users with a 
contracted capacity that is less than 60 MW can voluntarily bid for the supply of reserve 
                                                 
128
 Article 1.o. and 31.2 of the electricity law of 1998; Article 12 of the Regeling van het Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken van 9 januari 2005 inzake tariefstructuren en voorwaarden voor elektriciteit.  
129
 Article 5.1.1.1.a.1 of the grid code. 
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capacity to TenneT130.   
Two transactions can thus be distinguished that make up a large part of the network access 
transactions; these are the transaction of the exchange of the t-programs between the system 
operators and the program responsible parties, and the transaction of the supply of reserve 
power to the transmission system operator. In the following subsections, the attributes of this 
first transaction, its new form of governance, and the adaptation to this new form of 
governance will be discussed in detail. The transaction of the supply of reserve power will be 
discussed in section 6.7, on the balancing transactions, because energy firms also bid for the 
supply of reserve power to the transmission system operator to balance electricity supply and 
demand.  
 
6.5.1 The attributes of the transaction 
The frequency of this first network access transaction is recurrent. The program responsible 
parties have to send t-programs to the system operators on a daily basis and for every hour of 
the day. After TenneT has given its approval of the t-programs on the day before the t-
programs are implemented, the program responsible parties may adjust the t-programs until 
one hour before their implementation. The parties to this transaction are thus continuously 
exchanging information.   
Several forms of asset-specificity characterize this transaction, including human asset-
specificity, temporal specificity, and dedicated assets. The program responsible parties have to 
deliver the t-programs to the system operators in an electronic format that must conform to 
certain electronic message standards. These electronic messages are referred to as EDINE, 
which stands for Electronic Data Interchange in the Netherlands Energy Sector131. The Dutch 
regulator has made the testing of EDINE-messages by the program responsible parties 
compulsory. The energy firms that wish to exchange these messages must be in the possession 
of a certificate for each type of message. This certificate is distributed by the transmission 
                                                 
130
 Article 5.1.1.1.a.2 of the grid code. 
131
 www.tennet.org, www.edsn.nl (last accessed December 29, 2008).  
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system operator. It shows that the energy firm is capable of exchanging the particular type of 
message. The program responsibility thus requires the availability of employees who are able 
to work with EDINE-messages. The energy firms will need to invest in specific human capital. 
It also requires the presence of these employees 365 days a year; the transportation programs 
have to be sent every day, they have to comply with a strict schedule of delivery132, and 
adjustments to these programs can be made for every hour of the day (Wenting, 2002: 7). 
These network access transactions of exchanging transportation programs are thus 
characterized by human asset-specificity, and by temporal specificity. The program responsible 
parties have dedicated the investments in facilities and employees to one contracting party: the 
system operator. 
The behavioral uncertainty in this transaction is absent; the contracting parties do not have an 
incentive to strategically disguise or distort information. The distribution system operators and 
the program responsible parties have an incentive to provide TenneT with accurate t-programs, 
as compared to disguising any information. The distribution system operators have this 
incentive, because any transportation problem that might arise in real time in their network 
(possibly due to inaccurate t-programs) has to be solved and paid for by these distribution 
system operators. The program responsible parties do not pay for not abiding by their 
transportation programs, but they do pay a penalty when their actual consumption and 
production of electricity differs from the sum of these t-programs. The sum of the t-programs is 
referred to as an energy program (or e-program) that describes the amount of electricity that a 
program responsible party expects to put on and take out of the network. An e-program is not 
specific for one network connection as are the t-programs. The transmission system operator 
needs the e-programs to balance electricity supply and demand133. The program responsible 
                                                 
132
 T-programs have to be sent to the system operators on the day before the implementation of the T-
programs before 14h00. The distribution system operators send the total of the T-programs of their 
network area to TenneT before 14h45. Between 14h45 and 15h15 TenneT checks the total of these T-
programs and whether they will lead to transportation problems. Until 17h30, the system operators can 
solve the transportation restrictions, and before that time TenneT has to approve the T-programs and 
communicate to the system operators and program responsible parties (TenneT, 2002: 15; TenneT, 2007: 
14). 
133
 See the following section (6.6) for a more elaborate discussion on these e-programs.  
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parties have an incentive to supply accurate e-programs and behave according to these 
programs, because otherwise they pay for the imbalance between the e-programs and the actual 
supply and demand of electricity to the network. They therefore also have an incentive to 
provide accurate t-programs, because the e-programs are the sum of the t-programs. The 
incentives between the distribution system operators, the program responsible parties and the 
transmission system operator have thus been aligned; the transmission system operator needs 
accurate t-programs, and the distribution system operators and program responsible parties 
have a financial incentive to provide such accurate programs.  
 
6.5.2 Misalignment 
Before the liberalization, the information exchange on the expected transportation was 
internalized in the SEP, and in the vertically integrated firms. This form of governance is 
assumed to have been aligned with the attributes of the transactions. The regulations on the 
unbundling of the system operators are now creating a misalignment. The regulators have, 
however, also influenced the attributes of the network access transactions in the unbundled 
industry. Article 3.9 of the system code specifies how the imbalance price should be 
determined. This imbalance price has to be paid by the energy firms when the e-programs, and 
thus the sum of the t-programs, are not in conformity with the actual electricity production and 
consumption of the energy firms. The energy firms are thus given a stimulus to provide the 
system operator with accurate t-programs. The regulator has aligned the incentives of the 
energy firms with those of the system operators, and it has thus eliminated the behavioral 
uncertainty in the transaction. From a transaction cost economics perspective, the absence of 
behavioral uncertainty means that there is no governance problem (Williamson, 1985: 31). 
Williamson states that ‘uncertainty is assumed to be present in sufficient degree to pose an 
adaptive, sequential decision problem’ (Williamson, 1985: 79). When uncertainty is present, it 
is ‘imperative that the parties devise a machinery to work things out’ (Williamson, 1985: 60). 
For this transaction, and seen from a TCE perspective, this contractual relation for the t-
programs would not require such a machinery. But, as the following section will show, an 
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elaborate form of governance has been set up for this transaction of exchanging t-programs.  
 
6.5.3 The governance structure 
The new form of governance for the t-program transactions can be characterized as a hybrid 
form, in which the contracting parties retain their autonomy, but are dependent upon each other 
to a substantial degree. The system operators need the t-programs from the program 
responsible parties to be able to predict the transportation restrictions, and the program 
responsible parties depend on the system operators for making sure that these transportation 
problems do not occur.  
The transmission system operator has an authoritative role in this hybrid form. Firstly, TenneT 
decides whether an energy firm is capable of being responsible for sending the programs. 
Those energy firms that want to have the program responsibility over their connections, and 
that want to take over the program responsibility from other energy firms and electricity 
consumers, must have permission from the transmission system operator to act as a program 
responsible party. Permission is granted when the transmission system operator has made sure 
that the firm has the expertise and the technical, administrative and organizational facilities that 
are required for the program responsibility, and when the firm has signed an agreement with 
the transmission system operator that sets out various conditions for the implementation of the 
program responsibility, including a financial guarantee134. Secondly, TenneT manages the 
electronic postbox to which the messages are sent that contain the programs. Together with the 
distribution system operators, TenneT determines the procedures for using the postbox, the 
communication protocols for the daily information exchange, the rules on what information 
should be included in the messages, and the time schedule for sending the programs to the 
postbox135. Thirdly, TenneT has to approve the t-programs that are submitted by the program 
responsible parties and distribution system operators (TenneT, 2007: 15). And finally, TenneT 
can impose restrictions on the network users. When TenneT has approved the t-programs, it 
                                                 
134
 Article 3.2.11 of the system code. 
135
 Article 5.1.1.4 and 5.1.1.5 of the grid code state that the system operators determine these procedures  
and protocols for the data exchange.  
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can place a restriction on a particular part of the network. This means that additional transport 
along these restricted lines should be avoided, and energy firms cannot alter their t-programs in 
such a way that they make use of these restricted lines136. 
The incentive intensity is of an intermediate degree. An intermediate incentive intensity 
characterizes a governance structure among others when the transaction itself may not directly 
earn an income, but is a prerequisite for earning an income with a consecutive transaction. The 
program responsible parties have an incentive to send the t-programs, because it is a 
requirement for receiving or delivering electricity. But it is only a first step: the generators, 
traders and retailers of electricity do not earn an income from sending these t-programs. They 
still need to produce or sell electricity. The network users also have an intermediate incentive 
intensity with respect to behaving according to the t-programs. A larger or smaller 
transportation of electricity over a connection may influence the imbalance with respect to the 
e-programs, and the program responsible parties have to pay for this imbalance, but there is no 
sanction on not adhering to the t-programs. TenneT may preclude certain changes to the t-
programs in the area of the restricted part of the network. When network users ignore this 
restriction in real time, and transport additional electricity along the restricted area, there is no 
direct sanction on this behavior. 
The administrative apparatus of this governance structure includes an information disclosure 
mechanism. When network users expect to alter their consumption or production of electricity, 
and when these changes will affect more than five percent of the total capacity on a particular 
part of the network, they have to inform the system operators of these changes and send them 
altered t-programs (TenneT, 2002: 14). The administrative apparatus also includes a form of 
monitoring of the contracting parties and a penalty. The amount of electricity that is 
transported over each network connection is measured by the system operators, and can be 
used to check whether the network users followed their t-programs. A penalty, in the form of 
the imbalance price, exists for not abiding by the e-programs, and thus for the sum of the t-
programs of a program responsible party. In addition, a monitoring system exists that checks 
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 Article 5.1.1.8.a of the grid code. 
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the quality of the transportation service of the system operators137. The electricity law of 1998 
states that each system operator is responsible for registering its quality level138. A ministerial 
regulation has defined the quality of the transportation service according to three criteria: the 
yearly duration of blackouts of the electric system, the average duration of a blackout, and the 
frequency of the blackouts139. These are largely based on a system of quality registration that 
was in place before the liberalization, and that was developed by the system operators. The 
system operators have to send their registrations to the competition authority every year. The 
competition authority may start an investigation to check the reliability of the registration of a 
system operator, and may take measurements in the network of the system operator140. This 
latter regulatory power of the competition authority and therefore also of the sector-specific 
regulator (Energiekamer) means that regulation becomes part of the governance structure. In 
the contractual agreement between the network users and the system operators, the network 
users have agreed to send the t-programs and the system operators to aim for a particular 
quality level of their transportation service. The regulator now intervenes by monitoring this 
quality level.   
The contracts between the system operators and the network users on the transportation of 
electricity, which include the conditions on the exchange of the t-programs and the quality of 
the transportation service, are long term. These contracts state that they are signed for an 
indefinite period, and at least for twelve months141. Changes can be made to these contracts, 
                                                 
137
 The grid code includes a table that specifies the desired quality level of the transportation service 
(article 3.2). Article 3.3.5 of this code states that the system operators may propose adjustments to this 
table.  
138
 Article 19a of the electricity law of 1998. 
139
 Regeling van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 20 december 2004, nr. WJZ 4082582, 
houdende nadere regels ten aanzien van de kwaliteitsaspecten van het netbeheer op het terrein van 
elektriciteit en gas (Regeling kwaliteitsaspecten netbeheer elektriciteit en gas), page 1. 
140
 Article 19a.4 of the electricity law of 1998; Regeling van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 20 
december 2004, nr. WJZ 4082582, houdende nadere regels ten aanzien van de kwaliteitsaspecten van het 
netbeheer op het terrein van elektriciteit en gas (Regeling kwaliteitsaspecten netbeheer elektriciteit en 
gas), page 5.  
141
 For example, the contracts and the general conditions for the connection and transportation of 
electricity of Continuon, a distribution system operator, refer to this contract duration.  
www.continuon.nl/informatieopmaat/mkb/products/algemenevoorwaarden/index.jsp (last accessed 
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and they are therefore flexible. Articles 32 to 34 of the electricity law of 1998 allow for 
changes to be made to the conditions on the transportation of electricity over the network, the 
program responsibility, the quality of the transportation service, and the measurement of the 
transportation of electricity142. These changes will necessitate changes to the contractual 
agreements between the system operators and the network users. The general conditions to the 
contracts on the transportation of electricity also state that the system operators can make 
changes to these conditions. In addition, changes in the tariffs for transportation alter the 
contractual agreements143. The dispute resolution for this network access transaction is done by 
a third party. Conflicts between system operators and network users on the program 
responsibility and the transportation restrictions have been resolved by the competition 
authority. Firstly, the authority has made a decision in a conflict between a distribution system 
operator and an operator of a private network on whether the distribution system operator 
should supply those connected to the private network with a connection number that is needed 
for the program responsibility144. Secondly, it decided on a conflict between a network user 
and a distribution system operator on the duration of a blackout, and whether the system 
operator had to pay the network user as compensation for the loss of electricity during the 
blackout145. However, these disputes did not concern the exchange of t-programs between the 
system operators and the program responsible parties, as can be expected from the ex ante 
incentive alignment between these parties, and thus the conclusion on the absence of 
behavioral uncertainty.  
In summary, the governance structure for the t-program transactions is characterized by an 
intermediate degree of incentive intensity, an administrative apparatus of information 
                                                                                                                                 
January 4, 2009). Another Dutch distribution system operator, Delta, refers to the same contract duration 
in its general conditions. www.deltanetwerkbedrijf.nl/web/show/id=94000 (last accessed January 4, 
2009). 
142
 Article 31 of the electricity law of 1998 specifies these activities to which articles 32 to 34 apply. 
143
 Article 24 of the general conditions (note 141) refers to changes that can be made to these conditions.  
144
 Besluitnummer: 102454/25. Betreft zaak: Besluit inzake geschil zaak 102454; geschil ECW Netwerk 
B.V. vs. N.V. Continuon Netbeheer. 
145
 Besluitnummer: 102487/21. Betreft zaak: Besluit tot geschilbeslechting inzake aanvrager versus Eneco 
Netbeheer B.V.. 
201
The Dutch electricity industry  
 
191
 
disclosure mechanisms and penalties, and long-term flexible contracts. These three attributes 
have been defined as those of a hybrid form of governance. This hybrid form is characterized 
by an authoritative role for the transmission system operator and by the involvement of a third 
party, the regulator, which monitors the implementation of the contractual agreements and that 
settles the disputes between parties to these contracts. Within the framework of transaction cost 
economics, a hybrid form would not have been adopted when considering the attributes of the 
transactions, and in particular the absence of behavioral uncertainty. The process of adaptation 
is able to explain the emergence of this hybrid form. 
  
6.5.4 Adaptation 
To the network users and program responsible parties, the identity of the contracting party for 
the t-program transactions is highly relevant. There is in fact only one contracting party with 
which they can transact for the t-programs. This is the distribution system operator that 
operates the regional network to which the network users are connected, or TenneT when the 
network users are connected to the transmission network. Because there is only one relevant 
contracting party, the network users and program responsible parties prefer to set up a long-
term contract. Without this contractual relation, they do not have access to the network and 
cannot receive or deliver electricity. For the system operators, the identity of the contracting 
party is less relevant, or at least it is not restricted to one contracting party. Currently, TenneT 
registers 55 energy firms that act as program responsible parties in the Dutch electricity 
industry.  
The system operators have, however, another reason to want to set up a long–term contractual 
relation with the network users and program responsible parties. When economic actors are 
connected to their network, the system operators will always need information on how much 
electricity will be put on the network and how much will be taken out of the network in which 
location. The system operators will always need these t-programs to be able to predict and 
thereafter resolve transportation problems in their network, and thus to ensure the reliability of 
the electric system. The sole function of these t-programs is to ensure the safety and reliability 
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of the system. When adapting to a new form of governance for these t-program transactions, 
the contracting parties will thus only focus on the system requirements, while considerations of 
price are less relevant. The electricity law of 1998 also states that when the contracting parties 
and the regulator are formulating the conditions for the program responsibility146, the 
importance of a good quality of the service of the system operators, and the importance of a 
reliable functioning of the electricity supply147, should be taken into account.   
The electricity law also specifies which parties have to be involved in the adaptation to a new 
form of governance for the t-program transactions. It requires a multilateral adaptation. Article 
31 states that the system operators should send a proposal for the conditions on the program 
responsibility, on the quality criteria for the transportation service of the system operators, and 
on the measurement of the transportation of electricity, to the regulator. The system operators 
should consult with parties in the electricity industry, including the energy firms, on these 
conditions148. On the basis of the proposal of the system operators, the regulator formulates a 
first draft of the regulatory decision on the conditions for program responsibility etcetera149. 
The system operators and parties in the electricity industry can express their views on this first 
draft, but it is the regulator that finally decides on the conditions150. These conditions are 
formulated in the various codes, including the grid, system, measurement and tariff codes. The 
contractual relations between the system operators and the network users are based on these 
codes. The various parties, including the system operators, network users and the regulator, 
which were involved in the adaptation process, are also parties to the new form of governance 
for the t-program transactions.  
This multilateral adaptation in which the identity of the contracting party is relevant and the 
economic actors have to consider the requirements of the electric system in the adaptation 
process, explains the emergence of the hybrid form of governance for these network access 
transactions. Since these transactions used to be internalized in the SEP before the 
                                                 
146
 Article 31.2 of the electricity law of 1998. 
147
 Articles 36.1.b and 36.1.e of the electricity law of 1998.  
148
 Article 33.1 of the electricity law of 1998.  
149
 Article 32.2 of the electricity law of 1998. 
150
 Articles 34.2 and 36.1 of the electricity law of 1998. 
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liberalization of the industry, the governance transformation can be summarized as one from 
the vertically integrated hierarchy to the hybrid form. The adaptation can therefore be 
characterized as an autonomous adaptation.   
 
6.5.5 The role of regulation 
Regulation affects this governance transformation for the network access transactions in 
several ways: it influences the attributes of the t-program transactions, the attributes of the new 
governance structure, the adaptation process, and it becomes part of the new form of 
governance. Firstly, the grid code obliges the program responsible parties to send the t-
programs according to the strict time schedule, and in the particular electronic format 
(EDINE)151. Regulation thus influences that the transactions are characterized by human asset-
specificity and by temporal specificity. It has also eliminated the behavioral uncertainty of the 
transaction. Secondly, several ex ante rules of the game influence the form of governance. The 
measurement code states that the economic actor that is responsible for measuring the 
electricity use, should measure this use for each network connection and for every fifteen 
minutes, and should send this data to the system operator. The system operator may use this 
data to monitor whether the network users are abiding by their t-programs152. Regulation thus 
determines that the governance structure is characterized by monitoring. The system code has 
introduced a penalty as a form of administrative control to the governance structure for the t-
program transactions. This penalty, in the form of the imbalance price, only has to be paid for 
the difference between the actual production and consumption and the sum of the t-programs. 
The electricity law states that each system operator is responsible for registering the quality 
level of its transportation service, and a ministerial regulation and the grid code define the 
quality of the transportation service. Article 19a of the electricity law states that the system 
operators have to publish the registration of their transportation quality. The electricity law 
thus requires that the form of governance is characterized by an information disclosure 
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 Articles 5.1.13 until 5.1.1.5 of the grid code. 
152
 Articles 2.3.4.1, 3.1.1 and 3.1.3 of the measurement code. 
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mechanism. Thirdly, regulation also influences the process of adaptation. It obliges a 
multilateral adaptation that takes the system requirements into account. Finally, regulation also 
becomes part of the governance structure. The regulator monitors the reliability of the quality 
registration of the system operator and may take measurements in the network to check the 
registration. The regulator also resolves disputes. 
 
 
6.6 Balancing transactions: exchange of energy programs  
Two types of balancing transactions have been distinguished in chapter five153. The first 
balancing transaction concerns the exchange of information between the transmission system 
operator and the network users (generators, retailers, traders and consumers of electricity) on 
the amount of electricity that these network users expect to put on and take out of the network 
on the next day, in the form of so-called energy programs or e-programs. The network users 
send these e-programs to the transmission system operator on a daily basis. The transmission 
system operator needs this information in order to balance electricity supply and demand on 
the day before the operational day. Since these projections often differ from the actual 
generation and consumption of electricity, the transmission system operator purchases 
electricity to balance supply and demand in real time. The supply of balancing power by the 
network users to the transmission system operator is the second balancing transaction. The 
transmission system operator pays the network users that reduce or increase their offtake from, 
or input into, the network to resolve an imbalance of supply and demand, and bills the network 
users that cause an imbalance by an additional offtake from, or input into, the network. In the 
liberalized Dutch electricity industry, the Dutch transmission system operator, TenneT, 
                                                 
153
 The Dutch transmission system operator, TenneT, identifies three pillars for achieving and 
maintaining the system-wide balance. These include the program responsibility, which refers to the 
responsibility of network users to send information on their electricity production and consumption (the 
energy programs) to TenneT; the supply of balancing power to TenneT; and the financial settlement with 
the program responsible parties for their contribution to the (im)balance (www.tennet.org, last accessed 
January 2, 2009). These three pillars are in conformity with the balancing transactions that are discussed 
in this and the following section. 
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balances electricity supply and demand for the entire electric system, and the network users 
have to balance their own electricity supply and demand. This section will discuss the first 
balancing transaction on the exchange of energy programs, and the following section (6.7) will 
discuss the supply of balancing power to the transmission system operator.   
 
6.6.1 The attributes of the transaction 
The electricity law of 1998 states that licensed energy firms and everyone who has a 
connection to the electricity network have the responsibility to formulate e-programs, to send 
them to the transmission system operator, and to behave according to these programs154. The 
program responsible parties include the generators, consumers, retailers and traders of 
electricity. The electricity consumers with a small connection to the network, such as the 
households and small businesses, transfer their program responsibility to the electricity retailer 
that also supplies their electricity. Energy firms with a license to retail electricity can also 
transfer their responsibility for the e-programs to other energy firms. The majority of the new 
entrant retailers in the Dutch electricity industry have transferred their program responsibility 
to a Dutch energy incumbent155. Some reasons for contracting out this program responsibility 
are a lack of technical expertise or of organizational capabilities. The energy programs also 
have to be delivered to the transmission system operator in the EDINE-format, as do the 
transportation programs156. The program responsibility requires the availability of employees 
who are able to work with the EDINE-messages. It also requires the presence of these 
employees 365 days a year; the energy programs have to be sent every day, they have to 
comply with a strict schedule of delivery, and adjustments to these programs can be made for 
                                                 
154
 Article 1.1.o of the electricity law of 1998.  
155
 The incumbents profit from a larger amount of customers for which they act as program responsible 
party. The total imbalance of a larger number of customers is likely to be smaller than when there are less 
customers for which program responsibility is provided, because these various (im)balances cancel one 
another out. This reduces the imbalance costs for the incumbents. Kahn has referred to a similar and 
related feature in the electricity industry, that of economies of scale of demand: the greater the number 
and diversity of customers and markets served, the greater is the likelihood that the variations in their 
separate demands will tend to cancel one another out (Kahn, 1971: 122), see also section 3.1 of chapter 
three. 
156
 See also section 6.5 for a more extensive discussion on the EDINE-messages. 
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every fifteen minutes of the day (Wenting, 2002: 7). These balancing transactions of 
exchanging energy programs are thus characterized by a human asset-specificity and a 
temporal specificity. The energy firms have also dedicated the investments in facilities and 
employees to one contracting party: the transmission system operator.  
The frequency of these balancing transactions is recurrent, because the e-programs are sent to 
the transmission system operator on a daily basis, and adjustments to the e-programs can occur 
multiple times during a day. This transfer of the e-programs by the network users to the 
transmission system operator follows a strict schedule of delivery.  
The behavioral uncertainty in the transactions is absent; the transactions do not allow for 
increased opportunities to behave opportunistically, and thus to strategically disguise or distort 
information. As was illustrated for the transaction of the t-programs, the program responsible 
parties have an incentive to provide the transmission system operator with accurate e-
programs, because otherwise they will have to pay the imbalance price. The transmission 
system operator wishes to receive accurate e-programs, because it enables him to better 
balance electricity supply and demand. The incentives between these contracting parties have 
thus been aligned ex ante.  
 
6.6.2 Misaligment 
Before the liberalization of the Dutch electricity industry, the transactions for balancing 
electricity supply and demand were internalized in the SEP. The SEP was an organization of 
cooperating electricity generators that operated as a pooling system. It pooled all the produced 
electricity and sold it back to the generators for a uniform tariff. The generators transferred the 
electricity for this uniform tariff plus a regional surcharge to the distributors. Until the end of 
the 1980s, the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity were vertically integrated. 
The energy programs did not exist as they do in their current form. Since the SEP was an 
organization of cooperating generators, and it pooled all the produced electricity, and 
monitored the amount of electricity that was taken out of the network by consumers, it had its 
own and immediate access to information on electricity supply and demand. The unbundling of 
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the transmission and distribution system operators from the generation and retail of electricity 
ended the pooling system. The independent transmission system operator, TenneT, replaced 
the SEP. Since the governance structure of before the liberalization (the vertical integration) is 
assumed to have been aligned with the balancing transactions, the rules on vertical unbundling 
have created a misalignment. When considering the attributes of the energy program 
transactions, transaction cost economics does not predict the comparative efficiency of a new 
form of governance. The absence of behavioral uncertainty means that there is no need for ex 
post governance structures. A contractual agreement may suffice to structure the relation 
between the transacting parties. The following subsection 6.6.3 does, however, show that a 
new governance structure for these balancing transactions has emerged.   
 
6.6.3 The governance structure 
The governance structure that has emerged for the energy program transactions is a hybrid 
form. The contracting parties to this governance structure retain their autonomy, but are 
dependent upon each other to a substantial degree. The energy firms depend on TenneT’s 
approval of the energy programs, because otherwise they will not be able to supply and receive 
electricity. TenneT needs the information from the energy firms to be able to balance 
electricity supply and demand. As comparable to the governance of the t-program transactions, 
the transmission system operator has an authoritative role in this hybrid governance structure 
for the e-programs. Firstly, TenneT must give the energy firms permission to act as program 
responsible parties. Secondly, TenneT manages the electronic postbox to which the messages 
are sent that contain the energy programs. Together with the distribution system operators, 
TenneT determines the procedures for using the postbox, the communication protocols for the 
daily information exchange, and the rules on what information should be included in the 
messages. Thirdly, TenneT either approves, asks for adjustments, or rejects the energy 
programs. Once the transmission system operator has received the energy programs, it checks 
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both their internal and their external consistency157. Energy programs that are internally 
consistent, balance the (expected) amount of electricity that is to be taken out of the network 
(by consumption, sale and export of electricity) to the amount of electricity that is to be put on 
the network (by production, purchase and import of electricity). Energy programs that are 
externally consistent match the information on an energy transaction that is mentioned in one 
energy program to the information on this same energy transaction in a different energy 
program. The transmission system operator will withhold its approval of an energy program if 
it does not meet the requirements of the internal and external consistency. The program 
responsible parties can adjust their e-programs to meet these requirements. If the program 
responsible parties are not able to resolve an external inconsistency of an e-program before the 
start of this program, the transmission system operator will charge the parties the price of an 
imbalance for this inconsistency. The transmission system operator can also withhold its 
approval of an energy program when problems with the transportation of electricity are 
expected158. The system operator can request a change in location of the electricity production 
in order to resolve the transportation problems. In this case, the program responsible party has 
to send a revised energy program (Wenting, 2002: 7).  
The administrative apparatus of this governance structure thus includes information disclosure 
and information verification mechanisms (the system operator collects information on whether 
the contracting party is capable of sending the e-programs, and whether these e-programs meet 
the requirements of consistency), and a financial penalty (the imbalance price) that is charged 
when the requirements of consistency are not met. In addition, the system operators also 
monitor the program responsible parties by taking measurements in the network, and by 
comparing these amounts of electricity that are put on and taken out of the network to the 
energy programs. The program responsible parties pay the difference between these two, 
multiplied by the imbalance price, to the system operator. 
The governance structure is characterized by an intermediate degree of incentive intensity. In 
                                                 
157
 See articles 3.6.12 and 3.6.13 of the system code for a description of the internal and external 
consistency of the energy programs.  
158
 Article 3.6.14 of the system code. 
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chapter five, an intermediate incentive intensity has been defined as characterizing a 
governance structure when the transaction itself may not directly earn an income, but is a 
prerequisite for earning an income with a consecutive transaction; or when a part of the income 
to be earned cannot be influenced by the economic actor. The energy firms do have an 
incentive to send energy programs to the transmission system operator, because otherwise they 
are not able to deliver or receive electricity. The exchange of energy programs is thus a 
requisite for earning an income, but it is not a sufficient one: the electricity still has to be 
produced or bought and delivered and retailed to the consumers before earning an income. In 
addition, the energy firms have an incentive to deliver externally consistent programs, or else 
TenneT charges the energy firms the imbalance price. The energy firms also have an incentive 
to deliver good energy programs, meaning energy programs that are close to the actual 
production and consumption of electricity on the next day, and to behave according to these 
energy programs. These good energy programs reduce the amount that has to be paid to the 
transmission system operator for the imbalance between the energy programs and the actual 
production and consumption. However, the actual production and consumption also depend on 
factors that are not under the control of the energy firms, such as the weather on a particular 
day. Energy programs can be adjusted until one hour before operation of the programs. For 
these one-hour periods, energy firms cannot adjust their programs to changing conditions, and 
they can therefore not influence the amount of imbalance that they have to pay to TenneT. 
These real-life conditions and the time restrictions on the energy programs complicate the 
formulation of good energy programs, and reduce the incentive intensity.  
The contracts between the transmission system operator and the network users for the 
exchange of the energy programs are based on the conditions for program responsibility that 
are set out in the system code. These contracts are flexible; the articles 32 to 34 of the 
electricity law of 1998 specify the procedures for making changes to the conditions in the 
system code. The contracts are long term. When energy firms want to supply or receive 
electricity, they will always have to send the energy programs to the transmission system 
operator, and they therefore have an incentive to retain their relation with the transmission 
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system operator for the exchange of the energy programs. The energy firms do not have an 
incentive to contract out the activity of formulating and sending the energy programs to 
another firm. A disadvantage of contracting out the program responsibility to another firm is 
that detailed information is transferred to this firm on energy transactions, including 
information on contracts with other parties for the supply of electricity (Wenting, 2002: 7). 
Disputes between the transmission system operator and the program responsible parties with 
respect to the energy programs will be resolved by a third party: the board of directors of the 
competition authority. 
 
In summary, the new form of governance is characterized by information disclosure and 
verification mechanisms, monitoring and penalties, an intermediate degree of incentive 
intensity and long-term flexible contracts. This hybrid form is heavily influenced by 
regulation: the contracts between the transmission system operator and the program responsible 
parties are based on the system code. The authoritative role of TenneT in this governance 
structure is determined by the public authorities, and formulated in the system code.  
 
6.6.4 Adaptation 
Within the transaction cost economics framework, the attributes of the energy program 
transactions (i.e. the absence of behavioral uncertainty) cannot explain the emergence of this 
hybrid form of governance. The attributes of adaptation (the identity of the contracting party, 
the type of response in the adaptation process, and the laterality of the adaptation) are able to 
illustrate the transformation to the hybrid governance structure. 
The identity of the contracting party is highly relevant to the program responsible parties, 
because there is only one contracting party with which they can exchange the energy programs. 
Without their contractual relation with the transmission system operator, the program 
responsible parties are not able to deliver and receive electricity. In the absence of another 
suitable contracting party, the program responsible parties prefer a long-term relation with the 
transmission system operator to a short-term market relation.  
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The energy program transactions are necessary in order to retain a balance on the network, and 
thus to ensure the safety of the electric system. Because the energy firms and the operators 
engage in this transaction and develop a structure to coordinate the transaction, they take the 
system requirements into account. A dependence on a balance for the safety of the system will 
remain for a long time, and therefore the economic actors prefer a long-term, hybrid form.  
This type of response and also the laterality of the adaptation are largely determined by the 
legislation in the electricity industry. Articles 31 to 37 of the 1998 electricity law require a 
multilateral adaptation that considers, among others, the reliable, sustainable and efficient 
functioning of the supply of electricity, a good quality of the services provided by the system 
operators, and the importance of maintaining the balance between electricity supply and 
demand in a non-discriminatory and transparent way. The law thus requires that, when 
adapting to another form of governance, the transacting parties consider the requirements of 
the electric system, such as the importance of a balanced supply and demand and a reliable 
network. The parties to the energy program transactions have therefore preferred the long-term 
nature of the hybrid form of governance and the cooperation between the contracting parties in 
this governance structure. These requirements of the electric system will not change quickly, 
and many of the economic actors in the electricity industry are affected by these requirements. 
The multilateral adaptation to another form of governance for the energy program transactions 
involves the system operators, the energy firms and the regulator. In July 1999, the system 
operators sent a proposition to the Dutch regulator (Energiekamer) for the conditions that they 
aim to include in their contracts with network users on the system services, the maintenance of 
the energy balance, and the program responsibility, and thus for the formulation of a system 
code159. Both the regulator and the system operators have consulted with the energy firms on 
these conditions. The Dutch regulator makes the final decision on what conditions to include in 
the system code. With respect to making changes to the system code, the transmission system 
                                                 
159
 Articles 31.1.c, 31.1.i, and 31.2 of the electricity law of 1998 specify the procedure for developing a 
code. The decision of the DTe, with reference number 99-005, and title Besluit tot vaststellen van de 
voorwaarden bedoeld in artikel 26e van de Elektriciteitswet 1998, refers to the decision-making process 
with respect to the system code, grid code and measurement code.   
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operator or at least one third of the distribution system operators can make a request to all the 
system operators for formulating a proposal for changes to the conditions as set out in the 
code160. The system operators consult with the organizations that represent the various parties 
in the electricity industry, including the energy firms, on the proposals for changes to the 
system code161. The system operators have to send such proposals to the competition authority, 
and they must indicate how they took into account the views of the organizations in the 
electricity industry162. Currently, it is the competition authority that decides on changes that are 
to be made to the conditions in the system code. The competition authority takes the proposal 
of the system operators into account when making the decision. Both the system operators and 
the organizations in the electricity industry can send their views to the competition authority on 
the latter’s proposal for changes to the system code163. The parties to this multilateral 
adaptation are also the parties to the hybrid form of governance for the energy program 
transactions.  
 
This multilateral adaptation in which the identity of the contracting party and the requirements 
of the electric system are important, explains the transformation to the hybrid form of 
governance. Before the liberalization of the Dutch electricity industry, the centrally 
coordinated pooling system of the SEP internalized the balancing transactions. The governance 
transformation for this balancing transaction of exchanging energy programs can thus be 
summarized as a transformation from the vertically integrated hierarchy to a hybrid form of 
governance. The incentive intensity of the energy firms has increased in the liberalized 
environment. The energy firms now have a financial incentive to match their electricity supply 
to their demand, whereas in the pooling system, electricity supply and demand were only 
balanced for the entire electric system. Fiat is replaced by information disclosure and 
information verification mechanisms, and by dispute resolution by the board of directors of the 
                                                 
160
 Article 32.1 of the electricity law of 1998. 
161
 Article 33.1 of the electricity law of 1998.  
162
 Article 33.2 of the electricity law of 1998. 
163
 Article 34.2 of the electricity law of 1998. 
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competition authority. The type of adaptation can be described as an autonomous adaptation 
between forms of governance. 
 
6.6.5 The role of regulation 
Regulation influences the attributes of this balancing transaction, the new form of governance, 
and the attributes of adaptation. Regulation is also part of the new governance structure. 
Firstly, the system code specifies that an imbalance price must be paid for not abiding by the 
energy programs. This code thereby stimulates the program responsible parties to send accurate 
energy programs to the transmission system operator, and aligns the incentives between these 
two contracting parties. Regulation has therefore eliminated the attribute of behavioral 
uncertainty in the transaction, and has reduced the need for a new form of governance. 
Regulation has also influenced the human asset-specificity and temporal specificity of this 
balancing transaction, as was the case for the t-program transaction. Secondly, the system code 
introduced several administrative control instruments into the governance structure, including 
the monitoring of electricity input and offtake from the network, a penalty in the form of the 
imbalance price, and a mechanism that verifies whether the program responsible parties have 
submitted internally and externally consistent energy programs. Articles 32 to 34 of the 
electricity law of 1998 have led to flexible contracts between the transacting parties. Thirdly, 
the public authorities influence the attributes of adaptation; they have specified in the 
electricity law how the energy firms and the system operators have to formulate and make 
changes to the system code. These parties to the energy program transaction have to adapt 
multilaterally and consider the system requirements. The authorities have reduced the search 
costs by setting several requirements for the governance structure of the energy program 
transaction in the system code. Finally, the competition authority is part of the governance 
structure, as it settles the disputes between the contracting parties.  
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6.7 Balancing and network access transactions: supply of reserve power 
The energy programs of the first balancing transaction inform the transmission system operator 
of the expected input of electricity into the network and the expected offtake of electricity from 
the network for the next day. The actual production and consumption of electricity often differ 
from these energy programs. The transmission system operator therefore needs the availability 
of power to balance electricity supply and demand in real time. The second balancing 
transaction thus concerns the supply of reserve power by the network users to the transmission 
system operator. The transmission system operator also needs this power to resolve the 
transportation restrictions on the network. The first three subsections (6.7.1-6.7.3) introduce 
this second balancing transaction, after which the attributes of the transaction, the governance 
structure, the misalignment, the adaptation, and the role of regulation are discussed in 
subsections 6.7.4 until 6.7.8 respectively. 
 
6.7.1 Regulating power and reserve power on the single buyer market 
The transmission system operator has set up a single buyer market to coordinate this second 
type of balancing transaction. On this market, energy firms bid for the supply of regulating 
power and reserve power to TenneT. Regulating power and reserve power is power that the 
energy firms are able to produce more, to produce less, or to consume less, as compared to 
their energy programs. The grid code obliges energy firms to supply reserve power. Article 5.1 
of this code states that those connected to the network with a contracted capacity of over 60 
MW are obliged to bid for the supply of reserve power to TenneT. Network users with a 
capacity that does not exceed 60 MW can bid for the supply of reserve power to TenneT on a 
voluntary basis. In addition to the compulsory contracts for the supply of reserve power, 
TenneT has also contracted with energy firms for the supply of 250 MW of regulating power. 
These energy firms are obliged to bid regulating power to the single buyer market up to their 
contracted amount. Other energy firms, which do not have such a contract with TenneT, can 
bid for the supply of regulating power on a voluntary basis. When there is an imbalance, 
TenneT first calls on the bids for regulating power. Regulating power must be made available 
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to the transmission system operator within fifteen minutes, and is used to maintain the balance 
on the network for the fifteen-minute periods164. Reserve power is used when TenneT decides 
that the regulating power is used for too long and too extensively, and when TenneT has to 
resolve transportation problems in the network. The bids for reserve power are for one-hour 
periods, and the energy firms can indicate within which period they are able to supply or 
withdraw the power to or from the network. This period cannot extend beyond three days (DTe 
and TenneT, 2004: 7). When TenneT calls on the bids for the supply of reserve power for an 
increase of the production, the energy firms supply the total amount of electricity that was 
included in the bid. When TenneT calls on the bids for reserve power for decreasing the 
production, it can call upon parts of the bids, which is necessary to resolve a transportation 
problem on the network. When TenneT has signaled a transportation problem, it asks the 
energy firms to supply a specific bid with a particular amount of electricity that can be 
increased or decreased and the location in the network where the power has to be supplied. 
TenneT selects the energy firm that has bid to supply this power at the lowest price. This 
bidding and TenneT’s selection takes place by phone. 
This is different in the case of the regulating power. TenneT automatically sends messages, the 
so-called delta signals, to the energy firms, which specify how much regulating power the 
energy firms must supply to (or withdraw from) the network. The delta signals thus indicate 
which parts of the bid the system operator calls upon. The delta signals change the energy 
programs that have been submitted by the energy firms. This gives the energy firms an 
incentive to respond to the delta signals; if they do not respond to the delta signals, they will 
have to pay TenneT for the imbalance between their changed energy programs and their actual 
production and consumption of electricity. These delta signals are sent by TenneT to the 
energy firms via a system for frequency control (Frequentie Vermogens Regeling (FVR)). This 
system checks every two seconds if there is an imbalance between electricity supply and 
                                                 
164
 The energy programs are also based on these fifteen-minute periods; for each fifteen minutes, the 
energy firms specify how much electricity they expect to put and take out of the network. For each day, 
the energy firms thus supply information on electricity generation and consumption for 96 fifteen-minute 
intervals to TenneT.  
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demand. When there is an imbalance, this system selects the most suitable bids for resolving 
the imbalance, and sends the delta signals to the energy firms. Every energy firm that wants to 
submit bids to TenneT needs a connection to this FVR-system.   
 
6.7.2 Regulating prices and imbalance prices 
The energy firms send their bids for the supply of regulating power and reserve power to 
TenneT on the day before the operational day. They send bids for increasing the amount of 
electricity that is put on the network (through an increased production or a decreased 
consumption) and for decreasing the input into the network (through a decreased production). 
They can change their bids for a particular period up until one hour before the start of this 
period. The energy firms include a price in their bids for which they are willing to supply the 
regulating power or reserve power. They give two different prices: one for increasing their 
input into the network, and one for decreasing their input. TenneT puts the bids in increasing 
order of price, and calls first on the bids with the lowest price, and then proceeds to the higher 
prices. All the energy firms that have supplied regulating or reserve power in a particular 
period are paid the price of the highest bid that TenneT had to use in that particular period 
(DTe and TenneT, 2004: 9). There are two bid price ladders, one for regulating power and one 
for reserve power. TenneT pays the energy firms for regulating power or reserve power that 
has increased the input into the network. And TenneT either pays the energy firms for 
decreasing their input into the network, or the energy firms pay TenneT for decreasing their 
input. This depends on the bid price ladder of a particular period. When looking at previous 
ladders on TenneT’s website, TenneT often pays the energy firms for decreasing the input into 
the network when smaller amounts of electricity (100-300 MW) need to be reduced, and the 
energy firms pay TenneT when the decrease in volume is around 600 MW.  
TenneT transfers the costs for the regulating power to the energy firms that have caused the 
imbalance165. The energy firms that had a larger offtake from (or smaller input into) the 
                                                 
165
 The costs that were made to resolve the transportation restrictions with reserve power are not included 
in the calculation of the imbalance prices. The system operators pay for the reserve power that was 
needed within their part of the electricity network.   
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network than was specified in their energy programs pay an imbalance price to TenneT. And 
those firms that had a larger input into (or smaller offtake from) the network receive (or pay) 
the imbalance price. These imbalance prices that are paid or received by the energy firms are 
based on the regulating prices. They also depend on the system imbalance, and thus on whether 
TenneT had to increase or decrease the input into the network. When TenneT had to increase 
the input into the network, and the energy firm decreased (increased) its input, the firm had to 
pay to (receive from) TenneT the imbalance price that is based on the regulating price for 
increasing the input. When TenneT had to decrease the input into the network, and the energy 
firm decreased (increased) its input, the firm had to pay to (receive from) TenneT the 
imbalance price that is based on the regulating price for decreasing the input. When in one 
fifteen-minute period, TenneT had to both increase and decrease its input into the network, the 
imbalance prices that the energy firms pay (or receive) cannot depend on the conditions of 
increase or decrease into the network. In this case, when energy firms decrease (increase) their 
input as compared to their energy programs they pay to (receive from) TenneT the price for 
increasing (decreasing) the input (TenneT, 2005: 10). The imbalance prices are thus very 
unpredictable, because they differ for situations when TenneT has either dispatched bi-
directional or when TenneT has dispatched in one direction only (Beune and Nobel, 2001: 49). 
The result for TenneT will always be zero; the system operator does not make a profit on this 
single buyer market. 
The delta signal gives the energy firms information on the price for the regulating power in a 
particular fifteen-minute period. When the transmission system operator has called on an 
energy firm’s bid by sending a delta signal, the regulating price is at least equal to the bid price 
of the energy firm. This gives the energy firms an incentive to spread their bids, in other words, 
to send bids for the same fifteen-minute period to the transmission system operator with 
different prices. This gives them a better picture of the height of the regulating price. 
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6.7.3 APX intraday market 
Until September 2006, the single buyer market for regulating and reserve power was the only 
market in which a real time price for electricity was determined. TenneT is the only party that 
can purchase electricity on this market. The energy firms therefore had no access to a market in 
which they could trade electricity for the next fifteen-minute period. The APX offered only a 
forward market in which electricity could be traded up until one hour before operation. 
Bilateral contracts between energy firms are also forward contracts. In September 2006, APX 
introduced the intraday market for Dutch power after renewed interest in such a market by 
energy firms166. The APX made a first attempt to such a market in 2001, but due to a lack of 
liquidity on this market, it was closed within a short period of time (Huisman and Huurman, 
2004). On this new APX intraday market, energy firms can trade electricity for the fifteen-
minute periods. This allows them to better balance their individual positions. For example, 
when an energy firm expects to have a larger input into (or offtake from) the network during 
the next fifteen minutes as compared to its energy program, it can sell (or purchase) electricity 
on this market. By doing so, the energy firm is not completely dependent on the imbalance 
system of TenneT, in which it is not entirely clear beforehand what the imbalance price will be. 
Previously, the energy firms could only manage their individual positions up until one hour 
before operation. For the one hour in between, they depended entirely on the imbalance system 
of TenneT. Traders thus use the intraday market to reduce the risks associated with unexpected 
imbalance prices charged by TenneT167. All contracts on this market are traded anonymously 
and are settled by the APX Group. The owner of TenneT (TenneT Holding B.V.) owns 72 per 
cent of the shares of the APX Group.  
  
6.7.4 The attributes of the transaction 
The frequency of these transactions is recurrent. Those energy firms that have a contract with 
TenneT for the supply of regulating power, and those energy firms that are obliged by the grid 
                                                 
166
 www.apxgroup.com (last accessed January 3, 2009). 
167
 www.apxgroup.com (last accessed January 3, 2009). 
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code to supply reserve power, bid to supply power to TenneT on a daily basis. These energy 
firms can send bids for 96 periods per day, and can alter these bids during the day up until one 
hour before operation of a particular fifteen-minute period. 
Several investments in physical and human assets have to be made before energy firms can bid 
for the supply of regulating power to TenneT. Firstly, when energy firms want to send bids to 
TenneT for the supply of regulating power, they need a connection to the FVR-system. To 
enable such a connection, the energy firms have to invest in technical facilities168. Secondly, 
the messages that include the bids for the supply of regulating and reserve power can be 
transferred to TenneT in the same format as is used for the energy program transactions (the 
EDINE-format). As was shown in the previous section on the first balancing transaction, these 
EDINE-messages require specific investments in human capital169. The specific investments in 
the connection to the FVR-system and in the EDINE-format are also dedicated assets. These 
investments only serve the contractual relation and the transactions with one contracting party: 
the transmission system operator. The transactions between TenneT and those energy firms 
that have a contract with TenneT for the supply of regulating power, and those firms that are 
obliged to supply reserve power, are characterized by temporal specificity. When sending the 
bids to TenneT, these energy firms have to comply with strict time schedules (TenneT, 2003: 
10). And when receiving a delta signal on the basis of the bids for regulating power, the energy 
firms have to adjust their production or consumption within a few minutes. For those energy 
firms that bid for the supply of regulating power and reserve power to TenneT on a voluntary 
basis, the temporal specificity is less relevant. They can decide themselves for what day or for 
what particular fifteen-minute periods they want to send bids. If these firms have sent bids for 
the supply of regulating power, they will have to be able to increase or decrease their 
production or consumption within a few minutes, and then these transactions are also 
characterized by a substantial temporal specificity.    
The transaction of supplying regulating power and reserve power to TenneT is characterized by 
                                                 
168
 Reactie Essent N.V. op NMa Consultatie Concentratie Energiemarkten. www.nmanet.nl, p. 4.  
169
 www.slea.nl/Downloads/Load%20Management.pdf (last accessed July 20, 2008). 
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behavioral uncertainty. The energy firms are not always willing to supply their reserve 
capacity to TenneT170, and they therefore have an incentive to disguise information about their 
available capacity. They may want to use the reserve capacity to balance their individual 
positions, or to sell it to other energy firms, instead of reserving it for TenneT. When energy 
firms reserve capacity for TenneT, they are not sure if TenneT will call upon this capacity, and 
therefore they are not sure whether they will earn an income on this reserve capacity171. The 
energy firms thus have an incentive to withhold information on their available capacity from 
TenneT. They may also want to use their private information on their available capacity in 
setting their prices. In the summer of 2003, there was a shortage of electricity supply, and 
TenneT had no information on the available reserve capacity, other than information from the 
very short bid ladder. After calls to the energy firms, it became obvious that some of them were 
only willing to supply their power at very high prices172. There is thus a behavioral uncertainty 
in the relation with respect to the energy firms’ decisions on whether to send bids to TenneT.   
 
6.7.5 Misalignment 
Before the liberalization of the Dutch electricity industry, the balancing transactions of the 
supply of reserve power were internalized in the SEP. The SEP monitored the amount of 
electricity that was taken out of the network, and ordered generators to produce electricity in 
particular generating plants, and thereby the SEP balanced electricity supply and demand in 
real time. This vertical integration is assumed to have been aligned with the attributes of the 
                                                 
170
 ‘Not every party bid for supplying all of its reserve capacity to TenneT’ (annual report TenneT 2001: 
19). ‘Apparently program responsible parties control resources that are not made available either to the 
APX or to TenneT’s market for regulating and reserve power’ (Brattle Group, 2001: 27). 
171
 Section 2.3 of chapter three referred to a negative externality for generators as the need to supply 
reserve capacity to the transmission system operator, when they could have earned a (higher) income on 
this electricity in a marketplace. This negative externality is seen as a reason for the comparative 
efficiency of vertical integration in the electricity industry. 
172
 From a hearing on the design of a regulatory decision with respect to the publication of information on 
the availability of production capacity for resolving imbalances by the energy firms, it became obvious 
that the energy firms are not willing to display this information. Verslag van de hoorzitting, 23 september 
2003, 13.45 – 16.00 uur. Zaaknummer: 101595. Inzake: Ontwerpbesluit TenneT. www.cogen.nl (last 
accessed January 3, 2009). 
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balancing transactions. The current balancing transactions are characterized by several types of 
asset-specificity and by behavioral uncertainty. From a transaction cost economics perspective, 
the vertically integrated hierarchy can still be considered as an efficient form of governance for 
these transactions. The rules on vertical unbundling have, however, prohibited this structure for 
the balancing transactions, and have thus created a misalignment for these transactions. An 
adaptation to a new form of governance had to take place. 
 
6.7.6 The governance structure   
The structure that governs this second balancing transaction is a hybrid form, in which a 
bidding mechanism is combined with long-term contracts between the energy firms and 
TenneT for the supply of regulating power and reserve power. The contracting parties retain 
their autonomy, but their relation is characterized by bilateral dependency. TenneT depends on 
the energy firms for the supply of power, and the energy firms depend on TenneT for 
maintaining the balance. To govern this bilateral dependency, TenneT contracts with energy 
firms for the supply of 250 MW of regulating power. Every year, TenneT invites energy firms 
to tender for these contracts. In addition, the grid code obliges the energy firms with a capacity 
larger than 60 MW to contract with TenneT for the supply of reserve power. On the basis of 
these contracts, the energy firms bid for the supply of regulating power and reserve power. 
Other energy firms that do not have long-term supply contracts with TenneT and that do not 
fall under the requirements of the grid code, can voluntarily bid for the supply of regulating 
power and reserve power to TenneT on this market. 
The incentive intensity of the energy firms with respect to this second balancing transaction is 
characterized as an intermediate degree of incentive intensity. The incentive intensity will be 
described with respect to the decision to participate in the bidding mechanism, the bidding for 
reserve power, and the response to the delta signals. Firstly, in the transition period to the new 
balancing system173, the Dutch regulator (Energiekamer) and the transmission system operator 
                                                 
173
 This period is referred to as the reference period. It was introduced to allow the energy firms to get 
acquainted with the new system of imbalance prices. During this period, from the 1st of July 1999 until 
the 31st of December 2000, the imbalance price was set at 0.  
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aimed at first to rely solely on a bidding mechanism and on voluntary tenders for the supply of 
power to TenneT. ‘But by mid 2000, there was an unsuccessful tender for regulation and 
reserve power’ (Beune and Nobel, 2001: 48). At that time, the regulator concluded that a 
market for reserve power was not likely to emerge in the Dutch electricity industry, because 
the electricity generators were not willing to contract with the transmission system operator for 
the supply of the necessary reserve capacity174. The grid code was thereafter extended with the 
obligation to all energy firms with a capacity of more than 60 MW to offer reserve power to 
TenneT. One reason for this lack of interest is that the energy firms have to reserve a particular 
amount of capacity, while they are not sure if TenneT will call upon this capacity. The energy 
firms are thus not sure if they get paid for their reserve capacity. On the APX or in bilateral 
contracts, the energy firms could have been sure to sell their electricity and earn an income. 
The energy firms that have contracts with TenneT for the supply of regulating power do 
receive a fixed fee for signing these contracts. Another reason is that on the APX, the energy 
firms can ask almost any price they want for their electricity. On the single buyer market, the 
energy firms normally have an incentive not to set their prices too high, because the imbalance 
prices are based on the prices for regulating power (Beune and Nobel, 2001: 52). If an energy 
firm, by some unexpected event, deviates from its energy program and creates an imbalance, it 
has to pay this imbalance price that is based on the regulating price.  
Secondly, when energy firms are bidding for the supply of power to TenneT, their incentive 
intensity is not very high either. The real-time regulating prices are not known to the energy 
firms. The bid price ladder and the delta signals can be used to provide some information on 
these prices, but this information is very limited in its ability to predict the level of the 
regulating prices175. The energy firms can thus hardly alter their future behavior - in terms of 
future bids to TenneT or in terms of buying or selling electricity on the APX intraday market to 
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settle their individual balance positions - to earn an income (in the form of paying a reduced 
amount for the imbalance that was caused by the energy firm, or of sending better informed 
bids to TenneT).  
Thirdly, the energy firms do have a high incentive to react to the delta signals. If they do not 
respond to these signals, they have to pay TenneT for the imbalance that they have caused. The 
imbalance prices are very unpredictable, and therefore the energy firms will prefer to react to 
the delta signal, to reduce the risk of being confronted with very high imbalance prices.  
To conclude, only when the energy firms have bid for the supply of regulating power, they 
have a high incentive to respond to the delta signals. The incentive of energy firms to engage in 
this second balancing transaction with TenneT has not been very high. When obliged to 
transact, the incentive intensity of bidding for the supply of power to TenneT is not very high 
either.  
The administrative apparatus of governance structures are the mechanisms that support the 
functioning of these structures. It includes mechanisms to check whether the other contracting 
party is living up to the contractual agreements. For this second balancing transaction, these 
mechanisms include a monitoring of the network users by taking measurements of the input 
and offtake of electricity from the network. Whether energy firms have not responded to the 
delta signals is determined by taking these measurements. The administrative apparatus also 
includes a penalty (in the form of paying the imbalance price) for energy firms that do not react 
to the delta signal. The administrative apparatus of this governance structure also includes 
various information disclosure mechanisms. The system code states that TenneT should have 
access to up to date information of the energy producers with a connected capacity of more 
than 60 MW176. In addition, after the shortage of electricity supply in the summer of 2003, the 
system code was altered to include the following information disclosure mechanisms. Firstly, 
every production firm with a capacity of more than 5 MW has to inform the transmission 
system operator every three months of the capacity of its different electricity production plants 
for each day for the next twelve months. Secondly, when there is a change to the available 
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production capacity, the production firms have to send this information to TenneT within 24 
hours. Thirdly, the energy firms with a capacity of more than 5 MW have to send information 
to TenneT on a daily basis on their available capacity that can be used for regulating the 
balance177. TenneT publishes this information on the same day178. 
The contracts between TenneT and the energy firms for the supply of reserve power and 
regulating power are long-term. The energy firms with a capacity of more than 60 MW are 
obliged to supply reserve power to TenneT. They will have this obligation as long as they are 
connected to the network, and therefore they have a long-term relation with TenneT for the 
supply of reserve power. The contracts for the supply of regulating power have a duration of 
one year. TenneT invites tenders for these contracts on an annual basis. Those energy firms 
that contract with TenneT for regulating power receive a fixed income that is financed out of 
the system tariff (in addition to the regulating price when TenneT calls upon the energy firms’ 
bids) (Wals et al., 2003: 26). A maximum and a minimum price for which the energy firms can 
bid for the supply of regulating power are specified in these contracts. These prices are linked 
to the APX price (DTe and TenneT, 2004: 7). The system code specifies the procedures for 
determining the regulating prices. These procedures can be changed by altering the system 
code. Section 6.6.3 has discussed how changes can be made to the system code. The contracts 
for the supply of regulating power and reserve power are therefore flexible; they do allow for 
changes to their contents. The board of directors of the competition authority settles the 
disputes between the transmission system operator and the energy firms on how the 
transmission system operator executes its tasks.  
 
In summary, the new governance structure for the supply of regulating power and reserve 
power to TenneT that allows the transmission system operator to balance electricity supply and 
demand and to resolve transportation restrictions in real time is a hybrid form. It combines a 
bidding mechanism with long-term contracts and regulation. It is characterized by an 
                                                 
177
 Article 2.4 of the system code. 
178
 Article 2.5.3 of the system code. 
225
The Dutch electricity industry  
 
215
 
intermediate degree of incentive intensity, a monitoring of network users, penalties and 
information disclosure mechanisms, and by long-term, flexible contracts and dispute resolution 
by the competition authority.   
 
6.7.7 Adaptation 
In the transition period from an internal balancing by the SEP to the new governance structure 
for the second type of balancing transaction, the Dutch sector-specific regulator and the 
transmission system operator aimed at first to set up a single buyer market on which the energy 
firms would voluntarily bid for the supply of regulating power and reserve power. The energy 
firms would also have to voluntarily tender for the contracts with TenneT for the supply of this 
power179. Within the proposed framework of adaptation, to achieve such a market, TenneT 
would have to adapt unilaterally, respond to price signals, and not care for the identity of the 
contracting parties. However, TenneT did not adapt unilaterally to the new form of 
governance. ‘Various firms in the Dutch electricity industry and the distribution system 
operators were closely involved in the introduction of the new system for balancing’ (TenneT, 
2001: 19). The Dutch sector-specific agency regulated the contracting for the supply of reserve 
power. In this regulated search for a governance structure for the reserve power transactions, 
the regulator involved the energy firms, the transmission and distribution system operators180. 
The adaptation to the new form of governance was thus a multilateral adaptation. TenneT did 
not adjust to the new form of governance by taking into account only the price that it had to 
pay for the regulating power and reserve power. If this were the case, the transmission system 
operator could have only set up a single buyer market and call on the bids with the lowest 
price. In order to ensure the safety of the electric system and thus the balance of supply and 
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demand, TenneT contracted with generators for the supply of regulating power, and it 
submitted the proposal to the regulator for changing the grid code to include the obligation for 
energy firms of supplying reserve power. TenneT also proposed to the regulator to include 
additional information disclosure mechanisms in the system code. Since these changes to the 
system code took effect, the energy firms are obliged to supply TenneT on a daily basis with 
information on their available capacity. TenneT has indicated that it needs this information to 
ensure the security of supply for the short and long term181. The transmission system operator 
and the regulator did consider the requirements of the electric system in their adaptation to the 
new form of governance. In certain cases, the transmission system operator cannot solely rely 
on the bid ladder for information on the available capacity. The regulator consulted with 
various parties on this regulatory decision, including the energy firms, APX, industrial 
consumers of electricity, and EnergieNed (the association of energy producers, traders and 
retailers in the Netherlands)182. The identity of the contracting parties was relevant. They had 
to be large electricity generators that could supply electricity to the Dutch network and that had 
the organizational and technical capabilities to alter their input and offtake from the network 
automatically. At that time, there were only four large electricity generators in the Dutch 
electricity industry that were obliged to have these technical facilities183.  
The process of adaptation was thus characterized by a multilateral response to system 
requirements in which the identity of the contracting parties was relevant. This adaptation 
process can explain the governance transformation to the hybrid form. The type of adaptation 
can be summarized as one of autonomous adaptation between governance structures, because a 
transformation from the vertically integrated hierarchy of the SEP to a hybrid form took place.   
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6.7.8 The role of regulation  
Regulation influences this governance structure between the energy firms and TenneT in 
several ways. Firstly, the regulator has set several ex ante rules for the governance structure. 
The system code specifies the procedures for determining the regulating prices and the 
imbalance prices184. The imbalance price is based on the regulating price, and therefore the 
incentive intensity of the energy firms in the bidding process is reduced. The energy firms 
cannot entirely increase their income by transferring higher bids for the supply of regulating 
power, because if by some unexpected event they deviate from their energy programs, they 
have to pay the imbalance price that is based on the regulating price. Regulation thus gives the 
energy firms an incentive to minimize their bid prices. The system code also requires that the 
energy firms inform TenneT of their available production capacity185. In addition to this 
information disclosure mechanism, other administrative control instruments, such as the 
monitoring and the penalty of the imbalance price, are determined by regulation. Regulation 
also determines the long-term nature of the contracts for the supply of reserve power, and the 
flexibility of the contracts for the supply of regulating power and reserve power. Secondly, 
regulation has reduced the adaptation costs for the transmission system operator and the energy 
firms. By obliging the supply of reserve power, the regulator has reduced the search, 
bargaining and negotiation costs for adapting towards the hybrid form of governance for both 
the energy firms and TenneT. The regulator has also reduced the search costs for TenneT, and 
in particular the costs of searching for contracting parties that can supply reserve power to the 
transmission system operator. Thirdly, the regulator has also stimulated the contracting 
between TenneT and the energy firms for the supply of 250 MW of regulating power by 
imposing a regulatory threat on the energy firms. The obligation of supplying power for energy 
firms with a capacity larger than 60 MW would at first also apply to regulating power, and not 
only to reserve power. The energy firms responded by voluntarily contracting with TenneT for 
this regulating power, and therefore only the obligation to supply reserve power was included 
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in the grid code. Fourthly, the regulator also influenced the attributes of adaptation. When 
taking the regulatory decision on the obligatory supply of reserve power, it enforced a 
multilateral response to the new governance structure, by involving the transmission and 
distribution system operators and the energy firms in the decision. This same regulatory 
decision led to a governance structure in which not only the price, but mainly the security of 
supply is taken into account. Finally, regulation is part of the governance structure, because it 
settles the disputes between the transmission system operator and the network users.    
 
 
6.8 Switching transactions 
The governance transformations that have been discussed in the previous sections (6.4 until 
6.7) were mainly influenced by the regulations on the vertical unbundling of the integrated 
energy firms. New forms of governance had to emerge to coordinate the unbundled relations 
between the system operators and the network users for a connection and an access to the 
network, and a balancing of electricity supply and demand. Before the liberalization, these 
network connection, network access and balancing transactions were internalized in the 
vertically integrated firm. The transactions that will be discussed in this section, the switching 
transactions, and their governance, are mainly influenced by the regulations on the introduction 
of consumer choice into the industry. The 2003 EC electricity directive demanded that by July 
2004 all non-household consumers are free to choose their electricity retailer, and that by July 
2007 every consumer is free to choose its retailer in the European Union. In the Dutch 
electricity industry, the electricity consumers can choose their retailer for green electricity 
since July 2001, and for grey electricity since July 2004. The Dutch regulations have thus 
demanded a faster implementation of consumer choice than was required by the EC directives. 
The rules on consumer choice are included in the directives to introduce competition into the 
supply of electricity, with the result that the incumbent electricity firms loose their monopoly 
in their particular region. These rules aim to stimulate the entry of new electricity retailers into 
the European electricity industries. Currently, the Energiekamer grants 41 licences to various 
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energy firms to retail electricity in the Dutch electricity industry186. The distribution system 
operators retain their monopoly for their part of the electricity network. When consumers are 
given a choice, and may thus switch to a different retailer, information has to be exchanged 
between the consumer, the old and the new retailer, and the distribution system operator. This 
exchange of information on the switching consumer and its meter readings is the switching 
transaction. 
Article 24a of the electricity law of 1998 states that the system operator is responsible for 
implementing the switch, and that additional rules should be set on the term within which the 
system operator implements the switch. These additional rules have been formulated in the 
information code. This code defines the responsibilities of the various parties in the electricity 
industry with respect to the exchange of information between the parties. It specifies what 
information has to be exchanged and within which time periods, and it describes the switching 
process that has to be followed when switching consumers to a different retailer. This 
switching process consists of several steps. Firstly, the consumer authorizes its (potentially) 
new electricity retailer to start the switching process, after which this retailer sends information 
on the switch to the system operator, including the network connection number of the 
switching consumer (EAN-code), the intended switch date, and the name of the program 
responsible party after the switch187. Secondly, the system operator checks among others 
whether this notification of the switch is complete, whether the connection number is correct 
and if there are no other switch requests for the same connection. When the system operator 
intends to execute the switch, it informs the old and new retailer the day after it has received 
the notification of the switch. Thirdly, the system operator executes the switch by making 
changes in the so-called connection register on the indicated switch date. Every system 
operator in the Dutch electricity industry manages a connection register for all the connections 
in its part of the network. For each EAN-code, the registers include information on the name of 
the electricity consumer, the address of the connection, the current electricity retailer, the 
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program responsible party, the transportation capacity on the connection, how electricity is 
measured on the connection, and the name of the firm that is responsible for measuring the 
electricity use188. Finally, maximum fifteen days after the switch date, the new retailer has to 
send the meter readings of the switch date to the system operator. When the consumer has not 
sent the meter readings to the electricity retailer, the system operator can take the meter reading 
or make an estimate. This has to be done before the 21st day after the switch date. Before the 
30th day, the system operator has to communicate the meter readings to the old and new 
retailer.  
 
6.8.1 The attributes of the transaction 
The frequency of the switching transaction is recurrent. The organization that facilitates the 
exchange of switching information between the retailers and the system operators is EDSN 
(Energie Data Services Nederland). This organization reports to process 62,000 switch requests 
per month189, and to exchange more than 100 billion messages per year190. In June 2007, 23 
independent electricity retailers191 operated in the Dutch electricity industry (NMa/DTe, 2007: 
6). This means that, on average, each of these retailers processed 270 switch requests per 
day192. However, the three largest Dutch energy firms supply electricity to around eighty per 
cent of the industry, which means that the largest amount of the switch requests affect these 
companies, and they will thus process a number of switches that is much higher than the 270. 
For the system operators, that are responsible for implementing the switch, the amount of 
switches per day is also higher than the 270, simply because there are fewer system operators 
than there are retailers. The frequency of these transactions may therefore be characterized as 
recurrent.   
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The information on the switch of retailer can be exchanged between the various parties in the 
same electronic format as the messages on the t-programs and e-programs, which is the so-
called EDINE-format. As sections 6.5.1 and 6.6.1 have shown, the use of this EDINE-format 
requires specific investments in human capital. In addition to these EDINE-messages and the 
exchange through the central postbox that is managed by TenneT, another format and way of 
exchanging messages has been developed in the Dutch electricity industry. In July 2001, two 
incumbent energy firms, Eneco and Essent, set up the Energie Clearinghouse (ECH)193 to 
simplify the information exchange between parties in the electricity industry. The focus of 
ECH was on the information exchange to enable the consumers to switch retailer. At that time, 
the EDINE-format already existed. The first messages that were exchanged through the ECH 
were comparable to the EDINE-format, but later they were altered to meet the requirements of 
the energy firms, and more information was added to the messages. In October 2007, the 
organization that managed the EDINE-standard merged with the Energie Clearinghouse, and 
together they currently operate under the name of EDSN. The system operators are the 
shareholders of EDSN, and the representatives of the electricity retailers, program responsible 
parties, measurement responsible parties, and system operators, sit on the board of directors of 
EDSN (ECN, 2006: 5). EDSN takes over some of the responsibilities of the electricity retailers 
and the system operators in the switching process; it receives the messages from the retailers 
and sends them to the system operators. The retailers do not need to communicate directly with 
the different system operators. EDSN also checks the correctness of the switch requests, which 
would otherwise have been done by the system operators. The energy firms that contract with 
EDSN pay for its services, while the exchange of information through the central postbox of 
TenneT is for free. A large share of the messages (around 98 per cent) for switching retailer is 
exchanged through EDSN194, as opposed to the central postbox of TenneT. Messages in the 
EDINE–format can also be exchanged through EDSN. Of all the energy firms that retail 
electricity, 43 per cent use the EDINE-format and 57 per cent use the EDSN (former ECH) 
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standard195. The program responsible parties, system operators, and electricity retailers need to 
meet certain requirements before they are allowed to make use of the EDSN switching services 
(EDSN, 2005). They need to show that they are familiar with the various services of EDSN, 
the codes of the regulator, the switching process, the messages that need to be sent in this 
process, EDSN contact information, and EDSN support services. Their information 
technology, the security of this technology, and the interface of this technology with EDSN 
have to conform to certain standards that are set by EDSN. They also have to be trained on 
how to send messages to EDSN and how to receive messages. As comparable to the EDINE-
messages that are exchanged through the central postbox of TenneT, these switching messages 
that are send through the EDSN system need substantial investments in human capital. 
Employees have to be trained so that the energy firms can meet the above requirements. The 
investments in human capital are also dedicated assets; they are dedicated to one contracting 
party, which is EDSN.    
The information code describes what information the parties to the switching transaction have 
to exchange, and within which time periods. The energy firms have implemented the 
requirements of this code into a more detailed description of the switching process. This 
thousand-page document, which is referred to as the Reference Model, defines and names the 
various messages that are involved in the switching process, and describes which of these 
messages have to be exchanged between which parties. In addition, EDSN has published a 
description of the services that it provides to the retailers and system operators196, which also 
includes detailed information on the switching process. These documents are all very explicit 
on what is expected from each transacting party, and within which time period. The Dutch 
regulator has, however, reported that it received signals that the switching process is not taking 
place as it should197.   
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In the Dutch electricity industry, the distribution system operators are legally unbundled from 
the retailers and the generators of electricity, but they are still located under the same holding. 
In 2011, the ownership unbundling has to be implemented, and the distribution system 
operators are not allowed anymore to be located under the same holding as the generators and 
retailers. In the current structure, the distribution system operators may still have an incentive 
to favor the electricity retailers with which they have an organizational relation. With respect to 
the switching transaction, this would mean that the system operators do not have an incentive 
to switch consumers from the related electricity retailer to another energy firm. The Dutch 
regulator has observed that the distribution system operators have indeed displayed behavior 
with which they aim to obstruct or complicate the switching of consumers to independent 
retailers in several ways198. Firstly, the regulator observed that three distribution system 
operators did not implement switches of an independent retailer while there was no reason for 
not executing these switches according to the regulations. Secondly, the system operators did 
not implement switches and provided reasons for the refusals that were not mentioned in the 
regulations. Thirdly, the system operators did not execute switches within the set time periods. 
This indicates that the system operators do indeed display opportunistic behavior in the 
switching transaction. In a recent monitor of the Dutch electricity industry by the regulator, 
several retailers have also indicated to experience problems with the slow supply of 
measurement data by the system operators. When the retailers do not receive this data, they are 
not able to send electricity bills to their new consumers, and this leads to liquidity problems, 
especially for the new entrants (NMa/DTe, 2007: 21). In this monitor, the new entrants also 
claim that mistakes are made in the switching process, and that this creates high costs, and 
reduces their ability to acquire new customers. When integrated electricity retailers experience 
problems with switching, they can solve these problems relatively quick and with less costs as 
compared to the new entrants, because these incumbents have personal contacts with the 
employees of the system operators (NMa/DTe, 2007: 21-22). The switching transaction is thus 
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characterized by a behavioral uncertainty; the new entrant retailers may be disadvantaged by 
the opportunistic behavior of the distribution system operators.   
 
6.8.2 Misalignment  
Before the liberalization, the switching transactions did not occur very often. The integrated 
electric utilities only performed a switch when electricity consumers moved to a different 
region. These consumers switched to a different integrated electric utility. The behavioral 
uncertainty in these transactions was very low; the regional electric utilities were not in 
competition with each other, and did not have to display opportunistic behavior to retain a 
consumer, and to obstruct the switching process. These transactions are somewhat different 
from the current switch of retailer in the liberalized industry. The latter transactions only 
involve a switch of retailer, and the electricity consumers retain the same regional system 
operator. The system operator, who is responsible for making the switch and for gathering the 
meter readings, facilitates the exchange of information on the switching consumer between the 
old and the new retailer. This switching transaction is vital to an industry in which new energy 
firms must be able to enter, and in which these new energy firms must be enabled to compete 
with the incumbents. The new rules on the introduction of consumer choice that have 
stimulated the competition, have led to an increase in behavioral uncertainty in the switching 
transactions, and have thereby created a misalignment.  
 
6.8.3 The governance structure 
The governance structure that has emerged for the switching transactions is a hybrid form. The 
retailers and system operators need to exchange information on the switching consumer, and a 
third party, EDSN, facilitates this exchange. The energy firms have agreed that before they 
send a switch request to EDSN, they will first check whether the electricity consumer, that is 
willing to switch, does not have any other electricity supply contracts with another retailer that 
cannot be cancelled in the short term. A database was set up with information on these 
electricity supply contracts that includes the date at which the contract can be cancelled, the 
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period of notice of termination of the contract, and whether the contract has already been 
cancelled. EDSN also manages this database (Contract Controle Protocol), and thus facilitates 
the exchange of information on the electricity supply contracts. The energy firms transfer data 
on their contracts with consumers to EDSN on a weekly basis. An information disclosure 
mechanism thus characterizes the administrative apparatus of this governance structure. The 
administrative apparatus is also characterized by monitoring. EDSN monitors the quality of the 
switching transaction, and in particular how fast the response was to switch requests, how fast 
the measurement data were supplied, and how fast the switches were completed199. The energy 
firms can check their own performance and how it compares to the industry average. The 
regulator also monitors the quality of the switching transaction (NMa, 2006: 18), which means 
that regulation is also part of this governance structure. The regulator enforces the contracts 
between EDSN and the system operators: it has given three system operators a binding 
instruction, because they were not implementing switches that were requested by an 
independent retailer, and they were not performing switches on time200. 
The incentive intensity of the electricity retailers is of an intermediate degree. The electricity 
retailers have an incentive to participate in the governance structure for switching transactions, 
because it may increase their number of electricity consumers. The retailers will earn a higher 
income when more consumers switch to their firm. A governance structure that enables a 
coordination of the switching process may also reduce the costs of switching consumers. The 
incentive intensity is, however, reduced, because the electricity retailers also need to contribute 
in this governance structure to the switching of their customers to competitor firms. 
In 2007, a new association was set up, referred to as NEDU, that serves as a platform in which 
the electricity retailers, system operators, and program responsible parties may propose 
adjustments to the switching process and the switching messages to improve the exchange of 
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information among the parties. This association is a client of EDSN, and purchases the 
switching services from EDSN. NEDU and EDSN have signed a long-term contract for the 
supply of the switching services to the members of NEDU, which include the electricity 
retailers, system operators, program responsible parties, and measurement responsible parties. 
This long-term contract is a so-called framework agreement in which the terms and prices for 
the orders that NEDU places with EDSN can be set when the services are demanded. The 
agreement is signed for a period that extends beyond five years201. The orders may include 
defining new messages, describing the processes for the exchange of information, and 
designing changes to the EDSN system that supports the exchange of the switching 
messages202. The agreement is thus highly flexible. The association and the framework 
agreement with EDSN have been set up, with the express intention, to facilitate making 
changes to the current agreements between the parties to the switching transaction. When a 
system operator is a party to a conflict on a switching transaction, the board of directors of the 
competition authority may resolve the dispute. 
In summary, the new form of governance for the switching transactions is a hybrid. It is 
characterized by an intermediate incentive intensity, information disclosure mechanisms, 
monitoring, and long-term, flexible contracts. The regulator is part of this governance 
structure: it monitors the quality of the switching transactions, and enforces the agreements 
with binding instructions.     
 
6.8.4 Adaptation  
The identity of the contracting party is highly relevant; the majority of the economic actors in 
the electricity industry have chosen to contract with EDSN for the switching services (98 per 
cent of the switching messages is exchanged through EDSN). The electricity retailers that want 
to request a switch, will send this request to EDSN. The system operators that have a 
                                                 
201
 www.edsn.nl/docs/Algemeen/communicatiedocument_-_v2_1.pdf (last accessed September 9, 2008). 
Page 25. 
202
 www.edsn.nl/docs/Algemeen/communicatiedocument_-_v2_1.pdf (last accessed September 9, 2008). 
Page 6. 
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responsibility for executing the switch, and for establishing the meter readings, communicate 
their approval of the switch and the meter readings to EDSN.  
The search for this current contracting party (EDSN), and for this form of governance, in 
which information is exchanged through EDSN, has involved many of the economic actors in 
the industry. In June 2000, the Ministry of Economic Affairs installed a platform for 
facilitating the changes towards a liberalized energy industry (Platform Versnelling 
Energieliberalisering, PVE). Participants in this platform were the transmission system 
operator, employers’ organizations, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and various associations 
to which the energy firms are connected. One of these associations for retailers, traders and 
generators in the Dutch electricity industry (EnergieNed) set up a support program that 
facilitated the implementation of the rules, as developed within PVE, for a liberalized industry. 
This support program, (Support Programma Opening Energiemarkt Derde fase, Spoed!), 
formulated an industry-wide planning for the changes that had to be made before the 
introduction of consumer choice; it translated the codes into the Reference Model; and it 
enabled the energy firms to practice with the administrative processes of switching. In July 
2004, when every consumer was able to choose its retailer, the activities of the platform and 
the support program were ended. Some of the activities were continued in B’con, which was an 
organization that monitored the information exchange between the energy firms to improve the 
quality of this exchange. It implemented the changes in legislation and the codes into the 
Reference Model, and organized industry-wide tests for changes to the model. B’con merged 
with ECH and the organization that implemented the EDINE-standard into EDSN. The 
adaptation towards the new form of governance can thus be characterized as a multilateral 
adaptation; the Ministry of Economic Affairs facilitated the start to the new structure; the 
various energy firms were involved, including the retailers, system operators, and new entrants, 
through their associations; and the regulator formulated the codes that had to be implemented 
into the firm-level agreements. The actors involved in the adaptation process are also the 
parties to the hybrid form of governance, including the system operators, old and new retailers, 
and the regulator that monitors the switching process. 
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The adaptation to the hybrid form of governance occurred, because the economic actors have 
to take the electric system into account. The switching to another retailer is more complicated 
in the electricity industry than in other industries, because the parties to this transaction have to 
consider the presence of the electricity network. The electricity consumers cannot, as in a 
market, change to a new firm every day without exposing the details of their previous retailer 
and use of the service. The electricity meters have to be read on the switching day in order to 
allow the old and new retailers to send correct bills to the consumers. Every meter is located 
near the network connection. In most cases, the system operators own the meters and are 
responsible for the meter readings. The system operators are therefore involved in the 
exchange of switching information between the old and the new retailers. The switching is also 
more complicated in the electricity industry, because the electricity network has natural 
monopoly characteristics and the distribution system operators retain their regional 
monopolies. The switching consumer retains its connection and transportation agreement with 
the system operator, but signs a new supply contract with the new retailer. The system operator 
needs to register this change of retailer in the connection, because it needs to know to which 
retailer to send the future meter readings. Since 2007, EDSN has taken over some of the 
activities of the system operators. 
This adaptation process, characterized by a search for a relevant contracting party, and a 
multilateral adaptation that takes the system requirements into account, explains the emergence 
of the hybrid form of governance. Before the liberalization, switching transactions occurred 
only when electricity consumers moved to a different region. The integrated energy firms 
exchanged information on the consumers bilaterally. These transactions have thus always been 
governed by a hybrid form, but a governance transformation from the bilateral to the trilateral 
form occurred. In the current governance structure for the switching transactions, the third 
party, EDSN, facilitates the exchange of switching information between the retailers. With 
transaction cost economics, the emergence of the trilateral form is difficult to explain with an 
increase in the frequency of the transactions (see figure 2.2 in chapter two). When considering 
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the economic actors that are involved in the multilateral adaption and that have to take the 
system requirements into account, the emergence of the trilateral form can be understood.   
 
6.8.5 The role of regulation 
The role of regulation, in terms of the ex ante rules of the game, is more limited when 
compared to the previous transactions. The 1998 electricity law obliges the system operators to 
execute the switch, and the information code describes the responsibilities of the various 
parties in the switching process. Articles 31 to 34 of the 1998 law also describe how the rules 
for the exchange of measurement data have to be formulated, and which economic actors have 
to be involved in the formulation of these rules. The economic actors must include the system 
operators, representative organizations of the parties in the electricity industry, and the 
regulator. Regulation is part of the governance structure; it monitors the quality of the 
exchange of information on the switching consumer, and it has given the system operators a 
binding instruction.    
 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
When considering all these governance transformations, it must be concluded that regulation 
still plays a large role in this Dutch electricity industry that policymakers, at the European and 
national levels, have aimed to liberalize. Regulation sets the ex ante rules of the game for the 
governance structures, it becomes part of the new forms of governance, it influences the 
attributes of the transactions, and it has guided the adaptation process to the new forms of 
governance. It has been illustrated that for several transactions, TCE has not been able to 
explain the emergence of the particular form of governance. Only when looking at the process 
of adaptation can the transformations to the governance structures be understood.   
Before the liberalization of the Dutch electricity industry, the network connection transactions 
between the generators of electricity and the transmission system operator were vertically 
integrated. The rules on vertical unbundling have, however, created a misalignment between 
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these transactions and their governance. The transacting parties were led to search for another 
governance structure for transactions that were still characterized by behavioral uncertainty and 
asset-specificity, and for which the hierarchy is thus considered to be an efficient structure. The 
regulator has further stimulated this misalignment through its influence on the attributes of the 
transactions. It encourages the network users to make site-specific investments through its 
regulation of the network connection tariffs. These tariffs increase when plants are located 
farther away from the network. The new structure that has emerged is a long-term connection 
contract that is governed by regulation. The regulator enforces the individual network 
connection contracts, and resolves the disputes between the contracting parties. The adaptation 
process is able to explain the emergence of this hybrid form of governance: the economic 
actors have adapted multilaterally, and took the requirements of the electric system into 
account, and searched for a contracting party with an identity that was highly relevant. This 
contracting party had to be able to provide a connection to the electricity network. The 
difference with transaction cost economics is that in this case the analysis has also focused on 
the regulation of an unbundled connection transaction between firms as compared to the 
regulation of the vertically integrated utility that is providing a bundled service to consumers.  
The rules on vertical unbundling have also created a misalignment for the transactions that 
exchange the transportation programs to access the network, and for those transactions that 
exchange the energy programs to balance electricity supply and demand. But for these 
transactions, the regulators have ex ante aligned the incentives of the system operators and the 
network users, and thereby they have removed the behavioral uncertainty in the transactions. 
Transaction cost economics argues that there is no need for a governance structure when 
behavioral uncertainty is absent. However, hybrid forms of governance did emerge for these 
network access and balancing transactions. The regulator has become part of these governance 
structures; it monitors the implementation of the contractual agreements and resolves the 
disputes. In contrast to TCE, the adaptation process is able to explain these governance 
transformations to a hybrid form. The regulator has determined that the adaptations should take 
place multilaterally, and that the economic actors should take the requirements of the system 
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into account when adapting to the new forms.  
The transactions for the supply of reserve power to the transmission system operator used to be 
internalized in the SEP. In the unbundled environment, the regulator and the transmission 
system operator tried to set up a market form of governance for these transactions, in which 
they wanted to rely solely on a bidding mechanism and on voluntary tenders. The generators 
were, however, not willing to contract with the system operator for the supply of reserve 
power, and the regulator had to oblige these contracts. The adaptation process did not predict a 
transformation to the market, but instead the emergence of a hybrid form of governance. The 
economic actors adapted multilaterally, took the system requirements into account, and 
recognized the relevance of the contracting party. A hybrid form, that combines long-term 
contracts with a bidding mechanism, did in fact emerge for these transactions. Regulation is 
also part of this governance structure; the regulator resolves the disputes. Since these 
transactions used to be aligned in a vertically integrated hierarchy, and they are still 
characterized by behavioral uncertainty and asset-specificity, the current hybrid form may be 
regarded as a second best solution.   
The regulator has increased the behavioral uncertainty in the switching transactions. By 
introducing consumer choice into the electricity industry, the contracting parties to the 
switching transactions have an incentive to obstruct the transfer of information in order to 
retain their customers. The ex ante regulations thus create a misalignment, because before the 
introduction of competition the parties to the switching transaction did not have such 
incentives. A trilateral form of governance has emerged, in which the regulator monitors 
whether the contracting parties live up to their contractual agreements, and enforces the 
agreements. The adaptation process is able to explain the transformation to this hybrid form.
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7 – The French Electricity Industry  
 
 
Since the nationalization law of 1946, the French electricity industry is characterized by an 
extensive vertical integration. The incumbent energy firm, Electricité de France (EDF), has a 
national monopoly in the transmission of electricity. It distributes electricity to more than 
ninety per cent of the French consumers, and is by far the largest generator and supplier of 
electricity in the French electricity industry. Even in the annual report of 2007, more than ten 
years after the first EC electricity directive, EDF writes that it is an integrated energy firm that 
is active in generation, transportation, distribution, supply and trade of electricity (EDF, 2007: 
12). In France, the vertically integrated structure of EDF is regarded as economically efficient. 
Neither the government, the interest groups, nor the public favors the liberalization of the 
electricity industry (Finon, 2003: 259). This is illustrated by the late transposition of the first 
European electricity directive of 1996 into French legislation in February 2000. It has been 
argued that ‘the aim of the French reformer is not to favour the development of competition per 
se, but to respect the Directive a minima’ (Finon, 2003: 260). In 2007, EDF implemented the 
requirements of the 2003 EC directive, and legally unbundled its transmission and distribution 
system operators from electricity generation and retail. These system operators are currently 
subsidiaries of EDF, and are therefore still located under EDF’s holding structure. 
The following section discusses the governance structures that characterized the French 
electricity industry before the liberalization in more detail (section 7.1). Section 7.2 introduces 
the French regulations that implement the European directives of 1996 and 2003. Section 7.3 
characterizes the French institutional organization of regulation, and thus the French public 
authorities that formulate, execute and enforce the electricity regulations, the regulatory 
responsibilities and objectives of these public authorities, and the coordination mechanisms 
that structure the relations between the authorities. Sections 7.4 until 7.7 discuss the 
governance transformations of the network connection, network access, balancing and 
switching transactions. The characteristics of each new governance structure and the 
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governance transformation are discussed, and these are explained by respectively the attributes 
of the transactions and the attributes of adaptation. The role of the new regulations in each of 
the governance transformations is analyzed.   
 
 
7.1 Governance before liberalization 
7.1.1 The vertical integration of EDF 
The nationalization law of 1946 created Electricité de France. EDF was given control over 
almost all of the generation and distribution of electricity, and over the entire transmission 
network, and the export and import of electricity.  
Several small electricity firms that generated less than twelve million kWh of electricity per 
year were excluded from nationalization, as were the Compagnie Nationale du Rhône 
(hydroelectricity), Charbonnages de France (coalmines) and SNCF (railways). These 
independent firms have always been responsible for a very small part of total electricity 
generation. The annual report of EDF of 1996, just before the liberalization of the industry, 
mentioned that EDF produced 93 per cent of electricity in France in that year. Furthermore, 
EDF owned parts of the independent electricity generators. It owned seventeen per cent of the 
Compagnie Nationale du Rhône203, and it still has a nineteen per cent share of a former 
subsidiary of Charbonnages de France204, called Société Nationale d’Electricité Thermique. 
The Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR) mandated EDF to operate and sell its hydro 
production (Finon, 2003: 262). The decree of 20 May 1955 obliged EDF to purchase and 
transport electricity of these independent generators. EDF had to offer a contract to 
autonomous producers for the purchase of their surplus electricity for a period at least equal to 
the term of the depreciation period applicable to the installations (Cross, 1996: 35). This period 
had to last for a minimum of five years (Poppe and Cauret, 1997: 202). EDF had to purchase at 
the long-term avoided cost (Audigier, 1999: 7), which is the cost that EDF had incurred if it 
                                                 
203
 The energy firm Electrabel, part of the Suez Group, bought a 49.9 percent share in the Compagnie 
Nationale du Rhône.  
204
 Charbonnages de France was closed at the end of 2007.  
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were to build the generation capacity itself. A decree in 1994 suspended EDF’s purchase 
obligation for diesel- and fossil fuel-fired production of electricity, but not for chp and 
renewables-based production.  
The low-voltage part of the electricity network is operated by the distributors under a 
concession regime. Before the 1946 nationalization law, concessions to build and operate a 
distribution line were granted either by municipalities, groups of municipalities (syndicats), 
counties (départements) or the state. Private companies that wanted to build a distribution line 
over public land needed a concession. Whenever a distribution line crossed private land only, 
no concession was necessary. In 1946, the nationalization law expropriated the private power 
firms and concessions were granted to EDF. EDF uses the distribution system and pays rentals 
to the municipalities in return. It controls around 95 per cent of the distribution of electricity 
(Laffont, 1996: 420). Some 200 small distribution firms were not nationalized. These include 
municipal utilities that did not give concessions to private firms to operate their distribution 
system, but that operated the distribution system themselves.  
The transmission system is also operated under a concession regime. The concessions are 
granted to EDF by the French state and the municipalities. Article 1 of the nationalization law 
required the nationalization of the import and export of electricity, and gave EDF a monopoly 
for these activities in the French electricity industry (Cross, 1996: 44). 
Because EDF has integrated around 93 percent of generation, 95 percent of the distribution and 
supply of electricity, and the entire transmission system for more than fifty years, many of the 
electricity transactions have been governed by vertical integration. EDF has had an almost 
complete national monopoly for these various activities in the French electricity industry. 
 
7.1.2 The governance of the electricity transactions before liberalization   
The contracting parties to the network connection and network access transactions include the 
generators, the transmission and distribution system operators, and the consumers of 
electricity. EDF has vertically integrated the network connection and network access 
transactions between the generators of electricity and the distribution and transmission system 
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operators. There were, however, some exceptions. Several independent generators of electricity 
have been excluded from the nationalization, and they were therefore not internalized within 
EDF. These firms had to develop other forms of governance, than the vertical integration, with 
EDF for the network connection and network access transactions. These forms of governance 
can be characterized as regulated long-term agreements; the decree of 1955 obliged EDF to 
purchase electricity from these independent generators and to transport the electricity along its 
network, which gave the generators access to EDF’s electricity network. EDF signed long-term 
supply agreements with Charbonnages de France and the Société Nationale d’Electricité 
Thermique, which stated that these two independent generators supplied the electricity to 
EDF205. The contractual relation between EDF and the Compagnie Nationale du Rhône came 
close to a vertical integration of CNR into EDF. Employees of EDF operated the power plants 
of CNR, and produced the hydroelectricity206. The electricity consumers have contracted for 
the supply of electricity with the distributors and suppliers of electricity for a regulated tariff, 
and thereby obtained a connection and an access to the network.  
Because EDF has a national monopoly on the transmission system and integrates the largest 
part of electricity generation, the balancing transactions have also been vertically integrated. 
The switching transactions occurred only when consumers moved to a different address. Most 
of these switching transactions were internalized within EDF, because EDF distributed 
electricity to around 95 per cent of the consumers207.  
 
The French electricity industry also has to implement the European directives on the creation 
of an internal competitive electricity market for the European Union, and thus has to move 
away from the vertically integrated monopoly that has governed the electricity transactions in 
                                                 
205
 Avis de la Commission des participations et des transferts n° 2004-AC-3 du 26 juillet 2004 relatif au 
transfert au secteur privé de la SNET par Charbonnages de France. 
206
 Présence Energie, no. 857, juin 2007, page 28.  
207
 A few exceptions existed for the consumers that lived in an area with a different incumbent distributor 
than EDF (e.g. Electricité de Strasbourg or Gaz Electricité de Grenoble), and that moved to the EDF 
region. In 1954, EDF purchased the majority of the shares of Electricité de Strasbourg. www.electricite-
strasbourg.fr/internet/promotion.nsf/wContenu/U1D10T30Q0.htm (last accessed November 16, 2008). 
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this industry for over fifty years. The following section presents the new French regulations for 
the electricity industry.  
 
 
7.2 Electricity regulations 
The EC electricity directive of 1996 has been implemented into the French electricity law of 
February 2000 on the modernization and development of the public service of electricity. This 
law has been altered by the law of August 2004 and the law of December 2006. The 2004 law, 
on the public service of electricity and gas and the electricity and gas enterprises, mainly 
addresses the independent organization of the distribution and transmission system operators. 
The 2006 law, on the energy sector, focuses on the legal independence of the distributors and 
the opening of the energy industry to competition and consumer choice. In addition to these 
electricity laws, the ministry responsible for energy policy has formulated various decrees 
(décrets) and orders (arrêtes) for the electricity industry. Decrees are formulated to give a more 
specific implementation of a law, or they can be autonomous rules without reference to a law. 
They can be general rules, or be applicable only to a particular individual. Orders are inferior 
to the decrees, and may serve to implement a law or a decree. The ministry has formulated 
decrees and orders on network connection, network access, electricity prices, and quality levels 
of the transmission and distribution services. The independent regulatory agency for the 
electricity industry, the Commission de régulation de l’energie (CRE), may also formulate 
orders. It has done so in the past on among others investments of the transmission system 
operator, balancing, and accounting unbundling. In the following sections, this regulatory 
framework for the French electricity industry will be introduced for the various activities in the 
industry: generation, transmission and distribution system operation, network connection and 
network access, balancing of electricity supply and demand, and electricity retail, consumer 
choice and switching208.  
                                                 
208
 The data used for this and the following section has been taken from official documents published by 
the relevant authorities including among others press releases and activity reports (www.cre.fr, www.rte-
france.com, www.industrie.gouv.fr/energie/sommaire, www.finances.gouv.fr/DGCCRF), electricity laws 
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7.2.1 Generation 
The EC directives of 1996 and 2003 include requirements for the construction of new 
generation capacity, but they do not refer to a regulation of existing capacity. These 
requirements on the construction of new capacity have been implemented into the French 
regulations for the electricity industry. The French minister responsible for energy policy 
formulates a multi-year plan for investments in generation capacity (la programmation 
pluriannuelle des investissements de production) that includes objectives on where the capacity 
should be built, and on the type of technologies and primary energy sources that should be 
used to produce the electricity. This multi-year plan has to allow for the generation of 
electricity with new technologies, decentralized plants and cogeneration. It also has to take into 
account the long-term projections, made by the transmission system operator, on the future 
demand for electricity, and on the capacity of the distribution and transmission system. To 
make these projections the transmission system operator has access to all the necessary 
information of the distribution system operators, the generators, retailers and consumers of 
electricity.  
New generation capacity is built through an authorization procedure and through a tendering 
procedure209. The minister responsible for energy policy must authorize the energy firms to 
build generation capacity. When the generation capacity that is being built under the 
authorization procedure is not sufficient, given the objectives of the multi-year investment 
plan, the minister can write a call for tenders. This call will include several requirements for 
the capacity to be built, including the region where the plant should be constructed, and various 
technical and economic characteristics of the plant. EDF and the non-nationalized distributors 
                                                                                                                                 
(loi no 2000-108 du 10 février 2000 relative à la modernisation et au développement du service public de 
l’électricité, loi no 2003-8 du 3 janvier 2003 relative aux marchés du gaz et de l’électricité et au service 
public de l’énergie, loi no 2004-803 du 9 août 2004 relative au service public de l’électricité et du gaz et 
aux entreprises électriques et gazières, loi n° 2006-1537 du 7 décembre 2006 relative au secteur de 
l'énergie), OECD reports on French competition and regulatory policies (Daffe/Comp(99)8, 
Daffe/Comp(2004)7), International Energy Agency (2000) Energy Policies of IEA Countries – France 
2000 Review, and interviews with the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry and the Commission 
de régulation de l’énergie. 
209
 The articles 6 through 11 of the law of February 2000 specify these requirements for electricity 
generation. 
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are obliged to purchase the electricity produced by the energy firm that has responded to the 
call for tender. They also have a purchase obligation for electricity that is produced with 
renewable energy sources.  
The incumbent, independent generators, such as CNR and SNET, were always obliged to sell 
their surplus electricity to EDF or to the non-nationalized distributors. This obligation does not 
exist anymore since the implementation of the electricity law of 2000. This law of February 
2000 has introduced the possibility for other generators to enter the French electricity industry, 
and thus to compete with EDF and the smaller incumbent generators of electricity. The Belgian 
energy firm Electrabel and the Spanish energy firm Endesa have entered the French electricity 
industry. 
 
7.2.2 Transmission and distribution 
The transmission system of the French electricity network is the high-voltage part of the 
network that is equal to and above 50 kV210. The distribution system is the low-voltage part of 
the network, and thus below 50 kV. The réseau de transport d’electricité (RTE), also referred 
to as RTE EDF Transport, is the French transmission system operator. It has a national 
monopoly for the operation of the transmission system. The distribution system is operated by 
Electricité de France and by the non-nationalized distributors211, each within their regional 
monopolies.     
 
7.2.2.1 Responsibilities of the transmission and distribution system operators 
RTE EDF Transport is responsible for the operation, maintenance, and development of the 
transmission system, in order to allow for the connection of the distribution system, the 
electricity generators and the consumers to the transmission system. It has to provide a non-
discriminatory access to its network. Within their regional monopolies, the distribution system 
operators have the same responsibilities as RTE EDF Transport, but for their low-voltage part 
                                                 
210
 Article 12 of the law of February 2000. 
211
 Article 18 of the law of February 2000. 
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of the network. The distribution system operators also have a responsibility to provide a 
transparent and non-discriminatory access to their network. They have to perform metering 
activities for the network users, such as the supply and maintenance of the metering equipment 
and the management of the metering data212.  In addition, the transmission and distribution 
system operators have to ensure the balance between electricity supply and demand on their 
respective parts of the network for every second of the day213. The tariffs that the system 
operators receive for operating the network, and for providing a connection and an access to 
the network are regulated, and are set by the ministries of energy and of economy. A decree 
determines the quality levels that the transmission and distribution system operators have to 
achieve214. 

7.2.2.2 Independence of the transmission and distribution system operators 
The law of August 2004 states that the transmission system should be managed by an 
organization that is different from the organizations that manage the activities of electricity 
generation and retail215. The transmission system operator should develop, maintain and 
operate the transmission network in a way that is independent from the interests of the 
activities of electricity generation and retail that are undertaken by the organizations that are 
located under the same holding. In addition, the managing directors of the transmission system 
operator may not have any responsibilities for the activities of electricity generation and 
retail216. The minister of energy appoints the director of the transmission system operator after 
an advice by the independent regulatory agency for the electricity industry (CRE)217. This 
director of RTE cannot sit on the board of directors of EDF, and accounts for the system 
operators’ activities to the regulatory agency. The employees of RTE report only to the director 
of RTE. The transmission system operator has its own budget and publishes accounts that are 
                                                 
212
 Article 13 of the law of August 2004.  
213
 Articles 14, 18 and 19 of the law of February 2000. 
214
 Article 21 of the law of February 2000. 
215
 Article 5 of the law of August 2004. 
216
 Article 6 of the law of August 2004. 
217
 www.industry.gouv.fr (last accessed September 28, 2008), article 7 of the law of August 2004.   
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separate from those of the holding, and that report only on the transmission activities218. Article 
9 of the law of August 2004 states that EDF has to transfer all of its assets, obligations and 
contracts that belong to the operation of the transmission system to RTE. The contracts or 
specific clauses in the contracts may not be changed while they are being transferred to RTE. 
This transfer occurred on the first of January 2005219. In addition, article 10 states that parts of 
the transmission system that at the time of the publication of the law do not belong to EDF, and 
parts of the distribution system with a voltage level that is equal to or higher than 50 kV, must 
also be transferred to RTE. The transmission system operator thus obtains every part of the 
network in the French electricity industry with a voltage level of 50 kV and higher, and a clear 
separation between the distribution and transmission system results. As of the first of January 
of 2005, the transmission system operator is a separate subsidiary within the larger holding 
structure of EDF, and operates under the name of RTE EDF Transport (EDF, 2007: 21). 
The law of December 2006 has obliged the legal unbundling of the distribution system 
operators. The distribution system operators that transport electricity to more than 100,000 
clients have to be separated in terms of their legal form from those organizations that generate 
and/or retail electricity220. The legal separation of the distribution system operators involves the 
transfer of the assets, rights and obligations that relate to the activity of distributing electricity 
to these operators. This transfer should not lead to the modification of contracts or clauses in 
these contracts. Before the legal separation, the relations between the distribution system 
operators and the other activities within EDF were formalized into protocols. Once the 
distribution system operators were legally unbundled, these protocols got contractual value221. 
EDF has implemented this law of 2006 through the creation of a subsidiary referred to as 
Electricité Réseau Distribution France (ERDF). On the 31st of December 2007, the distribution 
activities of EDF were transferred to this subsidiary that is located under the EDF holding 
                                                 
218
 www.industry.gouv.fr (last accessed September 28, 2008). 
219
 www.rte-france.com/htm/fr/mediatheque/telecharge/Base_Prospectus_2006.pdf (last accessed January 
22, 2009). 
220
 Article 13 of the law of August 2004, which has been modified by article 23 of the law of December 
2006. 
221
 Article 14 of the law of August 2004. 
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(EDF, 2007: 37). The distribution system operators may not have any responsibilities for 
electricity generation or retail. They have to develop the distribution network in a way that is 
independent from the interests of the electricity generation and retail activities. The majority of 
the members of the board of directors or of the supervisory board of the distribution system 
operators are elected by parliament. This board may exert a control over the budget, financing, 
and investments of the distribution system operator. The French state should hold the majority 
of the distribution system operator’s capital222.  
 
7.2.3 Network connection and network access 
The large generators and consumers of electricity, and the distribution system operators need a 
connection and an access to the high-voltage grid. These network users have to engage in a 
contractual relation with the transmission system operator. The decentralized electricity 
generators and the consumers of smaller amounts of electricity need a connection to the 
distribution grid. The installations that connect these network users to the electricity network 
have to meet several technical requirements. The electricity law of February 2000 states that 
these technical requirements are determined by decree. The regulated tariff for the use of the 
network, paid by every network user, covers a part of the costs of connecting the generators, 
consumers and distributors to the network. The remainder of these costs is paid for by either 
the system operators, or by the generators and consumers that are requesting a connection. 
Generators of electricity may also choose another firm to connect them to the network, but 
only when the system operator223 has agreed to this, and when this other firm takes into 
account the various requirements for the connection installations.  
The distribution and transmission system operators have to guarantee a right of access to the 
electricity network. The law of August 2004 states that the transmission system operator and 
the distribution system operators have to formulate, in a code of good conduct, the measures 
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 Article 15 of the law of August 2004. 
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 The law of February 2000 does not directly refer to a distribution system operator but to a ‘maître 
d'ouvrage’, which is usually a system operator, but can also be a ‘collectivité territoriale, un établissement 
public de coopération intercommunale ou un syndicat mixte’ (article 4).  
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that the operators take to ensure a non-discriminatory access for third parties to the network. 
The independent regulator for the electricity industry monitors the implementation of these 
codes of good conduct, and each year it publishes a report on these monitors224 (CRE, 2007: 2). 
Network access contracts have to be signed between the network users and the system 
operators that stipulate the conditions under which an access to the network is provided and the 
network can be used. The distribution system operators also have to sign a network access 
contract with electricity retailers that supply electricity to eligible consumers. The electricity 
consumers do not need to sign a separate network access contract with the distribution system 
operator, when their electricity retailer has such a contract225. 
 
7.2.4 Balancing of electricity supply and demand 
The network users formulate two types of programs on a daily basis: the ‘programmes d’appel’ 
and the ‘programmes d’approvisionnement’226. The electricity generators and the energy firms 
that import electricity formulate ‘programmes d’appel’. These programs specify the amount of 
electricity that these network users expect to supply to the network on the next day, and the 
propositions for adjustments to these programs. The authorities that organize the public 
distribution of electricity227 and the electricity retailers formulate ‘programmes 
d’approvisionnement’, which indicate the amount of electricity that they expect to supply, and 
be supplied to them on the next day. These programs are sent to the transmission system 
operator, who makes sure that they match its expectations of the national electricity 
consumption on the next day. These programs are a necessity for the network users to access 
the network, and for the transmission system operator to balance electricity supply and demand 
and to resolve the restrictions on the transportation of electricity. The transmission system 
operator may change the ‘programmes d’appel’, when they do not respect the rules on the 
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 Article 6 of the law of August 2004. 
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 Article 23 of the law of February 2000. 
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 Article 15 of the law of February 2000. 
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 These are authorities that supply electricity to consumers that benefit from regulated tariffs or from 
special tariffs (for consumers that are not able to pay the regulated tariffs or the prices of electricity), as is 
defined in article 2 of the law of February 2000.  
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connection of the French network to other national transmission systems228. 
The transmission system operator has to ensure the availability and the use of reserve capacity 
in order to allow for the functioning of the electric system. The operator negotiates with 
electricity generators and retailers for the supply of reserve capacity, following competitive, 
non-discriminatory and transparent procedures. For the short term, the operator may call upon 
the network users to adjust their programmes d’appel. The costs for this reserve capacity that is 
needed to balance supply and demand are divided among the network users and the balancing 
responsible parties (firms that take over the responsibility to balance the input and offtake of 
electricity from the network for other network users). All the electricity that is not used, but 
that is technically available in the generating plants that are connected to the network, should 
be made available to the transmission system operator through the balancing mechanism.   
The generators and consumers of electricity, which are connected to the distribution or to the 
transmission system, are responsible for the difference between the amount of electricity that 
they put on and take out of the network. The programs that these network users transfer to the 
system operators are always balanced, which means that the expected generation of electricity 
is equal to the expected consumption of electricity. The transmission system operator may ask 
those network users that are responsible for creating a difference between their actual 
production and consumption on the one hand and their submitted programs on the other hand 
to pay for these imbalances, and thus for the costs of adjustments by the system operator. The 
network users can choose how they want to pay for these differences, through a contract with 
the transmission system operator or with a balancing responsible firm, or they can ask an 
electricity retailer to contract with a balancing responsible firm for them. 
 
7.2.5. Retail, customer choice and switching 
Since the first of July of 2007, every consumer in the French electricity industry is eligible, and 
may thus choose its own electricity retailer. The consumers may switch from EDF to another 
energy firm. In the third quarter of 2008, close to 212,000 consumers switched to another 
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 Article 15 of the law of February 2000.  
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retailer (CRE, 2008b: 16). The electricity retailers and the non-nationalized distributors are 
also regarded as eligible clients. The electricity retailers are recognized as eligible for the 
electricity that they buy for resale to final consumers. The distributors are eligible for the 
supply of electricity to eligible consumers only in the area of their regional monopolies, and for 
the loss of electricity on their own networks229. The French electricity consumers may still 
choose to be supplied for a regulated tariff (le tarif réglementé transitoire d'ajustement du 
marché) until July 2010.  
 
 
7.3 Regulatory institutional organization 
The regulatory institutional organization for the French electricity industry characterizes the 
public authorities that formulate, execute and enforce the regulations for this industry, the 
allocation of regulatory responsibilities and powers among these authorities, the coordination 
mechanisms that structure the authorities’ mutual relations, and the objectives of the public 
authorities. 
 
7.3.1 Public authorities 
In June 2007, a new French ministry was created that is responsible for formulating policy on 
ecology, energy and sustainable development. It is referred to as the Ministère de l'écologie, de 
l'énergie, du développement durable et de l'aménagement du territoire (MEEDDAT). One of 
the departments within this ministry is the department of energy (direction de l'énergie), which 
formulates and implements energy and electricity policy. This department supervises the 
proper implementation of the missions for the public services of energy and electricity. It aims 
to ensure the security of supply of energy in France, and the proper functioning of the energy 
markets. It is also competent to address statutory problems with the electricity and gas 
enterprises230. This department is comprised of several divisions, including one for the energy 
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 Article 22 of the law of February 2000. 
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 Décret n° 2008-680 du 9 juillet 2008 portant organisation de l'administration centrale du ministère de 
l'écologie, de l'énergie, du développement durable et de l'aménagement du territoire. 
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market and one for the electric system. The division for the energy market formulates and 
implements the tariffs for the electricity industry, the policies for electricity retail, and it 
monitors the electricity prices. The division that is responsible for the electric system develops 
and implements the policies on the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. It 
negotiates the contracts between the French state and EDF on the public services, and it 
monitors the implementation of these contracts231. These public services that EDF has to 
provide to the energy consumers include the safety of its generating plants and the network, the 
protection of the environment, the balance between electricity supply and demand at the 
national and regional levels, and the quality of electricity. In the public service contract of 
2005, it is mentioned that EDF provides an indispensable contribution to the objectives of 
French energy policy, such as the French energy independence, the conservation of the 
environment, the security of supply, and the social cohesion232. This last objective includes aid 
to families that have difficulties with paying their energy bills.  
The department of energy within the ministry shares the responsibility for implementing 
electricity legislation with the Commission de régulation de l’energie (CRE). The CRE was 
created in March 2000 as an independent regulatory agency for the electricity and gas 
industries.  
In May 2007, the French ministry of economic affairs, finance and industry233 was split into 
two separate ministries: the Ministère de l’économie, de l’industrie et de l’emploi (MINEIE) 
and the Ministère du budget, des comptes publics et de la fonction publique. One of the 
departments that is located within this first ministry, is the Direction générale de la 
concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF 
prepares and implements competition legislation. It shares this responsibility with the French 
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 Arrêté du 9 juillet 2008 portant organisation de l'administration centrale du ministère de l'écologie, de 
l'énergie, du développement durable et de l'aménagement du territoire. 
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 service-public.edf.com/accueil-com-fr/edf-service-public-101001.html (last accessed November 16, 
2008). 
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 This ministry of economic affairs, finance and industry (MINEFI), which ceased to exist in May 2007, 
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competition authority: the Conseil de la concurrence. The competition authority was created 
by the ‘ordonnance’ of the 1st of December 1986, which transferred decision-making powers 
on anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and economic dependence from 
the minister to the competition authority. The minister retains responsibility for merger control. 
The Conseil de la concurrence has the status of an independent administrative authority.  
There are two judicial orders in France. ‘The administrative order has jurisdiction over 
decisions taken by the government and the judicial order deals with litigation between private 
individuals. Competition law is part of the judicial order, decrees, which are issued by the 
government, fall under the administrative order’ (Audigier, 1999: 5). The Conseil d’etat 
(council of state) heads the administrative jurisdiction, while appeals from decisions by the 
Conseil de la concurrence and the CRE are taken by the court of appeal of Paris.   
 
7.3.2 Regulatory responsibilities and powers 
There exists no clear division of regulatory powers among the ministries and the CRE, in 
which for example, the ministries formulate the rules and the independent agency executes the 
rules. In fact, the CRE formulates, implements and enforces regulations, and settles disputes 
between the parties in the electricity industry. The distinction between the public authorities is 
mainly related to the area of regulation for which they exert their regulatory powers. The 
responsibilities of the CRE include regulating the connection and access to the network, the 
balancing of electricity supply and demand, and the unbundling of accounts. The ministries 
retain the regulatory responsibilities for investments in generation and transmission capacity, 
and decide on the legal form of the transmission system operator, appoint the director of the 
transmission system operator, and set the network access and end-user tariffs. The Conseil de 
la concurrence has an advisory role with respect to these regulatory responsibilities.  
 
7.3.2.1 Formulating rules 
The CRE has the responsibility for making regulatory decisions on connection and access to 
and usage of the electricity network. It aims for transparent and non-discriminatory network 
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access rules. In cooperation with the transmission system operator (RTE), the CRE formulates 
the contract for access to the transmission network. Each contract that is signed between a 
network user and RTE is send to the CRE. The ministers of energy and economy set the 
network access tariffs and the evolution of these tariffs, after a proposal by the CRE. The 
ministers usually follow the proposals of the CRE, but are not obliged to do so. The first 
proposal on network access tariffs of the CRE was not rejected, but it had to be reformulated. 
When a proposal of the CRE is not followed, the ministers cannot determine the tariff. The 
CRE has to formulate a new proposal. 
The CRE determines the accounting unbundling principles234. It exercises this power in co-
operation with the Conseil de la concurrence, who gives its opinion prior to putting any new 
principles of accountancy into application, and which may be referred to by the president of the 
CRE at any time. The government has the sole responsibility for determining the legal form of 
the transmission system operator. In January 2005, RTE was changed from an integrated 
department within EDF with accounting and management independence to a separate legal 
entity in the form of a subsidiary within EDF. The CRE takes the regulatory decisions on the 
missions of the system operators. 
The CRE determines the presentation of the balancing programs (the programmes d’appel and 
the programmes d’approvisionnement), the proposals for adjustments to these programs, and 
the criteria for the transmission system operator on the basis of which the operator chooses 
between these proposals for adjustments. The CRE also determines the methods for calculating 
the difference between the actual production and consumption of electricity on the one hand 
and the submitted programs on the other hand, as well as the methods for financial 
compensation for these imbalances.  
In article 22 of the law of 2000, which was modified by article 2 of the law of 2006, the then 
minister of economy, finances and industry prescribed that every consumer is eligible, and may 
thus choose his own electricity retailer. Various decrees that have been formulated by the 
Minister of economy, finances and industry, have stipulated which consumers are eligible at 
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which date. For example, the decree of 2000235 refers to those consumers that consume more 
than 16 GWh, and the decree of 2004236 refers to all non-residential consumers.  
 
7.3.2.2 Executing rules  
The CRE and the Ministry of ecology, energy and sustainable development execute the 
electricity regulations through their involvement in the planning for new generating capacity, 
the approval of investments in transmission capacity, and the appointment of the director of the 
transmission system operator among others. The ministry formulates a long-term investment 
plan for electricity generation (programmation pluriannuelle des investissements de production 
d’électricité (PPI)). New electricity generating plants can be build through an authorization 
procedure or through tender offers. The minister authorizes energy firms to construct new 
generating capacity, and he can deny permits in case of overcapacity. The minister will launch 
tender offers if insufficient capacity of a particular technology is being built. The CRE has to 
implement the tenders for the construction of new generating capacity. It issues a call for 
tenders, draws up the specifications, opens the tenders and makes a recommendation on the 
candidates. The minister selects the firm that wins the tender. The CRE organizes these tender 
offers for renewable sources of energy, like wind power and biomass, which is only a small 
part of total electricity generation. 
RTE develops an annual investment program for the electricity transmission network, which 
needs to be approved by the CRE. In addition, RTE formulates a multi-year network 
development plan, which requires the approval of the minister. The CRE gives its opinion on 
the multi-year plan. The minister appoints the director of RTE. He chooses among three 
candidates that are proposed by EDF.  
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 Décret n°2000-456 du 29 mai 2000 relatif à l'éligibilité des consommateurs d'électricité et portant 
application de l'article 22 de la loi n° 2000-108 du 10 février 2000 relative à la modernisation et au 
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 Décret n°2004-597 du 23 juin 2004 relatif à l'éligibilité des consommateurs d'électricité et modifiant le 
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7.3.2.3 Enforcing rules  
The CRE has to ensure that the energy firms act in accordance with the accounting unbundling 
criteria, in order to avoid cross-subsidies and an abuse of dominant position. It has the right to 
monitor the firms, and it can use its sanctioning powers in the case that the criteria are not met. 
The CRE can use two types of penalties when energy firms violate a regulation on the 
principles of accounting unbundling: a prohibition on accessing the electricity network for at 
most a year, and a financial penalty with a maximum of five percent of the energy firm’s 
revenues. These penalties may also be used when energy firms do not comply with the 
regulations on making their accounts available, and on access and use of the electricity 
network.  
The minister of energy may also impose a financial penalty on a network user, and he may 
demand that an installation of a network user is temporarily put out of service. The minister 
may impose these sanctions when a network user does not pay the public service charges, or 
when the user does not abide by regulations on the generation of electricity, the eligibility of 
consumers, the supply of last resort, the activity of purchasing electricity for resale to 
consumers, and the obligation of the supply of information237.  The minister may also prohibit 
a retailer to purchase electricity for resale to consumers, when this retailer has not paid for an 
access to the network or for the imbalances on the network that were created by the electricity 
retailer238.   
The CRE and the minister of energy have a right of access to all the information of the system 
operators and energy firms that the authorities need for the execution of their tasks that are 
attributed to them in the electricity law, and thus also for enforcing the rules.       
 
7.3.2.4 Dispute resolution 
Whenever a system operator refuses to sign a network access contract with a potential network 
user, the CRE has to receive a notification of this refusal. The CRE has the power to settle 
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disputes between (potential) network users and the transmission and distribution system 
operators in the event of such a refusal, and when there is a disagreement on the performance 
or interpretation of the contract or on the use of the network. Whenever the CRE observes a 
threat to the security of the electric system due to such a dispute, it has the right to request the 
minister in charge of energy to take restraining measures. When the parties to the dispute do 
not comply with the regulatory agency’s decision on the settlement of the dispute, the CRE can 
use the two types of penalties (the ban on accessing the network and the financial penalty). The 
Paris Appeal Court has the power to set aside or overturn decisions on the settlement of 
disputes that are pronounced by the sector-specific regulator. Within CRE a separate 
committee settles the disputes between network users and system operators. The members of 
this committee cannot be members of the commission of the CRE239.  
 
7.3.3 Regulatory coordination mechanisms 
7.3.3.1 CRE – Conseil de la Concurrence 
The CRE has the right to monitor firms within the electricity industry. If the CRE encounters a 
possible situation of economic dependence, abuse of dominant position or a restrictive 
agreement, it notifies the Conseil de la concurrence. The CRE has no concurrent powers under 
the ‘Code de Commerce’ (competition legislation). The Conseil de la concurrence refers 
disputes in the energy sector to the CRE whenever these disputes do not violate competition 
legislation. ‘In order to ensure the consistency of decisions made by the competition authorities 
and the sectoral regulators, the same Court of Appeal is used’ (Bureau and Curien, 2001: 146). 
The relationship between the CRE and the competition authority is mainly characterized as one 
of giving each other advice. For example, the Conseil de la concurrence has to give its opinion 
to the CRE on new principles of accountancy. In an interview with the CRE it was mentioned 
that: ‘the Conseil de la concurrence has to give its opinion to the CRE, but in fact, before, we 
work together. We were never surprised by their opinion. It was only on general principles of 
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accountancy and not for slight modifications’. ‘On the general principles we always agree’240. 
Their relationship is thus characterized as an informal, cooperative one.   
 
7.3.3.2 CRE – Ministry 
The CRE makes recommendations to the minister of energy on the amount of funds that it 
requires, but it is the minister that decides on the commission’s budget. A member of the 
commission stated that the independence of the CRE has nothing to gain, but that the setting of 
the budget by the government is certainly a limitation241. In an interview with the CRE it was 
said that: ‘the fact that our budget is given to us by the government is not completely 
satisfactory. It would be better if we were funded by the contributions of the gas and electricity 
consumers. It will give us more independence from the government’242. The CRE is made up 
of seven members as of March 31, 2004. The appointment of the members of the commission 
does not give a large influence to the ministry of energy over the commission, as the various 
members are appointed by different organizations. Two members (including the chairman) are 
appointed by decree by the President, two members by the President of the Parliament, two 
members by the President of the Senate and one member by the President of the Social and 
Economic Council. The security of tenure of the members of the commission is protected to a 
certain extent. ‘The Commission members cannot be removed from office, except in the event 
of resignation as a matter of course. This may only occur when there has been a breach of very 
strict rules relating to conflicts of interest, and is noted by the minister for energy after 
recommendation from the Commission’243. The ministry cannot give any individual 
instructions to members of the commission. Article 35 of the law of February 2000 prohibits 
any orders to be given by the government or any third parties to the CRE. 
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7.3.4 Regulatory objectives 
A regulatory objective of the Commission de régulation de l’énergie is the proper functioning 
of the markets for electricity and gas, which should benefit the final consumers of these two 
commodities. In particular, the commission aims for conditions on access to the distribution 
and transmission system that do not interfere with the development of competition in the 
French electricity industry244.  
The objectives of the Ministry of energy (MEEDDAT) can be summarized by looking at the 
aims of French energy policy. This policy does not only aim for the proper functioning of the 
French energy markets, but also for an energy independence, a security of supply, a social 
cohesion, and a conservation of the environment245.  
The Conseil de la concurrence has the objective of ensuring the functioning of competition in 
French markets. Consumers must have access to a large variety of goods and services at 
competitive prices that are the result of a free market246. The difference between the objectives 
of the CRE and the Conseil de la concurrence is that the sector-specific regulator has to 
stimulate the development of a market and competition in an industry that consisted until 
recently of a national monopoly and a large involvement of the government in the operation of 
the monopoly, whereas the Conseil de la concurrence must ensure that economic actors do not 
harm the competition in markets that are already in place.  
 
The two previous sections (7.2 and 7.3) have presented the regulations and the regulatory 
institutions in the French electricity industry. The regulations on the legal unbundling of the 
transmission and distribution system operators, and the introduction of consumer choice are 
changing the governance structures in the French electricity industry. These governance 
transformations from the vertically integrated monopoly to new forms of governance will be 
discussed in the following sections (7.4 until 7.7) for the four types of electricity transactions: 
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the network connection transactions, the network access transactions, the balancing 
transactions, and the switching transactions. The governance transformations and the new 
forms of governance will be explained by respectively the attributes of adaptation and the 
attributes of the transactions. These sections will also illustrate the influence of regulation and 
the public authorities on the attributes of the transactions, their role in the adaptation processes, 
and their effect on the new forms of governance. The following section (7.4) will start with an 
analysis of the governance transformation of the network connection transactions.       
 
 
7.4 Network connection transactions  
The network connection transactions have been defined, in chapter five, as consisting of 
connecting the generating plants and the equipment of electricity consumers to the electricity 
network, connecting the distribution network to the transmission network, and of maintaining 
these connections. The contracting parties to these transactions include the system operators, 
and the generators and consumers of electricity. The large generators and consumers of 
electricity engage in a contractual relation for a connection to the electricity network with the 
transmission system operator, while the smaller generators and consumers contract with the 
distribution system operators. The electricity retailers may also engage in a contractual relation 
with the system operators on behalf of the consumers. Three contractual agreements need to be 
signed between a system operator and a potential network user (a generator or a consumer) 
before the user can be connected to the electricity network. These include a connection 
agreement (convention de raccordement), an operating agreement (convention d’exploitation), 
and a network access contract.  
The connection agreement specifies the technical requirements that the system operators and 
network users have to meet before a connection can be put into service. These requirements 
include those for the installations of the generators and consumers, the changes to the network, 
the protection of the connection, and for the equipment that measures the electricity use and the 
quality of electricity. The connection agreement also describes which part of the connection the 
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network user owns, which part belongs to the system operator247, and how much the network 
user has to pay the system operator for the connection. After the connection agreement has 
been signed, the construction of the connection can start. The connection is only put into 
service when the operating agreement and the network access contract have been signed.  
The operating agreement specifies the rules for the relation between the network users and the 
system operators that must ensure a coherent operation of the connected installations with the 
electricity network and its connections248. This agreement is a supplement to the network 
access contract. In this section, the focus is on the connection agreement. The other two 
agreements are necessary for putting the connection into operation, but describe the rules on 
the use of the network for the network users and the system operators. They are thus only 
relevant when the connections have already been constructed. These agreements will be 
referred to in section 7.5 on the network access transactions.  
 
7.4.1 The attributes of the transaction 
The network connection transactions are characterized by an occasional frequency. When a 
generator or a consumer signs a network connection contract with a distribution system 
operator or with the transmission system operator, the activity of connecting the generator or 
the consumer to the network occurs only once. The network users may change the capacity that 
they subtract from (or supply to) the network, and the capacity at which they are connected to 
the network. When altering these capacities, the network users may retain the same network 
connection contract, and the changes to these capacities are formulated in a supplement to the 
network connection contract. Because the network connection transactions include these 
capacity changes, the frequency of these transactions is characterized as occasional249.  
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The network connection transactions are characterized by site-specificity. A part of the costs 
for connecting users to the electricity network is covered by the tariffs for using the network. 
The rest of the connection costs has to be paid for by either the system operator or the network 
user. When the costs are incurred for the reinforcement of the network, the system operator 
pays, but when they are incurred for the connection of a network user, the user pays for these 
costs. The general principles for calculating the contribution of the network users are 
determined by the ministries of economic affairs and of energy, after an advice by the CRE250. 
The contribution of the network user for a connection to the distribution network increases 
with an increase in the length of the electricity lines251. The costs for connecting the large 
generating plants to the transmission network also increase when the distance from the plants 
to the network increases252. The French ministries thus create the site-specificity for these 
connection transactions; for electricity generators and consumers it is cheaper to locate their 
installation and equipment close to the network.  
The investments of the network users in the connection to the electricity network are also 
characterized by a physical asset specificity and by dedicated assets. The investments are only 
made for connecting installations and equipment to the electricity network, and when these 
connection assets are put to a different use they hardly have any economic value. The 
generators and consumers dedicate these investments to one contracting party: the system 
operator.  
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As will be illustrated here by several examples of CRE’s dispute resolutions, the system 
operators have displayed opportunistic behavior with respect to connecting users to the 
electricity network. They have disguised information that should have been made available to 
the network users. The incentives between the two contracting parties (the network users and 
the system operators) have not been aligned: the system operators have a monopoly for their 
network and for providing connections to their network, and therefore they have an incentive to 
set high prices and unreasonable conditions at the expense of the network users. The 
connection transactions are therefore characterized by behavioral uncertainty. A first example 
of a dispute resolution concerns the energy firm, SITOM, which has requested EDF for 
information on a possible connection of its generating plants to the electricity network. This 
energy firm also consumes part of the electricity that it produces, and it is therefore unclear at 
which capacity the plants should be connected to the network. EDF has been unwilling to 
provide the energy firm with information on its connection. If the energy firm had to be 
connected to the high-voltage part of the network, EDF would have expenses for investigating 
the possibilities for this connection, but would not earn an income on the construction of the 
connection and on the distribution of electricity to this user. CRE ruled that EDF has not 
abided by the regulations and should have provided the energy firm with information on the 
possibilities for its connection253. In another dispute, CRE ruled that EDF did not provide the 
network user with transparent information on why the connection charges were raised from 
21,300 euro to more than 300,000 euro, and what costs were included in this last amount254. A 
third example of a dispute resolution concerns EDF’s refusal to investigate the possibility of 
connecting the Société Pouchon Cogen to the existing distribution network. EDF has instead 
proposed to build a new distribution line, and thereby increasing the connection costs and time 
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for the energy firm. CRE concluded that by not investigating the possibility of connecting the 
firm to the existing distribution network, EDF has not abided by the decree of March 2003. In 
addition, EDF has not provided sufficiently transparent information to justify its conclusion 
that, due to constraints of voltage levels, a new electricity line needs to be build for connecting 
the energy firm. It has not demonstrated that this solution is the one with the least costs, and it 
has delayed the connection of the production plants of this energy firm by at least eight 
months. CRE ruled that if, after a sufficient investigation of the different technical possibilities, 
the conclusion is that a new electricity line needs to be built, the costs for reinforcing the 
network should be paid by EDF255. EDF has thus not provided sufficient information, and the 
information that was provided was not transparent, and EDF has aimed to increase the costs for 
the energy firm that according to CRE’s ruling should be paid by EDF.  
 
7.4.2 Misalignment 
The network connection transactions between the electricity generators and the system 
operators have for more than fifty years been governed by a vertically integrated hierarchy. 
Since 1946, EDF has integrated the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. The 
network connection contracts between the consumers and the system operators have been 
governed by regulation. These governance structures of before the liberalization of the French 
electricity industry are assumed to have been efficiently aligned with the transactions. Very 
few empirical studies within transaction cost economics have analyzed the regulation as a 
governance structure between the various unbundled activities of the electricity value chain in 
a liberalized environment (see section 3.5) TCE has mainly addressed the regulation of 
contracts between consumers and utility firms, and the governance of transactions between the 
regulator and the utility firms. Since various types of asset-specificity, a behavioral uncertainty, 
and a monopoly for providing a connection to the network, characterize the network 
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connection transactions in the liberalized industry, transaction cost economics predicts that the 
vertically integrated hierarchy and regulation are still the most efficient governance structures 
for respectively the network connection transactions between the generators and the system 
operators, and between the consumers and the system operators. The new rules on the vertical 
unbundling therefore create a misalignment of the governance structures to the transactions 
between the generators and the system operators, and are thereby stimulating a process of 
adaptation to a new form of governance. 
 
7.4.3 The governance structure 
This new form of governance for the network connection transactions will be characterized 
along the attributes of incentive intensity, administrative apparatus and contract law regime.  
The incentive intensity of the system operators for the network connection transactions is 
characterized as being of an intermediate degree. An intermediate incentive intensity 
characterizes a governance structure when a part of the income to be earned cannot be 
influenced by the economic actor (see section 5.1). The system operators are limited in 
influencing their returns from connecting users to the network, because the tariffs for the use of 
the network are regulated, and the additional connection charges also have to be approved by 
the CRE256. The system operators may be able to increase their profits by reducing their costs 
of constructing and maintaining the connections. Ulset (1996) has measured incentive intensity 
by price formats257. He argues that fixed price contracts increase the incentive to reduce costs. 
When a client pays most of the suppliers’ expenses before a project is finished, the client 
carries most of the risk, thereby lowering the incentive intensity among the suppliers (Ulset, 
1996: 67). In the connection agreement, the network users and system operators have agreed 
on a price for the connection, and therefore the agreement increases the incentive of the system 
operators to reduce costs. In addition, the network users pay only up until forty per cent of total 
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costs before the construction is finished. A quarter of this forty per cent is paid when the 
network user has signed the proposal of the system operator for the technical and financial 
conditions of the connection, and the rest of this forty per cent is paid when the network user 
signs the connection agreement258. The network user does not pay the total amount of the 
connection charges before the project is finished, and therefore the incentive intensity of the 
system operator is increased. In summary, the incentive intensity can be characterized as 
intermediate: due to the regulated tariffs the system operators cannot entirely influence their 
income, but they can reduce their costs. 
Various administrative control instruments characterize the governance structure of the 
network connection transactions. These include information disclosure mechanisms, 
information verification mechanisms, and penalties. Firstly, a network user has to disclose 
information to the distribution system operator about the changes that it intends to make to its 
connected installations. The distribution system operator has to approve these changes259. The 
distribution system operator also informs the network user of the changes that it intends to 
make to the connection when these changes affect the clauses and conditions of the connection 
agreement260. In addition, the distribution system operator informs the network users of its 
plans to make adjustments to the network at least two weeks in advance. These changes to the 
network can include maintenance works, a renewal of the network or an expansion of the 
network. The network users may not have access to electricity for the duration of these changes 
to the network261. Furthermore, the consumers and generators have to connect equipment to 
their installations that allows them to exchange information with the transmission system 
operator, in order to ensure among others the proper integration of their installations in the 
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electric system. This requirement also holds for some generators that are connected to the 
distribution network, and that are sufficiently large to be able to have a substantial influence on 
the operation of the distribution network262. At the request of the transmission system operator, 
the consumers and generators (with a connected capacity that is larger than 120 MW) may 
have to install a communication system that allows them to communicate instantaneously with 
the system operator. Such a communication system enables the generators and consumers to 
react to signals of the TSO for an increase or decrease in the production or consumption of 
electricity. These communication systems have to meet the specifications that are determined 
by the TSO. The connection agreement has to mention what information needs to be 
exchanged, and the specifications for the communication equipment263. 
Secondly, several mechanisms are in place to verify the safety of the installations of the 
network users. The network users have to take various tests to prove that their installations can 
safely be connected to the electricity network. An independent organization, ‘le Comité 
national pour la securité des usagers d’électricité’ (Consuel), verifies whether the installations 
meet the safety regulations, as set out in the decree of March 2001. The network users send a 
proof of conformity to these regulations that is signed by Consuel to the distribution system 
operators264. The distribution system operators may also access the electrical equipment of the 
network users to verify whether it meets the quality standards as set out in the connection 
agreement. This equipment connects the network users’ installations to the network, and is 
located at the point where electricity is delivered to the network. The verification may only be 
                                                 
262
 Arrêté du 17 mars 2003 relatif aux prescriptions techniques de conception et de fonctionnement pour 
le raccordement à un réseau public de distribution d'une installation de production d'énergie électrique 
(article 14). 
263
 Arrêté du 4 juillet 2003 relatif aux prescriptions techniques de conception et de fonctionnement pour le 
raccordement direct au réseau public de transport d'une installation de consommation d'énergie électrique 
(article 13). Arrêté du 4 juillet 2003 relatif aux prescriptions techniques de conception et de 
fonctionnement pour le raccordement au réseau public de transport d'une installation de production 
d'énergie électrique (articles 18 and 26). 
264
 Convention de raccordement au réseau public de distribution HTA d’une installation de production 
et/ou de consommation d’énergie électrique (conditions générales) (Article 8.5.1, page 37). 
www.erdfdistribution.fr (last accessed November 20, 2008). 
272
The French electricity industry 
 
262  
performed to ensure the safety of the electric system265.  
Thirdly, if the network users do not pay for their connection, the distribution system operator 
may suspend the connection agreement266. The distribution system operators and network users 
may be held accountable for the responsibilities that are attributed to them in the connection 
agreement; when they inflict damage on another party, they have to financially compensate this 
other party for the damages. For example, the distribution system operator may be held 
accountable for delays in the construction of the connection to the network267.  
The connection agreements between the system operators and the network users are signed for 
an indefinite period, and they last for as long as the installations are connected to the electricity 
network268. The network connections are usually in place for multiple decades269. During this 
period, the system operator has the obligation to keep the connection available for the network 
user, and the user has the responsibility to maintain its installations as stated in the connection 
agreement. These agreements can therefore be characterized as long term.  
They are also flexible contracts, because adjustments can be made to their clauses. The 
agreement for a connection to the distribution network states that if the system operator or the 
network user wishes to alter the connection or the connected installation respectively, these 
contracting parties should consult each other, and they may alter the terms included in the 
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connection agreement by including a supplement to this agreement270. Articles 2.2.3 and 3.5 of 
the connection agreement for the transmission grid state that modifications to the agreement 
may be made when the network users or the system operators wish to make changes to their 
installations or the connection respectively271. 
Article 4.7 of the connection agreement272 states that the contracting parties should aim to 
settle the disputes amicably, and otherwise they may ask the CRE to settle the disputes. The 
CRE has settled many disputes on the connection of energy firms and consumers to the 
electricity network273. These were concerned with delays in the construction of the connection, 
the connection costs, and with the technical solutions for the connection. In many of these 
cases, the network users claimed that the system operators had not provided them with 
sufficient and transparent information on the connection.  
This governance structure can, in sum, be characterized as a hybrid form, in which the two 
parties – the system operators and the network users – retain their autonomy. The network 
users depend on the system operators for a connection to the network. The system operators 
have a regional or national monopoly for the network, while the network users do not possess 
such a monopoly position. The system operators have some authority over the network users in 
this governance structure. They may, for example, disconnect the network users to avoid a 
collapse of parts or the entire network. They also instruct the network users to develop a 
system of protection for their installations, mainly to avoid a disturbance in the network that 
may harm the quality of electricity. The system operators determine the features of these 
protection systems, the way in which they should be operated and coordinated with the 
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network, and the level of quality that these systems have to meet274. They have to approve the 
changes that the network users intend to make to their installations. 
Regulation is also part of the governance structure, because the sector-specific regulator (CRE) 
settles the disputes between the system operators and the network users on network connection. 
The hybrid form can more specifically be characterized as a trilateral governance structure: a 
third party, the regulator, governs the transactions between the two contracting parties. In this 
trilateral structure, the system operators have an intermediate incentive intensity, and use 
several administrative instruments to check the safety of the network users’ installations, and 
the contracts are long-term and flexible.  
The next subsection will consider the attributes of adaptation to understand the emergence of 
and the transformation to this hybrid form, by looking at the search for a contracting party, the 
laterality of the adaption, and the response in the adaptation process to either the price or to the 
system requirements.  
 
7.4.4 Adaptation 
The network users’ search for a contracting party to engage in the network connection 
transactions is restricted: they can only transact with the monopolistic system operators. The 
transmission system operator (RTE) has a monopoly for the connection to the high-voltage part 
of the electricity network. Electricité Reseau Distribution France (ERDF), a distribution 
system operator and subsidiary of EDF, controls around 95 per cent of the distribution 
activities in the French electricity industry (ERDF, 2007: 3). The other five per cent is 
distributed by the non-nationalized distributors. When network users want to connect to the 
transmission system, they have no other choice than to contract with RTE. When the network 
users want to connect to the distribution system, the relevance of the identity of the contacting 
party is also very high. In 95 per cent of their connection requests, the network users are 
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restricted to contracting with ERDF.  
The system operators have formulated technical guidelines (référentiels techniques) that 
include among others information on the process of connection, on the technical requirements 
for the installations that are to be connected to the network, and on the systems of protection 
and communication. The system operators must take into account the relevant legislation, 
decrees and orders, and the regulatory decisions of the CRE in their formulation of the 
technical guidelines. These guidelines are not contractual agreements between the network 
users and the system operators, but elements from the guidelines are included in the connection 
agreements. The guidelines have influenced the new form of governance in several ways. They 
specify the duration and the flexibility of the agreement. The incentive intensity is increased by 
determining a fixed price before the construction of the connection starts, and by specifying the 
forty per cent down payment. In 2004, the CRE obliged the system operators to publish their 
technical guidelines. With the publication of these guidelines, the CRE aims to approach the 
situation of the network users in other European Union countries that have access to 
information on the technical, regulatory and contractual conditions for network connection 
through the grid codes275. The CRE described what should be included at minimum in the 
guidelines. The CRE also ruled that before the publication of the guidelines, the system 
operators should consult with the network users or their representative organizations. The 
network users should also be consulted when the system operators intend to modify the 
technical guidelines. The system operators have to communicate the results of these 
consultations and the expressed opinions to the CRE and to the minister of energy276. Since 
2004, the adaptation to the new form of governance has thus allowed for a multilateral 
adaptation; the system operators are obliged to consult with the network users. 
From several communications of the CRE, it is obvious that the network users have complaints 
about the current process of consultation, and that these users suggest alterations to the 
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process277. Both RTE and EDF Réseau Distribution have published incomplete guidelines278. 
The network users claim that the system operators treat the guidelines as having a prescriptive 
character, while only the contractual agreements between the system operators and network 
users are binding. They suggest that, since the CRE can settle disputes ex post on these 
matters, it may even be better that the CRE intervenes ex ante and obliges the system operators 
to take into account the remarks of the network users, and that the network users may propose 
changes to the guidelines through a procedure of arbitrage or through a unilateral imposition of 
modifications. The CRE could not react to these suggestions, as it does not have the power to 
intervene ex ante in these matters. It can be concluded that the network users believe that their 
influence on the content of these guidelines can be improved. 
In addition to the technical guidelines, the regulatory decisions of the CRE also have an 
influence on the new form of governance for the network connection transaction (see also the 
next subsection, 7.4.5). When making regulatory decisions on network connection, the CRE 
consults with other parties in the electricity industry. For example, when determining the 
additional connection charges for the distribution network in 2008, the CRE organized two 
round tables and invited among others the distribution system operators, the generators, 
retailers and consumers of electricity, and the ministry of energy279.  
A large part of the regulations for network connection that affect the governance structure 
(such as those for information disclosure and information verification mechanisms, and the 
tariffs for the use of the network) are, however, determined by decree or order, and thus set by 
the ministry. For these regulations, no such consultative mechanisms exist as mentioned in the 
two previous cases.  
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The adaptation to the new form of governance has been driven by the requirements of the 
electric system. The network connection transactions would not even exist if there were no 
dependence on a network for the supply and consumption of electricity. The dependence on the 
network will most likely continue for a long period of time, which can explain the preference 
for a long-term hybrid form. The dependence on the electric system can also explain the 
involvement of the public authorities, the presence of the information disclosure and 
verification mechanisms, and the role of authority for the system operator in this governance 
structure. Since the electricity networks remain natural monopolies in the liberalized electricity 
industry, the public authorities have continued to regulate the activities of distribution and 
transmission. Their regulatory objectives include ensuring the security of supply and the 
security of the network. In the decree of 2003 they attributed a responsibility for the security of 
the network to the system operators. This decree states that the system operator has to verify 
that the new installation, which is to be connected to the network, must not endanger the 
quality and the safety of the electricity network280. The decree of 2008 states that only those 
installations can be connected to the network that have a protection system, and the equipment 
that allows the network user and the system operator to exchange information281. This 
information disclosure mechanism, in which the system operator and the network user put in 
place equipment to communicate, is included in the governance structure to ensure the safety 
of the electric system. This equipment allows the system operator to send information to the 
generators to immediately increase or decrease their production to avoid an overload (of parts) 
of the network. The information verification mechanism, in which the user has to supply the 
operator with a proof of conformity to the technical standards, is also included in the 
governance structure to ensure the safety of the electric system. The system operators are given 
authority over the network users to ensure the safety of the electric system and to avoid a 
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disturbance in the network. They may, for example, disconnect the network users, and oblige 
the network users to set up a protection system for their installation.  
Network users could not select the contracting party and the governance structure on the basis 
of price, because of the regulated tariffs for a connection to the network. The price for the 
connection services does play another role in the selection of the governance structure, because 
it explains the involvement of the third parties: the public authorities set the tariffs to ensure 
that the system operators, with their monopoly position, do not demand unreasonably high 
prices.  
 
The relevance of the contracting party, the multilateral adaptation, and the fact that the parties 
to the governance structure take the requirements of the electric system into account in the 
process of adaptation, can explain the transformation to the hybrid form of governance. For the 
relation between the electricity generators and the system operators, the adaptation can be 
described as an autonomous adaptation, because the governance structure transformed from a 
vertically integrated hierarchy to a hybrid form of governance.  
 
7.4.5 The role of regulation 
Regulation sets the ex ante rules of the game. The law of February 2000 states that the 
distribution and transmission system operators should provide a non-discriminatory connection 
to the electricity network. This law also states that the ministers of energy and of economic 
affairs determine the tariffs for the use of the network, and, in an order, they set the general 
principles for calculating the additional connection charges. CRE approves the additional 
connection charges that are proposed by the system operators. Several decrees and orders set 
the technical conditions for the network users’ installations that are to be connected to the 
electricity network. CRE has to approve the procedures for processing connection requests by 
the system operators282. 
                                                 
282
 Décret n° 2006-1731 du 23 décembre 2006 approuvant le cahier des charges type de concession du 
réseau public de transport d'électricité. 
279
The French electricity industry  
 
269
 
These ex ante rules have an influence on the governance structure. By determining the tariffs 
for the use of the network and approving the connection charges, the public authorities reduce 
the incentive intensity of the system operators. The decrees and orders require the creation of 
various information disclosure and information verification mechanisms, including the 
communication facilities between the network users and system operators, and the proof of 
conformity to the safety regulations. Regulation is also part of the new governance structure: 
the CRE settles the disputes over network connection. In addition, regulation influences the 
attributes of the transaction. By making the network connection costs dependent upon the size 
of the electricity lines, the ministers create the attribute of site-specificity for the network 
connection transactions. Finally, regulation has had an influence on the process of adaptation. 
The CRE has determined that the system operators should publish their technical reference 
guides and that they should consult with the network users when they aim to alter these guides. 
The CRE has thereby stimulated a multilateral adaptation to the new governance structures.   
 
 
7.5 Network access and balancing transactions: exchange of programs  
In order to ensure their access to the electricity network, the network users have to send either 
a ‘programme d’appel’ or a ‘programme d’approvisionnement’ to the transmission system 
operator283. The electricity generators formulate the programmes d’appel, which include 
information on the amount of electricity that they expect to supply to the network on the next 
day, and proposals for adjusting these programs. The electricity retailers and the authorities 
that organize the public distribution of electricity formulate the programmes 
d’approvisionnement, which include information on the amount of electricity that they expect 
to be supplied to them on the next day, and that they expect to supply to their customers. These 
programs are sent to the transmission system operator, who makes sure that they match its 
expectations of the national electricity consumption on the next day. The transmission system 
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operator needs these programs to identify the transportation restrictions on the network284, and 
to ensure the balance between electricity supply and demand285.  
Not every network user (the generators, consumers, and authorities that organize the pubic 
distribution of electricity) has to send these programs to RTE. The network users that do not 
wish to send these programs, may sign a so-called agreement on attachment (accord de 
rattachement) in which they transfer their program responsibility to another network user. The 
network user that takes on the responsibility for sending programs to RTE is referred to as a 
program responsible party. Every network user has to sign a network access contract with the 
system operator. The network access contracts specify the level of capacity (in kW) at which 
the users access the network, the responsibilities of the system operator with respect to the 
quality of the electricity transportation, the agreements on the measurement of electricity use, 
and the network access tariffs. In these network access contracts, the network users indicate the 
name of their program responsible party, and the name of the party that takes over their 
responsibility for balancing electricity supply and demand (the balancing responsible party). 
Those network users that send the programs to RTE have to sign a participation agreement 
(accord de participation) with RTE in addition to the network access contract. In this 
participation agreement, these program responsible parties agree to abide by the rules on the 
program responsibility, which include rules on how the programs need to be sent to RTE, 
within which time frame, and which changes can be made to the programs286. The balancing 
responsible parties also have to sign a participation agreement with RTE, in which they declare 
to abide by the rules on the balancing responsibility287.  The CRE has to approve these rules.  
A difference can be noted with respect to the exchange of the programs between the Dutch and 
                                                 
284
 Article C.3.1 of the Regles relative a la programmation, mecanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de 
responsable d’equilibre. www.rte-france.com (last accessed December 7, 2008). 
285
 Article 15 of the law of February 2000. 
286
 Règles relatives à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsible 
d’Equilibre - Section 1 Règles relatives à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement, au 
Recouvrement des charges d’ajustement. 
287
 Règles relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsable 
d’Equilibre, section 2 relative à la reconstitution des Flux et au calcul des écarts des Responsables 
d’équilibre. 
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French electricity industries. The Dutch network users have to send two separate programs to 
the transmission system operator for two purposes: restricting transportations on the network 
and balancing electricity supply and demand. In the Netherlands, these two types of programs 
are referred to as the transportation programs and the energy programs, respectively. In the 
French electricity industry, only one program is exchanged to serve these two purposes, which 
is either the programme d’appel or the programme d’approvisionnement, depending on the 
type of network user. 
Because only one type of program is used in the French electricity industry for both the 
signaling of transportation restrictions and the balancing of electricity supply and demand, 
these two purposes are discussed together in this section. The network access transaction and 
the balancing transaction that are studied in this section thus concern the exchange of 
information between the transmission system operator and the program responsible parties, in 
the form of the programs, which allow the network users an access to the network, and RTE to 
signal the transportation restrictions and to ensure a balance of electricity supply and demand 
on the day before the operational day. The network users have to behave according to these 
programs. 
 
7.5.1 The attributes of the transactions 
The programmes d’appel288 include information on the amount of electricity that the generators 
expect to put on the network on the next day, and on their participation in keeping reserves for 
frequency control. The program responsible parties send this information to RTE for half-hour 
periods, and they thus formulate 48 programs for each day. After submitting these programs on 
day t-1, the program responsible parties may adjust these programs until two hours before their 
implementation. Since these transactions occur multiple times during a day, and take place 
every day, the frequency of these transactions is characterized as recurrent.  
The program responsible parties have to follow a strict time schedule for the delivery of the 
                                                 
288
 The focus will be on the programmes d’appel in the rest of this section, because the rules on the 
exchange of the programs focus on these programmes d’appel (Règles relatives à la Programmation, au 
Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsible d’Equilibre).  
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programs before an access to the network can be guaranteed. These transactions are therefore 
characterized by temporal specificity. On the day before the operational day, and not later than 
12h30, the program responsible parties send information to RTE on their expected production 
for the next day for half-hour periods and for each EDP (entité de programmation). An EDP 
corresponds to one or several generating plants for which a program responsible party 
formulates a programme d’appel. Before 12h30 on the day before the operational day, the 
program responsible parties also send information to RTE on the technical constraints of the 
generating plants for which they assume program responsibility. When a program responsible 
party has signed a contract with RTE to participate in the system services (e.g. frequency 
control), it also has to transmit information on the generation of electricity to abide by these 
contracts. RTE uses this information to prescribe the capacity that the program responsible 
party has to reserve for frequency control, and that the party has to indicate in its programmes 
d’appel. RTE sends these instructions to the program responsible parties before 1 pm. Before 
14h30, the program responsible parties resend the information on their expected generation to 
RTE. This information is still on a provisional basis. Before 4 pm, the program responsible 
parties send their programmes d’appel and information on their contribution to the reserves for 
every EDP289. When these programmes d’appel are not consistent with for example the 
technical constraints, RTE informs the program responsible party. This party has to adjust its 
programs within fifteen minutes, or RTE may alter the programs290. Before 8 pm, RTE 
translates the programmes d’appel into so-called running programs (programmes de marche) 
that indicate for each EDP how they have to produce for each half hour on the next day. For 
the first time at 10 pm on the day before the operational day, the program responsible party 
may alter its programmes d’appel, which also alters the running programs. These alterations 
may not be contrary to the agreements made in the adjustment mechanism. The adjustment 
mechanism allows RTE to balance electricity supply and demand and to resolve transportation 
                                                 
289
 Règles relatives à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsible 
d’Equilibre - C.3.1.3 Transmissions anticipées de certaines données. 
290
 Règles relatives à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsible 
d’Equilibre - C.3.1.4 Transmission à RTE du Programme d’Appel et du Programme Prévisionnel à 
l’Heure Limite d’Accès au Réseau. 
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restrictions in real time291. The running programs include the agreements that are made by RTE 
in the adjustment mechanism. The program responsible party has to follow the running 
programs of the EDP292.  
In addition to this temporal specificity, these network access and balancing transactions are 
also characterized by human asset-specificity. Before a program responsible party can send the 
programs to RTE, it has to be able to access the information system of RTE and to use several 
of RTE’s applications for exchanging messages on the programs and adjustments to the 
programs. A set of rules has been formulated on how to access this information system and the 
use of the applications (règles d’accès au system d’information et d’utilisation des applications 
de RTE) to which the program responsible parties have to conform. RTE defines the messages 
that have to be exchanged in order to transfer information on the programs between RTE and 
the program responsible parties293. Before the program responsible parties and RTE sign a 
participation agreement, the program responsible parties have to take several tests to ensure 
that they are able to access the information system and exchange the messages. When changes 
in the regulations on the programmes d’appel result in changes in the messages, RTE organizes 
additional tests for the program responsible parties294. The program responsible parties have to 
pay for the investments in assets that are needed to access the information system of RTE295. 
They have to invest in specific human assets to be able to access the information system, use 
the applications of RTE and send the various messages on the programs to RTE. These human 
assets are specific, because the applications of RTE (e.g. Diapason, Eode) are only suited for 
exchanging messages on the system services, such as the exchange of programs for the 
transportation restrictions and the balancing of electricity supply and demand. In the 
                                                 
291
 The following section (7.6) will focus on this adjustment mechanism. 
292
 Règles relatives à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsible 
d’Equilibre - C.3.8 Respect du programme de marche par le responsable de programmation. 
293
 Article 6.1 of the Règles d’accès au system d’information et d’utilisation des applications de RTE. 
www.rte-france.com (last accessed December 7, 2008).  
294
 Article B.4.1 Tests relatifs au systeme d’information du participant of the Regles relative a la 
programmation, mecanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable d’equilibre. www.rte-
france.com (last accessed December 7, 2008). 
295
 Article 3.3 of the Règles d’accès au system d’information et d’utilisation des applications de RTE. 
www.rte-france.com (last accessed December 7, 2008). 
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participation agreements, the program (and balancing) responsible parties indicate the names of 
their employees that are responsible for using the applications and for abiding by the rules on 
access to the information system and the applications296. The specific human assets are also 
dedicated assets, because the program responsible parties have only invested in these assets for 
their transactions on the programmes d’appel with the transmission system operator.  
Whether these network access and balancing transactions are characterized by behavioral 
uncertainty is influenced by the fact that the transacting parties have to pay for deviating from 
their programs. Every generator and every consumer of electricity is responsible for the 
difference between the amount of electricity that they put on the network and the amount of 
electricity that they take out of the network (i.e. the imbalance), and thus for abiding by their 
programs297. They may transfer this responsibility to another party, the balancing responsible 
party, which can be the same as the program responsible party. When the imbalance is 
negative, and thus more electricity is taken out of the network than is put on the network, the 
balancing responsible party has to pay RTE for this difference. When the imbalance is positive, 
RTE remunerates the balancing responsible party for the difference. The value of these 
imbalances is based on the spot price for electricity that is determined on Powernext (the 
French day-ahead and futures market for electricity and gas), and on the prices that are 
established by the adjustment mechanism298. In this adjustment mechanism, network users 
offer reserve capacity to RTE for balancing electricity supply and demand and for resolving 
transportation restrictions in real time. Whether RTE or the balancing responsible party have to 
pay the spot price or the price of the adjustment mechanism for the imbalance is based on the 
direction of balancing, and thus on whether RTE had to increase or decrease the amount of 
electricity on the network in a particular thirty minute-period. Four different options are the 
result (see also table 7.1). Firstly, when RTE had to increase the amount of electricity on the 
                                                 
296
 Article B.4. of the Regles relative a la programmation, mecanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de 
responsable d’equilibre. www.rte-france.com (last accessed December 7, 2008). 
297
 Article 15 of the law of February 2000. 
298
 Règles relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsable 
d’Equilibre, section 2 relative à la reconstitution des Flux et au calcul des écarts des Responsables 
d’équilibre. Chapitre B, page 4.  
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network (i.e. the balancing trend was upward), and the imbalance of the balancing responsible 
party is positive, RTE pays the balancing responsible party the Powernext spot price. Secondly, 
when the balancing trend was downward, and the imbalance of the balancing responsible party 
is positive, RTE pays the average weighted price for the downward balancing of the adjustment 
mechanism to the balancing responsible party. This price is divided by a factor 1+K, where K 
is 0,05. The upper limit of this price is fixed at the Powernext spot price299. This factor K is a 
penalty for the balancing responsible party, because this party has supplied too much electricity 
to the network in a period where RTE had to decrease the amount of electricity. The height of 
K may be adjusted over time, and it has to be approved by the CRE. When the balancing 
responsible party is, for example, also an electricity generator, this factor reduces the party’s 
incentive to supply too much electricity, and to deviate from its programs, because the party 
could have earned a higher return for this electricity on the spot market. Thirdly, when the 
balancing trend is downward, and the imbalance of the balancing responsible party is negative, 
the balancing responsible party pays the Powernext spot price to RTE. Fourthly, when the 
balancing trend is upward, and the imbalance of the balancing responsible party is negative, the 
latter pays the average weighted price for the upward balancing of the adjustment mechanism 
to RTE. This price is multiplied by the factor 1+K, and may not be lower than the Powernext 
spot price. This factor again serves as a penalty for the balancing responsible parties.  
 
Table 7.1 Imbalance prices300 
 Case where the balancing trend 
is upward 
Case where the balancing trend 
is downward 
Positive imbalances Powernext spot price AWPb / (1+K) 
Negative imbalances AWPh x (1+K) Powernext spot price 
 
                                                 
299
 www.rte-france.com (last accessed December 20, 2008). 
300
 Règles relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsable 
d’Equilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, Chapitre E, page 83, and www.rte-france.com (last accessed December 7, 2008).  
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Because the balancing responsible parties have to pay for their imbalances and these payments 
are subject to penalties, they have an incentive to reduce their imbalances. When these 
balancing responsible parties are also responsible for exchanging programs, they have an 
incentive to provide accurate programs to RTE. If these programs are close to the actual 
consumption and generation of electricity, the balancing responsible parties reduce their 
imbalances. RTE wants to receive accurate programs, because it enables the operator to make 
more accurate predictions of the imbalances and transportation restrictions in real time. Since 
the balancing responsible parties do not have an incentive to disguise or distort information in 
their programs, and thus do not have an incentive to behave opportunistically, these network 
access and balancing transactions are not characterized by behavioral uncertainty. The CRE 
has not resolved any disputes on the exchange of programs, which also alludes to the absence 
of behavioral uncertainty in the transaction301. 
 
7.5.2 Misalignment 
The network access and balancing transactions between the generators, transmission and 
distribution system operators used to be internalized within EDF. This vertically integrated 
hierarchy is assumed to have been aligned with the transactions, and therefore the rules on the 
vertical unbundling create a misalignment. The attributes of the transactions have, however, 
changed into a direction in which transaction cost economics would not predict an ex post 
governance structure. There is no behavioral uncertainty in these transactions. The incentives 
between the two contracting parties (RTE and the balancing responsible party) are aligned ex 
ante, and therefore a contractual agreement between the contracting parties would suffice 
                                                 
301
 The Société nationale d'électricité et de thermique (SNET) has asked the CRE to resolve a dispute with 
RTE on the balancing mechanism. The SNET argued that this mechanism was not well adapted to 
SNET’s situation with a few generating plants that had an increased risk of breakdown and substantially 
increased the imbalance costs. The CRE rejected the demands of the SNET, and argued that it could have 
transferred its program responsibility to another firm to reduce its imbalance risks. This dispute did not 
revolve around the exchange of programs, but around an energy firm that demanded an exemption from 
paying the high imbalance costs. Décision du 6 février 2003 sur un différend qui oppose la Société 
nationale d'électricité et de thermique (SNET) à Réseau de transport d'électricité (RTE), gestionnaire du 
réseau public de transport d'électricité, relatif aux modalités d'exécution du contrat de responsable 
d'équilibre de la SNET. 
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according to the predictions of transaction cost economics. The following subsection (7.5.3) 
will, however, demonstrate that an elaborate hybrid governance structure has emerged. In the 
absence of behavioral uncertainty, transaction cost economics does not predict the comparative 
efficiency of a hybrid form of governance. 
 
7.5.3 The governance structure 
The governance structure will be characterized along three attributes: the incentive intensity, 
the administrative control, and the contract law regime. Incentive intensity has been defined in 
chapter five as the degree to which changes in efforts expended by an economic actor have an 
immediate effect on his compensation or stream of revenues. The governance of the network 
access and balancing transactions is characterized by an intermediate degree of incentive 
intensity. A governance structure is characterized by an intermediate incentive intensity when a 
part of the income to be earned cannot be influenced by the economic actor; or when the 
transaction itself may not directly earn an income, but is a prerequisite for earning an income 
with a consecutive transaction. The contracting parties to the network access and balancing 
transactions do not directly earn an income from exchanging the programs, but these 
transactions are a requisite for access to the network, and thus for enabling the contracting 
parties to earn an income in other transactions, such as the sale of electricity to consumers. The 
balancing and program responsible parties have an incentive to abide by their programs in 
order to reduce their imbalance costs, but several factors that are outside of the balancing and 
program responsible parties’ control influence these costs. Firstly, the parties cannot exactly 
predict how much electricity will be consumed or produced on the next day by the network 
users for which they have taken over responsibility, due to for instance the weather or 
unexpected problems with generating facilities. Secondly, the price that a balancing 
responsible party pays or receives in the imbalance settlement depends upon the balancing 
trend (see figure 7.1), and thus on the behavior of the other network users in the industry, 
which is outside of the control of a balancing responsible party.   
The administrative apparatus of the governance structure consists first of all of a monitoring of 
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the network users. RTE measures the electricity that the network users put on (and take out of) 
the network for each half hour302. On the basis of these measurements, RTE determines the 
imbalances and the amounts that the balancing responsible parties have to pay or receive303. 
Secondly, RTE discloses the information on the amount of electricity that was put on and taken 
out of the network to the balancing responsible parties304. The latter verify whether the 
information that was transferred by RTE is correct305. Thirdly, RTE may impose several 
penalties on the program and balancing responsible parties and the network users. When the 
rules on the programs, the balancing responsibility, and the adjustment mechanism are 
changed, they alter the participation agreements. When the program or balancing responsible 
party does not sign the new supplement to the participation agreement within twenty days, 
RTE may end the participation agreement with this party306. Furthermore, the network access 
contracts state that RTE may suspend access to the network, or end the network access 
contract, when a network user does not pay the tariffs as stipulated in the contract307.   
In the network access contracts with the transmission system operator, it is stated that they are 
signed for an indefinite period308. The duration of these contracts will in most cases extend 
beyond a year, and they are therefore characterized as long term. The period for cancelling 
                                                 
302
 Règles relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsable 
d’Equilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D10.1.2.1, page 71. 
303
 Règles relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsable 
d’Equilibre, section 2 relative à la reconstitution des Flux et au calcul des écarts des Responsables 
d’équilibre. Article C12.1, page 17. 
304
 Règles relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsable 
d’Equilibre, section 2 relative à la reconstitution des Flux et au calcul des écarts des Responsables 
d’équilibre. Article C12.4, page 19. 
305
 Règles relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsable 
d’Equilibre, section 2 relative à la reconstitution des Flux et au calcul des écarts des Responsables 
d’équilibre. Article C14.2, page 26. 
306
 Règles relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au dispositif de Responsable 
d’Equilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article B3, page 24. 
307
 Article 10.5 Pénalités prévues en cas de non-paiement of the network access contract between 
generators and RTE. 
308
 Network access contract between generators and RTE (article 14.8, page 49), network access contract 
between consumers and RTE (article 12.8, page 50), network access contract between distributors and 
RTE (article 12.8, page 55). 
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these network access contracts may already exceed a year. When a network user informs the 
system operator of its intention to end its contractual relation for access to the network after the 
31st of August in year t, the contract will be cancelled in January of year t+2. The network 
access contracts with the distribution system operator (ERDF) are signed for a period of three 
years309, and can therefore also be characterized as long term.  
The contracts between the system operators and the program and balancing responsible parties 
and the network users are flexible. When changes to the rules on the programs, the adjustment 
mechanism, and the balancing responsibility are made, the existing participation agreements 
are altered310. The network access contracts are altered when regulations are changed or new 
regulations are formulated that affect the clauses in these contracts311.  
The rules on the program and balancing responsibility and the network access contracts state 
that the contracting parties should aim to resolve their disputes amicably, before turning to the 
CRE312. The CRE has resolved several disputes with respect to network access. These disputes 
were never concerned with the exchange of the programmes d’appel between the system 
operator and a network user, but with for example network access tariffs313 and with the 
                                                 
309
 Network access contract between generators and distribution system operator (ERDF) (article 11.3, 
page 43). Network access contract between consumers and distribution system operator (ERDF) (article 
11.3, page 37).  
310
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article B.3 Modalités de révision des règles, page 24. Section 2 relative à la 
reconstitution des Flux et au calcul des écarts des Responsables d’équilibre, article B6 Modalités de 
révision de la section 2 des règles, page 8. 
311
 Network access contract between generators and RTE, article 14.1, page 47. Network access contract 
between consumers and RTE, article 12.1, page 49. 
312
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre. B.16 règlement des différends. Conditions générales relatives à l’accès au réseau public de 
transport d’électricité – Producteurs (article 14.6). Conditions générales relatives à l’accès au réseau 
public de transport d’électricité – Consommateur (article 12.6). 
313
 Décision de la Commission de Régulation de l’Electricité (CRE) en date du 12 décembre 2002 sur un 
différend qui oppose la société Pem Abrasif Refractaires (PEMAR) à Réseau de transport d’électricité 
(RTE), en tant que gestionnaire du réseau public de transport d’électricité, relatif à la tarification 
d’utilisation des réseaux publics applicable aux consommateurs raccordés en tension 42 kV. 
Décision de la Commission de régulation de l’énergie du 25 mai 2004 se prononçant sur un différend qui 
oppose Réseau de transport d’électricité (RTE) à la société Cerestar France relatif à la tarification de 
l’accès au réseau public de transport et à la signature d’un contrat d’accès au réseau. 
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number of network access contracts that are needed for multiple connection points314. 
 
The governance structure can thus be characterized as a hybrid form, in which the contracting 
parties (the program and balancing responsible parties and the system operators) retain their 
autonomy, but are dependent upon each other for the exchange of the programs. This hybrid 
form is characterized by an intermediate incentive intensity, an administrative apparatus of 
information disclosure mechanisms, monitoring and penalties, and long-term, flexible 
contracts, and dispute resolution by the regulator.  Given the absence of behavioral uncertainty, 
transaction cost economics would not predict such a hybrid form. In the following subsection, 
the attributes of adaptation enable an explanation of a transformation to this hybrid form.   
 
7.5.4 Adaptation 
The attributes of adaptation include the identity of the contracting party, the laterality of the 
adaptation, and the type of response in the process of adaptation. To the program responsible 
parties, the identity of the contracting party in these network access and balancing transactions 
is highly relevant. The program responsible parties are limited in their search for a contracting 
party; they can only transact with the transmission system operator for the exchange of the 
programs, and therefore, they prefer to engage in a long-term contractual relation, as they have 
no alternative within the French electricity industry.  
With respect to the laterality, it can be concluded that various parties are involved in the 
process of adaptation to the new forms of governance. The program responsible parties and the 
transmission system operator must sign a participation agreement before the program 
responsible party may exchange the programs. In this participation agreement, the program 
                                                                                                                                 
Décision de la Commission de régulation de l’énergie du 10 février 2005 se prononçant sur un différend 
qui oppose Réseau de Transport d’Electricité (RTE) à la Compagnie Parisienne de Chauffage Urbain 
(CPCU) relatif à l’application du tarif d’utilisation du réseau public de transport. 
314
 Décision de la Commission de Régulation de l’Electricité (CRE) en date du 27 juin 2002 sur un 
différend, qui oppose la société Semmaris à EDF, en tant que gestionnaire du réseau public de distribution 
d’électricité, relatif aux conditions de prise en compte de la multiplicité des points de livraison dans le 
dispositif contractuel d’accès au réseau électrique. 
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responsible party declares to adhere to the rules on the programs and the adjustment 
mechanism. These rules are therefore an integral part of the contractual relation and the 
governance structure between the program responsible party and the transmission system 
operator. These rules also describe the procedures for adjusting the rules. RTE, the network 
users that have signed a participation agreement with RTE (the participants), and the members 
of the ‘Commission de Fonctionnement du Mécanisme d’Ajustement’ (CFMA) can propose 
changes to the rules. The CFMA is a group within the ‘Comité d’Utilisateurs du Réseau de 
Transport d’Électricité’ (CURTE). When RTE puts forward a proposal for changes to the rules, 
the participants and the members of the CFMA may react to this proposal or may make a 
counterproposition on how the rules have to be altered. The adaptation to new governance 
structures is thus multilateral, as it involves the various parties in the electricity industry. RTE 
does, however, have a large role in changing the rules; it may decide not to pursue a proposal 
for changes in the rules with an explanation for this refusal to the CFMA, and RTE formulates 
the final proposition for changes to the rules. This final proposition is send to the CRE for 
approval315. A similar procedure is used for changing the rules on the balancing responsibility. 
A governance commission has been established that brings together RTE, the distribution 
system operators, and the representatives of the balancing responsible parties. The members of 
this commission may propose changes to the rules on the balancing responsibility316. In 
addition, the network access contracts between the generators and RTE, and between the 
consumers and RTE state that any changes to the general conditions of these contracts should 
be subject to a consultation with the distribution system operators and the representatives of the 
network users. These multilateral adaptations may reduce the search costs for a governance 
structure: the involvement of the different actors in the adaptation process stimulates a 
communication on which features of a potential future governance structure enable or inhibit a 
                                                 
315
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article B.3 Modalités de révision des règles, page 24. 
316
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 2 règles relatives au dispositif de responsable d’équilibre, article B6 Modalités de 
révision de la section 2 des règles, page 8. 
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proper execution of the program transactions. 
The program and balancing responsible parties and the transmission system operator engage in 
these network access and balancing transactions, because they have to take the electric system 
into account. These transactions are necessary to resolve restrictions on the transportation of 
electricity and to balance electricity supply and demand, and thus to ensure the security and 
safety of electricity supply. Because these requirements of the electric system will not change 
in the near future, the parties prefer to engage in a long-term relation. While these system 
requirements are the reason for engaging in these transactions and for developing a governance 
structure for the transactions, the economic actors did consider the price of the imbalances 
when adapting to the new form of governance. In the current governance structure, the 
balancing responsible parties are responsible for their own imbalances, and a penalty is 
included for creating an imbalance in the opposite direction of the total imbalance. The parties 
thus have an incentive to abide by their programs, and to reduce their imbalance costs.  
This multilateral adaptation, in which the identity of the contracting party is relevant, and the 
requirements of the system are considered, explains the transformation to the hybrid form of 
governance. Because this new governance structure transformed from a vertically integrated 
hierarchy, the type of adaptation is characterized as an autonomous adaptation.   
 
7.5.5 The role of regulation 
Regulation has influenced the attributes of the transaction, the governance structure and the 
process of adaptation. Firstly, article 15 of the electricity law of 2000 requires this transaction 
of exchanging the programs. The rules on the programs stipulate the time schedule within 
which the programs have to be exchanged, and thereby formalize the temporal specificity that 
is inherent in the transaction. The rules have transferred the responsibility for the imbalances, 
and for abiding by the programs to the balancing and program responsible parties, and they 
have given these parties a financial incentive to abide by their programs. The program 
responsible parties therefore have a reason to provide RTE with accurate programs, and 
thereby regulation has ex ante aligned the incentives between the contracting parties and 
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eliminated the behavioral uncertainty in the transactions. The need for ex post governance 
structures is reduced. Secondly, in the participation agreements, the parties declare to adhere to 
the rules on the programs, adjustment mechanism and balancing. These rules that are approved 
by the CRE are therefore an integral part of the governance structure that coordinates the 
program transactions. These rules also create the contract flexibility: they stipulate the 
possibility for adjusting the rules and the participation agreements. They also specify that RTE 
monitors the electricity use of the network users, and discloses this information to the program 
responsible parties. Thirdly, the rules formulate which parties in the electricity industry should 
be involved in the process of adaptation. Finally, the CRE is appointed as the authority that 
settles the disputes and is thus part of the governance structure. The CRE has not yet settled 
any disputes on the exchange of the programs so far.  
 
 
7.6 Network access and balancing transactions: supply of reserve power 
The transaction of exchanging programs enables the transmission system operator to resolve 
transportation restrictions and to balance electricity supply and demand on the day before the 
operational day. The transmission system operator also needs to resolve the restrictions on the 
network and to balance supply and demand in real time. For this purpose, a mechanism has 
been set up in which network users bid for the supply of reserve power to RTE. The transaction 
that will be discussed in this section concerns this bidding mechanism.  
Several types of reserves exist in the French electricity system, including primary and 
secondary reserves and rapid tertiary reserves. The primary and secondary reserves are the 
reserves of the large electricity generators that participate in the primary and secondary 
frequency and power regulation. The primary frequency regulation is an automatic function at 
the level of the generators that responds to changes in frequency. The secondary frequency 
regulation is an automatic function, at the national dispatching level of RTE, which is intended 
to adjust the generation of electricity to the exchange programs on the interconnections and to 
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the normal frequency317. The generators communicate these primary and secondary reserves to 
RTE in their programmes d’appel. RTE concludes bilateral contracts with the generators for 
the supply of these reserves. The aim of the rapid tertiary reserves is to complete the 
contributions to the secondary frequency regulation service, in the event that (one of) the large 
generators connected to the transmission network should fail318. This tertiary reserve is offered 
to RTE through the bidding mechanism. In addition, RTE has contracted 1500 MW of tertiary 
reserves (CRE, 2007: 55).  
There are two types of bids in this bidding mechanism: implicit and explicit bids. The implicit 
bids are made by so-called adjustment parties (acteurs d’ajustement) for an increase (or 
decrease) in the input into the electricity network. These bids are made for an entité 
d’ajustement (EDA), which consists of one or several EDPs (entités de programmation). An 
EDP corresponds to one or several generating plants for which a program responsible party 
formulates a programme d’appel. An adjustment party has to be the program responsible party 
for the EDPs that are included in the EDA, and must thus have signed a participation 
agreement with RTE. An EDA consists of EDPs that are able to respond to a call by RTE for 
increasing (or decreasing) their supply into the network within a particular period of time. 
These implicit bids alter the programmes d’appel of the EDPs that are included in the EDA. 
Explicit bids are bids that are not associated with a program, and that consist among others of 
bids for decreasing the offtake of electricity from the network319.   
For the purpose of balancing electricity supply and demand, RTE classifies the bids of the 
adjustment parties in increasing order of price for the bids that increase the supply of electricity 
into the network, and in decreasing order of price for the bids that decrease the supply of 
                                                 
317
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, page 18-20.  
318
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, page 19. 
319
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D3: typologie des offres, page 51. 
295
The French electricity industry  
 
285
 
electricity. RTE calls upon the bids on the basis of their price, their technical constraints and 
the conditions for using the bids. These conditions, which are specified by the adjustment 
parties when submitting the bids, include among others the maximum and minimum amount of 
electricity that can be supplied to the network, the duration of the supply of reserve power, and 
the time period within which the EDA can supply the reserve power to the network320. For the 
purpose of resolving the restrictions on the transportation of electricity, RTE also classifies the 
bids by merit order, but only those bids of EDAs that are able to resolve the transportation 
restrictions321. In order to ensure the safety of the network, RTE may temporarily remove bids 
from the bid price ladder when these bids create or aggravate restrictions on the transportation 
of electricity, or RTE may reserve this electricity for responding to transportation 
restrictions322.  
When RTE calls upon (or cancels) a bid, it transfers a so-called adjustment order to the 
adjustment party, at the earliest one hour before the period that the EDA can increase or 
decrease its supply into the network. In this adjustment order, RTE specifies the amount of 
electricity that needs to be increased or decreased, when the electricity should be supplied, and 
when the EDA should stop supplying the electricity. The adjustment parties have to execute 
their bids that are called upon by RTE323. RTE remunerates the adjustment parties for their 
supply of reserve power on the basis of the bid price and the amount of electricity that is 
                                                 
320
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D.5.1: classement des offres, page 58. 
321
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D.5.1.3 Préséance économique sur un nombre restreint d’offres, page 60. 
322
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D.5.1.3.2 Offres générant et aggravant des congestions, article D.5.1.4 
Contraintes du Système, page 60. 
323
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D.6 Exécution des ordres d’ajustement par l’acteur d’ajustement, page 63. 
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requested by RTE when calling upon a bid324. 
This transaction for resolving transportation restrictions and balancing supply and demand in 
real time thus concerns the supply of reserve power to RTE, in which the adjustment parties 
bid for the supply of reserve power, RTE calls upon these bids, and the EDAs supply the 
electricity.  
 
7.6.1 The attributes of the transactions 
The adjustment parties have to submit their bids for the supply of reserve power before a gate 
closure. Each adjustment period of 24 hours consists of 25 gate closures. The first gate closure 
is 16h00 on the day before the operational day, which means that before 16h00 the adjustment 
parties have to submit their bids. The other 24 gate closures are at each whole hour starting at 
22h00 on the day before the operational day, and the last one is at 21h00 on the operational 
day325. The frequency of this transaction is therefore characterized as recurrent. The adjustment 
parties send their bids to RTE every day, and they have to follow the strict schedule of the gate 
closures for transferring the bids. When RTE calls upon a bid, the adjustment party has to 
respond to this call and the EDA has to increase or decrease its supply of electricity into the 
network at the exact time as indicated by RTE in the adjustment order.  
This transaction is therefore also characterized by temporal specificity. The adjustment parties 
have to invest in facilities and human assets that allow them to send bids 365 days a year, and 
24 hours a day. These bids have to be sent within the strict time schedule of the gate closures. 
The EDAs have to be able to respond to the adjustment orders of RTE within a particular short 
period of time. If they are not able to respond in the short periods of time, RTE will charge the 
EDAs for not supplying the reserve power.  
The adjustment parties need to have access to the information system and applications of RTE 
                                                 
324
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D.8.1 Offres activées, page 67. 
325
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D.4.1 Mécanisme des guichets, page 56.  
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to be able to send bids to RTE. The application for transferring bids for the supply of reserve 
power to RTE is referred to as SyGA (Système de Gestion des Ajustements). The rules on the 
programs, the adjustment mechanism and the balancing responsibility require that the 
adjustment parties take various tests of sending messages with the SyGA application. The 
adjustment parties have to illustrate that they are able to exchange messages with RTE that 
include bids for the supply of reserve power before they may sign a participation agreement 
with RTE326. More than two hundred of these messages are specified in the rules on the 
information system327. The employees of the adjustment parties need to have specific 
knowledge on sending these messages with the SyGA application, which can only be used for 
transferring bids to RTE. The adjustment parties have to invest in these specific human assets, 
and the transaction is therefore also characterized by human asset-specificity. These assets are 
dedicated to one contracting party: the transmission system operator.  
Competition on this bidding mechanism for the supply of reserve power to RTE is very weak 
(CRE, 2004: 56). The bidding mechanism started in 2003, and even after five years, 84 per 
cent of all the electricity that is called upon by RTE is supplied by EDF (CRE, 2008a: 79)328. 
There have been no observations of a distortion or a disguise of information between these two 
parties for this transaction; the CRE did not resolve any disputes on the supply of reserve 
power. Therefore, no behavioral uncertainty can be observed for this transaction on the supply 
of reserve power between these transacting parties. This French bidding mechanism is not 
confronted to the same extent by the problems of the participants to the Dutch bidding 
mechanism. The Dutch participants are more numerous, and they are subject to a greater risk 
on whether the transmission system operator will call upon their bids. They have an incentive 
                                                 
326
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D.1 Conditions préalables, page 48; article, D.3.2.1 Caractéristiques de base 
d’une offre d’ajustement, page 51. 
327
 Règles d'accès au Système d'information et applications de RTE : Programmation et Mécanisme 
d'ajustement, annexe SI application SyGA, pages 5-17.  
328
 Several other French adjustment parties exist. In total these parties supply between three and four per 
cent of reserve power to RTE (CRE, 2006: 99). There are also adjustment parties of the United Kingdom 
that have a participation agreement with RTE, but RTE has never called upon bids of these parties (CRE, 
2008a: 79).  
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to disguise information on their available reserve capacity, because they may use this 
electricity for another purpose for which they are more certain to receive an income. When 
EDF bids for the supply of reserve power to RTE, it is certain that, on average, 84 per cent of 
all its reserve power is called upon. This does not create an incentive for EDF to disguise 
information.  
 
7.6.2 Misalignment 
Before the liberalization of the French electricity industry, the transactions for the balancing of 
electricity supply and demand in real time were internalized in the vertically integrated 
hierarchy. EDF had a monopoly on the transmission of electricity, and it generated around 93 
per cent of electricity. It was responsible for balancing electricity supply and demand for the 
entire electric system. This vertically integrated hierarchy is assumed to have been aligned with 
the attributes of the transactions. The rules on the vertical unbundling would therefore create a 
misalignment. Currently, the transactions are characterized by an absence of behavioral 
uncertainty. From a transaction cost economics perspective, an ex post governance structure 
would therefore not be an efficient institutional solution. When the incentives are aligned ex 
ante between two transacting parties, a contractual agreement is sufficient. A hybrid 
governance structure did however emerge for these transactions.   
 
7.6.3 The governance structure 
The incentive intensity is characterized as being of an intermediate degree. EDF can influence 
its income by increasing its bid prices. If RTE needs to call upon bids for an increase (or 
decrease) in the supply of electricity into the network, EDF is sure for more than eighty per 
cent on average that RTE calls upon EDF’s bids, and EDF thus earns an income. There are, 
however, some factors that are outside of EDF’s control that reduce its incentive intensity. 
Firstly, EDF will reserve larger amounts of electricity than are called upon by RTE due to 
small imbalances. The amount of imbalance also depends on factors that are outside of EDF’s 
control. Secondly, there is some competition on this bidding mechanism, mainly from Swiss 
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energy firms and only when the prices are high (CRE, 2004: 56). EDF may thus reserve 
electricity for the bidding mechanism, and may not earn an income on this reserve power, 
because RTE calls on the bids of the Swiss energy firms. 
The governance structure is characterized by several administrative control instruments, 
including monitoring and penalties and information disclosure mechanisms. RTE measures the 
electricity that was put on and taken out of the network by each EDA, and compares these 
measurements to the total of the program, the adjustments to the program, the participation in 
the secondary frequency regulation, and the adjustment bids that were called upon by RTE for 
each EDA. This difference is always considered to be a faulty execution of the adjustment 
order, and a penalty is attached to such a faulty execution. This penalty is calculated by 
multiplying the volume of the incorrect execution by 35 per cent and by either the bid price or 
the Powernext spot price329. When an EDA is repeatedly executing the adjustment orders in an 
incorrect way, RTE may exclude this EDA from the adjustment mechanism or cancel the 
participation agreement. RTE transfers information on the value of the adjustment orders to the 
adjustment parties on a daily basis. The adjustment parties may contest this information. RTE 
also transfers the final information to the adjustment parties for each month, on the basis of 
which the adjustment parties send a bill to RTE for the supply of reserve power330. When RTE 
has not abided by the conditions for using the bids, it has to compensate the adjustment parties 
financially.  
When the adjustment parties sign a participation agreement with RTE, they promise in this 
agreement to adhere to the rules on the programs and the adjustment mechanism, and to the 
rules on accessing the information system of RTE. These rules indicate that they can be 
modified, and the modifications to these rules are added as supplements to the existing 
participation agreements. The contracts between RTE and the adjustment parties for 
                                                 
329
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D10: controle de l’execution des orders d’ajustement et penalites, page 71. 
330
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article D9: information de l’acteur d’ajustment, page 69-70. 
300
The French electricity industry 
 
290  
participation in the adjustment mechanism are therefore flexible contracts.     
These participation agreements are signed for an indefinite period. In 2003, the adjustment 
mechanism was set up, and RTE signed agreements with 16 adjustment parties for a 
participation in this mechanism. The parties that signed such a participation agreement with 
RTE increased to 18 in 2004, 29 in 2005, 32 in 2006, and 35 in 2007331. Because these 
agreements are flexible and therefore no new agreements have to be signed when the rules 
change, the parties that have signed a participation agreement with RTE from 2003 until 2007 
have a long-term agreement (exceeding one year) with RTE. 
When the parties to the participation agreement for the adjustment mechanism are in a conflict 
with respect to this agreement or the rules on the programs and the adjustment mechanism, 
they should aim to resolve these conflicts amicably. The CRE is the public authority that is 
authorized to settle disputes between the parties to the participation agreement for the 
adjustment mechanism. The CRE has not yet had to resolve any disputes with respect to the 
bidding for the supply of reserve power.  
In summary, this governance structure is characterized as a hybrid form, in which contractual 
agreements for the supply of secondary and tertiary reserves between energy firms and the 
transmission system operator are combined with a bidding mechanism for tertiary reserves, and 
a regulator that may resolve disputes. The attributes of this governance structure include an 
intermediate incentive intensity, penalties, monitoring, an information disclosure mechanism, 
and flexible, long-term contracts.     
 
7.6.4 Adaptation 
The identity of the contracting party is highly relevant. The bidding mechanism is a single 
buyer market, and the transmission system operator, RTE, is the single buyer. The energy firms 
can only bid for the supply of reserve power to RTE, and they can only engage in the 
contractual agreements for the supply of secondary and tertiary reserves with RTE. 
Various parties in the French electricity industry are involved in the process of adaptation to 
                                                 
331
 Annual report RTE 2007, page 12; annual report RTE 2006, page 11; annual report RTE 2005, page 
10; annual report RTE 2004, page 8. 
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the new form of governance for these transactions on the supply of reserve power. This 
multilaterality of the adaptation is required by the rules on the programs and the adjustment 
mechanism. The adjustment parties and the transmission system operator must sign a 
participation agreement before the adjustment party may bid for the supply of reserve power. 
In this participation agreement, the adjustment party declares to adhere to the rules on the 
programs and the adjustment mechanism, and therefore these rules are an integral part of the 
contractual relation and the governance structure between the adjustment party and the 
transmission system operator. These rules prescribe the procedures for making changes to the 
rules, and the parties that are to be involved in these procedures. These parties include RTE, 
the adjustment parties, and the members of the ‘Commission de Fonctionnement du 
Mécanisme d’Ajustement’ (CFMA). These procedures for making changes to the rules are the 
same as for the transactions on the exchange of programs, as discussed in the previous section 
7.5. The CRE has to approve the changes to the rules332.  
In this adaptation process to the new governance structure, the parties to the adaptation process 
have aimed to increase the flexibility for the parties that are bidding for the supply of reserve 
power. One way of increasing the flexibility for the adjustment parties is through adding more 
gate closures, which allows the parties to alter their bids or submit new bids more often. These 
changes to the rules on the adjustment mechanism have allowed for an increase in the 
flexibility, but only within the constraint of ensuring the safety of the electric system (CRE, 
2006: 97). In addition, this transaction for the supply of reserve power exists, because the 
parties in the electricity industry have to consider the fact that electricity cannot be stored, at 
least not in an economically efficient way, and that they therefore have to devise a governance 
structure that ensures the safety of the electricity supply.       
This multilateral adaptation that considers the requirements of the electric system and the 
relevance of the identity of the contracting party, explains the transformation to the hybrid 
form of governance. The adaptation is characterized as an autonomous adaptation, because the 
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 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article B.3 Modalités de révision des règles, page 24. 
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parties to the adaptation process transformed from the vertically integrated hierarchy before the 
liberalization to this hybrid form of governance.  
 
7.6.5 The role of regulation 
The CRE has to approve the rules on the presentation of the proposals for adjustments by the 
adjustment parties to RTE, and the criteria for choosing between these proposals by RTE. The 
CRE has to approve these rules before they are implemented, and it thereby sets the ex ante 
rules of the game for RTE and the adjustment parties333.  The CRE also has to approve any 
changes to the rules on the programs and the adjustment mechanism334. The law of February 
2000 obliges the electricity generators that are connected to the transmission network to bid all 
of their reserve capacity that is technically available to RTE through the adjustment 
mechanism. The minister of energy may demand a justification from electricity generators on 
why a generating plant is not technically available335.  The rules determine that the adjustment 
parties have to pay a penalty when they do not execute an adjustment order of RTE. They lead 
to the flexibility of the contracts, and require the multilaterality of the adaptation process. 
Regulation is also part of the governance structure through the dispute settlement.    
 
 
7.7 Switching transactions 
When a French consumer wishes to switch to another electricity retailer, the newly chosen 
retailer contacts the distribution system operator with a request for a switch. In around 95 per 
cent of the switches, this distribution system operator is Electricité Réseau Distribution France 
(ERDF), the subsidiary of EDF336. The distribution system operator performs the switch. 
                                                 
333
 Article 15 of the law of February 2000. 
334
 Règles relative a la programmation, mécanisme d’ajustement et au dispositifs de responsable 
d’équilibre, section 1 relative à la Programmation, au Mécanisme d’Ajustement et au Recouvrement des 
charges d’ajustement, article B3: Modalités de révision des règles, page 24. 
335
 Article 15 of the law of February 2000.  
336
 This section focuses on the switching transactions that are performed by ERDF, because ERDF 
operates 95 per cent of the distribution network. The 200 small distributors that were not nationalized 
distribute only to around five per cent of the French consumers.  
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Before the new electricity retailer can request such a switch and offer the consumer a contract, 
it must gather some information about the consumer, such as the number of the consumer’s 
connection point, the capacity for which the consumer has access to the network, the electricity 
consumption, and information about the contract that the consumer currently has with the other 
retailer337. The new electricity retailer may collect this information from the consumer or from 
ERDF. ERDF will transfer all the technical information and the information on the electricity 
use of this consumer to the new retailer, only when this retailer has an authorization of the 
consumer to access this information. The retailer can access this information through the 
secure internet portal of ERDF, which is referred to as the système de gestion des échanges 
(SGE).  
When the new retailer requests ERDF to perform a switch, it sends information to ERDF, via 
the SGE, on the date of the switch, the new balancing responsible party, the tariffs, and the 
capacity at which the consumer accesses the network. ERDF checks within three days whether 
this switch can be performed, which means that it checks the switch date and whether there are 
no other switch requests for this connection. When a request for a switch is received before the 
10th of the month, the switch date can be set on the first of the next month, but when the 
request is received after the 10th of the month, the switch can only performed on the first day of 
the second month after the switch request338. ERDF communicates the switch date to both the 
old and the new retailer. The actual switch consists of attaching the connection number of the 
consumer to the perimeter of the new retailer. This switch is performed by ERDF.  
The old and new retailer must be able to send correct bills to the consumer, and therefore the 
meter readings have to be determined on the switch date. Information on the meter readings on 
the switch date is estimated by ERDF339. The switching transaction thus concerns the transfer 
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 Référentiel clientèle, C3.d. changement de fournisseur, www.erdfdistribution.fr (last accessed January 
20, 2009). 
338
 Modèle de contrat ERDF /Fournisseur relatif à l’accès au Réseau Public de Distribution, à son 
utilisation et à l’échange de données pour les Points de Connexion pour lesquels a été souscrit un Contrat 
Unique, ERDF-FOR-CF_02E, version 5.1, article 1.5.3.5 Changement de fournisseur à un point de 
livraison. 
339
 Référentiel clientèle. Procédure de changement de fournisseur pour les clients professionnels ou 
résidentiels BT 36 KVA (page 3) www.erdfdistribution.fr (last accessed January 20, 2009).  
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of information on the switch between the new retailer and the distribution system operator. The 
distribution system operator communicates with the old retailer, and the new retailer 
communicates with the consumer on the switch. 
 
7.7.1 The attributes of the transactions 
Every month, ERDF sends information to the CRE on the amount of consumers that have 
switched to another retailer (ERDF, 2007: 27). The CRE publishes this information every three 
months in an ‘Observatoire des marchés de l’électricité et du gaz’. From the 1st of July of 2007 
until October 2008, the CRE reports 497,000 switches. This means that ERDF performs close 
to 1,600 switches per day340. The frequency of the switching transaction can therefore be 
characterized as recurrent.  
The electricity retailers and the distribution system operator have to exchange information on 
the meter readings, and thus on the electricity use of the consumers, to be able to send correct 
bills. The distribution system operator is responsible for measuring the electricity use (or 
making estimates of this use). The information on the meter readings is accessible for the 
electricity retailers via the so-called ‘Plate-forme d’échanges’ of ERDF. The electricity 
retailers need to invest in specific human capital, in order to be able to use this platform. The 
employees need to be able to send the messages with the platform. A supplement to the GRD-F 
contract states that ERDF organizes training sessions to teach the employees of the retailers to 
work with the platform341. The investments that the electricity retailers make to access and use 
this platform are for their own costs342. Each retailer appoints a few employees that are 
allowed, and thus capable, of exchanging messages on the platform. The retailers communicate 
the name and contact details of these employees to ERDF343. These specific human assets are 
                                                 
340
 497,000 divided by 15 months and divided by 20 (for the amount of working days per month) is 1657, 
multiplied by 95 per cent (for the percentage of consumers to which ERDF distributes electricity) is 1574.  
341
 Article 4.2 of annexe 8: Règles d’accès et d’utilisation de la plate-forme d’échanges d’ERDF.  
342
 Article 3.3 of annexe 8: Règles d’accès et d’utilisation de la plate-forme d’échanges d’ERDF. 
343
 Modèle de contrat ERDF /Fournisseur relatif à l’accès au Réseau Public de Distribution, à son 
utilisation et à l’échange de données pour les Points de Connexion pour lesquels a été souscrit un Contrat 
Unique, ERDF-FOR-CF_02E, version 5.1, article 1.6 Modalités des échanges de données entre le 
fournisseur et ERDF relativement au périmètre de facturation. 
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also dedicated assets, as they can only be used for exchanging information with the 
distribution system operator via this platform.   
Two examples will be given that illustrate the presence of behavioral uncertainty in the 
switching transactions. These examples concern the opportunistic behavior of the distribution 
system operator (ERDF) and of the incumbent energy firm (EDF). The first example involves 
the four electricity retailers, Direct Energie, Gaz de France, Electrabel France and Poweo, 
which have demanded the CRE to resolve a dispute with ERDF. This dispute concerned the 
contract between the retailers and ERDF (the GRD-F contract) on access to the distribution 
network, the use of the distribution network, and the exchange of information on the 
connection points for which consumers have signed a unique contract. A unique contract is a 
contract between consumers and electricity retailers for which the consumers receive 
electricity, and a connection and an access to the network. The retailers arrange for a 
connection and an access to the network for the consumers with the distribution system 
operator, and therefore the consumers do not need to sign a separate contract with the 
distribution system operator. When consumers are switching to a different retailer, they may 
choose to sign such a unique contract with the retailer, or they may sign two separate contracts: 
one with the distribution system operator for access to the network and one with the new 
retailer for the supply of electricity. The system operator ERDF is a subsidiary of EDF, and is 
still located under the EDF holding. Therefore, ERDF does not have an incentive to aid other 
retailers in the switching process and to stimulate the customers of EDF to choose another 
retailer. The regulatory decision on the resolution of this dispute refers to an allegation of the 
retailers to ERDF: these retailers believe in the presence of such a privileged relation between 
ERDF and EDF. The retailers accuse ERDF of not providing clear information for the 
electricity consumers and the retailers, which also inhibits the retailers to provide their 
(potential) customers with clear information. The unwillingness of ERDF to provide clear 
information (on among others its responsibilities with respect to the consumers) may 
complicate the consumers’ decisions on switching to another retailer. The retailers demand that 
ERDF clarifies the information in the annexes to the contracts, that it simplifies the 
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information for the consumers that is published on its website (le référentiel clientèle), and that 
it indicates the contractual nature of this reference work for the consumers. ERDF should 
improve the readability of the documents that indicate the rights and obligations of the 
consumers. The retailers argue that the consumers that have signed a separate contract with 
ERDF should not have an advantage over the consumers with a unique contract. This 
advantage would include a better access to information of ERDF for those consumers with a 
separate contract, a distribution system operator that assumes its responsibilities with respect to 
its clients, and better consumer complaint facilities. ERDF has contested the demands of the 
retailers. The CRE has ruled that ERDF should alter article 1.3 of the GRD-F contract to allow 
for a simple and complete consultation of this contract in the annexes to the unique contracts of 
the electricity consumers. The CRE has also argued that the presentation of the reference work 
should be improved, and that these improvements should be made in consultation with the 
various parties in the electricity industry.344.  
The second example concerns the statement of objections that the European Commission sent 
to EDF at the end of December 2008. A statement of objections is a formal step in the antitrust 
investigations of the European Commission, in which the Commission informs a firm of the 
objections that are raised against this firm on, for example, an abuse of dominant position. In 
the case of EDF, the objections relate to contracts that are signed by EDF with industrial 
customers in France. The European Commission is concerned that these contracts may prevent 
customers from switching to other energy firms, and thereby reduce competition in the 
industry. The European Commission has stated that in particular the exclusive nature and the 
long duration of these contracts and the large share of the market that is covered by these 
contracts may decrease the competition in the French energy industry345. 
                                                 
344
 Décision du comité de règlement des différends et des sanctions de la Commission de regulation de 
l’énergie en date du 7 avril 2008 sur les différends qui opposent respectivement les sociétés Direct 
Energie, Gaz de France, Electrabel France et Poweo, à la société Electricité Réseau Distribution France 
(ERDF), relatifs à la signature d’un contrat GRD-F. 
345
 Press release of the European Commission on December 29, 2008: Antitrust: Commission confirms 
sending Statement of Objections to EdF on French electricity market. MEMO/08/809. europe.eu (last 
accessed January 19, 2009).  
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7.7.2 Misalignment 
The liberalization has altered the attributes of the switching transactions, and has in this way 
created a misalignment of these transactions with their governance structures. Before the 
introduction of competition, switching transactions occurred only when consumers moved to a 
different address. In around 95 per cent of the switches, the consumers moved to a region that 
was also served by EDF. Information on the switching consumers was therefore processed in 
the integrated firm. When consumers are given a choice of electricity retailer, the frequency of 
the switching transactions increases substantially. In addition, the behavioral uncertainty in 
these transactions increases when competition is introduced into the industry. The distribution 
system operator, that is located under the holding structure of the incumbent energy firm, has 
an incentive to disguise information to keep consumers from switching to another energy firm. 
The electricity retailers do not have an incentive to aid the consumers and the other retailers in 
switching the consumers to a competing firm. A new form of governance needs to emerge that 
coordinates the switching transactions between the distribution system operator and the 
independent electricity retailers. Transaction cost economics predicts, on the basis of these 
transaction attributes, that the bilateral governance structure is (comparatively) the most 
efficient. The following section does, however, illustrate that a trilateral form of governance 
has emerged for these transactions.  
 
7.7.3 The governance structure 
The incentive intensity of the switching transactions is characterized as being of an 
intermediate level. The electricity retailers only have an incentive to perform a switch when a 
consumer is switching to their firm. This new consumer will generate an income for the 
electricity retailer. The electricity retailers do not have an incentive to aid in switching a 
consumer to another retailer. They work to prevent their customers from switching to another 
firm, as is illustrated by the long-term contracts that EDF signed with the industrial consumers. 
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ERDF does not have an incentive to switch consumers from EDF to another retailer, as is 
illustrated by the example on the dispute resolution by the CRE.   
The administrative control instruments of this governance structure include an information 
disclosure mechanism and an information verification mechanism. When a consumer has 
expressed an interest in switching to a new retailer, but has not yet signed a contract with this 
retailer, ERDF must disclose some information about this consumer to the retailer. This 
information includes the number of the consumer’s connection point, the capacity for which 
the consumer has access to the network, the electricity consumption, and information about the 
contract that the consumer currently has with the other retailer. When ERDF receives a request 
for a switch, it verifies whether this switch can take place. ERDF checks whether there are no 
other switch requests for the connection point, and whether there haven’t been any 
unauthorized interventions in the measuring equipment or the network connection of the 
consumer that is requesting the switch346. ERDF may prohibit a retailer an access to the 
platform when the behavior of this retailer is a risk to the proper functioning of the platform347.   
The contracts between ERDF and the electricity retailers are flexible. Article 10.1 of these 
contracts states that, in case of substantial changes to the legal and regulatory environment, the 
parties must revise the clauses in the contracts so that they conform to the new regulations. 
When changes of an economic or commercial nature affect the contracts, the parties must 
together aim for a solution and they may change the contract. ERDF is authorized to alter 
several of the supplements to the contracts without consulting with the other party, such as the 
supplement on the exchange of messages between ERDF and the retailers348. The contracts 
between ERDF and the electricity retailers are signed for a period of three years, and are 
                                                 
346
 Modèle de contrat ERDF /Fournisseur relatif à l’accès au Réseau Public de Distribution, à son 
utilisation et à l’échange de données pour les Points de Connexion pour lesquels a été souscrit un Contrat 
Unique, ERDF-FOR-CF_02E, version 5.1, article 1.5.3.5 Changement de fournisseur à un point de 
livraison. 
347
 Article 10.2 of annexe 8: Règles d’accès et d’utilisation de la plate-forme d’échanges d’ERDF.  
348
 Modèle de contrat ERDF /Fournisseur relatif à l’accès au Réseau Public de Distribution, à son 
utilisation et à l’échange de données pour les Points de Connexion pour lesquels a été souscrit un Contrat 
Unique, ERDF-FOR-CF_02E, version 5.1, article 10.1 adaptation. 
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therefore long–term contracts349. The CRE is authorized to settle disputes between ERDF and 
the electricity retailers. It has settled a dispute between ERDF and various electricity retailers 
on the translation of the regulations into the contracts between the parties and ERDF (the 
GRD-F contracts)350.  
In summary, the governance structure is a hybrid form in which the retailers and the 
distribution system operator are parties to the transaction. These parties are autonomous, but 
the retailers depend on the system operator for performing the switch. The governance 
structure is characterized by an intermediate incentive intensity, information disclosure and 
verification mechanisms, and a long-term, flexible contract. Regulation is part of this 
governance structure, because the CRE settles the disputes between the parties to this 
switching transaction.   
 
7.7.4 Adaptation 
The identity of the contracting party is highly relevant to the electricity retailers. For the 
consumers that are connected to the distribution network, the retailers can only transact for the 
switches with the distribution system operators, which is ERDF in around 95 per cent of the 
switches. The other five per cent are the non-nationalized distributors. For a very small part of 
the switches, the electricity retailers have to transact with the transmission system operator. 
This is only the case for the large industrial consumers that are connected to the transmission 
network and that wish to switch to a new retailer. But for the large majority of the switches, the 
electricity retailers are thus restricted in their search for a contracting party and a new 
governance structure to ERDF.    
                                                 
349
 Modèle de contrat ERDF /Fournisseur relatif à l’accès au Réseau Public de Distribution, à son 
utilisation et à l’échange de données pour les Points de Connexion pour lesquels a été souscrit un Contrat 
Unique, ERDF-FOR-CF_02E, version 5.1, article 10.5 date d’effet et durée du contrat. 
350
 Décision du comité de règlement des différends et des sanctions de la Commission de regulation de 
l’énergie en date du 7 avril 2008 sur les différends qui opposent respectivement les sociétés Direct 
Energie, Gaz de France, Electrabel France et Poweo, à la société Electricité Réseau Distribution France 
(ERDF), relatifs à la signature d’un contrat GRD-F. 
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The CRE has created the ‘Groupe de Travail Electricité 2007’ (GTE 2007), in which the 
various parties in the electricity industry consult on the introduction of consumer choice into 
the industry by the first of July 2007. The GTE 2007 has aimed to put several measures in 
place for the protection of the electricity consumers, such as clear contractual information, 
transparency, and a mechanism to handle consumer complaints. A GTE 2004 existed to 
prepare the non-residential consumers for an electricity industry in which they can choose their 
own retailer. The work of the GTE 2004 is continued in the ‘Comité des Utilisateurs du Réseau 
de Distribution d'Electricité’ (CURDE) and in the ‘Comité des Utilisateurs des Réseaux de 
Transport d'Electricité’ (CURTE).  
Two committees have been created within the GTE 2007: one of these committees (le comité 
consommateurs) is concerned with the relations between the consumers, the retailers and the 
distribution system operator, and the other committee (le comité systèmes d’information et 
processus) studies the impact of consumer choice on the information systems in the industry. 
In addition, various working groups exist within the GTE 2007 that focus on different themes 
relevant within the industry at different points in time. The GTE 2007, and thus also the 
committees and working groups, are composed of various parties in the electricity industry, 
such as the electricity consumers, the distribution system operators, the transmission system 
operator, the retailers, the balancing responsible parties, the CRE and the DGCCRF. The 
presence of these representatives in the GTE 2007 may evolve over time, and new parties may 
enter the GTE 2007 after a confirmation by the CRE. The working groups present their 
accomplishments before the GTE 2007. These groups communicate the decisions that were 
taken, the contributions of the various participants, and also the points on which the 
participants could not reach an agreement, to the GTE 2007. These points may then be 
discussed at the level of the committees or the plenary sessions of the GTE 2007351. The 
contract between the electricity retailers and the distribution system operators (the GRD-F 
contract) is also discussed within the GTE 2007. The adaptation towards this contract and the 
new governance structure has therefore been a multilateral adaptation, as it involved the 
                                                 
351
 www.gte2007.com (last accessed January 22, 2009). 
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various parties in the electricity industry, including the distribution system operator, the 
retailers and the CRE. This has not been an adaptation in which the parties have agreed on the 
contents of the GRD-F contract, and it has therefore involved a dispute resolution by the CRE. 
In 2004, a third version of the contract was signed between the retailers and ERDF. Four 
retailers, Direct Energie, Gaz de France, Electrabel France and Poweo, have demanded the 
adaptation of this contract within the GTE. ERDF presented the retailers with a fourth version 
of the contract despite the fact that the disagreements were not resolved. In August 2007, the 
retailers again asked ERDF to adjust the contract. After a refusal by ERDF, the retailers have 
demanded the CRE to resolve this dispute, and to adjust the contract in a way that clarifies the 
responsibilities of ERDF352. The CRE has ruled in favor of the retailers.   
This transaction and the hybrid governance structure exist, because the retailers have to take 
the electric system into account. The customers, and the potential customers, of the electricity 
retailers need a connection and an access to the electricity network to be able to purchase 
electricity from the retailers. The system operators own the networks, the connections to these 
networks and often also the metering equipment. The retailers depend on these system 
operators for information on the electricity use and the meter readings. This is why the 
switching transaction (i.e. the exchange of information between the retailers and the 
distribution system operator on the switching consumer) exists. Because the dependence of the 
consumers on the electricity network will continue in the near future, the parties to the 
transactions prefer to set up a long-term governance structure.  
This multilateral adaptation, in which the identity of the contracting party is relevant and the 
dependence on the electric system is taken into account, explains the transformation to a hybrid 
governance structure, and the adaptation can therefore be characterized as an autonomous 
adaptation.  
 
                                                 
352
 Décision du comité de règlement des différends et des sanctions de la Commission de regulation de 
l’énergie en date du 7 avril 2008 sur les différends qui opposent respectivement les sociétés Direct 
Energie, Gaz de France, Electrabel France et Poweo, à la société Electricité Réseau Distribution France 
(ERDF), relatifs à la signature d’un contrat GRD-F, page 8. 
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7.7.5 The role of regulation 
The electricity law of 2000, which was modified by the law of 2006, states that every 
electricity consumer is free to choose an electricity retailer. The non-nationalized distributors 
are also treated as eligible consumers by this law for the supply of electricity to their customers 
within their region, and for the electricity that they purchase for losses on their network. The 
electricity retailers are also eligible for the electricity that they purchase and resell to their 
customers353. Several decrees have over time determined which consumers are allowed to 
choose their electricity retailer. A first decree in May 2000 set the threshold at 16 GWh: those 
consumers that consumed 16 GWh of electricity or more in 1999, were free to choose their 
retailer354. The decree of 2003 reduced the threshold to 7 GWh, and the decree of 2004 
expanded the eligibility to all non-residential consumers355. Since July 2007, every French 
consumer is free to choose an electricity retailer. Regulation has stimulated the multilateral 
adaptation to the new governance structure. Regulation is also part of this new governance 
structure: the CRE has settled a dispute on the GRD-F contract between ERDF and the 
electricity retailers.  
 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
The governance structures of the network connection transactions between the generators and 
the system operators, the network access transactions, the balancing transactions, and the 
switching transactions were transformed from the vertically integrated hierarchy to the hybrid 
form of governance. Autonomous adaptations have thus taken place for these transactions. The 
                                                 
353
 Article 22 of the law of February 2000. 
354
 Décret no 2000-456 du 29 mai 2000 relatif à l'éligibilité des consommateurs d'électricité et portant 
application de l'article 22 de la loi no 2000-108 du 10 février 2000 relative à la modernisation et au 
développement du service public de l'électricité (articles 1 and 3). 
355
 Décret n°2003-100 du 5 février 2003 portant modification du décret n° 2000-456 du 29 mai 2000 
relatif à l'éligibilité des consommateurs d'électricité et portant application de l'article 22 de la loi n° 2000-
108 du 10 février 2000 relative à la modernisation et au développement du service public de l'électricité. 
Décret n° 2004-597 du 23 juin 2004 relatif à l'éligibilité des consommateurs d'électricité et modifiant le 
décret n° 2000-456 du 29 mai 2000 (article 1).  
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network connection transactions between the consumers and the system operators used to be 
governed by regulation, and in the liberalized industry, these transactions are still governed by 
regulation. Regulation is part of each of the new governance structures. Regulation has also 
had an extensive influence on the transactions, the new governance structures and the 
adaptation processes. For example, regulation reduced the behavioral uncertainty in the 
network access and balancing transactions on the exchange of the programs. It reduced the 
incentive intensity for the network connection transactions; it requested the presence of 
information disclosure and information verification mechanisms for these same transactions; it 
created the flexibility of the contracts for the transactions on the exchange of the programs and 
the supply of reserve power; and it demanded a penalty for the transactions on the supply of 
reserve power. Regulation has also required the multilateral adaptations for several 
transactions, including the network access and balancing transactions.   
The attributes of the transactions are only able to explain the efficiency of the governance 
structure of the network connection transactions between the electricity consumers and the 
system operators. For these transactions, no misalignment was created by the European 
directives and the national regulations. Transaction cost economics regards the regulation of 
the network connection transactions between the generators and the system operators as 
second-best solutions, and it cannot explain the efficiency of the hybrid forms of governance 
for the transactions on the exchange of the programs and the supply of reserve power. The 
absence of behavioral uncertainty in these transactions would not require an ex post safeguard. 
Transaction cost economics predicts a bilateral structure, instead of the current trilateral 
structure, for the switching transactions, because of the recurrent frequency of these 
transactions in the liberalized electricity industry. The attributes of adaptation have been able 
to explain the governance transformations to the hybrid forms of governance. 
The following chapter presents a comparison between the governance transformations in the 
Dutch and French electricity industries, and it provides a conclusion for the entire thesis.
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions 
 
 
This final chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis. It summarizes the main findings of 
the multiple case study, and in particular the findings on the transformations to new 
governance structures and the influence of regulation on these governance transformations. It 
indicates how the transformations to the new governance structures are explained by the 
attributes of the adaptations, and when the attributes of the transactions explain the efficiency 
of the new governance structures (section 8.1). This chapter thereby summarizes the answer to 
the general research question: What is the influence of regulation on the transformations 
between governance structures in the liberalizing Dutch and French electricity industries? The 
table in appendix E repeats the research questions 1a until 5b that were posed in chapter one, 
and indicates which sections of this thesis answer these research questions. This chapter also 
presents the theoretical contribution, the policy recommendations, and the limitations of this 
thesis (sections 8.2, 8.4 and 8.5). It also reports on the differences between the real-life 
contexts of the Dutch and French electricity industries, and indicates how these contexts have 
affected the governance transformations (section 8.3).  
 
 
8.1 Main findings 
8.1.1 Governance transformations and new governance structures 
The case study in chapters six and seven has analyzed the governance transformations for the 
network connection, network access, balancing, and switching transactions in the Dutch and 
French electricity industry. In total, nine transactions have been discussed (see table 8.1)356.  
                                                 
356
 The network access and balancing transactions consist of the exchange of transportation and energy 
programs, and the supply of reserve power to resolve transportation restrictions and to balance electricity 
supply and demand in real time. In the Dutch electricity industry the exchange of transportation programs 
for network access and the exchange of energy programs for balancing supply and demand are two 
separate transactions, whereas in the French electricity industry this information for network access and 
balancing is exchanged in one transaction only. 
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Table 8.1 Nine transactions of the multiple case study 
Dutch electricity industry French electricity industry 
1. Network connection transaction (§6.4) 6. Network connection transaction (§7.4) 
2. Network access transaction:  
exchange of transportation programs (§6.5) 
7. Network access and balancing transactions: 
exchange of programs (§7.5) 
3. Balancing transaction:  
exchange of energy programs (§6.6) 
 
4. Network access and balancing transactions: 
supply of reserve power (§6.7) 
8. Network access and balancing transactions: 
supply of reserve power (§7.6) 
5. Switching transaction (§6.8) 9. Switching transaction (§7.7) 
 
Every new governance structure for each of these transactions is a hybrid form and regulation 
is part of each of these governance structures. For each of the nine transactions, the governance 
transformations were from the vertically integrated hierarchy to the hybrid form of governance.  
 
8.1.2 The influence of regulation 
The influence of regulation on these governance transformations can be summarized as being 
of four types. Regulation sets the ex ante rules of the game and thereby influences the attributes 
of the transactions, the attributes of the governance structures, and the attributes of adaptation 
and the adaptation costs. Regulation has also become part of the new governance structures. 
These four types of regulatory influences are summarized here, and in table 8.2.  
Firstly, regulation influences the attributes of the transactions. It creates the site-specificity of 
the network connection transactions in both the Dutch and French electricity industry: the 
regulated connection tariffs are lower when the generators and consumers of electricity locate 
their plants and equipment closer to the network. In both industries, regulation sets strict time 
schedules for exchanging the messages on the programs and the bids for reserve power, and 
thereby formalizes the temporal specificity that is inherent in these transactions. Regulation 
leads to investments in human capital to enable the exchange of these messages, and thereby 
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creates a human asset-specificity for the network access and balancing transactions. These 
investments in human capital and the investments that enable a compliance with the strict time 
schedules are also dedicated assets: they are only made to transact with the transmission 
system operator. Regulation eliminates the behavioral uncertainty in the transactions of 
exchanging the programs in both the Dutch and French electricity industry. Regulation 
determines that program responsible parties have to pay an imbalance price when they do not 
abide by their programs. This gives these parties an incentive to provide the transmission 
system operator with accurate programs, and eliminates the parties’ incentive to disguise or 
distort information. These rules on imbalance pricing thus align the incentives between the 
program responsible parties and the transmission system operator and reduce the need for ex 
post governance structures.  
Secondly, regulation has also had an influence on the attributes of the governance structures, 
and in particular on the incentive intensity, the administrative control instruments and the 
contract flexibility. In the Dutch and French electricity industries, the public authorities 
determine the network connection tariffs. These regulated tariffs reduce the incentive intensity 
of the system operators, as the tariffs limit the operators’ ability to influence their income. In 
the Dutch electricity industry, regulation also influences the incentive intensity for the supply 
of reserve power. In this industry, the imbalance price is based on the regulating price. The 
energy firms pay the imbalance price when they do not abide by their programs, and they 
receive the regulating price for the supply of reserve power to the transmission system 
operator. If the energy firms increase their bid prices (which increases the regulating price), 
they may have to pay this higher price themselves when an unexpected event creates an 
imbalance. This link between the two prices, which is formulated in the system code, therefore 
reduces the incentive intensity of the energy firms in the bidding process. Dutch and French 
regulations have determined that the administrative apparatus of the program transactions 
includes a monitoring of the electricity use and a penalty, in the form of the imbalance price. In 
the Dutch electricity industry, the transaction on the exchange of the transportation programs is 
governed by an information disclosure mechanism: the transmission system operator must 
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publish information on the quality of its transportation service. The Dutch transaction on 
exchanging energy programs is governed by an information verification mechanism: the 
transmission system operator must verify whether the program responsible parties have 
delivered internally and externally consistent programs. In the French electricity industry, the 
transmission system operator must disclose information on the measurements of the electricity 
use to the network users for the program transactions. The French transactions for the supply of 
reserve power are governed by a penalty: the rules state that the transmission system operator 
may impose a penalty when the energy firms do not respond to an adjustment order. The Dutch 
transactions for the supply of reserve power are governed by an information disclosure 
mechanism: the energy firms must disclose information on their available production capacity 
to the system operator. In both industries, the rules determine that the contracts for the 
transactions of exchanging programs are flexible.  
Thirdly, regulation has also influenced the attributes of adaptation, mainly by determining 
which economic actors have to be involved in the adaptation process. The Dutch and French 
public authorities have demanded a multilateral adaptation for the network connection 
transactions, the transactions for exchanging the programs, and for the supply of reserve 
power. The Dutch regulations state that the economic actors have to consider the requirements 
of the electric system, such as the safety and reliability of the network and of the electricity 
supply, in their adaptation to a new governance structure for the network connection, network 
access and balancing transactions. Through regulation’s large influence on the particularities of 
each governance structure, as discussed above, the public authorities reduce the search costs 
for the economic actors in the adaptation process. The authorities reduce the costs for searching 
a contracting party, and a new governance structure. Regulation has also reduced the 
bargaining and negotiation costs for the network users by, for example, demanding non-
discriminatory behavior from the system operators for a connection to the network, and by 
setting the connection tariffs.  
Finally, regulation is also part of the new governance structures. In the French electricity 
industry, the sector-specific regulator resolves the disputes between the contracting parties to 
319
Conclusion  
 
309
 
the transactions. In the Dutch electricity industry, the competition authority resolves the 
disputes for the electricity transactions to which a system operator is a contracting party. The 
Dutch public authorities have also intervened in the contractual agreements of the parties to the 
network connection and switching transactions with binding instructions and fines. These 
authorities also monitor the quality of the transportation service, and the quality of the 
switching transactions. 
 
Table 8.2 Four types of regulatory influences  
 Type of transaction Dutch electricity industry French electricity industry 
On the 
attributes of 
transactions: 
Network 
connection: 
Regulation creates site-specificity Regulation creates site-specificity 
 Exchange of 
programs and supply 
of reserve power: 
Regulation formalizes temporal and 
human-asset specificity and 
dedicated assets 
Regulation formalizes temporal and 
human-asset specificity and 
dedicated assets 
 Exchange of 
programs: 
Regulation eliminates behavioral 
uncertainty 
Regulation eliminates behavioral 
uncertainty 
On the 
attributes of 
governance: 
Network 
connection: 
Regulation reduces incentive 
intensity 
Regulation reduces incentive 
intensity 
 Exchange of 
programs:  
Regulation creates information 
disclosure and verification 
mechanisms, monitoring, a penalty, 
and contract flexibility 
Regulation creates an information 
disclosure mechanism, monitoring, 
a penalty, and contract flexibility 
 Supply of reserve 
power: 
Regulation reduces incentive 
intensity, and creates an 
information disclosure mechanism  
Regulation creates a penalty  
On the 
attributes of 
adaptation & 
adaptation 
costs: 
Network 
connection: 
Regulation creates multilateral 
adaptation to system requirements, 
and reduces search, bargaining and 
negotiation costs 
Regulation creates multilateral 
adaptation, and reduces search, 
bargaining and negotiation costs 
 Exchange of 
programs and supply 
of reserve power: 
Regulation creates multilateral 
adaptation to system requirements, 
and reduces search costs 
Regulation creates multilateral 
adaptation, and reduces search costs 
 Switching: Regulation reduces search costs  
Part of 
governance: 
Network connection, 
access, balancing 
and switching: 
Competition authority resolves 
disputes 
Sector-specific authority resolves 
disputes 
 
Network connection 
and switching: 
Public authority enforces contracts   
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8.1.3 Explanation with transactions 
Chapter two has introduced the discriminating alignment hypothesis of transaction cost 
economics, according to which ‘transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with 
governance structures, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a 
discriminating - mainly a transaction cost-economizing – result’ (Williamson, 1996a: 12). 
Chapters six and seven have characterized the attributes of the various electricity transactions 
and those of the governance structures, and have indicated if transaction cost economics 
considers these governance structures to be efficiently aligned with the transactions. This 
subsection summarizes when transaction cost economics has been able to explain the 
efficiency of the new governance structures for the electricity transactions. 
Transaction cost economics has analyzed regulation as a hybrid form of governance that solves 
the contractual hazard between consumers and the integrated electric utility. This utility has a 
monopoly on supplying electricity and has an incentive to set high prices. The regulator and 
the utility engage in a collective contract, in which the price and the conditions are determined 
for which the utility has to supply electricity to the consumers. Regulation enjoys a 
comparative efficiency advantage as a governance structure for the contractual hazard between 
the consumers and the electric utility with a monopoly on the supply of electricity. Chapters six 
and seven have illustrated that this analysis of regulation can also be applied to the network 
connection transactions between the system operators and the consumers in a liberalized and 
unbundled industry. Because of the monopoly position of the system operators for a connection 
to the network and the asymmetrical dependence of the network users on these system 
operators for a connection, the network connection contracts between the system operators and 
the consumers can most efficiently be governed by regulation. The attributes of these network 
connection transactions can thus explain the comparative efficiency of the new governance 
structure. 
Williamson states that economic actors should ‘try markets, try hybrids, try firms, try 
regulation, and resort to the public bureau when all else fails (comparatively)’ (Williamson, 
1998a: 47). Transaction cost economics thus regards regulation as one of the organization 
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forms of last resort (see also figure 2.4). Before the liberalization of the electricity industries, 
the network connection transactions between the electricity generators and the system 
operators were governed by vertically integrated firms. From a transaction cost economics 
perspective, the current regulation of the network connection transactions between the 
generators and the system operators is therefore a second-best solution.  
The transactions of the exchange of programs for a network access and a balancing of 
electricity supply and demand, and the French transactions of the supply of reserve power, are 
characterized by an absence of behavioral uncertainty. Williamson states that when uncertainty 
is present in a transaction, it is ‘imperative that the parties devise a machinery to work things 
out’ (Williamson, 1985: 60). But when uncertainty is absent, transaction cost economics does 
not predict the efficiency of an ex post governance structure (Williamson 1985: 31)357. 
Transaction cost economics is therefore not able to explain the efficiency of a hybrid form of 
governance for these transactions in both the Dutch and French electricity industry.  
Before the liberalization of the electricity industries, the transactions of the supply of reserve 
power were internalized in the vertically integrated firm. In the liberalized Dutch electricity 
industry, these transactions are characterized by a recurrent frequency, various types of asset-
specificity and a behavioral uncertainty, and they are governed by regulation. From a 
transaction cost economics perspective, these transactions could still be efficiently internalized 
in the hierarchy, and regulation is therefore again considered to be a second-best solution. The 
recurrent frequency of these transactions would justify the integration into the firm to recover 
the governance costs, as opposed to a trilateral form of governance that is more efficient for 
occasional transactions (see figure 2.1). 
The switching transactions were governed by vertically integrated hierarchies before the 
introduction of competition into the electricity industries. The consumers arranged their 
switching themselves only when they moved to a region served by a different utility. The 
frequency of these transactions increased substantially in the liberalized industries in which 
consumers are given a choice of electricity retailer. The switching transactions are currently 
                                                 
357
 ‘Contract reduces to a world of promise. Strategic behavior is thereby denied’ (Williamson, 1985: 31). 
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governed by regulation, and thus by a trilateral form of governance. Transaction cost 
economics is not able to explain the efficiency of the trilateral structures when the frequency of 
the transactions increases. Parties to a bilateral governance structure are only able to recover 
the governance costs of such a structure when the frequency is recurrent, but when the 
frequency is lower a trilateral governance structure is proposed by transaction cost economics 
to be more efficient.  
In summary, transaction cost economics is able to explain the efficiency of regulation for the 
network connection transactions between the consumers and the system operators. The fact that 
a market did not emerge for the electricity transactions confirms the predictions of transaction 
cost economics (see also section 3.5). From a TCE perspective, the new governance structures 
for the supply of reserve power and the network connection transactions between the 
generators and the system operators are second-best solutions. Transaction cost economics is 
not able to explain the efficiency of the hybrid governance structures for the transactions of 
exchanging the programs to access the network and to balance supply and demand: the absence 
of behavioral uncertainty in these transactions does not lead to ex post governance structures, 
and ex ante contractual agreements are considered to be more efficient. One reason for this 
inability of TCE to explain the emergence of these hybrid forms is that TCE does not explicitly 
take into account the dependence of contracting parties on a secure network. The program 
transactions are governed by an information verification mechanism, that is characteristic of 
hybrid structures, to ensure the safety of the electric system. TCE is also not able to explain the 
efficiency of the trilateral form of governance for the switching transactions, because the 
recurrent frequency would allow for a bilateral structure. TCE does not consider the specifics 
of these switching transactions, and in particular the dependence of the transacting parties on a 
network. It is less costly to centralize the information on the connections of consumers in a 
third party. This allows the retailers to contact only one party when they need to gather 
information on switching consumers, as opposed to numerous bilateral information exchanges 
with previous retailers and regional distributors.  
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8.1.4 Explanation with adaptation 
This thesis has introduced the concept of adaptation as an explanatory variable for the 
emergence of the new governance structures and the governance transformations. Economic 
actors adapt to a new governance structure when they find themselves in a situation of 
misalignment, and when the adaptation costs are lower than the transaction cost differential, 
being the difference between the actual transaction costs and the optimal transaction costs. It is 
assumed that economic actors economize on adaptation costs when they adapt to new forms of 
governance. Since adaptation costs are very difficult, or maybe even impossible, to quantify, 
attributes of adaptation have been characterized. A parallel with standard transaction cost 
economics is sought in order to enable the introduction of this concept of adaptation into the 
TCE framework. In this TCE framework, economic actors are assumed to economize on 
transaction costs, the unit of analysis is the transaction, and attributes of transactions are 
identified that should explain the efficiency of governance structures. In this complementary 
perspective that takes adaptation into account, adaptation is the unit of analysis, and the 
attributes of adaptation aim to explain the efficiency of the governance transformations. The 
attributes of adaptation are the identity of the contracting party, the laterality of the adaptation 
and the type of response (to either the system requirements or the price) in the adaptation 
process. These attributes are based on the definitions of adaptation of Hayek (1945) and 
Barnard (1938). Chapters six and seven have illustrated that for each of the transactions, the 
economic actors searched for a contracting party of which the identity was highly relevant, 
these economic actors adapted multilaterally, and they considered the requirements of the 
electric system in the adaptation process. As was proposed in chapter four, these attributes of 
adaptation explain the transformations to the hybrid forms of governance. For example, when 
the identity of the contracting party is highly relevant and therefore only one or a few potential 
contracting parties are available, the economic actors prefer to engage in a long-term relation 
once they have started negotiations with a (potential) contracting party, simply because the 
contracting parties with the preferential quality are limited, and the economic actors aim to 
reduce their future search costs for new contracting parties. A long-term hybrid form is then 
324
Conclusion 
 
314  
preferred over short-term market relations. The identity of the contracting party is highly 
relevant to the network users; for each of the electricity transactions they need to engage in a 
contractual relation with a system operator. There are only a few distribution system operators 
and one transmission system operator in each electricity industry. The economic actors have 
considered the requirements of the electric system when adapting to the new governance 
structures for each of the transactions. The economic actors prefer a long-term hybrid form, 
because the dependence on a network and the importance of the security and safety of the 
electricity supply are not likely to change in the near future. The parties to the multilateral 
adaptation have also been the parties to the new governance structure for each of the electricity 
transactions.  
 
8.1.5. Conclusion 
As a conclusion of this thesis, an answer to the general research question can be given. This 
question was formulated as follows: What is the influence of regulation on the transformations 
between governance structures in the liberalizing Dutch and French electricity industries? For 
each of the electricity transactions, a transformation to a hybrid form of governance occurred. 
The attributes of adaptation have been able to explain these governance transformations. The 
attributes of the transactions could only explain the efficiency of the governance structure for 
the network connection transactions between the consumers and the system operators. In the 
liberalizing Dutch and French electricity industries, regulation still plays a large role. 
Regulation has had a profound effect on these governance transformations: it prescribed that 
the economic actors adopt several of the characteristics of a hybrid form of governance, such 
as the elaborate administrative control instruments, the intermediate incentive intensity, and the 
contract flexibility. It prescribed a multilateral adaptation in which the economic actors have to 
consider the safety of the electric system. Regulation also governs the contractual relation 
between the parties to the electricity transactions. 
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8.2 Theoretical contribution of complementary elements 
Three theoretical contributions of this thesis are summarized in this section. Firstly, the 
introduction of the concept of adaptation into the transaction cost economics framework has 
provided an explanation for the new governance structures and for the transformations to these 
new structures. The attributes of adaptation have been able to explain the emergence of the 
hybrid forms of governance, also where the attributes of the transactions have not been able to 
explain the comparative efficiency of the new governance structures. This is especially evident 
in the case of the program transactions, for which transaction cost economics does not predict 
the efficiency of an ex post governance structure due to the absence of behavioral uncertainty. 
Hybrid governance structures did emerge for these transactions, because the parties to these 
transactions have to consider their dependence on an electricity network and the fact that 
electricity cannot be stored, and that the identity of the contracting parties is highly relevant. 
These transacting parties adapted multilaterally to the new hybrid forms. The attributes of 
adaptation have also been able to explain the transformation to the hybrid forms of governance 
for the network connection transactions and the transactions of the supply of reserve power. 
TCE refers to these governance structures as second-best solutions, and is not able to predict 
what second-best solutions will emerge, once an industry has been affected by ex ante 
regulations that exclude the most efficient solution.      
A second theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it formulates and analyzes the various 
roles of regulation in unbundled and liberalized industries. In Williamson’s transaction cost 
economics, the concept of regulation is mainly defined as a governance structure for the 
integrated electric utilities with a monopoly on the supply of electricity to consumers. This 
thesis has located regulation in the institutional environment, from where regulation sets the ex 
ante rules of the game and influences the attributes of the transactions, the governance 
structures and adaptation, as summarized in the subsection 8.1.2. Such a perspective on 
regulation can be internalized in the existing transaction cost economics framework, because 
this framework already refers to the existence of an institutional environment that affects the 
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governance structures. It locates concepts such as property rights and contract law in this 
institutional environment, but not regulation.  
Finally, transaction cost economics has focused on the contractual hazards between consumers 
and the integrated electric utilities (Williamson, 1976; Goldberg, 1976), between the regulator 
and the integrated electric utilities (Levy and Spiller, 1994), and between the coalmines and the 
electricity generators (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983) (see also section 3.5). The study of the 
contractual hazards between the various unbundled activities in the liberalized electricity 
industries has been underemphasized. This thesis has focused on these contractual hazards, as 
it has addressed the network connection, network access, balancing and switching transactions 
that all concern the relation between the unbundled system operators and the network users.  
 
 
8.3 Differences between the Dutch and French electricity industries 
The main purpose of the multiple case study has been to draw similar conclusions from the 
adaptation process for the governance transformations in the Dutch and French electricity 
industries. Several differences have also been observed between these two industries. They 
differ in terms of the independence of their system operators. The Dutch transmission system 
operator is unbundled in terms of its ownership, and the law of November 2006 prohibits the 
distribution system operators to be part of the same holding structure as electricity generation 
and retail. In France, the transmission system operator, RTE, is located under the EDF holding, 
and the distribution system operators are also subsidiaries of EDF. In both industries, however, 
the distribution and transmission system operators are separate legal entities. They have both 
implemented the requirement of legal unbundling as formulated in the EC electricity directive 
of 2003. The Dutch public authorities have demanded a greater independence of the system 
operators than is proposed in this directive. A consequence of this requirement on legal 
unbundling is that these differences between the Dutch and French electricity industries in 
terms of the system operators’ independence do not result in large differences in the 
governance structures. Each system operator is a separate legal entity with respect to the 
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network users, and therefore engages in a hybrid form with these network users (instead of 
internalizing the transactions). The greater independence of the Dutch operators does therefore 
not show up in the governance structures. This is of course also due to the fact that transaction 
cost economics does not focus on the ownership of the transacting parties when defining the 
governance structures.  
One example can, however, be given of a difference between the governance structures in the 
Dutch and French electricity industries that illustrates that the French transmission system 
operator retains a central role in coordinating the network users. This example concerns the 
transaction on the supply of reserve power to the system operator. Different types of regulating 
and reserve power exist, including primary, secondary and tertiary reserves. The primary 
frequency regulation is an automatic function at the level of the generators that responds to 
changes in frequency. In the Dutch electricity industry, both the secondary and tertiary reserves 
are offered to TenneT through a bidding mechanism. In the French electricity industry, the 
energy firms only bid for the supply of tertiary reserves to RTE. The secondary frequency 
regulation is still organized at the national dispatching level by RTE. The Dutch electricity 
industry has thus applied this market mechanism of bidding to a larger part of the reserves, 
whereas the French electricity industry stays closer to its structure of before the liberalization, 
of integrating activities, such as the dispatching for reserves, in a vertically integrated firm. 
This difference in the governance of the supply of reserve power and the differences in the 
independence of the system operators can be explained by the real-life contexts in the two 
industries. The Dutch and French electricity industries differ in terms of the governance 
structures from which they started the liberalization process. The French electricity industry 
had a more extensive vertical integration before the implementation of the 1996 EC directive: 
since 1946, EDF had a national monopoly on the transmission network, it generated 93 per 
cent of total electricity, and distributed to 95 per cent of the French consumers. In the Dutch 
electricity industry, many electric utilities distributed electricity in their regional monopolies. 
The largest of these distributors were integrated with the generation of electricity, and several 
independent distributors existed. The transmission system was organized at the national level, 
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as a cooperation of the large electricity generators. The French electricity industry thus started 
from a situation with a greater degree of vertical integration, and its adjustment to independent 
system operators may therefore take a longer time as compared to the Dutch industry.    
An additional explanation is the different objectives of the ministries of energy and economy in 
the Dutch and French electricity industries, and in particular their means towards achieving 
these objectives. The Dutch ministry of economic affairs aims to protect the electricity 
consumers through an effective functioning of the market, and thus through the introduction of 
competition into the electricity industry (see section 6.3.4). The ministry has not only pursued 
a greater independence of the system operators, but it has also demanded a faster introduction 
of consumer choice into the Dutch electricity industry than was required by the directives. 
Every Dutch consumer is free to choose a retailer for green electricity since July 2001 and for 
grey electricity since July 2004. The ministry’s desire to create a competitive electricity market 
is also illustrated by the large allocation of regulatory responsibilities to the sector-specific 
regulator, and the location of this regulator under the authority of the competition authority 
(Niesten, 2006). The mission of the sector-specific regulator is to ensure the effective 
functioning of the electricity market. The system operators are unbundled in terms of their 
ownership in order to stimulate competition in the Dutch electricity industry. The objectives of 
the French ministries of energy and economy have been entirely different. It has been said that 
‘the aim of the French reformer is not to favour the development of competition per se, but to 
respect the Directive a minima’ (Finon, 2003: 260). The French consumers were only given the 
option to choose their retailer by July 2007, and they may still choose to be supplied for a 
regulated tariff. The ministries retain the regulatory responsibility for determining these tariffs 
(Niesten, 2006). One objective of the ministry of energy is the energy independence of France 
(see section 7.3.4). The ministry aims to protect the interests of the French consumers through 
the protection of the national champion EDF, and it therefore does not have an incentive to 
increase the independence of the system operators. 
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8.4 Limitations  
The choice for the theoretical perspective of transaction cost economics confronts this thesis 
with several limitations. These limitations of transaction cost economics have often been 
addressed. For example, De Jong and Nooteboom have argued that ‘transaction cost economics 
considers many things such as preferences, capabilities, perceptions and knowledge to be 
stable and given exogenously. It implicitly assumes unchanging competencies and a constant 
state of technology’ (De Jong en Nooteboom, 2000: 13). Dietrich states that transaction cost 
economics ‘forecloses investigation of many important facets of the firm involving in 
particular idiosyncratic organisational capabilities and issues of economic power’ (Dietrich, 
1994: 4). These capabilities, knowledge, changes in technology, and economic power are 
alternative explanations for governance structures, as compared to the attributes of transactions 
within transaction cost economics. Another critique on transaction cost economics is that it is 
‘not path-dependent and a-historical’ (De Jong en Nooteboom, 2000: 13). Initial conditions 
may play a role in the evolution of liberalising industries, as was shown by Kahn (1998) for the 
Spanish electricity industry. 
This thesis has illustrated that the attributes of the transactions are severely limited as 
explanations for the new forms of governance in the liberalizing electricity industries. The aim 
of this thesis has not been to look at other theoretical perspectives to resolve this limited 
explanatory power of transactions in a liberalizing environment. The focus is instead on the 
concept of adaptation as an explanatory variable for governance changes and on incorporating 
this concept into the existing transaction cost economics framework, to address another critique 
on transaction cost economics. TCE has often been viewed as a ‘comparative static 
perspective’ (Groenewegen and Vromen, 1997: 33), which is ‘incapable, by itself, of 
explaining the dynamics of institutional change’ (Dietrich, 1994: 5). This thesis analyses the 
process of adaptation by economic actors from one governance structure to another, and in 
particular the identity of the future contracting party, the laterality of the adaptation and the 
type of response in the adaptation process. With these attributes of adaptation, this thesis is 
able to explain the governance transformations. Dietrich mentions an advantage of the attempts 
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to develop transaction cost economics, instead of suggesting alternative or substitutive 
frameworks. These developments of TCE avoid the marginalising of the critiques on 
transaction cost economics. He states that ‘a major problem with suggesting substitutive 
frameworks is that their substantive importance is marginalised, because most economists view 
the world through the eyes of the dominant school of thought’ (Dietrich, 1994: 8).    
 
 
8.5 Policy recommendations  
The European Commission aims to develop a competitive electricity market in the European 
Union. The two directives of 1996 and 2003 include common rules for the creation of such an 
internal competitive market. When considering the results of this thesis, it becomes clear that 
such a market has not yet emerged in the Dutch and the French electricity industries.  
It has been argued that if policy makers were to use a transaction cost economics framework, 
they would be better able to identify the contractual hazards in the electricity industry and 
therefore the difficulties with creating markets in this industry. Joskow (2000) stated that 
‘many policy makers and fellow travelers have been surprised by how difficult it has been to 
create wholesale electricity markets…Had policy makers viewed the restructuring challenge 
using a TCE framework, these potential problems are more likely to have been identified and 
mechanisms adopted ex ante to fix them’ (Joskow, 2000: 51, quoted in Williamson, 2002: 
187). The policies of the European Commission have instead emphasized the vertical 
unbundling of the electricity industries. This separation of the natural monopolies from the 
competitive segments has been described as the ‘standard neoclassical public policy 
prescription’ (Joskow, 1996: 345).  
This thesis illustrates that the electricity transactions are characterized by various types of 
asset-specificity and by bilateral dependencies of the transacting parties. The coordination of 
these transactions with a market is therefore difficult. If the European Commission aims to 
introduce a market, it should not restrict its policies and directives to structural measures such 
as the legal unbundling of the system operators. The policies should also aim to reduce the 
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specificity of the transactions, and they should accommodate for the behaviour of the economic 
actors in the electricity industry. Regulations that stimulate economic actors to adapt from a 
misaligned situation with a unilateral response and to changes in prices, may facilitate the 
emergence of market forms of governance. 
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A - The governance of interrelationships 
In addition to the four asset-specificity reasons for vertical integration, Joskow (1996, 2002) 
provides another argument for the efficiency of vertical integration in the electricity industry. 
He argues that vertical integration internalizes the investment and operating interrelationships 
between generation and transmission (Joskow, 2002: 509). Investment interrelationships 
between generation and transmission follow from the fact that ‘investments in transmission 
capacity to remove network constraints can affect the costs of generating electricity and the 
value of power produced at various locations on the network’ (Joskow, 1996: 350). In addition, 
the location of generating capacity involves trade-offs between generating and transmission 
costs. The integration of these two segments of the electricity value chain enables the reduction 
of the combined costs of generating and transmitting electricity. In this respect, Hunt (2002) 
remarked that ‘the long-term planning of investments in transmission and generation benefited 
from their vertical integration’ (Hunt, 2002: 26). 
Operating interrelationships between transmission and generation are important in the 
balancing of electricity supply and demand. The transmission system operator is responsible 
for balancing electricity supply and demand for the entire electric system. The TSO needs to 
call upon generators on a continuous basis to balance the system. Generators provide so-called 
ancillary services to the TSO, including reactive power, spinning reserves, standby reserves, 
blackstart capability and frequency regulation (Joskow, 1996: 349). This continuous balancing 
of the system requires such a complex coordination between generation and transmission that 
vertical integration is believed to be the more efficient governance structure (Joskow, 1996). 
Hunt (2002) stated that the ‘technical challenges of coordinating the generation with the 
transmission demanded such complex integration of generation and transmission (via the 
system operator) that it was considered impossible to separate them’ (Hunt, 2002: 25).  
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B - Network connection problems in disintegrated governance structures 
The integration of generation and transmission of electricity has been argued to be more 
efficient than governance through disintegrated structures (Joskow, 1996). The vertical 
integration of these two activities internalizes the investment complementarities between 
generation and transmission. When decisions on investments in generation and transmission 
are combined, and are thus made in a vertically integrated structure, the costs of these 
investments may be reduced358. In the Dutch electricity industry, there have been some 
problems with connecting new generating plants to the network as a result of the disintegrated 
decision-making on investments in generation and transmission. The Dutch transmission 
system operator announced that in 2007 it could not connect every new generating plant to the 
network, because there was not enough transmission capacity (TenneT, 2007: 22)359. This 
problem of too little connection and transmission capacity will very likely persist in the current 
unbundled industry structure, as generating plants take three to five years to build, and 
transmission lines eight to ten years. The transmission system operator has no advance 
information on when new generating plants will be built in the unbundled industry. It receives 
this information when the electricity firms announce their plans to build, and request a 
connection to the network. The transmission system operator always follows the investments in 
generation, and thus always lacks behind these investments in generating capacity. A solution 
to this problem is an increased coordination between the system operators and the generators of 
electricity on their investment plans. A market form of governance is therefore not likely to 
emerge, and has not emerged, for the network connection transactions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
358
 See also appendix A for a discussion on the investment and operating complementarities between 
transmission and generation. 
359
 This also meant that several green generating plants could not be connected, because TenneT has to 
provide connections to the network on a first come, first served basis. The Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs has proposed to formulate a new law for the electricity industry that gives green generating plants 
priority over other plants for connections to the network. 
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C- Governance of grid losses 
A grid loss is defined as the difference between the amount of electricity that is put on a 
network and the amount of electricity that can be taken out of this network. The electricity that 
can be consumed is always less than the electricity that is produced; when electricity is 
transported a small part of the amount of electricity that is put on the network is lost. Every 
system operator is responsible for purchasing electricity to cover these losses on their own 
network. The Dutch transmission system operator, TenneT, needs around 500 GWh of 
electricity per year for the grid losses on the transmission network. TenneT invites tenders for 
the supply of electricity to cover these grid losses. The costs that the system operators make for 
the grid losses are transferred to the electricity consumers, and covered by the regulated 
transportation tariff. Before the liberalization of the Dutch electricity industry, the transactions 
for the grid losses were internalized in the pooling system of the SEP. The SEP pooled all the 
produced electricity, transported the electricity along the transmission network, and set a 
uniform tariff for the electricity. The compensation for the grid losses is currently governed by 
a market: through tenders, TenneT may choose the energy firm that offers to supply the 
electricity at the lowest cost. The system operators can thus influence the costs for the grid 
losses360.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
360
 There has been a discussion between the regulator and the system operators on whether the costs for 
the grid losses can be influenced by the system operators, which would have consequences for how these 
costs are included in the calculation of the regulated tariff. The fact that these costs have to be incurred 
may be difficult to influence. The system operators can also hardly influence these costs by making 
technical adjustments to the network. But the costs for purchasing electricity to cover these grid losses 
can be influenced by the system operators. 
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D - Governance of voltage levels and reactive power supplies 
There are two types of energy that may be referred to as active power and reactive power. 
Active power is the component of electric power that produces light and heat among others. 
Reactive power is the component that is needed to keep the electricity network at the right 
voltage levels. The grid code states that every system operator is responsible for managing the 
voltage levels and the reactive power in their own networks361. TenneT allows the distribution 
system operators to use small amounts of its reactive power. When the distribution system 
operators want to use additional reactive power of TenneT, outside of this free range, they may 
contract with TenneT for the supply of reactive power. Every year the transmission and 
distribution system operators must come to an agreement on the range within which the 
distribution system operators are allowed to use TenneT’s reactive power. TenneT contracts 
with electricity generators that are connected to the high-voltage network for the supply of 
reactive power (TenneT, 2002: 36). TenneT pays these generators of electricity, as is stated in 
the contracts, and the distribution system operators pay TenneT when they use reactive power 
outside of the free range. The distribution system operators also contract with generators for 
the supply of reactive power. These costs for the reactive power are included in the regulated 
transportation tariff, and are thus paid for by the final consumers of electricity.  
The grid code states that the electricity generators should be able to supply reactive power to 
the networks when the voltage levels are low362. When there are problems with the 
transportation of electricity, or when these are likely to occur, TenneT has access to all the 
available reactive power of the generators, even when TenneT has not contracted for this 
reactive power (TenneT, 2002: 36). The electricity generators are therefore not free in their 
decision to supply reactive power363. This regulatory decision has been made, because a 
national market for reactive power is not likely to emerge. Reactive power cannot be 
                                                 
361
 Article 5.5.4.1 of the grid code. 
362
  Article 2.5.4.6 of the grid code. 
363
 Besluitnummer: 100264/6. Betreft: Besluit van de directeur van de Dienst uitvoering en toezicht 
Energie op de bezwaren ingebracht tegen zijn besluit van 21 december 2000, nr. 00-124 tot wijziging van 
de voorwaarden als bedoeld in artikel 31, eerste lid, onder a en onder c van de Elektriciteitswet 1998, 
page 2. www.dte.nl (last accessed August 24, 2008). 
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transported over large distances, and thus has to be used close to where it is put on the network. 
The price for reactive power is not regulated, and the electricity generators can thus freely 
determine the price at which they are willing to supply.  
For the large generators connected to the high-voltage network and the transmission system 
operator, the reactive power transactions have in the past been internalized in the SEP. 
Currently, these transactions are governed by a hybrid form in which the generators and system 
operators retain their autonomy, but are dependent upon each other for the supply of reactive 
power and the transportation of electricity. These contracting parties are engaged in a long-
term agreement; as long as the generators are connected to the networks, they have the 
obligation to be able to supply reactive power. The generators are limited in terms of the 
contracting parties to which they can supply reactive power. This contracting party is the 
system operator of the network to which the generators are connected. The generators can thus 
not, as in a market form, engage in short-term contracts whereby they continuously switch to 
another contracting party.   
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E - Recap to research questions 
1.a. What is the effect of regulation on the governance structures 
that existed before the liberalization of the electricity industry? 
§4.3.1, §4.3.2 
1.b. Between which segments of the electricity value chain and 
for what types of transactions does the need for new forms of 
governance arise as a result of the regulations? 
§4.3.2 
1.c. What contracting problems – that are in need of new forms 
of governance - emerge as a result of the regulations on 
unbundling and consumer choice?  
§4.3.2, §4.3.3 
2.a. What are the attributes of the relevant transactions in the 
electricity industry? 
§3.2.1, §4.3.2, §4.4, 
§6.4.1, §6.5.1, §6.6.1, 
§6.7.4, §6.8.1, §7.4.1, 
§7.5.1, §7.6.1, §7.7.1. 
2.b. What is the effect of regulation on the attributes of these 
electricity transactions? 
§4.4, §6.4.5, §6.5.5, 
§6.6.5, §6.7.8, §6.8.5, 
§7.4.5, §7.5.5, §7.6.5, 
§7.7.5. 
2.c. How do these attributes limit and/or enable the emergence of 
particular governance structures? 
§2.3, §6.4.2, §6.5.2, 
§6.6.2, §6.7.5, §6.8.4, 
§7.4.2, §7.5.1, §7.6.2, 
§7.7.2. 
3.a. How does transaction cost economics explain the efficiency 
of various forms of governance? 
§2.3 
3.b. For which transactions do the regulatory effects on 
governance and transactions create a misalignment between 
governance structures and transactions?  
§6.4.2, §6.5.2, §6.6.2, 
§6.7.5, §6.8.2, §7.4.2, 
§7.5.2, §7.6.2, §7.7.2. 
4.a. What new forms of governance are adopted in the 
liberalized electricity industries for each of the four types of 
electricity transactions? 
§6.4.3, §6.5.3, §6.6.3, 
§6.7.6, §6.8.3, §7.4.3, 
§7.5.3, §7.6.3, §7.7.3. 
4.b. How do the attributes of adaptation explain the 
transformations from one governance structure to another, and 
thus the emergence of the new governance structures? 
§6.4.4, §6.5.4, §6.6.4, 
§6.7.7, §6.8.4, §7.4.4, 
§7.5.4, §7.6.4, §7.7.4. 
5.a. How does regulation influence the process of adaptation? §6.4.5, §6.5.5, §6.6.5, 
§6.7.8, §6.8.5, §7.4.5, 
§7.5.5, §7.6.5, §7.7.5. 
5.b. When does regulation become part of the new governance 
structures? 
§6.4.5, §6.5.5, §6.6.5, 
§6.7.8, §6.8.5, §7.4.5, 
§7.5.5, §7.6.5, §7.7.5. 
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Dutch Summary 
 
De Europese overheden en energiebedrijven zijn meer dan tien jaar geleden begonnen met 
het liberaliseren van de elektriciteitsindustrieën. Twee richtlijnen van het Europese 
Parlement en de Europese Raad, uit 1996 en 2003, voor een interne elektriciteitsmarkt 
stellen de regels voor deze liberalisering. Deze regels schrijven de verticale splitsing van 
de geïntegreerde energiebedrijven voor en de mogelijkheid voor consumenten om zelf hun 
energiebedrijf te kiezen. De overheden in de Europese lidstaten implementeren deze 
richtlijnen in hun nationale wet- en regelgeving. Deze Europese en nationale regels hebben 
een grote invloed op de governance structuren in de elektriciteitsindustrieën: de verticaal 
geïntegreerde bedrijven met een regionaal of nationaal monopolie moeten veranderen in 
nieuwe vormen van governance. In de geliberaliseerde industrieën zijn de beheerders van 
het distributie- en het transmissienetwerk onafhankelijk van de productie en retail van 
elektriciteit en moeten de gevestigde bedrijven concurreren met nieuwe toetreders.  
Dit proefschrift karakteriseert deze nieuwe vormen van governance en de transformaties 
naar de nieuwe vormen van governance voor vier typen transacties: aansluiting op het 
netwerk, toegang tot het netwerk, het balanceren van vraag en aanbod van elektriciteit, en 
het switchen door consumenten. In een meervoudige case studie zijn deze transformaties 
geanalyseerd voor de Nederlandse en Franse elektriciteitsindustrieën. De nieuwe vormen 
van governance die voor elk van deze transacties zijn ontstaan in de Nederlandse en Franse 
industrie zijn hybride vormen van governance, die sterk gereguleerd worden en waarin de 
netbeheerders een coördinerende rol hebben.   
Het theoretische perspectief van waaruit deze governance structuren zijn bestudeerd is 
transactiekosteneconomie. Op basis van de eigenschappen van de transacties analyseert 
transactiekosteneconomie de efficiëntie van de governance structuren. Deze theorie 
voorspelt de efficiëntie van verticale integratie voor de transacties in de 
elektriciteitsindustrie. Binnen dit theoretische kader worden de nieuwe hybride vormen 
van governance dan ook gezien als de op een na beste governance oplossingen. 
Transactiekosteneconomie is een comparatief statische benadering die niet in staat is om 
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veranderingen in governance structuren te analyseren. Wanneer regulering leidt tot een 
inefficiënte match tussen de transacties en de governance structuren, kan 
transactiekosteneconomie niet aantonen welke nieuwe vormen van governance (de op een 
na beste oplossingen) er verschijnen en hoe de governance transformaties plaatsvinden.  
In dit proefschrift ligt daarom de nadruk op een theoretische uitbreiding van 
transactiekosteneconomie waarin de adaptatie van governance centraal staat. The 
efficiëntie van governance transformaties wordt geanalyseerd met het concept adaptatie. 
Adaptatie is het proces van aanpassing door actoren in een industrie naar een nieuwe vorm 
van governance. De drie eigenschappen van adaptatie zijn gedefinieerd als de identiteit van 
de  toekomstige contractpartij, de lateraliteit van het aanpassingsproces, en het type van 
respons in het aanpassingsproces (naar de prijs van het product of de dienst, of naar de 
vereisten van het elektrische systeem). Actoren passen zich aan wanneer hun governance 
structuren niet meer efficiënt matchen met de transacties (door bijvoorbeeld regulering), en 
wanneer de adaptatiekosten lager zijn dan het verschil tussen de werkelijke en de optimale 
transactiekosten. Met de eigenschappen van adaptatie kunnen de transformaties naar de 
hybride vormen van governance in de Nederlandse en Franse elektriciteitsindustrieën 
verklaard worden.   
Dit proefschrift analyseert ook de invloed van regulering op de governance transformaties. 
Regulering bepaalt de regels van het spel, en beïnvloedt daarmee de eigenschappen van de 
transacties, van governance en van adaptatie. Regulering is ook onderdeel van de nieuwe 
vormen van governance, doordat de regulator de uitvoering van de contracten afdwingt en 
geschillen tussen de contractpartijen beslecht.   
De Europese markt voor elektriciteit, die door de richtlijnen als doel werd gesteld, is nog 
steeds niet ontstaan. Verklaringen hiervoor zijn de grote mate van specificiteit en 
onzekerheid van de elektriciteitstransacties en de adaptatie naar de hybride vormen van 
governance.
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l)REGULATION, GOVERNANCE AND ADAPTATION
GOVERNANCE TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE DUTCH AND FRENCH LIBERALIZING
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRIES
What new forms of governance emerge in the liberalizing electricity industries? What
is the influence of regulation on the governance transformations? In 1996 and 2003, the
European Council and Parliament issued two directives on the creation of one European
competitive electricity market. These directives prescribe the unbundling of the electricity
networks from the integrated energy firms, and the option for consumers to choose their
own electricity retailer. The European governments have implemented these directives
into their national regulations. This thesis analyses which new governance structures
emerged in the Dutch and French electricity industries as a result of these regulations for
four types of electricity transactions: the network connection, network access, balancing
and switching transactions. The parties in these electricity industries did not adopt a
market, but hybrid forms of governance that remained extensively regulated. The
efficiency of these new governance structures cannot be explained with the attributes of
the transactions, as is proposed by transaction cost economics. This thesis therefore
introduces the concept of adaptation into transaction cost economics. Adaptation is the
adjustment by economic actors from one governance structure to another, and is
characterized by three attributes: the identity of the future contracting party, the laterality
of the adaption, and the type of response in the adaptation process. These attributes
explain the governance transformations and the new governance structures in the two
industries. Regulation continues to play a pervasive role in the liberalized electricity
industries. It influences the attributes of the transactions, the new governance structures
and the adaptation process. 
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